

SADC REGIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998



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United Nations Development Programme



Southern African Development Community



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Foreword

Southern Africa's three and a half centuries of struggle for freedom and peace reached a major milestone when South Africa achieved majority rule in 1994. This also marked the end of Africa's decolonization, and coincided with continent-wide political reform that saw democracy entrenched in many countries.

For people, many of whom have for years been victims of political violence, poverty, and exploitation resulting from oppressive and discriminatory systems of governance, yearning for peace and development. In the past five years, Southern Africa has witnessed a number of developments that augur well for the future.

Previous efforts in the region to promote human development have been disrupted by powerful minority regimes and rebel movements. Many schools, health posts, clinics, hospitals, community centres, roads and railways have been destroyed. Forty years later, vast agricultural land areas remain inaccessible to farmers due to landmines. Wars have undoubtedly been one of the major obstacles to human development in Southern Africa. The end of apartheid therefore raised much hope amongst the peoples of this region, enabling the conditions for them and their governments to work together to defend the objectives for which we all have been fighting: peace, freedom and development.

Southern Africa's backlog of human development is enormous. Millions live in conditions of extreme poverty that is evident in low quality housing, high levels of illiteracy, low levels of educational attainment, high incidences of infant, child and maternal mortality. The rural population has particularly poor physical and living environments. Growing rates of unemployment, especially among women and the youth, emphasize how much effort and many resources are needed to lift large numbers of our people out of the current social and economic malaise.

Through their individual and collective efforts, SADC governments are determined to achieve high levels of human development and good governance. The challenge is enormous, but we can meet it given the political will that exists and our abundant human and natural resources.

The record of achievement in human development since the 1960s is impressive, especially since much of the period saw continuous political destabilization. Democracy created a peaceful environment in which all citizens can work to improve their lot.

As the current Chairman of SADC, I am particularly pleased to note from this report that the peoples of Southern Africa, through the private sector, civic and non-governmental organizations and in partnership with government, have taken up the challenge of human development and good governance.

Of course, Southern Africa does not and has never existed in isolation. From time immemorial, we have been traders, first with other regions of the continent and later with Asia and Europe. Today we are part of the global world, facing the challenge of acquiring the skills and the capacity to take advantage of the opportunities that globalisation offers.

We need to invest more in education, health and housing and much less in wars. Equally, we need to fight the inequalities and deprivation of the past, without creating new ones. A new society is taking shape in Southern Africa; one characterized by high levels of tolerance, by accommodation rather than discrimination, and by transparency rather than corruption. This is the new Southern Africa desired by its people – peaceful and prosperous.

Our efforts to overcome centuries of underdevelopment and poverty will not go far without assistance from the international community. This report shows that millions of dollars are still spent servicing debts. As a region we have chosen to focus on the future rather than dwell on the past. But it is a fact that the debt burden remains a major hurdle to human development and political stability in this region. In many SADC countries foreign debt servicing takes more than 50% of government revenue. It comprises more than 15% of Gross Domestic Product. We appeal to the international community to revisit the subject of debt relief more seriously and compassionately.

I would like to congratulate all the peoples of Southern Africa for having fought for the right cause all these years. Justice and freedom have triumphed. But the war for peace and development is only just beginning. We all need to double our efforts.

This report, the first on governance and human development in SADC, presents a benchmark against which we will measure our progress or failure in these two important areas. It documents the region's history, its economic structure and its strengths and weaknesses. It recalls mistakes we have made and points to new strategies that can lead to high and sustainable levels of good governance and human development.

With the challenges clearly spelt out, it is a report for all to read, in particular policy makers.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read 'N Mandela', written in a cursive, flowing style.

President Nelson Mandela
Chairman of SADC

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The RHDR team expresses sincere appreciation to the members of the Steering Committee who invested considerable time and effort in compiling the reports in spite of their busy schedules and other commitments. The Steering Committee, chaired by Kaire Mbuende (Executive Secretary, SADC), was established to define the parameters and ensure transparency of the process of producing the report. Its membership consisted of the following eminent persons: Geraldine Fraser Moleketi (Minister for Welfare and Population Development, South Africa), Herbert Murerwa (Minister of Finance, Zimbabwe), Carlos Lopes (Resident Representative UNDP, Zimbabwe), Stephen Adei (Resident Representative UNDP, Namibia), Oscar Monteiro (Law Lecturer, Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique), Nkandu Luo (Minister of Health, Zambia). The Executive Director of SARIPS/SAPES Trust, Ibbo Mandaza, was an ex-officio member of the Steering Committee and team leader of the project. The team is especially grateful to Stephen Adei for his valuable advice during two brief visits to the SAPES Head Office. The central support and encouragement of the UNDP Resident Representative, Carlos Lopes and his staff in Harare, in particular. Patrice Chiwota, was indispensable throughout the course of this study, as was the contribution of Oddvar Jakobsen, UNDP Namibia and Hakan Bjorkman, Human Development Report Office, New York.

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The report was based on background papers presented and discussed at a workshop in Swaziland in March 1998. About 45 participants attended the workshop. These included experts, academics and practitioners from Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The report benefited greatly from contributions by the following: Jacky d'Almeida, Nathan DeAssis, Mwesiga Baregu, Chinyamata Chipeta, Jassodanand Chooramun, Hlangusemphi Dlamini, Joao Honwana, Ben Kaluwa, Kenny Kapinga, Wilmon Karihindi, Gladson Komani Kayira, Heeramun Lachund, Guy Lamb, Cornelius S. Lukhule, Herman Lupogo, Philomene Makolo, Nomaxhule Nomalungelo Maphalala, Faustino Mazango, Samuel M. Mhlongo, Patrick V. Motsa, Agnes Mpambawashe, Ollen Mwalubunju, Siteke Mwale, Tomoko Nishimoto, Cosmo Lizo Nkonyeni, Zacheas D.M. Nyathi, Jackie Potgieter, Mampondweni J. Shongwe, Mukutulu Sinyani, James Tjivikua and Mike M. Zwane.

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Ibbo Mandaza

Team Leader

Harare

December 1998

Preface

The *SADC Regional Human Development Report 1998* is a milestone in the gathering and compilation of critical information in the Southern African Development Community. This report provides vital information on the region's performance in trying to improve the quality of life for the people of the region.

The report shows that, although still being in difficult economic situations, most SADC countries have started reaping the fruits of economic reforms. However, the impact of these reforms has not yet reached the majority of the people. The regional integration strategy of SADC, therefore, needs to be implemented with vigour to ensure sustained improvement in the human development index of the region.

SADC countries have made remarkable progress in education, public health and social service provision and most countries are allocating over 20% of their budgets to education and over 15% to health. Substantial infrastructure has been put in place in rural areas where the target of having a health facility within five kilometres of any individual's residence has been achieved. It is, however, recognized that more still needs to be done to improve the provision of services.

SADC countries share common values of democracy, peace, and security. Most of the countries of the region have embraced political pluralism which augers well for entrenching democratic principles and values. The position adopted by the member countries towards those countries where there is conflict in the region shows a commitment to preserving peace and stability in SADC. Only through peace and stability can there be socio-economic and human development.

This report will help SADC member states to focus their policies and actions on improving the human development index.

The SADC Secretariat would like to thank the SARIPS of the SAPES Trust, particularly the team responsible for this report, for a job well done. This is yet more proof that such projects can be undertaken by professionals from the sub-region.

Kaire Mbuende

Executive Secretary
SADC

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Abbreviations

ACS	Active Civil Society
ADB	African Development Bank
ADIR	African Development Indicator Report
AFORD	Alliance for Democracy
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
Arith	Arithmetic
Av	Average
BLS States	Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
BNF	Botswana National Front
BSACo	British South Africa Company
Cap	Capita
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
Chadema	Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendelo
CSOs	Central Statistical Offices <i>also</i> Civil Society Organizations
CTA	Corruption, Transparency and Accountability
CUF	Civic United Front
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DB	Data Bank
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EDEP	Equally Distributed Equivalent Percentage
FAP	Financial Assistance Policy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FHH	Female-headed Households
GDI	Gender-related Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GNP	Gross National Product
Ha	Hectare
HDI	Human Development Index
HDM	Human Deprivation Measure
HDR	Human Development Report
HIES	Household Income and Expenditure Survey
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HRC	Human Rights Commission
ICIDH	International Classification of Impairment, Disabilities and Handicaps
IDG	Index of Democratic Governance
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFS	International Financial Statistics
IJ	Independent Judiciary
IMF	International Monetary Fund

ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LED	Local Economic Development
MHH	Male-headed Households
MMD	Movement for Multi-party Democracy
MPLA	Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRC	Native Recruitment Corporation
ODA	Official Development Assistance <i>also</i> Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAPs	Poverty Alleviation Programmes
Pop	Population
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PR	Proportional Representation
R and D	Research and Development
RHDR	Regional Human Development Report
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAPES	Southern Africa Political Economy Series
SARIPS	Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies
SATUCC	Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council
SDRs	Special Drawing Rights
SSAC	Selected Statistics on African Countries
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
Tons	Tonnes
UCI	Universal Child Immunization
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WDR	World Development Report
WiLDAF	Women in Law and Development in Africa
WLSA	Women and Law in Southern Africa
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWT&S	World's Women: The Trends and Statistics, United Nations
Yrs	Years
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

Executive Summary

A. Overview

1. The Southern African region, which is largely constituted as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprising 14 member states – Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – has, since 1994, entered a period of unprecedented optimism. The present period provides great opportunities for human development and good governance performance in the region.
2. The end to apartheid rule and the attainment of majority rule in South Africa, the cessation of internal conflicts in Mozambique and temporarily in Angola, all taking place at the same time as several countries in SADC were re-adopting plural political systems, has raised prospects for lasting peace, stability and human security in the region.
3. Although still going through difficult economic situations, most countries in SADC are adopting macroeconomic and social policies which have long-term potential for improving human development performance across the region. However, the twin problems of HIV/AIDS and military conflicts constitute major stumbling blocks to progress in human development in both the individual countries and the region as a whole. For instance, the recent conflict in Lesotho has destroyed that country's impressive record of human development and good governance. By the estimates of this report, it will take Lesotho at least 10 years to get back to where it was in human development and governance terms.
4. The Lesotho conflict, together with the wars in Angola and DRC, clearly show that war is a major drawback to human development and good governance in SADC. Scarce resources are diverted from education, health and other social development programmes to military hardware. During war, democratic principles are trampled upon by both the army and the government under the pretext of national security. It usually becomes difficult to democratize a regime that has just emerged from war. It is evident, therefore, that the wars currently going on in this region are costly and a drawback to human and democratic developments in the region as a whole. SADC should, therefore, re-double its effort to restore peace in the region and develop a culture of conflict resolution through peaceful means. Concerted human development and good governance constitute part of the strategy for peaceful conflict resolution.
5. The Southern African region is culturally, economically and politically diverse. The countries of the region have had different historical experiences. A lot of effort and determination are required to forge a community with one purpose and goal. Better performance in human development and governance mirrors the diversity of the countries of SADC. Some countries, such as Mauritius, Botswana, Seychelles and Namibia are far ahead in their human development and democratic development record. Others, such as Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia lag far behind in human development and good governance performance.

6. However, SADC has a lot of potential. The region is well endowed with minerals, water resources, wildlife resources, agricultural land and human resources. Regional integration, which has become a necessity for further improvement in human development and good governance, should contribute to a better utilization of the resources and a more equitable distribution of benefits to individual countries and citizens.

B. Human Development

7. Human development, or the process of enlarging people's choices so that they can live longer and healthy lives, has long been recognized as a development priority by SADC governments. Since independence, most governments in SADC have devoted close to 20% of their budgets to education, close to 5% to health development and substantial other resources have been devoted to agricultural and water development in recognition that about 66% of the SADC population still live in rural areas. The achievements in human development in SADC have been impressive. The life expectancy for most countries has increased by over 15 years in three decades, adult literacy has risen for many countries from around 30% in the 1960s to 70% and above in the 1990s. Gross enrolment ratios for primary and secondary education have also shown a significant improvement.
8. In spite of the positive investment and continued efforts by governments to improve their human development performance, in 1995 only 64% of SADC countries had a Human Development Index (HDI) above 0,5. The countries concerned were Seychelles, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Angola. The rest are some of the poorest countries in the world.
9. Poverty and inequality, themselves partial products of bad development policies of the past, constitute major limitations to human development in SADC. On average, some 30% of the SADC population live in conditions of abject poverty. Some 30–40% of the labour force is either completely unemployed or ekes a living out of drought-prone subsistence agriculture. Income inequalities are enormous, with most Gini coefficients running above 50%.
10. Human development levels differ between countries and within countries on the basis of in-country regional, gender, age and racial differences. The most successful groups are those in urban areas, the historically favoured racial groups of whites and Asians and the politically influential middle class in government and the private sector.
11. Three major factors constitute threats to human development in SADC. These are the prevalence and growth of HIV/AIDS, the economic problems engulfing most SADC states and the war currently being fought in Angola and DRC involving a number of SADC member states. As elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS has become a leading killer disease in SADC. The countries of Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia have the highest prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS of adults aged 15 – 49 years in the sub-region. The impact of HIV/AIDS has begun to be felt through the decline in the life expectancy of a number of countries. In SADC, some of the countries have lost up to 10 years in life expectancy. Zambia, for instance, is shown in this report to have experienced a drop in life expectancy from 54 years in 1990 to 43 years in 1995. This has had a major negative impact on the country's human development index. Clearly, much effort is required to confront and reverse the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Joint efforts by governments in the region will go a long way towards solving this problem.
12. In 1998, almost all SADC governments, with the exception of Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles, were undergoing either International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) or other

self-imposed economic measures. The economic problems of most SADC countries, evident in low growth rates, high though falling levels of inflation, budget deficit, trade imbalances and high percentages of government revenue devoted to external debt servicing, have a major negative impact on governments' capacities to invest in human development. In a number of these countries, such as Zambia and Malawi, substantially reduced government revenues and their diversion to debt servicing have contributed to a decay in the physical and social infrastructure. Hospitals and schools are experiencing major shortages in supplies.

13. In the past five years, SADC governments have endeavoured to improve the management of their economies. Budget deficits have been controlled and macroeconomic policy management has improved. Among others, inflation has come down and economic growth rates have shown positive trends across the region with the exception of a few war-torn countries. As governments concentrate on better economic management and open up their economies for private investment, it is pressing that the international community support these efforts. In particular, the debt burden needs to be removed and bilateral aid increased.
14. Military expenditure is a major threat to human development in SADC. In 1998, at least 50% of the SADC countries were directly involved in war/conflict situations. Inevitably, scarce resources were diverted to the military effort. Four countries, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe were involved in the internal war in the DRC. Three other countries – Botswana, South Africa and Lesotho – were involved in the post-election conflict in Lesotho. All seven countries can be expected to set up their military budgets to meet the cost of these conflicts. Unfortunately, most of these countries are already going through difficult economic problems even without the war.

C. Good Governance

15. The peoples of Southern Africa have lived under oppressive and discriminatory regimes for over three centuries. Undemocratic colonial regimes discriminated against the citizens of the region on the basis of race. In general, the black people were not allowed to participate in electing the governments of their countries. Instead, they were separated into so-called 'Native Reserves' based on ethnic identity. Across the region, this system of separate development and political inequality and discrimination was rejected by the majority of the population. As a result, by 1970, nine of the present SADC member states had attained independence from their colonial governments.
16. Between 1975 and 1980 the second group of countries comprising Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe also attained independence leaving only Namibia and South Africa under minority colonial-type systems of governance. Thus, the period between 1990 and 1994, which saw Namibia achieve her independence and South Africa majority rule, represented for the peoples of Southern Africa a victory of unprecedented proportions. Many wars have been fought and many lives lost in the fight for democracy and justice in Southern Africa. Thus, good governance, which is the sub-theme of this first regional report, is deeply rooted in the aspirations of the people of this region. Through their organizations, and as individual citizens, the people of SADC desire democratic and participatory governance. Above all, they desire peace.
17. With the few exceptions of Botswana, Mauritius and Zimbabwe, and, for different reasons, Swaziland, most SADC states returned to the colonial-type system of governance just a few years after independence when they overwhelmingly adopted a one-party system of governance. Several of them, Angola, DRC (then Zaire), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia claimed that the multi-party

system was divisive and led to political instability. In practice, however, instability, oppression and discrimination were more prevalent under the one-party state system. Citizens were discriminated against, this time not on the basis of race but ethnic origins. It is the rejection of the one-party state system and the re-adoption of a multi-party form of government which has once again demonstrated the people's desire for good governance which is based on their participation.

18. This report shows that, since around 1994, over 86% of SADC countries have re-adopted and are governed through a multi-party system based on a popularly elected government. The first wave of popular elections started in Zambia in 1991, followed by Lesotho in 1993 and ended with Tanzania in 1995. Although both Zambia and Lesotho started their second multi-party elections on a bad note characterized by boycotts and controversy in 1997 and 1998 respectively, there is still a lot of hope that elections will become an entrenched method of selecting the leadership in this region. The value of elections, however, does not lie in the number of political parties registered in a country and their token participation in occasional elections but in people's participation and representation of different interests in political institutions and in the decision-making processes of the country.
19. This report shows that elections, as such, are far from constituting good governance. Not only do elections in this region require increased electorate participation, but also governments need to go further to emphasize popular participation and inclusive strategies that will ensure that the legitimacy of elections is enhanced. Elections whose results lead to 100% return of one party to parliament, as was the case in Lesotho in 1993 or which consistently produce overwhelming majority by the ruling party, often result in bitterness and suspicion among the losers. The findings of this report show that in SADC, with the exception of Malawi and Mozambique, the last multi-party elections led to ruling parties which control over 60% of seats in parliament. The range is 59% in Angola and 98% in Zimbabwe. On average, ruling parties control about 80% of the seats in parliament across the region. As a key institution of governance and control of dictatorial tendencies, parliament in SADC is generally weak. The backbenchers, who are predominantly members of the ruling party, are unable to fill the gap left by the absence of a strong opposition.
20. Elections and innovative constitutions are important steps towards good governance but they do not constitute good governance by themselves. Recent developments in Namibia and Zambia have shown that constitutions can be changed and good reasons can easily be found to justify these changes. As this report argues, it is desirable that SADC countries build solid democratic systems of governance anchored in a constitutional framework, institutional structures and the processes of decision making and monitoring. It is for this reason that this report has proposed the index of democratic governance (IDG) which measures the institutional setting, participation and transparency of the system of governance at the political, institutional and economic levels. This index seeks to encourage governments and their citizens to look beyond elections for good governance.
21. Using the index of democratic governance (IDG) this report finds that SADC governments are still far behind in the progress towards participatory democracy and accountability in what governments do. In the first place, a large section of the population is still not fully participant to democratic process. Women constitute only 5–25% of the members of parliament across SADC. Although most governments have established machinery for facilitating women's participation in development and senior management, the situation on the ground shows that women still remain peripheral to both development and political decision making. Young and poor people too are yet to be fully integrated into the social and political development processes of their countries.

22. SADC countries need to seriously enhance participatory governance by establishing broad-based official institutions which backup constitutional safeguards. However, all these would be inadequate until people's organizations – local government and civil society organizations – are empowered and given their rightful position in the system of governance. Some SADC governments still snub civil society organizations. This, in spite of the tremendous contribution of the latter in the fight for the return of democratic rule and to human development efforts.

D. Conclusion

23. SADC needs to act quickly to identify methods of resolving intra-regional conflict through peaceful means. Some of the conflicts in the region are the result of intolerance and exclusionist political systems. On the other hand, dictators must also be punished firmly and collectively.
24. The region's focus on human development and good governance must be strengthened and the regional organization reinforced in order to achieve the goals of the people.
25. Given its resource base – human and natural – with good policies and programmes SADC is better placed than many regions of Africa to achieve higher levels of human development and good governance. Governments, both individually and collectively, need to do much more in the two areas addressed in this report.





Overview: Governance and Human Development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

I. Introduction

The Southern African region is faced with two major interrelated challenges, namely, establishing good governance with enduring systems of democracy, and sustainable human development. The symbiotic relationship between good governance and human development is amply demonstrated in the main text of this report. The evidence points to the conclusion that the two are indivisible – that human development cannot be sustained without good governance and that good governance cannot be sound unless it sustains human development. The picture of progress in attaining sustainable human development and good governance has been a mixed one to date. In 1990, for instance, only four (28,6%) SADC member states had a human development index (HDI) above 0,50. The record had significantly improved in 1995 when 50% of the SADC member states had a HDI above 0,50. In the area of governance, too, by the beginning of 1990, only two (18%) of the then 11 SADC member states (Botswana and Zimbabwe) practised a multi-party system of government. Four years later in 1994, 12 (86%) of the present 14 SADC member states had adopted a multi-party system and held competitive elections.

Clearly this is a picture which shows commendable progress in both human development and governance. But, in some areas there has been stagnation and in others, reversal. A number of SADC countries are experiencing very low rates of economic growth averaging 1,5% per annum in the period between 1980 and 1994. In 1995, SADC countries together owed US\$55,3 billion as external debt. The debt burden represented 138% of the SADC GNP. In 1995, SADC spent 3,4% of its GDP on the military. In fact, military expenditure was 41% of the combined education and health expenditure in 1990/91. Inequality based on income, gender, race and class are profound. Some SADC countries have some of the highest income inequalities in the world. Namibia's Gini coefficient is estimated at 0,70, Zimbabwe at 0,63, South Africa at 0,58 and Botswana at 0,55. The percentage of adult women who are economically active was only 49% in 1990 compared to 72% for men. Women in SADC control less than 39% of earned income and female representation in parliament was only 12,5% in 1995. Political pluralism is still in its infancy and parliaments are controlled overwhelmingly by ruling party majorities. The opposition, the media, civil society organizations and the private sector still operate in a less than conducive environment in the SADC region.

The region displays significant diversities and similarities in the experiences of individual countries in the economic, political and social spheres. Some countries, such as Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles have had stable democracies for over three decades and enjoy high levels of economic growth; both their human development and good governance records put them in the middle income group of countries across the world. Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and, to a limited extent, Zimbabwe, are also catching up. However, others like Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, which were relatively ahead in economic progress in the 1970s, have fallen back and are going through major economic difficulties. Inevitably, there is unevenness in progress in these spheres in different countries. On the whole, the similarities centre on relatively low levels of human development performance compared to developing countries in South East Asia and Latin America. The socio-historical context presented in this report provides a picture of a heritage of

historical integration during the past 150 years. It is a heritage of colonialism, apartheid, migration and uneven development between centres of dynamic growth and wealth on the one side, and peripheral areas which supplied labour to those centres and remained stunted in growth on the other. Presently, South Africa exports over 60% of its goods and services to the rest of SADC but imports from the latter less than 30% of its imports. This burdensome heritage impinges directly on the quality and character of human development and governance in the individual countries and the region as a collective.

Given the foregoing scenario of mixed progress, there is need to chart a path forward that addresses areas of weakness and shortfalls in human development and governance as the region gets poised to enter the new millennium.

(i) A Region in Transition

Southern Africa is just emerging from a long period of apartheid, colonial oppression and a series of conflicts in the post-independence period. This history has been disruptive to indigenous politics, economies and cultures. The disruptiveness has been much more profound than anywhere else in Sub-Saharan Africa. The white-settler colonial factor contributed to far-reaching consequences such as large-scale land alienation in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Alienation on that scale has left a legacy of discontent and yet to be resolved land claims in these post-colonial societies. (See Table 1.1)

Table 1.1
Land Inequality

Country	Land per Capita among Whites Compared to Land per Capita among Blacks
Namibia	300 times
South Africa	480 times
Zimbabwe	146 times

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Trust Databank

This partly explains the historical and contemporary underdevelopment, especially in the rural areas of this region. Currently, over 55% of the SADC population lives in rural dormitory-like villages without good facilities and services. A related historical legacy has been labour migration to the richer countries in the region; this partly explains underdevelopment in the labour-supplier states. The roots of poverty and low levels of human development can be located in these historical legacies in both former white-settler states (through land alienation) on the one hand and in labour-supplier states (through drawing on productive labour while stunting peasant production) on the other. The human poverty index (HPI) of SADC was 40% in 1995. Some 29% of the population were not expected to live beyond the age of 40 while adult illiteracy averaged 30%. The majority of this population was located in rural 'African reserves' where 57% of them had no access to health facilities and 55% had no sanitation facilities. Politically, the majority of the poor are marginalized and subject to manipulation and a continual denial of their basic rights and freedoms.

The way out of poverty and underdevelopment will, therefore, be neither a simple nor a short one. Other elements of the transition process include:

- racial oppression to reconciliation;
- past ethnic divisions and conflicts to nation-building;
- narrow nationalism to regionalism;
- regional underdevelopment to full partnership in the global system.

(ii) Governance in a Region in Transition

The historical legacies of dispossession, poverty and underdevelopment have impinged on the content and conduct of governance in the post-independence period; for example,

low levels of literacy and education have a bearing on the level and quality of participation in the political process, institution-building and in the development process itself. They also have a bearing on the formation and organizational capacity of civil society institutions.

The more recent transition from a single-party state system to a multi-party system in most countries is a major landmark. This transition will, however, only be sustainable if the levels of literacy and education improve to enhance the quality of participation of the majority of the population, and of women in particular, in the political and governance process.

This report provides an important analysis of the contemporary governance situation in SADC. Some 86% of the countries have made some headway in institution-building to consolidate democracy; they have established, amongst others, independent electoral commissions, human rights institutions and anti-corruption commissions (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Zambia). Others have not yet established one or more of these institutions and the autonomy of the judiciary also varies between countries. Another issue is the lack of participation of civil society and people's involvement so essential for a vibrant democracy.

The transition from authoritarian systems of governance, like the transition from poverty and underdevelopment, will be neither a simple nor a smooth process. It is occurring against the backdrop of economic reforms which lack popular support in most countries in the region (DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Sustainable human development requires economic reforms which include safety nets for the poor and vulnerable groups in society. It also requires adequate investment in key social sectors of education, health and housing. The legitimacy of economic reforms and the governance process will depend on whether basic social needs are met.

In the main text of this report, specific emphasis is given to:

- the gender dimension in governance, in particular, the low and uneven participation of women in decision-making institutions such as parliament, the judiciary and the executive;
- obstacles to achieving a higher level of participatory governance at local and central government levels.

These aspects are largely determined by the level of progress in human development in the region. Gender equality and broad popular participation are determined by economic and civil society development and political commitment.

II. Aspirations of the People and Societies

For over a hundred years or more, the people of the region participated in struggles of different varieties for self-determination and development. As the report shows, various political movements and civil society organizations played a key role in the struggles against colonialism and *apartheid*. There were high hopes kindled at independence amongst the peoples of this region. That Southern Africa was the last part of the continent to achieve freedom and majority rule further sharpened those hopes.


The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the attainment of majority rule after long struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. (See Figure 1.1) Prior to this, most other countries had achieved relatively peaceful decolonization in the 1960s, with the exception of Angola and Mozambique which won independence through armed struggles in the 1970s.

The aspirations of Southern Africans can be said to include:

- broad participation in processes of governance and development;
- meeting of basic material needs now that political independence has been attained;
- consolidation of political freedom and human rights;

Figure 1.1

SADC Countries by Year of Attainment of Independence and Majority Rule



- transparent electoral processes which are both free and fair at central and local government levels;
- participation in the design and implementation of local and national programmes to ensure that their concerns and interests are taken on board;
- representation in consultative forums to work out strategic visions for countries and to negotiate social accords or social contracts between the main players – government, business, labour and other civil society organizations – to underpin economic and social progress;
- good governance characterized by accountability and transparency in the upholding of the rule of law, the management of public finances, and pragmatic economic policies which ensure equitable growth and sustainable human development.

The peoples and societies in this region aspire to participatory political, economic and institutional systems and people-centred development. They seek to assert their rights to autonomy while mutually co-operating with governments in governance and development. In SADC, there is a critical mass of creative energy within the peoples and their civil society organizations which should be tapped into by local and national development initiatives. Harnessing this creative energy is an essential condition for success in poverty alleviation and eradication programmes, programmes directed towards achieving growth with equity and programmes which seek to redress past inequalities such as those based on race, gender and ethnicity.

As the main text of the report shows, historically, there has been a great deal of interaction amongst and between the peoples and societies in this region. This has been through processes of labour migration and trade, and through the support of liberation struggles and providing shelter to displaced refugees. The concept of regional integration is, therefore, a concept which the peoples would support if its rationale and benefits are fully explained to them. It is important to seek the views and experiences of citizens towards the concept with a view to ensuring their ownership of the regional integration progress.

In sum, the aspirations of the peoples and societies in SADC centre on:

- addressing historically-derived inequalities based on race, class, gender and ethnic advantage;
- overcoming poverty and attaining prosperity which would imply sustainable education, health, skills training and employment programmes;
- promoting and sustaining political freedoms and human rights thereby consolidating good governance.

III. Symbiosis between Good Governance and Human Development

Sustainable human development cannot be achieved in the absence of the structures and processes of good governance. Conditions of repression are inimical to sustainable human development as the history of this region clearly shows. The historical legacy of colonialism and *apartheid* has left small islands of prosperity in a large sea of poverty and underdevelopment. Bad governance contributed to poor human development prior to independence. However, as was argued above, good governance can only be consolidated in conditions where there is satisfactory human development. It is not possible to attain high levels of participation in the political and development process where illiteracy is high, education is lacking, unemployment is high, and where gender and race inequalities are glaring. Furthermore, governance and political reforms can only be consolidated if economic reforms bear fruit and promote human development which is both equitable and sustainable.

The present conjuncture is different from that between the 1940s and 1980s when the Cold War was a major factor conditioning international relations. It was possible then to attain rapid economic development under authoritarian systems of undemocratic governance (such as Taiwan and South Korea) in East Asia where, with support from western powers and financial institutions, development thrived under dictatorships for some years till the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, the global situation has changed significantly. Good governance is now a necessary accompaniment of economic development in its various facets. The experiences in Indonesia in early 1998 showed citizens' frustration and impatience with a dictatorship which had given more priority to economic development than to building democracy. Good governance has become a conditionality for lending and aid. The authoritarian paradigm of development first, democracy later collapsed with the crumbling of Cold War ideological conditions.


Experiences in other more developed countries have shown that an educated population is an asset and serves as a safeguard for good governance. A literate population possesses the capacity to make informed choices relating to governance and human development and also has the capacity to participate actively rather than be apathetic. The growth of the middle classes in a society is vital for the consolidation of good governance. Such growth is often associated with the strengthening of civil society organizations which continually pressure governments to be responsive and accountable. Economic growth, education, gender inequality and employment are, therefore, important pillars for human development, democracy and governance. They may not be sufficient conditions for the latter but they are certainly indispensable.

IV. Progress in Spite of Adversities

Current problems of governance and development tend to overshadow the progress which has been made by countries in the region. In spite of a painful history of racial oppression and colonial domination, most countries quickly succeeded in creating conditions of peace and stability. Racial and ethnic tolerance has been a major goal of governments and, by and large, it has been achieved. With the exceptions of those countries where civil conflicts broke out (for example, Angola and Mozambique, and more recently the DRC), conditions of human security have been achieved to a reasonable degree.

Progress in social development has been impressive despite having started from a very low base at independence. Significant resources were invested in primary, secondary and university education in all the countries in the region. (See *Figure 1.2*) Universal primary education was a goal of most governments. After 30 years, SADC life expectancy has increased by more than 10 years, adult literacy has increased from less than 30% for most countries in the 1960s to over 70% in the 1990s. Infant mortality has dropped from over 131 per 1 000 live births at independence to 105 per 1 000 live births in 1995. While in-country disparities in these areas are large, as Chapter 3 vividly demonstrates, at national level progress is impressive. Although, on the whole, women still lag far behind men in

Figure 1.2

Change in Gross Primary and Secondary School Enrolment Ratio for the SADC Region

Source : SARIPS/SAPES Trust Databank

education, health, earned income and participation in politics, large numbers of girls have entered the mainstream educational system since independence in the early 1960s. This has resulted in the creation of a small but impressive pool of skilled women across the professional spectrum in all the countries of the region.

Technical and vocational institutions were also established. This investment was vital. However, it eventually became unsustainable due to an unsatisfactory mix between the content of education and the specific skill requirements of industry. The link between education and the various sectors of the economy remains a major challenge facing governments in this region. The growing phenomenon of unemployed educated graduates is an indicator of progress in the provision of education but also a weakness in linking it to the requirements of the labour markets and the economy.

In the health sector, it would be easy to overlook the progress made in the provision of clinics, hospitals and primary health-care programmes by governments since independence. Evidence of the success in investing in the training of health personnel is the expanded regional labour market of trained doctors and nurses even though the latter tend to migrate to countries offering the most remunerative conditions. Unfortunately, low economic growth in many of these countries has impacted negatively on the health sector and women's health has been most affected. The notable difference between colonial and early post-colonial health infrastructure and services should not be belittled. Slogans such as 'Health for All by the year 2000' may not be fulfilled but they capture the aspirations of most governments and their peoples.

Rural development was another major focus of post-independence governments in spite of their limited resources. Road construction connected remote villages with the major towns. Agricultural extension services introduced new techniques in crop cultivation, and crop marketing depots facilitated the sale of agricultural produce from villages. New inputs were introduced which contributed to higher yields. Veterinary facilities were established to contribute to improved livestock production. Regionally, institutions (such as ICRISAT to develop drought-resistant crops and to monitor food security) were established under the auspices of SADC. There were important achievements despite problems of sustainability.

V. Challenges Ahead

This report consistently argues that the unique history of the Southern African region has bequeathed it with a multiple set of challenges. These relate to overcoming the legacies of racism, gender inequality, *apartheid* and colonialism, poverty and underdevelopment.

The enormous inequalities and disparities in wealth, incomes and life opportunities have remained more or less intact.

Inequalities are especially acute in relation to access to resources such as land and credit as well as other productive assets and access to education, health, housing and employment. In their quest for sustainable human development, governments and societies must address these legacies. Good governance will be difficult to attain, let alone consolidate, if the manifestations of these legacies are not confronted. Countries that waged liberation struggles to win independence now face a unique set of challenges. These centre on addressing the legacies of the violence and political culture nurtured during those struggles. Where civil conflicts broke out (as in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) not long after independence, the healing process will take a long time. Governments should squarely face the social and economic consequences of that conflict, and put into place reconciliation and reconstruction programmes for those communities which endured the suffering. The commandist or authoritarian culture which pervaded the politics of armed struggles should give way to a more participatory, inclusive and gender-sensitive political culture in the post-colonial era.

Another challenge is to address the demands for good governance and human development simultaneously. To pursue democratization and economic development simultaneously requires a careful balancing act. This is where the building of national consensus through consultative processes becomes crucial. But such consensus-building requires broad participation by all sectors of society. Nowhere is this perhaps more necessary than in the delicate balancing of political and economic reforms. In order to strengthen the legitimacy of economic reforms, broad consultations, if not negotiations, between governments and national associations of business, farmers, labour, consumers and other civil society groups become essential. As the report observes, current economic reforms in some countries in the region have been painful to implement. Opposition to them appears to have grown because they are often viewed, rightly or wrongly, as an external imposition by lending agencies. A different approach towards the designing of such reforms is needed – one which is based on consultation and consensus-building.

There will still remain an element of ‘trial and error’ as countries in the region devise structures and processes of governance and sustainable human development to meet their specific needs. As the report observes, the framework of multi-party democracy is an important pillar that now exists in most countries. The attainment of high economic growth remains elusive in most countries but it is central to attaining better levels of literacy, education, health, employment, better incomes and rural development.

A major transformation in the SADC region will be needed in overcoming the colonial and racial past, in addressing poverty and underdevelopment as well as creating the suitable conditions for good governance. This will be a process rather than a one-off event. The end-point in the process of transition should be a transformation of the region’s economic, social and political institutional settings. Such a transformation needs to be guided by a strategic vision formulated by states with support from their citizens. That vision should ensure an agenda for the empowerment of citizens as well as growth with equity and security.

VI. Towards an Agenda for SADC

This report provides a balance sheet of good governance and human development in the region. It assesses the areas of strengths and weaknesses, of progress and stagnation and it establishes symbiotic links between governance and human development. Based on the analysis of this report, a set of conclusions can be reached and a guiding agenda for SADC be proposed to chart the way forward for a region of 14 countries with a combined population of nearly 190 million people. This is a task of great magnitude. Yet it is absolutely imperative for the governments’ leadership, in consultation with their citizens, to begin to formulate a vision as we prepare to enter the 21st century. The agenda we set

out here is an attempt to contribute to that vision. The principal elements of this agenda are:

- political;
- institutional;
- economic;
- social;
- gender.

All these aspects underpin good governance and sustainable human development.

(i) The Political Dimension

The report observes that progress has been made in building democracy based on multi-party systems in most countries in the region with only a few exceptions. However, the new structures and processes of multi-party democracy are still fragile and require further consolidation. Specific attention and improvements will be imperative in:

- the conduct of elections to ensure transparency and general acceptability of the outcomes. Here independent electoral commissions have a crucial role to play;
- ensuring that fragile multi-party democracy does not degenerate into dominant-party or de facto one-party state systems. In this regard, other forms of electoral representation, such as proportional representation, should replace or complement existing first-past-the-post electoral systems;
- promoting broad political participation and choice by citizens so as to pre-empt voter apathy and alienation from the political process;
- ensuring the fullest participation of women at all levels of the political process, i.e., local, district, provincial and national, and in all the political structures of each country, through party lists and parliamentary representation;
- strengthening the system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judiciary. In particular, the weakness of the legislative vis-a-vis the executive requires urgent attention;
- constitutional reforms which embed checks and balances, strengthen the impartiality of the judiciary, enshrine the protection of human rights, and define the length of term of office of presidencies should be encouraged and achieved;
- minimum regional standards pertaining to electoral systems and conduct, human and constitutional rights and political freedoms. SADC would encourage states to aspire to meet those standards.

(ii) The Institutional Dimension

Some varying progress has been made in strengthening their institutional capacity in the region. Several new institutions have been established and existing ones re-structured to increase their capacity and effectiveness in carrying out their mandate. However, in general, the capacity to design and implement policy as well as efficiency in the delivery of basic public sector services remains weak. Privatization is only one of the actions required to deal with this problem and much more thinking needs to be done to improve the institutional capacity of individual governments and the regional organization.

In addition, the institutional dimension relates to accountability and transparency in the use of public finances, and safeguards against corruption. It is, therefore, important to address the following:

- state and institutional reform to achieve accountability and transparency. Without an effective and strong state, sustainable human development is likely to be elusive. The strengthening of the state's capacity for delivery provides strategic advantages in tackling the challenge of development;
- ensuring that there are bodies which address issues of transparency and corruption in state institutions and in the private sector. Those states which have not established anti-corruption commissions or bureaux should be encouraged to do so. While the

existence of such commissions does not automatically ensure the control of corruption, they are a crucial initial step;

- strengthening the legitimacy of policies and the policy-making process by encouraging and institutionalizing the participation of actors outside the state. Actors such as business and labour organizations, farmers and professional associations and other civil society organizations should be consulted in the process of economic and social policy-making. Attempts such as those along the lines of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) in South Africa would be worth considering.

(iii) The Economic Dimension

As the report explains in some detail, SADC's economic growth has been slow, averaging less than 2% in most countries. The problems besetting the economies range from huge deficits and debt burden to high interest rates, high inflation and high unemployment. The globalization process is undermining Southern Africa's comparative advantages and the domestic markets of most states in the region are too small to face the global challenge. Clearly, there are a number of imperative steps that may be taken:

- economic reforms should be undertaken to address the aforementioned problems besetting most countries in the region. It will be important to design and implement those reforms in such a manner that they enjoy broad legitimacy through consensus. The mutually reinforcing role of a strong and effective (or developmentalist) state and a vibrant private sector and labour movement will be a key one;
- economic reform programmes will need to address the needs of a fast-expanding informal sector in a context of low formal-sector growth in employment. The reforms will also need to ensure greater export competitiveness.

The small size of most economies and markets in the region compels the countries to pursue the path of regional integration much more seriously and systematically than in the past. SADC must build on its experiences in sectoral development to creating more favourable conditions for the flows of investment, goods and services. Programmes which seek to homogenize investment and trade regimes should, therefore, be worked out. The impetus behind integration should come not only from governments but from other actors. The Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC), the SADC Business Council and related organizations should contribute actively to strategies for regional integration.

(iv) The Social Dimension

As the report shows, some of the consequences of institutional and economic reforms have been painful to certain sectors of the population. In most countries, budgets for key social services such as education, health, housing and water provisioning have been substantially reduced. The quality of these services have suffered accordingly. Women, children, the aged and the disabled have been worst affected. The HIV/AIDS pandemic continues to pose serious challenges in terms of the loss of human and material resources in all countries of the SADC region.

Programmes and institutions which provide social safety nets need strengthening. Most countries already have social development funds or poverty alleviation programmes (PAPs) to address the needs of the poorest segments in society, and those who have lost jobs and livelihoods due to retrenchments. An assessment of comparative experiences of administering these programmes would be useful at this stage in evaluating their effectiveness.

These and other experiences in addressing the social dimensions show that some headway has been made. Several countries have established special women's units or departments in ministries; others have created task forces or focal points which are concerned with gender issues. Women's organizations and groups operate in relative freedom in all

the respective countries. Although much remains to be done in terms of achieving gender equality, the recent establishment of a SADC gender unit is a step in the right direction. The women's budget initiative to ensure women's concerns in national budgets are included is another. Efforts should be stepped up to establish a SADC council of NGOs that will encourage a stronger partnership between governments and NGOs in the social sector. Local initiatives by civil society groups in building schools, roads, clinics and protecting the environment should be supported.

SADC needs to develop a tertiary education strategy to facilitate regional centres of research and training. It should build on its experiences and successes in crop research, mining and energy research and veterinary research. Countries in the region should invest efforts in technological capacity development. Research and Development (R and D) in key sectors of the economies should be a major priority for states in the region.

Given the historical legacy of wide disparities in access to resources, a bottom-up strategy focusing on the following is necessary:

- long-term investment in public education systems;
- strong support for adequate public health care systems;
- support to high-growth and labour-intensive industries;
- ensuring spread of technologies to the poor and marginalized;
- support for small- and medium-scale industries sourcing on poor communities.


The above are some of the critical aspects of the transformation towards sustainable economies, eradication of poverty and underdevelopment. The region has the capacity for good governance and a better record in human development if only the transformation can be undertaken by the people and the states themselves within the region.

(v) The Gender Dimension

Many women in the SADC region are rural based and remain peripheral to human development and governance. Continued exclusion of women from the centre of development and decision making is not only unjustifiable but it is a major wastage of human resources. It is encouraging that both individual governments and the regional organization have taken up the challenge of gender equality. Much progress has been made in establishing machinery and structures to facilitate the integration of women and men as equals in society. However, as the report shows, much remains to be done and in some areas more radical strategies are required.

Figure 1.3

The Percentage of Women Who Reside in Rural Areas, SADC Countries



Source : UN 1991, Women's World, The Trends and Statistics, 1970 - 1990

VII. Conclusion

In the past four decades, most SADC countries have made significant progress in human development. This progress is now stalled and eroded by both HIV/AIDS and the current economic problems which have substantially reduced governments' capacities to spend more resources on human development programmes. The need for more resources from diverse sources – private, non-governmental organizations and the international community – is urgent. Governments should also rigorously search for strategies for using scarce resources more efficiently.

Since 1990, SADC governments have moved a long way towards establishing political pluralism in the region. New processes and institutions of governance have been established. Civil society organizations operate in a better environment than before. However, a lot remains to be done in the whole area of governance, as shown in Chapter 4. The region must develop standards and evolve a value system that will consolidate the recent democratic achievements. This is the rationale for introducing the Index of Democratic Governance (IDG), which will serve as a measure of progress in consolidation of democracy and good governance in SADC.

Finally, there are several important issues that provide the context of human development and governance in the SADC which are not discussed in this report: regional integration, HIV/AIDS, globalization, the environment, military and security concerns are mentioned only briefly and treated in boxes. These are important issues which future reports of this nature will need to address.

The Balance Sheet of the SADC region

The balance sheet of the SADC region is given below and the profiles of the 14 countries at the end of Chapter 3. It is a synthesis which highlights the major successes and deprivations of the SADC region in the areas of Health, Food and Nutrition, Education, Children, Women, Income and Poverty, Demography, Human Security, Environment and Governance.

Box 1.1

Balance Sheet of Human Development and Governance in SADC

Progress

Deprivation

HEALTH

- Average life expectancy increased by 10 years from 42 to 52 years between 1960 and 1995.
- In the SADC region, more than 60% of the population had access to health services and nearly 50% of the population has access to sanitation in 1995.

- The 1997 estimates show that about 12% of the SADC population aged 15 to 49 years was HIV positive.
- About 10 million people die every year from infectious and parasitic diseases, such as diarrhoea, malaria and tuberculosis.
- Maternal mortality in SADC averages 888 per 100 000 births.

FOOD AND NUTRITION

- Between 1970 and 1995, almost all SADC countries met and maintained their daily per capita calorie requirements.

- Between 1980 and 1996 food production per capita decreased by 15%.
- 36% of children under age five are stunting.

EDUCATION

The adult literacy rate increased in the past three decades, from less than 45% to well over 70%.

- The gross enrolment ratio for all levels remains stable at 30% during the past 15 years due to the decrease of this component for at least five SADC countries.

CHILDREN

- During the past 30 years, infant and under-five mortality rates decreased dramatically

- 30% of children aged 10–14 are still in the labour force.

WOMEN

- The number of female tertiary students doubled during the past two decades.
- Women's participation in the service sector has expanded.

- More than two-thirds of illiterates are women.
- Women do not have an equal share of land, employment, credit and political power in comparison to men.
- There are still widespread incidences of violence against women.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- There has been general improvement in the average income of the working people over the past three decades.

- A reduction by one-half in SADC poverty by 2015 is estimated to require a significant acceleration in growth rate for the five countries who represent two-thirds of the SADC population, for which the average per capita income in 1995 was less than US\$500. In order to reduce relative poverty by half by 2015, per capita income for those countries will have to double over the next 20 years. This translates into a need to increase annual per capita rate of growth per capita from the -3,5% experienced over the past 15 years to at least 3,5% over the next two decades. For the other countries, the improvement needed is less dramatic, but still substantial (an increased per capita growth rate from -0,5% to 3,5%)

DEMOGRAPHY

- The fertility rate has declined slightly from 5,1 live births per women to 4,88 in five years (between 1990 and 1995).

- The population of SADC increases by four million every year.
- Over 35% of SADC citizens live in urban areas.

Balance Sheet of Human Development and Governance in SADC

Progress

Deprivation

HUMAN SECURITY

- There are more and more integration policies in terms of solving the SADC countries internal conflicts at the level of the region.
- There are improvements in the balance between military and social spending, and defence expenditure was halved in the last 10 years.

- Internal conflicts affect some SADC countries and the number of refugees or internally displaced population is increasing in some parts of the region.

ENVIRONMENT

- The percentage of rural families with access to safe water has increased from less than 10% to almost 60% during the past two decades.

- The rate of deforestation was about 0,7% during the period 1990-95. At present rates of deforestation, one-third of the SADC forests will disappear by the middle of the next century.

GOVERNANCE

- By 1998, 12 of the 14 SADC countries had adopted multi-party constitutions which also enshrined the supremacy of the rule of law.
- By 1995, 12 of the 14 SADC countries had conducted multi-party elections. In addition, Swaziland held a 'special election type' which was adopted since the suspension of a multi-party electoral system in 1973.
- In 1995, SADC countries established a Security Organ which has brought about major progress in the fight against crime and generated a general positive security condition in the region.

- In the multi-party democracies of Namibia and Zambia constitutional reforms generated major political and legal controversies. These reforms made a major reversal to earlier achievements on plural politics and rights of individuals to stand for elections.
- Elections in SADC continue to be ridden with disputes, poor administration and low participation by citizens and their organizations. The Zambian and Lesotho second multi-party elections since the beginning of the 1990s resulted in major controversies and boycotts which do not augur well for peace and stability in the region.
- Most parliaments and local councils in SADC are characterized by a weak and ineffective political opposition.
- Inter-country and intra-country conflicts are still evident in a number of SADC countries. Particularly, the internal conflicts in the DRC and Lesotho, in which SADC has had to adopt military solutions, do not augur well for peace in the region.



The Economy of Inequality and Underdevelopment

High rates of unemployment, deepening poverty and inequalities lead to social upheaval

I. The Legacy of White Settler Dominion

The economic structure of the SADC region is founded upon the historical ambitions of white settler domination. These are reflected in the key political and economic components which characterize the present Southern African terrain. This type of colonial economic structure acts as a major constraint to the development of a diversified industrial economy in the region. Almost all the countries are tied to the export of primary and semi-processed commodities to the international economic system which is characterized by both unequal terms of trade which favour developed countries and fluctuating commodity prices which cause unbearable instability in the fragile economies of the developing countries. The goals of good governance and human development will not be achieved under the present economic structure of the region. Both good governance and human development require stability, participation of the majority of the population and substantially reduced levels of poverty. These foundations are lacking in the region as this chapter will show.

The past five years have witnessed major political changes induced by some of the economic crises discussed in this chapter. Whereas the peoples of Southern Africa welcome the latest political reforms (see Chapter 4), it is evident that such reforms will be difficult to sustain under the present economic conditions in the region. This background chapter discusses three major features of SADC economies which have direct relevance to the goals of human development and political stability in the region:

- the historical export-oriented economic activities;
- economies which are highly susceptible to global market price fluctuations;
- the genesis and implications of the current economic problems on human development and good governance.

These three features are important for understanding both the most recent low growth and, in some cases, declines in some SADC countries' performance in human development and overall challenges facing these countries in their efforts to attain peace and good governance. It will be difficult for SADC to continue progress on human development and sustain political stability under conditions of growing unemployment, deepening poverty and racially-based inequalities. These economic problems constitute a threat to democracy and good governance in this region.

(i) Extractive and Export-oriented Economy: Mining and Agriculture

The discovery of gold and diamonds in the Johannesburg area of South Africa during the latter part of the 1880s spearheaded the development of a vibrant mining sector as large numbers of explorers, fortune seekers, investors and migrant labourers descended on the region. The belief that there was more gold in the north led to the colonization of Southern Rhodesia. However, it soon became evident that the dream of another huge gold deposit similar to South Africa's would not be realized. (Arrighi, 1973) Henceforth, although small-scale mining started in Southern Rhodesia, agriculture was to become the mainstay of the territory. Zambia was colonized by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which in 1899 established a civil administration. The company was also attracted

to the territory by its interest in mining. Initial exploration did not lead to any major discovery of gold. However, large-scale copper mining developed during the late 1920s in Zambia.

Copper mining developed rapidly in Zambia and the DRC after the Great Depression, especially during the Second World War period as the metal was required for the war effort. The development of copper mining exacerbated the rural to urban drift as large numbers of the rural populace migrated to mining centres in search of jobs.

The development of mining was accompanied by the development of two forms of transport networks in the region – the rail and the road. The northward expansion of the ‘mining belt’ was closely associated with the development of the railway network. The road infrastructure was developed in order to open up regions where minerals had been discovered and to help transport the same to major ports for shipment to Europe.

(ii) Labour Migration and its Consequences

Southern Africa was integrated into the global economy through capitalist penetration in the 19th century. This penetration relied upon migrant labour supplies from across the region and beyond. The development of colonial capitalism required constant and adequate supplies of migrant labour. However, given the unattractive conditions for that labour – hazardous work, poor wages and inadequate housing – the indigenous peoples were not keen to take up the jobs. The colonial state resorted to coercive taxes – such as the hut and poll taxes, and other assorted taxes – to draw reluctant Africans from the indigenous economy. (Arrighi, 1973; Manghezi, 1998) Desertions from work was one form of resistance against this type of colonial coercion. It became necessary for the colonial administrators in South Africa and Zimbabwe to seek ‘more pliant’ labour supplies from beyond their borders.

Migrant workers from the SADC region were a source of cheap labour for mines, farms and industries in South Africa and Zimbabwe

Figure 2.1

Labour Migration to South Africa



Source : SARIPS/SAPES Databank

The rapid development of the mining industry in South Africa created an insatiable demand for a large labour force. Initially, mining labour was recruited from within the Union of South Africa, but as the mining and manufacturing sectors expanded, recruitment agencies such as the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) and Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) were set up with the intention of mobilizing labour from outside that country. Henceforth, many of the neighbouring states were turned into labour reserves. These included the High Commission territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS states), the protectorates of Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Mozambique, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Angola. However, the bulk of the migrant labour supplies were obtained in

Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana. Most of this labour was absorbed into the mining, industrial and agricultural enterprises of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Southern Rhodesia too came to depend on labour supplies from other countries but mostly from Mozambique and its 'partners' in the ill-fated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The colonial labour markets had white workers (often a small minority) at their apex, workers from Asia or of mixed descent below them, and indigenous and migrant workers below them. The latter were in an invidious and insecure position to the extent that they were denied rights to citizenship and permanent employment status.

In Southern Africa, the colonial states played a key role, in conjunction with capital, in regulating the flow of labour supplies from the peasant sectors and neighbouring countries to sustain capitalist development. The hub of the regional political economy, then as now, was South Africa although the mining centres of colonial Zambia and Zimbabwe were also important catalysts of migration. Supplier states were also beneficiaries of the labour migration system and so had a vested interest in its continuance. For example, South Africa deferred payment of a significant portion of miners' wages which were made available to the Portuguese colonialists in gold valued at official prices. (Manghezi, 1998) In this way, migrant workers provided interest-free credit to the colonial financial systems and states.

To illustrate the significance of the proportion of migrant labour in the mining sector, for example, it can be observed that it constituted nearly 75% of labour in the gold and coal mines in South Africa in 1975. (Davies and Head, 1995) This was perhaps the high point of labour migration to South Africa from neighbouring countries. It can also be observed that about 17% of Lesotho's population of nearly two million was engaged in wage employment in 1976, while the comparable figure for Botswana was 23%. Between 1965 and 1975, nearly 90 000 Mozambican migrant workers were employed on average each year on South African mines. They constituted about 30% of the total labour force on the mines.

In Zimbabwe, migrant workers were also a prominent proportion in the agricultural and mining sectors. In 1974, for instance, migrant workers employed in commercial agriculture totalled nearly 120 000 thus constituting 33% of the sector's labour force. This was actually a decline from the high level of 60% of the labour force that had been attained in 1956. In mining, the proportion of migrant labour was nearly a third of the total sector's labour force in the mid-1970s.

As the literature on labour migration has shown, the impact of the process on underdevelopment in the peasant sectors which supplied the migrants was far-reaching. (Palmer and Parsons, 1977; First, 1983) The migration of predominantly able-bodied men at the prime of their productive life could not fail to have negative consequences for the peasant economies from which they were uprooted across the region. Both food and cash-crop production was, by and large, undermined because of labour migration. As studies on Mozambique and Lesotho have amply shown, peasant production was adversely affected by labour migration. (Manghezi, 1998; Matlosa, 1996) No corner of rural agriculture was left untouched by labour migration.

The peasant sector bore the main burden of the reproduction of the migrant labour force

In addition, the peasant sector bore the main burden of the reproduction of the migrant labour force. It nurtured them till they were of work-going age, cared for them during periods between labour contracts and after retirement. Their enormous cost in terms of training, education, welfare benefits, etc., was either not met at all or was met principally outside the core of the colonial capitalist economy. Thus, at the heart of labour migration, such as developed in Southern Africa, was the role of the peasant sector in subsidizing the recipient state. It might never be entirely possible to quantify the amount of subsidy which the peasant sector in the supplier states made available to capital and recipient states. It has been estimated that, by 1990, the amount of labour performed by migrants

working temporarily in another country in the region totalled 48 million worker years. Mozambique, which was the biggest supplier of labour, accounted for an estimated 17 million worker years, followed by Malawi with over 11 million workers years and Lesotho with about nine million worker years. (Paton, 1995) Zambian workers provided three million worker years while Zimbabwe a little under three million, Botswana a little under two million and Swaziland about one million worker years. It is scarcely surprising that the poorest countries within the region include Malawi and Mozambique, which were the largest labour exporters.

This history of labour migration left a deep imprint in the rural sectors of the supplier states. Agricultural production and other facets of local industry were crippled, by and large, while accumulation in the recipient states was consolidated resulting in the growth of their relative wealth. Of course, the impact of labour migration was not uniform on all the peasant societies from which it originated. In some, there was some utilization of the limited amounts of migrant earnings in agriculture. However, only a small proportion of migrant workers would have received sufficient earnings to make investment in peasant agriculture a profitable venture. It is necessary to treat both the sending and receiving societies as an interlocking unit with causative structural factors operating on both sides. As has been observed elsewhere, cross-border migration is supplemented by internal migration from peasant sectors to centres of manufacturing, mining and agricultural production. This is a process that occurs at varying levels in all the countries in the region. For example, this was the role of the Bantustans in South Africa, and their legacy continues.

The dependence of the major supplier states on remittances from migrants had become pronounced by the time of independence and afterwards. This has been particularly the case with Lesotho and Mozambique. However, Malawi has also experienced problems in adjusting from a labour supplier status. The economy of that country has been adversely affected by the significant reduction in exports of migrant workers from the 1980s. Agricultural growth has not been stimulated to the level where it may compensate for lost migrant earnings. In recipient states, there have also been difficult adjustments; labour shortage in agriculture has remained a big problem for Zimbabwe following the repatriation of Mozambican and Malawian workers. South African commercial agriculture increasingly draws upon both Mozambican and Zimbabwean migrant labour due to internal shortages.

(iii) Agrarian Capitalism, the Land Question and Underdevelopment

The land question has proved intractable in formerly settler-dominated colonies (Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe). It is a central issue in the wider regional political economy and relates also to the issue of labour migration addressed above. The resolution of the land question has a direct bearing on the addressing of poverty and underdevelopment in the region. However, we need to locate the land question in its proper historical context. In Zimbabwe, for instance, a massive land alienation programme was instituted by the settler colonial community. Most of the best land was expropriated by the colonial settler regime and Africans were shepherded into native reserves, most of which were either of poor soil quality or located far away from water and the major lines of communication. Settler farmers were encouraged to settle in regions with fertile soils and abundant water and wood resources. They were assured of cheap African labour, most of which was tapped from overcrowded communal lands. By the close of the 1960s, a white settler agrarian capitalist class, numbering about 4 700, had in its possession more than 50% of the best land in Zimbabwe. (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998; Moyo, 1998)

In South Africa, agrarian capitalism used the African peasantry as a source of its development and thus brought about the underdevelopment of South Africa's rural areas. Most of the African rural populace was coerced to migrate from the land in order to give way to settler dominated agrarian capitalism. In some parts of South Africa, the colonial regime implemented policies that stifled the development of an African agrarian capitalist class. Land alienation was so pronounced that by the 1960s, some 87% of agricultural land was in the hands of the minority settler community, the apartheid state and corporate mining

The history of labour migration left a deep imprint in the rural sectors of the supplier states

Migrant labourers' remittances have become an important source of income of supplier states

The land question: is it the solution to poverty and underdevelopment in the region?

houses while the majority of the rural African population was concentrated in the homelands. (Ncube, 1997) The homelands were overcrowded and their soils were infertile and their inhabitants thus served mainly as labour reserves. This overcrowding and associated land degradation today accounts for spatial inequality and geographical concentration of poverty in certain parts of South Africa. It also accounts for the reproduction of poverty in that country. The machinery of *apartheid* strengthened the repression of the Africans and ensured the reproduction of a cheap labour force.

In Zambia, the British South Africa Company (BSACo) encouraged the development of an agricultural sector which would supply cheap food to the mining industry. The company wanted farmers that they could depend upon to supply food to the rapidly expanding mining labour force. The foreign farmers (who were imported to play that role) were assured of adequate and cheap labour and were also offered protection against competition from the African peasantry and also against foreign commercial agriculture. As in the case of Southern Rhodesia, taxes and land expropriation and, in some cases, coercion, were used to create a working class. Government also implemented policies designed to stifle the emergence of the African farmer, especially in the southern region of the country. The peasantry also faced discrimination in the input and produce markets in the form of low prices for their produce and/or denial of markets.

The development of capitalism in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe entailed the underdevelopment of the peasant economy. The contradiction came with the colonial authorities' decision to recruit foreign farmers when they could have encouraged the Africans to adapt themselves to the new situation and thus provide the food necessary for the rapidly expanding urban labour force; there is enough evidence to suggest that the Africans would have risen to the challenge of the new order. (Palmer and Parsons, 1977)

Today, the most striking feature of Zambian and Zimbabwean agriculture is the existence of large private farms most of which are located either in areas of good soils or along the major lines of communication. Though now reduced in number (about 4 000 in Zimbabwe and 2 000 in Zambia) these farmers are located near to the main urban centres and thus supply a high proportion of food to these areas. They wield a lot of influence in terms of agricultural pricing and land policies. These farmers are the main producers of agricultural exports. They produce these crops using cheap African labour, most of which has no access to land. Although post-independence policies in agriculture have led to the emergence of a class of commercial and semi-commercial African farmers, the majority of the rural population remains starved of agricultural land in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

In Angola and Mozambique, estate agriculture was developed by the Portuguese and it too relied on a cheap African labour force. Moreover, in these two Lusophone countries, discrimination was so severe that at independence only a small proportion of the population was literate. The Portuguese policy of 'assimilado' ensured that only a tiny proportion of the African population was incorporated into the metropolitan (i.e., Portuguese) economy while the majority remained in abject poverty.

The DRC, Namibia and Tanzania experienced a rather different colonial history of exploitation. South West Africa (Namibia) moved from being a German colony to one administered by South Africa under a United Nations mandate. Under South Africa, the colony became a labour reserve for South Africa and a source of raw materials; also, a large number of agrarian capitalist farmers, mainly from South Africa and Germany, settled in the territory. Today, the white settler farmers in Namibia control the best land which they use for cattle farming and game ranching. The legacy of South Africa's occupation of Namibia (and its *apartheid* policy) is represented by highly skewed resources and an asset distribution pattern wherein only 5% of the population controls about 70% of the country's GDP. Moreover, 11,2% of the total population belonging to the people of European origin earns 51,5% of total annual income. Namibia has the most inequitable income distribution pattern in the region with the Gini coefficient estimated at 0,7.

Tanzania moved away from German to British rule in 1919. In this country, estate agriculture consisted mainly of sisal and, to a lesser extent, coffee plantations which were owned and managed by expatriate farmers most of whom left the country after independence. Although there is rapid commercialization in coffee production, Tanzanian's agriculture today remains dominated by small-scale producers. The DRC entered the post-independence era with a lot of political instability and has experienced brutal foreign exploitation of its mineral resources. Malawi's agriculture was dominated by large tea estates which were mainly in the south of the country. It was on those tea plantations that a rural working class developed during the colonial and post-colonial eras.

In relation to gender inequalities, throughout the region the pattern is that women have less access to the means of production. Policies and programmes continue to overlook the central role of women in the economy and reinforce inequality in women's access to both the productive resources, e.g., land, and support services such as credit.

While most of the regional constitutions are gender neutral, only a minority of women have access to land due to various discriminatory customary laws which are patriarchal. Often access to land is through inheritance, allocation, purchase and right of occupancy. Women, in most cases, only earn land rights or gain access to it through their fathers, brothers, husbands or sons.

More often than not, women are disadvantaged by a lack of understanding of the legal complexities that affect land matters. Issues of how to register land, how to take ownership and how to contest land rights are usually not clearly understood by the majority of women.

In Tanzania, for instance, only 35 out of the 100 women surveyed indicated that they have ownership rights to land. In terms of land holdings, women have smaller farms than men, e.g., for the years 1986/87 and 1990/91, average rural planted farms for Tanzanian females was 0,59ha and 0,53ha respectively while the average size of farms for males was 0,89ha and 0,73ha respectively.

In Botswana, female access to farms has been one-third of the total farms including cattle and crop farms. In 1990, only 20% of the female households had access to land. In 1992, there were about 6 000 poor households without any cattle or land. The majority of these were women. The number of resource-poor farmers has continued to increase from 44 000 in 1981 to 58 000 in 1990. The majority of these are women. In Zambia, 90% of the land available for agriculture falls under traditional land controlled by chiefs who follow patriarchal principles on its allocation. Women have absolutely no direct access to land in this situation.

In the second kinship system of Malawi which predominates in the south and part of central region, the matrilineal system, women hold land rights by descent but this advantage is declining as most men prefer to take their wives to their own homes where their sons will inherit. More and more women are therefore losing their rights and control over land.

In one region of Zimbabwe, for instance, it was found that only 5% of the women own an average of 1,5 acres each. The majority of women landowners are found in the drought-prone rural regions.

Closely related to the issue of land is the issue of livestock ownership. Men generally own more cattle than women throughout Southern Africa. In Botswana, for instance, of the total national herd, women own 14%. This marginalization from cattle ownership of women not only reflects female poverty, especially for rural women, but also means that those that have land but no access to cattle have no access to draught power for ploughing and end up ploughing late, ploughing less hectares and getting lower yields. In Tanzania, men can acquire cattle through dowry, purchase, inheritance and exchange with other

The land problem is a threat to political stability in a number of SADC countries

material items. Women do not control cash income, do not control clan property and usually get a very small share of the dowry.

So again, though there is no desegregated data on livestock ownership available, women's access to this means of production which provides employment opportunities, fuel, plant nutrients and draught-power, among other things, is limited.

In 1993 in Zimbabwe, 53% of female-headed households did not own cattle compared to 39% of the male-headed households. Those who did, owned three head on average per household. This clearly does not help with draught power.

Given the above disparities in access to land and related resources, gender equality must become a major goal for the countries in the SADC region.

In sum, the centrality of the land question varies from country to country but it has the potential to become explosive in the former settler societies of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Already in Zimbabwe land 'invasions' in the white-owned commercial farming land by peasant squatters has become a regular phenomenon. The politics of land ownership and distribution will become more explosive in this country unless solutions are found to land shortage, poverty and underdevelopment. The prospects for sustainable human development in the region are dim unless and until a permanent resolution is found to the land question.

II. The Economic Structure: Continuity and its Consequences

By the end of the colonial era, the basic structure of the SADC economy had been established. The main component of the structure was the existence of a thriving export enclave economy based on the exploitation and export of natural resources such as gold in South Africa, copper in Zambia and the DRC, and diamonds in Namibia. In Botswana, beef export was entrenched. Zimbabwe's agrarian capitalism concentrated on the production of maize and tobacco while in Malawi, tea was the main export crop until the mid-1970s when tobacco emerged as the leading export. In Lusophone countries – Angola and Mozambique – estate farming concentrated on coffee (Angola) and sugar (Mozambique). In Tanzania, sisal provided the main foreign exchange earner although after independence coffee production became a leading economic activity. Lesotho had become a classic example of a labour reservoir for South Africa, although a manufacturing sector (based on textiles) has recently emerged. In Swaziland, agrarian capitalism concentrated on sugar production.

Dependence on export of raw mineral and agricultural commodities continues

During the post-independence era there have been changes in production activity in many SADC member states which, however, have not led to any transformation in the structure of production. Before independence, Angola's main export was coffee but crude oil exports now account for more than 80% of export earnings. (UNDP, 1997) In Botswana, cattle farming was the mainstay of the economy during the colonial era. Shortly after independence, however, diamond mining started and that commodity has since become the main economic activity in that country. In 1995, mining (of diamonds, copper, nickel and soda ash) contributed 34% to GDP and 88% to export earnings while agriculture accounted for only 4% of Botswana's GDP. As already indicated above, tobacco, accounting for 76% of Malawi's exports, has since the mid-1970s replaced tea as the main export commodity.

South Africa and Zimbabwe have developed sizable manufacturing sectors. In South Africa, manufacturing developed rapidly due to a large internal market created by the mining sector and also due to the availability of raw materials from within the country and from the rest of the region. In Zimbabwe, manufacturing developed rapidly during the period encompassing the life of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland when the country had access to the markets of Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia

(Zambia). The development of the manufacturing sector was further accelerated after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the white settler regime in 1965. By isolating the country from the international community (except South Africa), UDI created the impetus for internally generated development through 'imposed' import-substitution industrialization. By the end of the settler regime in 1980, Southern Rhodesia had the second biggest industrial-manufacturing sector, after South Africa, in the Southern African region.

The region's economic structure which has evolved since the late 1800s is characterized by the production and export of a small range of commodities. Essentially, the SADC member states are export enclaves of a limited number of primary commodities. South Africa and Zimbabwe have the most diversified economies. In 1995, industry contributed roughly 31% of GDP in South Africa while in Zimbabwe it contributed 36% (Table 2.1). But even in these two countries, manufacturing remains largely inefficient and depends on high levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers for survival. Industrial and agricultural sectors still bear the hallmarks of the colonial era and post-independence policies have failed to restructure or transform these economies. The best agricultural land remains in the hands of settler farmers, industry is still largely foreign owned, and the African people remain largely marginalized in most economic activity.

The service sector has emerged to be an important component of the GDP in the region

South Africa is the dominant economy in the region in terms of total GDP. However, the SADC region consists of countries with different levels of per capita incomes. The first group consists of economies with high per capita incomes (i.e., US\$2 000 and above). These countries are Seychelles, Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. The second group consists of countries whose per capita GDP varies from US\$600 to US\$2 000 – Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Angola. The low income countries (i.e., with per capita GDP less than US\$600) are Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Lesotho. From a close scrutiny of Table 2.1 we note that services represent a very high proportion of GDP in every country. For example, in Namibia, services constitute 56% of GDP while in Mauritius they constitute 58%, followed by South Africa (64%). The lowest contribution of services to GDP is in Tanzania (24%), Angola (28%) and Malawi (31%). However, the fact that the service sector accounts for large proportions of GDP in SADC is partly due to the region's close association with the relatively developed South African economy where a sizeable service sector has developed. Most of the SADC member states, therefore, act as service centres for the South African economy or import most of the services from there.

Industry's contribution to GDP comes second. In Angola, industry contributes 59% to GDP, while in Botswana it is 56% and in Lesotho it contributes 46%. In Swaziland, industry contributes 45%, while in Zambia and Zimbabwe it contributes 40% and 36% respectively. It is also evident from Table 2.1 that industry represents large proportions of the GDP in most countries. However, it should be borne in mind that industry is defined here to include extractive activities such as mining and quarrying. The manufacturing sector in the region consists of a narrow range of goods. Moreover, the majority of the manufacturing enterprises in the region are either at the first stage of processing or at the final stage which consists of assembling of parts and components brought in from outside. This means that most manufacturing enterprises have low value added. On the other hand, the contribution of agriculture is highest in Tanzania (58%) followed by Malawi (42%) and Mozambique (33%).

Manufacturing enterprises have low value-added

(i) SADC Trade

Table 2.2 shows the value of the exports and imports of goods and services of SADC countries. In 1995, the region exported goods and services worth US\$44 738 million to the rest of the world, while imports amounted to US\$45 723 million. The region thus incurred a trade deficit of US\$985 million with the rest of the world. South Africa dominated the region's export and import trade as shown in Figure 2.2. In 1995, South Africa's exports of US\$27 861 million amounted to 62% of total SADC exports to the

rest of the world. On the other hand, that country's imports of US\$27 030 million constituted 59% of the region's total value of import from the rest of the world.

Angola and Zimbabwe are the other major exporters and importers. In 1995, Angola's exports of US\$3 880 million, however, constituted only 8,7% of total regional exports. Moreover, Angola's imports of US\$1 700 million represent only 3,7% of SADC's total imports. Zimbabwe's exports, whose value amounted to US\$1 849 million in 1995, represented only 4,1% of SADC's total exports while its imports amounting to US\$2 660 million contributed only 5,8% of SADC's total imports.

Another outstanding characteristic of the present SADC trade scenario is the fact that these countries tend to trade less among themselves but are more linked to the developed world. Thus in 1995, intra-SADC exports amounted to only US\$4 166 million representing only 9,3% of total SADC's exports. (SADC Report, 1998) In other words, SADC is more integrated with the developed world than within itself.

Imports consist mainly of finished consumer and capital goods while exports consist of raw materials and semi-processed commodities. The weakness of the foreign trade sector is evidenced by large trade balance deficits and high foreign debt burdens (*Table 2.2*). Most of the SADC member states are so much indebted that debt repayment is unimaginable without foreign aid. Among the countries caught in the debt trap are Zambia (US\$6,9 billion), Mozambique (US\$5,8 billion), DRC (US\$13,1 billion) and Malawi (US\$2,1 billion). In all these countries, the foreign debt represents huge proportions of the GDP and exports.

Table 2.3(a) shows that most of the SADC member states' exports consist of raw materials or semi-processed products while imports consist mainly of finished consumer and capital goods. Thus, although Zimbabwe has the second biggest manufacturing sector in SADC, her main exports are tobacco, gold, ferro-chrome and maize, most of which are destined for the European Union market and South Africa. Zimbabwe's imports consist of capital goods (41%), manufactures and chemicals most of which come from the United Kingdom and South Africa (see *Table 2.3(b)*).

Most of the countries' export sectors are dominated by one major export. For instance, Angola's crude oil exports account for about 86% of that country's total exports and are destined mainly to the USA and France. In turn, that country imports consumer goods (40%), capital goods (15%) and raw materials (15%), mainly from Portugal, France, the USA and Brazil. Zambia's exports are dominated by copper and cobalt (90%), most of which go to Japan, the European Union and India. Zambia's imports are sourced mainly from South Africa, the UK, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Botswana's exports are dominated by diamonds (88%) most of which are sold through Switzerland. In turn, the country imports most of its requirements (consumer goods, transport equipment and machinery) from South Africa. Namibia's exports are dominated by diamonds (35%), although the country exports large amounts of fish and other minerals as well. Most of the exports find their way to Switzerland, South Africa and the European Union. In turn, Namibia's imports consist of capital goods (29%), and food and beverages, most of which are sourced from South Africa.

An outstanding characteristic of the SADC economic structure is the high degree of dependence of member states on South Africa. South Africa dominates the SADC region and is the main supplier of both consumer and capital goods (see *Figures 2.2 and 2.3*). The rest of the SADC member states act as a market for South Africa and are incorporated into that economy. However, although South Africa is the regional economic giant, its industrial sector is inefficient and depends on high levels of protection for its survival.

Table 2.1
SADC's Economic Structure

Country	GDP per capita US\$ 1996-97	Agriculture as % of GDP 1995	Industry as % of GDP 1995	Services as % of GDP 1995
Angola	666	12	59	28
Botswana	4 936	5	56	48
DRC	110	30	36,5	33,5
Lesotho	444	10	46	34
Malawi	216	42	27	31
Mauritius	4 173	9	33	58
Mozambique	152	33	12	55
Namibia	2 067	14	30	56
Seychelles	7 364	7	16	77
South Africa	2 989	5	31	64
Swaziland	635	14	45	41
Tanzania	245	58	17	24
Zambia	402,7	22	40	37
Zimbabwe	600	15	36	48
SADC	1 032	9	32	59

Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 1998

Table 2.2
SADC Countries' Exports and Imports (US\$m) and Trade Balance, 1995

Country	Total Export US\$m	Total Import US\$m	Trade Balance US\$m
Angola	3 880	1 700	2 180
Botswana	2 098	1 880	218
DRC	1 705	2 259	-554
Lesotho	614	988	-374
Malawi	413	484	-71
Mauritius	1 503	1 931	-428
Mozambique	362	800	-438
Namibia	1 700	1 900	-200
Seychelles	27 861	27 030	-831
South Africa	272	289	-17
Swaziland	776	1 017	-241
Tanzania	519	1 541	-1 022
Zambia	1 186	1 244	-58
Zimbabwe	1 849	2 660	-811

Source: National Central Banks

Table 2.3(a)
SADC Main Exports

Country	Main Export	Main Exports as % of Total Export	Destination
Angola	Crude oil	86%	France, USA
Botswana	Diamonds	88%	Switzerland
DRC	Copper	60%	Belgium/Luxenburg, USA Italy
Lesotho	Manufacturers	80%	South Africa, EU
Malawi	Tobacco	76%	UK, USA, Japan, Germany
Mauritius	Textiles	56%	UK, France, USA
Mozambique	Shrimps and other fish	47%	Spain, USA, Japan
Namibia	Diamonds	35%	Switzerland
Seychelles	Canned tuna, frozen and fresh fish	..	Italy, Thailand
South Africa	Gold	22%	Japan, Italy, USA
Swaziland	Food and sugar	58%	South Africa, EU
Tanzania	Coffee	25%	Germany, UK
Zambia	Copper and cobalt	90%	Japan, EU, India
Zimbabwe	Tobacco	20%	UK, Germany, South Africa

Source: Extracted from Southern Africa: an Economic Profile, ABSA Bank and various issues and The Economic and Business Report, The World of Information Africa Review 1988. Twenty-first edition

Table 2.3(b)
SADC Main Imports

Country	Main Imports	Main Imports as % of Total Imports	Origin
Angola	Consumer goods	40%	France, Portugal, USA, Brazil
Botswana	Consumer goods & machinery	81%	South Africa
DRC	Manufactured goods	37%	Belgium/Luxenburg, Hong Kong, SA, Nigeria
Lesotho	Consumer goods	33%	South Africa
Malawi	Industrial and capital goods	60%	South Africa
Mauritius	Textiles yarn		France, SA, India
Mozambique	Consumer goods	40%	South Africa, USA
Namibia	Capital goods	29%	South Africa
Seychelles	Manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment	..	USA, UK, France, SA, Kuwait
South Africa	Capital goods, raw materials, semi-manufactured goods	80%	Germany, USA, UK, Japan Iran, Hong Kong, China, Australia
Swaziland	Capital goods	20%	South Africa
Tanzania	Consumer goods	23%	UK, Germany, Japan
Zambia	Fertilizer	20%	South Africa, UK, Japan
Zimbabwe	Capital goods	41%	South Africa, UK

Source: Extracted from Southern Africa: an Economic Profile, ABSA Bank and various issues and The Economic and Business Report, The World of Information Africa Review 1988. Twenty-first edition

Figure 2.2(a)
Share of Total SADC Exports, %, 1995





Figure 2.2(b)
Share of Total SADC Imports, %, 1995



Source : SADC Report 1998

Figure 2.3(a)

South Africa Exports to SADC Contrast Sharply with the Imports




Figure 2.3(b)

Share of South Africa Exports to SADC Countries, %, 1995





Figure 2.3(c)

Share of South Africa Imports from SADC Countries, %, 1995



Source : SADC Report, 1998

(ii) Recent Economic Performance in SADC

The economic performance of SADC states is shown in *Table 2.4* and *Figure 2.4*. Economic growth, though high in a number of the countries such as Mauritius, Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana and Namibia is low or erratic in most member states. South Africa's growth has been low since the early 1990s. This should be a source of worry to other countries in the region because South Africa is considered to be the engine of growth in SADC. Hence, economic decline in that country is bound to affect the growth prospects of other member states. Low GDP growth rates have been experienced in South Africa, Angola, Zambia and the DRC.



Table 2.4
Economic Growth Rates in SADC (1991-97)


Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Angola	-2,5	6,9	-24,7	2,5	11,2	12,1	5,9
Botswana	8,9	6,3	-0,1	4,1	3,1	7,0	6,9
DRC	-8,4	-10,5	-13,5	-3,9	-0,6	1,3	..
Lesotho	0,7	3,5	4,0	12,9	9,1	12,7	3,5
Malawi	7,8	-7,9	10,8	-11,6	13,4	12,0	5,3
Mauritius	4,3	6,4	4,9	5,3	5,6	5,8	5,0
Mozambique	4,9	-0,8	19,3	4,4	1,4	6,4	7,9
Namibia	7,4	8,2	-1,9	6,5	4,1	3,0	3,0
Seychelles	2,6	7,0	5,9	-1,7	-1,7	1,7	..
South Africa	-1,0	-2,2	1,3	2,7	3,4	3,2	1,7
Swaziland	-0,9	1,0	3,1	3,5	2,7	3,9	3,8
Tanzania	4,3	1,8	0,4	1,4	3,6	4,2	4,0
Zambia	-0,4	-1,8	6,8	-8,6	-2,3	6,4	3,5
Zimbabwe	5,6	-6,8	4,2	5,3	-3,2	7,2	3,7

Source : SADC Report 1998
For Seychelles source is SARIPS/SAPES Databank

An outstanding characteristic of the SADC growth scenario is that it is concentrated in small resource-rich countries such as Namibia and Botswana, although Angola and Mozambique have performed reasonably well. Economic growth is also rather erratic in most countries.

Figure 2.4
Economic Growth in SADC 1991-97





III. The Problem of Economic Growth: Implications for Human Development and Good Governance

SADC countries with political stability and high economic growth are also doing well in human development

Evidence from the first two decades of independence in Africa and elsewhere in the world shows that economic growth is one of the critical requirements for sustained progress in human development and political stability. In Southern Africa, this evidence is well supported by the performance of countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Each of these countries enjoyed relatively high levels of economic growth in the years following independence. As shown in Chapter 3, many of these countries also made major strides in human development during this early period. However, many of them are currently facing reversals of earlier achievements in human development. The present economic crisis in SADC countries, characterized by the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by most countries, low levels of growth, high inflation, currency devaluation, unbalanced terms of trade, budget deficits, the debt burden coupled by low flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and low overseas development assistance (ODA), has a serious negative impact on sustained growth in human development and political stability in this region.

When analysing the evolution of the economic crisis in the region, it has become conventional to begin with the major event which shook the world economy during the early 1970s. The Arab/Israel war of 1973 led to massive increases in the world price of oil and created a serious balance of payments crisis for oil-dependent developing countries. Most third world countries, including those in SADC, experienced a serious balance of payments crisis. The second oil shock which occurred in 1979 put further strain on the balance of payments of the oil importing nations. By the beginning of the 1980s, most of the developing countries, except those exporting oil, were finding it difficult to service their international debts. Since the early 1980s, many countries have been implementing economic reform programmes whose main objective was the restructuring of the economies through the promotion of market forces.

Clearly, the crisis facing the region is heavily related to the performance of the export sector. First, the crisis is mainly a financial crisis, and in large measure, a foreign exchange crisis. Most of the countries do not have enough financial resources to run their economies and to finance long-term investment. In order to maintain investment and consumption levels, most countries borrowed heavily and are now burdened with large foreign debts. The crisis is also due to structural factors which are largely caused by inherited economic structures and which have been exacerbated by the development strategies implemented during the post-independence era. For instance, the import substitution industrialization strategies adopted by most SADC member states were not sustainable since they relied too heavily on imports and subsidies.

The world recession which followed the 1973 energy crisis led, in part, to reduced world demand for raw materials exports and to increased protectionist tendencies in the USA, Europe and Japan. On the part of the poor countries, falling non-oil export prices and rising import prices resulted in large balance of payments deficits. The deterioration in the terms of trade led to the depreciation of most currencies. As the crisis worsened,

economic policies became more state directed. For instance, most governments reacted by controlling exchange rates, controlling consumer prices and embarking on deficit financing. These measures deepened rather than solved the problem whose symptoms were as follows:

(i) The Debt Crisis

The debt crisis is now both a symptom and one of the major causes of the crises in many SADC states. This is due to the fact that large amounts of financial resources are being set aside for debt servicing at the very time they are needed in those countries.

Some SADC countries are caught in a debt trap

The foreign exchange crisis has led to increased reliance on official development assistance (ODA) in many countries (Table 2.5). For instance, in Zambia, net ODA rose from roughly US\$55 per capita in 1980 to about US\$221 in 1995. However, ODA is also high in countries with good economic performance. In Namibia, ODA is about US\$117 per capita in 1995 while in the Seychelles it is about US\$130 per capita in 1995, having declined considerably from US\$349 in 1980. Other countries with large amounts of ODA per capita are Mozambique, Swaziland and Botswana with US\$66, US\$62 and US\$61 in 1995 respectively.

Table 2.5
Change in Net ODA and ODA per Capita, SADC Countries 1980 and 1995

Country	Net ODA, (US\$m)		ODA per capita, (US\$)	
	1980	1995	1980	1995
Angola	53	424	7	38
Botswana	106	91	118	61
DRC	428	195	16	4
Lesotho	94	115	70	58
Malawi	143	434	23	43
Mauritius	33	22	34	20
Mozambique	169	1 103	14	66
Namibia	0	187	0	117
Seychelles	22	13	349	130
South Africa	0	386	..	9
Swaziland	50	56	89	62
Tanzania	679	882	36	29
Zambia	318	2035	55	221
Zimbabwe	164	489	23	44
SADC	2 259	6 432	25	24

Source : World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1997

(ii) Low Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to SADC

In 1996, Africa received US\$5,5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). This represented a meagre 1,5% of the total global FDI flows. (ADB, 1998) Like the rest of the continent, Southern African countries are starved of the much needed foreign investment. Only South Africa in the region received 6% of the total \$5,5 billion in 1996. The other main recipients in SADC which shared about 33% of the FDI, in 1996, with more than 20 other Sub-Saharan countries were Angola, Namibia, Zambia and Mozambique. Given the region's extensive and comparatively well kept infrastructure, improved trade policies, attractive investment packages and an emerging positive political and security situation, the SADC region should be attracting much more FDI than is currently the case. The absence of substantial foreign investment is yet another symptom of the region's economic crisis.


Too low foreign direct investment to SADC

(iii) Deficit Financing

Figure 2.5 indicates the state of government budgets for the years 1980 and 1996. In 1980, in all the SADC countries, except Botswana and Angola, government expenditure exceeded government revenue. Government budget deficits were large in Malawi, Zambia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In 1996, the DRC and Angola registered large government budget deficits. By 1996, budget deficits had declined in Zambia, Mauritius, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the decline in the deficits was largely due to strict control of expenditure imposed as part of the adjustment effort.

Fig 2.5

Change in Budget Deficit as % of GDP, SADC Countries, 1991-92 and 1996-97




Sources : SADC Report, 1998; for Seychelles and Zambia, World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1997; for DRC, IMF, International Financial statistics, May 1998 (data 1995 not 1996-97)

One of the major causes of large government budget deficits is the large military expenditures incurred in the region. Angola and Mozambique are spending more on military than on education and health combined as shown in Figure 2.6. However, with increased military conflict in the region such as those in the DRC and Lesotho in which Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe (DRC) and Botswana and South Africa (Lesotho) are involved, military expenditure is bound to rise rapidly. The conflict and military solutions to its resolution is bound to take away the limited budget resources from human development related investment in health, education and community services.

Fig 2.6

Military Expenditure as a % of Combined Education and Health Expenditure, 1990-91



Source : Human Development Report, 1998

(iv) Inflation

Most countries in SADC have been experiencing high inflation rates (see Table 2.6) and low GDP growth as indicated. In the 1990s a number of SADC countries had inflation levels running at three digits. Since the mid-1990s, however, due to the elimination of informal sector currency dealings, concerted efforts to reduce budget deficits and relative improvements in the balance of trade, inflation rates have come down significantly in a number of SAP-implementing SADC countries.

Inflation is still high in the DRC, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In Angola, an inflation rate of 3 784% in 1995 has been recorded largely as a result of the war situation in that country. In other countries, the main cause of inflation is the large government budget deficit. However, inflation is also caused by structural deformities of the SADC member states. Structural transformation is therefore a necessary condition for the elimination of the inflationary process.

Table 2.6

SADC Average Inflation and Range, (%) 1991-97

Country	Average	Range
Angola	671,5	(64; 3 748)
Botswana	10,5	(8,9; 16,1)
DRC	591,0	(58; 5 444,5)
Lesotho	10,1	(7,9; 18,4)
Malawi	22,8	(8,2; 83,3)
Mauritius	5,7	(4,6; 10,5)
Mozambique	43,5	(24,3; 70)
Namibia	9,6	(8,2; 17,7)
Seychelles	0,1	(-1; 3)
South Africa	9,0	(7,4; 15,3)
Swaziland	8,4	(6,5; 13,7)
Tanzania	22,6	(16,1; 34,1)
Zambia	58,1	(18,6; 185,2)
Zimbabwe	23,9	(18,9; 42,1)

Source: SADC Report, 1998

For Seychelles, IMF, International Financial Statistics, May 1998

Note: For DRC inflation range is for the periods 1980-89 and 1990-95

(v) Exchange Rates

The crisis in the foreign trade sector has impacted negatively on the values of the local currencies. Following the energy crisis in 1973 and 1979 many countries devalued their currencies in order to contain import demand. However, as the crisis continued to worsen, more devaluations were effected during the 1980s and 1990s. Eventually, most countries allowed their exchange rates to be determined by market forces.

In most SADC member states, the nominal exchange rate has been heavily influenced by the conditionality embedded in structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). For instance, in Malawi the currency fell sharply against the US dollar in 1993 when the SAP began in earnest. Mozambique's currency fell sharply against the US dollar in 1987 when the SAP was introduced. Zambia's currency also fell drastically against the US dollar when serious implementation of the SAP started in 1991. Implementation of the economic structural adjustment programme in Zimbabwe in 1991 was also accompanied by a large decline in the nominal exchange rate of the currency.

Nominal exchange rates have fallen sharply against the US dollar since the mid-1980s. On the other hand, real exchange rates have exhibited an erratic pattern, rising or falling in sympathy with government monetary policies or instability in foreign trade. Countries whose currencies have appreciated are those with strong economic performances. These include Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana. However, some countries with weak economic performance have also experienced appreciation in currency values. These are Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi.

The massive instability in exchange rate is also related to the economic structure which is dominated by the export of a narrow range of commodities whose values tend to be unstable. The export base should be diversified and exports should consist of products with high value added.


IV. The Challenge of Transformation

Since the demise of colonialism and *apartheid*, there has been no structural transformation in the region. With the notable exceptions of South Africa and Zimbabwe (see Figure 2.6), the economies basically remain export enclaves dependent on the export of a narrow range of commodities. The agriculture sector in some countries (principally Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) is still largely settler-dominated, and the pattern of land ownership has not significantly changed since the attainment of independence. There remains, therefore, a high degree of resource and income inequality in most SADC states.

Economic and social transformation in the region will largely depend on:

- how the land question is resolved;
- whether there is a broader industrialization process which entails increased beneficiation of raw materials;
- the degree to which a strong technological foundation based on more advanced skill resources and technology is adopted.

Figure 2.7
Zimbabwe GDP Structure



Source: UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Socio-economic Indicators, 1990/91

All these aspects of transformation will impinge upon human development in a broad sense.

Land reform, which would entail provision of land to the landless and the poor, and transfer of skills to obtain higher productivity on that land, together with diversification into new products such as horticulture will provide a more sustainable basis for development in the rural sector of the region. There would have to be installed new flexible patterns of ownership in place of communal ownership such as long leases which reward more productive development of land. Communal agriculture requires transforming in

productive techniques and methods of conserving communal resources such as grazing, forestry and water. In short, land distribution or resettlement will be justifiable if it leads to higher productivity amongst the small farmers involved. However this will require greater outlays of investment by states, NGOs and international agencies in developing services ranging from good extension services to the provision of basic infrastructure such as irrigation, roads, draught-power and marketing outlets. In the long term, the population engaged in agriculture will gradually decrease while its productivity increases. The greater proportion of the region's population will need to be absorbed into the manufacturing, mining and services sectors. This presupposes that growth in these sectors should be faster than it has hitherto been.

There exists great scope for the further processing of the raw materials produced in the agricultural, mining and other sectors. Such processing would add value to the products in addition to creating greater opportunities for employment. For example, tobacco growing countries could export cigarettes, those which produce coffee could first process it within the region. More copper and iron products could also be manufactured within the region. The industrial transformation of the region requires a combination of small-scale and large-scale industries which engage in value-adding processing of the raw materials produced within the region.

However, such a transformation can only be sustained by a stronger technological base within the region. Such a base requires extensive skills-training programmes to establish a good human resource base. The adoption of new suitable technologies for the agricultural, mining, manufacturing and services sectors will be imperative. The indigenization of technological resources is an important step as the experiences of East and South-East Asian countries confirm. The linkages between the formal education systems, the labour market and technological base will need reviewing and strengthening. Sustainable human development should be the goal of technological transformation.

There exists great scope for the further processing of the region's raw materials

There is considerable confusion about what constitutes globalization – about its origins, date of birth, distinctness, geographical extent, intensity, impact and future. For all the hype surrounding it, globalization is ultimately the result of human agency. How Africa goes global will be determined to a large extent by the degree of social cohesion African countries can individually and collectively muster. It is this that will determine whether globalization is enriching or immiserizing. Both internal institutional and political weaknesses and the particular way Africa is being integrated into the global system are likely to lead to 'immiserising globalization'. The internal problems are the result, on the one hand, of internal inconsistencies and conflicts and what Africans themselves generally describe as the 'betrayal' by the leaders of the promise of independence, and, on the other, of the reverberations of foreign pressures on domestic politics, which not only alter the preferences or ideologies of key sectors, but also influence the social composition and strength of political coalitions.

Globalization has generally proceeded by either completely ignoring or trivializing local concerns, histories, problems and the 'social pacts' edified to address them. Indeed, globalization processes and the ideological paraphernalia that goes with it have given the impression that these local concerns were provincial, dated and idiosyncratic. It is essential for us to judge globalization through the prism of commonly perceived needs and capacities. From the many self-allotted 'historical tasks' of African nationalism, five would stand out as the most widely accepted at the time. These were complete decolonization of the continent, nation building, economic and social development, democratization, and regional co-operation. These were the key consistent elements of the 'nation-state project' of African nationalism. In judging globalization, it is useful to use its effects on Africa's capacity to address these concerns as a measure. Only the first of these has been achieved although the form of independence leaves much to be desired. Nation-building remains a central task due to the failure of the ruling elite to pursue this task in a serious and consistent manner. This can be attributed partly to the end of 'elite consensus', which has led to conflicts that have engulfed whole nations and brought about great suffering. This was

part cause and part effect of the political and institutional failure to deal creatively with the pluralistic nature of our societies.

Advocates of globalization claim that participation in world markets facilitates economic development. Since the 1980s, African countries have been 'adjusting' their economies largely on the advice of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Much of the advice has involved an incredible experimentation with a package of policies for which there was no prior experience. Thus far at least, the African experience is that these policies, explicitly designed to ensure that liberalization led to greater integration and increased economic growth, have failed.

Perhaps the most persuasive promise made by BVI was that adjustment would attract foreign capital. The response of private capital to Africa's diligent adoption of SAPs has, in the words of the World Bank, 'been disappointing'. However, the poor response of private investors – both domestic and foreign – should not have come as a surprise, what with contractions of domestic markets through deflationary policies and increased competition from imported goods, the collapse of public services and infrastructure and the political uncertainty engendered by policies that have undermined the 'social pacts' that hitherto provided some modicum of social cohesion.

Globalization and Democratization

There are different views as to what globalization entails for democracy in the developing countries. In one view, the 'opening up' of economies and societies, the political conditionalities transmitted through global institutions and the solidarity from movements encapsulated in the notion of 'global civil society' are generally supportive of efforts at democratization in many countries. In another, the demands of globalization, especially the erosion of national sovereignty and the uniformization of what are considered 'fundamentals' in economic policy, limit the range of options for democratic regimes.

Whatever is the case, globalization thus far has entailed an erosion of the authority of the legislative bodies of democracies. In the case of Africa, one can even talk of the

emergence of 'choiceless democracies' who have to accept the conditionalities of policies concocted by international technocracies. To 'signal' foreign capital, governments must demonstrate their 'autonomy' from local polities.

Regional Co-operation

One feature of globalization is the extent to which it has encouraged regionalism among contiguous states as a way of dealing with its own challenges in some collective way. Although the reasons for regional co-operation were couched in terms of economies of scale, etc., they also point to the need for regional collaboration if Africa is to assert itself on the world map. Eventually, not much was achieved in terms of regional co-operation so that today the continent with the most vocally expressed ideology of regional collaboration (pan-Africanism) has probably moved least in the direction of setting up viable regional arrangements.

Many factors have worked against regional integration in Africa. One is the small-mindedness of import-substitution industrialization in Africa where Lilliputian markets were taken to be the basis of viable industrialization. This, in turn, was a reflection of the pettiness of the many dictators that were to proliferate on the continent. Content with their little fiefdoms, they lacked vision and the will to imagine large units to which they would have to surrender some of the power they exercised over their hapless country men and women. And then, of course, there was the continued divide and rule of the neo-colonial powers.

In Africa, much of the debate on regional integration harks back to the 1960s in which regional integration assumed the extension of import-substitution industrialization among 'planned' economies. Consequently, emphasis was on complementary economies rather than on competition within the region. Regional integration in the context of globalization is usually geared towards enhancing the bargaining position of members in global negotiations and in serving as training ground for regional firms to compete equally in highly competitive global markets. Such arrangements have invariably involved some form of preferential treatment of member states. However, this goes against the thrust of structural adjustment

Box 2.1 (continued)

programmes, which tend to view such preferential treatment as 'distortions'. Indeed, in the context of Africa, the adoption of SAPs by individual African countries has often contradicted the terms of their adhesion to regional arrangements.

In conclusion, the current directions of globalization, Africa's own internal conditions and the manner in which Africa is being 'adjusted' to the exigencies of globalization are not supportive of this 'historical mission'.

Globalization everywhere provokes particularistic responses which take many forms. There are at least two possible wrong ways of reacting to globalization: one can either escape into xenophobic 'fundamentalism' or 'nativist' positions or one can engage in blind celebration of the 'universal' by an uncritical embrace of globalization. A better response is to see that the reformist impulses of the nationalist agenda, revamped to reflect the changed times, constitute a useful point of departure in dealing with

globalization. The face of Africa lies in a collective rethinking of the continent's unfulfilled humanistic tasks in the light of what has transpired and the concrete situation today so as to recast them into cornerstones of social justice, solidarity and equality and to enable the continent to reconnect with the rest of the world in a mutually beneficial way.

Thandika Mkandawire

Human Development in SADC: Achievements and Setbacks

*SADC still has
to do more to expand
the choices
of its citizens*

I. Overall Setting

Chapters 1 and 2 have presented the historical context of poverty, underdevelopment and the current conjuncture of low economic growth. This is the socio-economic context within which the human development situation in SADC is being analysed. It is a context of a region attempting a transition from historically entrenched inequalities and poverty relating to race, gender and class, and a highly skewed distribution of income and control of national resources. Post-independence civil conflicts have absorbed enormous amounts of resources through the purchase of armaments and the cost of military operations, while they have taken a tragic human toll and disrupted socio-economic development and infrastructure. SADC is attempting a transition from a state of economic fragility dependent on monocultures and commodity exports, beset by weak institutional capacity and ineffective policy management, to an economy that can achieve equitable and sustainable human development.

II. The Human Development Situation in the SADC Region

Human development is a process of expanding people's choices by enabling people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. It is a paradigm of development built on people's own aspirations for security, justice, empowerment and freedom. It has emerged as an alternative to the traditional perspective on development that focuses merely on economic progress. From the human development perspective, economic growth is not an end in itself, only a means to human development. The purpose of wealth should be to enrich every child, every woman and every man to reach her or his full potential. Yet, as the experience of many countries has shown, economic growth does not automatically translate into human development.

What are the conditions for human development? The list of factors contributing to achievements in human development can be long and varies according to country-specific circumstances. Some basic conditions are, however, relevant in all SADC countries for the achievement of people-centred and sustainable development:

- *Good governance* to ensure that the state plays an active and enabling role in promoting human development. Governance needs to be democratic and participatory, free from corruption and mismanagement, and with adequate checks and balances through free and fair elections as well as playing an active role in critical civil society organizations.
- *Investment in social services*, providing equitable access to education, health care, safe water, sanitation and adequate shelter.
- *Equitable economic growth* that creates job opportunities, raises the incomes and livelihood opportunities of poor people, and generates the necessary resources for effective governance and adequate investment in social services.

- *Gender equality* to ensure that the fruits of progress are shared between women and men and that the pivotal role of women in all aspects of development is recognized.
- *Peace and security* or the absence of armed conflicts and rampant crime that has tragic consequences for human development, social cohesion and solidarity, and for economic prospects.

These conditions can be seen as the essentials of promoting human development and every effort must be made to ensure that they are met. A dynamic partnership between governments, civil society and the private sector can thus create the enabling environment for people's empowerment, people-centred development strategies, and equitable distribution of the fruits of economic progress.

(i) Achievements in Human Development

Despite the many economic, social and political challenges facing the SADC region, and the historical legacy of underdevelopment and inequality, long-term achievements in human development have been impressive. Great strides have been made since independence towards universal access to primary education and enrolment rates have increased dramatically. Between 1970 and 1995, adult literacy in the region has increased from 48% to 71%. People in the region can expect to live 11 years longer today than 35 years ago. Seventy-six percent of one-year-olds are immunized against tuberculosis and nearly 70% against measles. The infant mortality rate has fallen from a regional average of 131 in 1970 to 105 in 1996 per 1 000 live births. The percentage of people with access to safe drinking water has increased in most countries, as well as the percentage of people with access to sanitation.

In terms of political freedom and people's participation, great progress has also been made. Twelve of the 14 countries in the region have made the transition from one-party to multi-party parliamentary systems, and civil society is thriving with an ever-increasing number of dynamic non-governmental organizations working for political reform and fighting human deprivation. In South Africa, the fall of *apartheid* in 1994 was a historic step forward for human development not only for South Africa but also for the region as a whole. Thirty years of civil war in Mozambique has finally ended and, with the notable exception of the DRC and Angola, the region is experiencing a newfound peace and stability, essential for human development and democratic governance.

(ii) Challenges and Setbacks


But many challenges still remain and progress in human development is under threat. A third of the region's people live on less than US\$1,00 per day. Forty percent of the population is estimated to live in human poverty, as defined below. Twenty-nine percent of people are not expected to survive to the age of 40. About one-fifth of all children under five years of age is under-weight, and about a third of all children do not reach grade five at school. Many people do not have access to essential social services. Nearly 60% are without access to basic health services, over half are without access to sanitation and over 40% are without access to safe drinking water.

One of the most worrying setbacks in human development is in the area of health. In almost all the countries in the region, government expenditure on social services rose significantly after independence as they sought to redress the inherited colonial imbalances in access to health and education. These investments did not, as some believe, contribute to the budget deficit crisis affecting the region in the 1980s and 1990s. The deficits were mainly due to low or negative economic growth, inflation, high unemployment, and, to a certain degree, high military expenditures. By the beginning of the 1990s, almost all countries had been urged to implement economic reforms by the IMF and the World Bank. This has led to significant reductions in public spending on health, as well as other social services such as education, and is now leading to a deteriorating health situation in the region.

There has been good progress in human development, though it is now threatened by war, HIV/AIDS and economic decline

There have been setbacks in the health sector due to HIV/AIDS

Figure 3.1
People Living with AIDS, Percentage of Adults 15-49 years, 1997




Source: UNAIDS, 1998

A new and significant threat to human development in the region is the AIDS pandemic. The combination of shrinking resources for health services and the AIDS pandemic is a deadly cocktail. On average, the HIV-infection rate among adults in SADC is 12% and rising rapidly. Zimbabwe and Botswana, with a quarter of the adult population living with HIV/AIDS, are now the two hardest hit countries in the world. Recent estimates suggest about 2,9 million people are HIV-positive in South Africa. AIDS is an unspeakable human tragedy and its social and economic impact can jeopardize years of progress in human development and economic progress.

As a result of the AIDS pandemic, combined with inadequate and shrinking public expenditure on health services, life expectancy has already started to drop. The 11-year increase in life expectancy achieved by the region since 1960 is now being eroded.

Figure 3.2
Change in Life Expectancy



Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report 1998; UNDP, Human Development Report 1992 & United Nations Population Division, 1998

For example, life expectancy decreased between 1990 and 1995 by 12 years in Zambia, eight years in Botswana, and seven years in Malawi. In countries of the region hardest hit by the pandemic – Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe – the average life expectancy would have reached 58 years in 1995–2000. But because of AIDS it is expected to fall to 48 years. Botswana was expected to reach a life expectancy of 67 years in 2000–2005. Instead, life expectancy is now projected to fall to 41 years in that period. In Zimbabwe, life expectancy is also projected to fall to 41 years in 2000–2005; it would have reached 66 years.

III. Measurement of Human Development

The Human Development Index (HDI) presented in UNDP's Human Development Report, 1990, attempted to measure and rank countries according to progress in human development. The concept of human development is much broader than what the HDI can reveal. It is not possible to come up with a comprehensive measure, or even a comprehensive set of indicators, because many vital dimensions of human development are not quantifiable. But a simple composite measure of human development provides a snapshot of the situation at the country or local level.

The HDI measures the overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development – longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living. It is measured by life expectancy, educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment) and adjusted income.

The purpose of the index is to focus the attention of policy-makers on the most important challenges of development. It provides an important alternative to GNP as a measure of progress.

Box 3.1

A Primer on the Human Development Index

Why do we need a human development index?

Because national progress tends otherwise to be measured by GNP alone, many people have looked for a better, more comprehensive socio-economic measure. The human development index is a contribution to this search.

What does the HDI include?

The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and mean years of schooling (one-third of weight). Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita adjusted for the local cost of living (purchasing power parity, or PPP).

Why only three components?

The ideal would be to reflect all aspects of human experience. The lack of data imposes some limits on this, and more indicators could perhaps be added as the information becomes available. But more

indicators would not necessarily be better. Some might overlap with existing indicators: infant mortality, for example, is already reflected in life expectancy. And adding more variables could confuse the picture and detract from the main trends.

How to combine indicators measured in different units?

The measuring rod for GNP is money. The breakthrough for the HDI, however, was to find a common measuring rod for the socio-economic distance travelled. The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for each dimension and then shows where each country stands in relation to these scales – expressed as a value between 0 and 1. So, since the minimum adult literacy rate is 0% and the maximum is 100%, the literacy component of knowledge for a country where literacy rate is 75% would be 0.75. Similarly, the minimum for life expectancy is 25 years and the maximum 85 years, so the longevity component for a country where life expectancy is 55 years would be 0.5. For income the minimum is \$100 (PPP) and the maximum is \$40 000 (PPP). Income above the average world income is adjusted using a progressively

higher discount rate. The scores for the three dimensions are then averaged in an overall index.

Is it not misleading to talk of a single HDI for a country with great inequality?

National averages can conceal much. The best solution would be to create separate HDIs for the most significant groups: by gender, for example, or by income group. Separate HDIs would reveal a more detailed profile of human deprivation in each country, and disaggregated HDIs are already being attempted for countries with sufficient data. Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe are some of the SADC countries where the HDI has been disaggregated to regional level.

How can the HDI be used?

The HDI offers an alternative to GNP for measuring the relative socio-economic progress of nations. It enables people and their governments to evaluate progress over time – and to determine priorities for policy intervention. It also permits instructive comparisons of the experiences in different countries.

This report presents a SADC-specific HDI that uses the same components and methodology as the global HDI but with one adjustment. The income component has been adjusted to reflect the lower average income in the region (see Technical Note).

The SADC-specific HDI reveals that Seychelles ranks highest with a value of 0,826, Mauritius second with 0,819 and South Africa third with 0,782. The three lowest ranking countries in the region are the DRC with 0,411, Malawi with 0,407 and Mozambique with 0,374 (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1
SADC-specific HDI, 1995

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC HDI (Value) 1995	SADC HDI Adjusted for Income Inequality (Value) 1995
1	Seychelles	0,826	..
2	Mauritius	0,819	..
3	South Africa	0,782	0,603
4	Swaziland	0,729	..
5	Namibia	0,724	0,508
6	Zimbabwe	0,679	0,492
7	Botswana	0,679	0,507
8	Lesotho	0,597	0,480
9	Angola	0,528	..
10	Zambia	0,473	0,400
11	Tanzania	0,416	0,377
12	DRC	0,411	..
13	Malawi	0,407	0,332
14	Mozambique	0,374	..
SADC		0,530	0,450

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Data Bank, 1998

Table 3.2
SADC-specific HDI with Adjustment for Income Inequality, 1995

HDI after Adjustment for Income Inequality Rank	Country	SADC HDI (Value) 1995	SADC HDI Adjusted for Income Inequality (Value) 1995	Fall in SADC HDI after Adjustment for Income Inequality (%) 1995
1	South Africa	0,782	0,603	22,9
2	Namibia	0,724	0,508	29,8
3	Zimbabwe	0,679	0,492	27,5
4	Botswana	0,679	0,507	25,3
5	Lesotho	0,597	0,480	19,6
6	Zambia	0,473	0,400	15,4
7	Tanzania	0,416	0,377	9,4
8	Malawi	0,407	0,332	18,4

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Data Bank, 1998

One limitation of the HDI is that it does not take into account unequal income distribution. Given the fact that income inequalities are particularly great in the SADC region, this report presents a special HDI exercise in which the income component has been adjusted to reflect such inequality. This is done by multiplying the income component by a factor that indicates distributional inequality – using 1(one) minus the Gini coefficient – in order to give credit to countries with less income inequality. This study has been done for only eight countries whose Gini coefficient is available. *Table 3.2* presents the results of this exercise and shows a significant reduction in HDI values and a slight change of ranking. Namibia, which has the highest unequal distribution of income, has the highest fall of 29,8%.

The HDI needs to also address inequalities among countries and within countries

(i) How the HDI Can be Used

The HDI can be a useful tool for policy makers. It can highlight performance in the different components of the HDI and show in what area of human development countries are doing better or worse. The SADC-specific HDI shows that the region performed best in adult literacy, with only two countries having scores below 0,5 in each of these categories (*see Table 3.3*). The second best category was in combined gross enrolment ratios where only four countries were below 0,5. In income levels, five countries were below 0,5. The worst performance was in life expectancy where eight countries fell below 0,5. In the income component of the HDI, Seychelles and Mauritius reached a score of more than 0,9.

Table 3.3
Analysis of 1995 HDI Component for SADC Countries:
Number of Countries by Different Levels of Performance.

HDI range	Life Expectancy	Adult Literacy	Gross Enrolment Ratios	Income per Capita
0,0–0,49	8	2	4	5
0,5–0,59	3	1	2	1
0,6–0,69	1	2	3	0
0,7–0,79	2	5	3	0
0,8–0,89	0	4	2	6
0,9–0,99	0	0	0	2
1,0	0	0	0	0
Total	14	14	14	14

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Data Bank

Another way that the HDI can be an effective tool for policy making is when it is disaggregated to show differences in human development performance within countries. The country HDI hides major internal regional, racial, ethnic, gender and rural–urban disparities. By measuring the relative achievements in human development by, for example, province, policy makers can use the findings to determine which provinces/regions need to be prioritized in the country's development efforts. In some countries around the world, disaggregated HDIs are used to help determine budget allocations to provincial and local governments on the basis of their level of human development.

The SADC region is bracing itself for a new millennium and a new century. The dawn of the new millennium brings in new challenges. One of these challenges is globalization. Globalization implies interdependence and competition. For Africa, globalization may turn out to mean dependence and marginalization. If Africa is going to escape the condition of dependence and marginalization, human resource development should take the centre stage. The SADC region has fully recognized this imperative. The Protocol on Education and Training in the SADC region is based on this recognition. Human-centred development is recognized as one of the essential means for socio-economic development. Sustainable development is only possible when high literacy and numeracy levels are achieved throughout the region. Collaboration among the SADC countries in the provision of high quality education and training, technological research and development, and implementation of a co-ordinated comprehensive and integrated programme of human resource development are recognized to be essential. In short, human capital formation in the SADC region is the key to ensuring that the region will be a major player in the global village.

Human capital formation does, however, require policies which are demand driven, effective and affordable. At minimum, the SADC region should aim at achieving the following in the field of education and training:

- Basic education for all;
- Science, mathematics and technological education;
- Technical, vocational and entrepreneurial education;
- Knowledge, scholarship and service-based higher education system;
- Research and development;
- Science and technology agenda;
- Cultural development.

In order to ensure that high literacy and numeracy levels are achieved throughout the region, all countries in the SADC region should promote basic education for all. This may mean universal primary education or free and compulsory education for children between the ages of six to 16. Basic education for all will create a critical mass for further education. It should also be understood as a right for the citizens of the SADC region.

The basis for technological research and development is a solid foundation in science and mathematics. The teaching of science and mathematics should, therefore, receive priority in general education in the SADC region. This will require well-trained teachers for science and mathematics. In addition, appropriate textbooks and other instructional materials should be developed and be shared throughout the region. For example, the Zim-Science programme in Zimbabwe should be made available throughout the region.

Technical, vocational and entrepreneurial education has traditionally received low priority and prestige. It is, however, being recognized that economic productivity and competitiveness, to a large extent, depend upon the technical competence of the labour force. Technical, vocational and entrepreneurial education should, therefore, be promoted in the SADC region in order to ensure there is the regional capacity to compete in the global market.

The SADC region should move towards manufacturing and value addition. This will be the basis for industrialization. This strategy is only possible if higher education systems in the region reorient themselves towards knowledge-based development. Academic output and scholarship should be geared towards addressing the development needs of the region. Centres of higher learning should also be centres of service and entrepreneurship. Knowledge acquisition and creation should form the central pillar in accelerating socio-economic development. This means that our higher education institutions should move away from being consumers of knowledge from the north to creators of knowledge to empower the south. The SADC Protocol on Education and Training emphasized this strategy when it stressed the importance of establishing and promoting regional centres of specialization and centres of excellence. These are aimed at being the major instruments for providing efficient and effective education and training, research and development in the region.

Until now, Africa has not given due priority to research and development and the promotion of science and technology. If the SADC region is going to be a major player in the global economy, the region should invest at least 2% of its GDP in research and development, and science and technology. A synergy should be developed between the regional centres of

excellence and industry. Centres of excellence should provide the necessary research infrastructure. Such research infrastructure should offer opportunities for incubation of research findings. The industry should use the centres of excellence to develop new products and explore new markets.

Globalization will create a cultural melting pot. Strong cultures will predominate. The danger exists, therefore, that Africa will lose its identity. The people without identity are like a rudderless ship on the higher seas. Cultural development should form the anchor of human resource development efforts in the SADC region. In this way, the region will draw strength from its rich and resilient cultures. Regional identity, unity and pride will develop and flourish.

This agenda for regional human resource development calls for immediate implementation of the SADC Protocol on Education and Training. This will enable the region to achieve the following objectives:

- Establishment of mechanisms and institutional arrangements to pool regional resources to effectively and efficiently produce the required professional, technical research and managerial personnel;
- Promotion and co-ordination of appropriate policies for human resource development;
- Encouragement of the participation of the private sector, non-governmental organizations and other key stakeholders in the provision of education and training;
- Promotion and co-ordination of regional policies and strategies for science and technology, including new information technology and research and development;
- Promotion of free access to good quality education and training opportunity within the region;
- Progressively achieve the equivalencies, harmonization and standardization of the education and training systems in the region.

To achieve these objectives, the SADC region should augment its resources with those of the development partners. Overall, however, the region will only be successful if its leaders summon the necessary political will in order to subordinate national interests to the regional agenda.

Nahas Angula

In the SADC region, disaggregated HDIs have been published in the various national human development reports produced by some countries in the region. *Tables 3.4 and 3.5* show the urban–rural HDI disparities in Botswana and HDI disparities between districts in Zimbabwe.

Table 3.4
Urban–rural HDI Disparities in Botswana

Settlement type	Life Expectancy Index	Income Index	Literacy Index	Schooling Index	Educational Attainment Index	HDI
National	0,67	0,87	0,69	0,72	0,70	0,75
Urban	0,75	0,90	0,83	0,66	0,77	0,81
Rural	0,64	0,49	0,64	0,74	0,68	0,60

Note: Please note that a different methodology was used in calculating the Botswana HDI. The values shown in the table are therefore not comparable to the SADC-specific HDI

Source: Botswana Human Development Report, 1997

Table 3.5
HDI Disparities between Selected Districts in Zimbabwe, 1992–95

District	Life expectancy	Adult literacy (%)	Average years of schooling	Adjusted income per capita (per annum) (Z\$)	HDI Value	HDI Rank
Harare	64	94,04	8,06	3 876,24	0,79	2
Marondera Urban	61	92,76	6,99	2 850,59	0,68	13
Mudzi	60	61,86	4,15	709,36	0,41	72
Rusape	63	93,44	8,34	3 930,29	0,79	3
Chipinge	52	53,50	3,98	916,65	0,36	76
Bindura Urban	63	88,30	7,22	2 719,78	0,67	16
Rushinga	57	53,80	4,80	1 025,97	0,41	73
Chegutu Urban	62	89,03	8,01	3 503,51	0,74	8
Kariba Rural	55	59,17	3,43	550,61	0,36	77
Umguza	64	84,62	6,17	2 942,11	0,68	12
Binga	60	49,29	3,49	662,44	0,37	75
Gwanda Urban	65	93,40	7,69	3 916,20	0,79	1
Matobo	69	81,46	4,84	1 240,66	0,55	36
Gweru Urban	64	95,11	7,37	3 507,02	0,76	5
Mberengwa	62	75,39	4,55	1 249,32	0,50	57
Masvingo Urban	60	95,15	7,71	3 868,37	0,76	4
Mwenezi	57	60,88	4,12	638,25	0,38	74
Zimbabwe	61	80,38	5,56	3 819,91	0,72	...

Note: The districts in this table were selected from the 77 districts in Zimbabwe. They are the best and worst regions in each province and then Harare. The HDI value in this table is not comparable to the SADC-specific HDI value.

Source: Zimbabwe National Human Development Report (1998)

The HDI can also reveal how well economic growth has been translated into human development. The level of income does not truly reflect the state of human development in a country, and a high level of GDP per capita is no guarantee for a high level of HDI. *Table 3.6* compares the HDI and GDP per capita ranking of the SADC countries. Of the 14 countries, seven rank better according to HDI than according to GDP per capita, suggesting they have been more successful in converting economic prosperity into

Table 3.6

HDI and GDP Ranking for SADC Countries, 1995

Country	HDI SADC Value	HDI Rank	Real GDP per Capita (PPP\$)	Real GDP per Capita (PPP\$) Rank	Real GDP per Capita (PPP\$) Rank Minus HDI Rank
Seychelles	0,826	1	7 697	2	1
Mauritius	0,819	2	13 294	1	-1
South Africa	0,782	3	4 334	4	1
Swaziland	0,729	4	2 954	6	2
Namibia	0,724	5	4 054	5	0
Zimbabwe	0,679	6	2 135	7	1
Botswana	0,679	7	5 611	3	-4
Lesotho	0,597	8	1 290	9	1
Angola	0,528	9	1 839	8	-1
Zambia	0,473	10	986	10	0
Tanzania	0,416	11	636	13	2
DRC	0,411	12	355	14	2
Malawi	0,407	13	773	12	-1
Mozambique	0,374	14	959	11	-3

Source: UNDP, 1998 and SARIPS/SAPES Databank


human capabilities. This achievement is noteworthy for such low-income countries as Lesotho, Tanzania and the DRC.

For five countries, the HDI ranking is lower than the GDP per capita ranking, suggesting that they have failed to translate economic progress into correspondingly higher levels of human development. This is particularly so for high income countries like Botswana and Mauritius, as well as some low income countries such as Mozambique, Angola and Malawi. *Figure 3.3* provides an illustration of how two countries, Botswana and Zimbabwe, can have similar HDI, but very different income levels.

(ii) SADC Human Development Performance and the Rest of the World

How does the SADC region compare with the rest of the world? *Table 3.7* shows the performance of selected regions in terms of their HDI value and its various components. In terms of income, SADC has a better performance than Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and South Asia, but lags behind East Asia and is lower than the average of all developing countries. The same contrasts emerge in comparison of education enrolment and adult literacy. In life expectancy, SADC is slightly higher than Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, but lags far behind the other regions. East Asia has the highest HDI, followed by South Asia and SADC.

Figure 3.3

Botswana and Zimbabwe, Similar HDI and Different Incomes

Source: UNDP, 1998 and SARIPS/SAPES Databank

Table 3.7

Human Development Index and its Components in Selected Regions of the World

	Sub-Saharan Africa	SADC	South Asia	East Asia	All Developing Countries
Life expectancy (Years)	50,6	52,75	61,8	69,3	62,2
Adult literacy, %	56,9	70,47	50,5	82,4	70,4
Combined gross enrolment ratio, %	42,0	52,31	52	65	57
Real GDP per capita US\$(PPP\$)	1 407	1 806	1 724	3 359	3 068
Human Development Index	0,386	0,458	0,4621	0,676	0,586

Note: The HDI values in this table are taken from the global HDI and are therefore not comparable with the SADC-specific HDI values. The table does, however, show the relative level of human development in the various regions.

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1998

IV. Poverty and Income Inequality in SADC

Income distribution is highly skewed within SADC. However, this tends to be closely associated with settler-dominated economies. In general, the richest 20% of the population in most countries own and control a large slice of the national income (*see Figure 3.4*).


Namibia, with a Gini coefficient of 0,7, has the most highly skewed income distribution pattern in SADC. The extent of inequality is such that a tiny proportion of the population (11%), consisting of mainly people of European origin, earns 51,5% of total income, while the indigenous groups earn only 47% of income. South Africa and Zimbabwe also exhibit extreme cases of income inequality. South Africa, with a Gini coefficient of 0,58, has 41% of the urban population earning less than two-thirds of the national mean per capita income. Moreover, 23,7% of the country's population lives below the poverty line. The richest 10% in South Africa earns 47% of national income while the poorest 10% earn only 1,4%. The richest 20% earns 63% of income compared to only 3,3% earned by the poorest 20%. (Ncube, 1998) Inequality in income distribution in Zimbabwe is indicated by a high Gini coefficient of 0,63. In Zimbabwe, 41% of the population lives below the national poverty line. The richest 10% earns 47% of national income while the poorest 10% earns only 2%. The richest 20% earns 62% compared to only 4% earned by the poorest 20%. (Kamidza, et al, 1998) A large section of the population (41%) lives below the national poverty line.

Namibia has one of the most unequal income distributions in SADC

Other countries with comparable income inequalities include Lesotho and Botswana, with Gini coefficients of 0,56 and 0,54, respectively. In Lesotho, 50,4% of the population earns an income that is below the income poverty line of US\$1 a day (*see Annex Table 5*). The richest 20% earns 60% of income while the poorest 20% earns only 3% of income. In Botswana, 34,7% of the population lives below the income poverty line of US\$1 a day while the richest 20% earns 59% of income and the poorest 20% earns only 3,6%.

Tanzania and Zambia have relatively less income inequality when judged by the percentage of income accruing to the top of the population, although poverty levels are high. However, in Zambia, 86% of the population lives below the national poverty line. Poverty is mainly concentrated in rural areas, where 75% of the people earn less than two-thirds of the national average per capita income (*see Annex Table 3*). More than 75% of household income is spent on food. In Tanzania, 50% of the population lives below the national poverty line. Tanzania's Gini coefficient is quite low (0,38) indicating a more

Figure 3.4
Selected SADC Countries with High Income Inequality, 1986-95
 (Income share of the richest and poorest 20% of the population)



Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1997

equitable income distribution pattern than is the case in other SADC member states. However, 52% of the rural population receive incomes less than two-thirds of the national average per capita income and 70% of household incomes are spent on food.

The pattern of income distribution in Tanzania and Zambia may be due to the welfarist policies which those governments pursued during the immediate post-independence era. However, the advent of market-oriented policies have tended to impact negatively on the patterns of income distribution. Therefore, income distribution is likely to become more unequal over time unless these countries adopt measures designed to reduce income disparity.

It is interesting to note that income inequality has tended to be rather high in countries with a good economic performance record, such as Namibia, Botswana and South Africa. What this suggests is that income growth does not reach the majority of the people in these countries. In other words, high economic performance is not always accompanied by high human development.

One important factor contributing to income disparities and poverty in the SADC region is access to formal sector employment. Policies are required to address the need for patterns of economic growth that expands job opportunities and thus contributes to the reduction of poverty.

Box 3.3

Employment and Unemployment in Botswana

As discussed in Chapter 3, rapid growth in formal sector employment has been one of the main factors that explains improvements in living standards in Botswana. On the other hand, disparities in access to formal sector employment provide much of the explanation for disparities in income levels.

The private sector accounts for about 60% of total wage employment. After many years of rapidly increasing private sector employment, the share of the private sector decreased from 63% in 1989 to 57% in 1995, while the share of government increased. This was primarily due to the economic recession of the early 1990s. By 1996, the effects of the recession had started to give way to a modest expansion in private sector employment. Employment in parastatals has remained fairly stable at around 6%.

During the recession, the overall decline in employment in the private sector was especially severe in manufacturing and construction. Employment construction fell by 33% between 1991 and 1996, from 33 800 to 22 500. In manufacturing, the fall in employment was less severe, from 26 000 to 23 900, a decrease of 8%.

In 1993, the labour force participation rate stood at approximately 50% in 1993, with about 60% for males and 40% for females. The estimated unemployment rate was 21% in 1994. Unemployment is prevalent among young people, people in rural areas and women. Among people of 20–24 years and 25–29 years, the unemployment rate was 36% and 27% respectively. Unemployment was higher for women than men in all settlement types. In urban areas, male unemployment stood at 14% while female unemployment was 22%; in

rural areas, male unemployment was 19%, compared with 20% for females.

A relatively high proportion of Botswana's formal sector jobs have depended on public provision rather than independent private enterprise. Compared with other countries, the share of the public sector employment (including parastatals) is high. Much of private sector employment is in large, often foreign-owned companies, many of which depend to a large extent on supplying goods and services to government or to people whose salaries are paid by government. Much of the potential for employment creation in future depends on establishing greater participation by Botswana in private enterprise, with more emphasis on competitiveness and services industries.

Sources of Household Income and Livelihood in Botswana

Cash earnings are the main source of income for most Botswana households, and especially among the better off. According to the 1993/94 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, cash earnings accounted for more than 60% of gross household income, having increased significantly since 1985/86. Formal sector wage employment was the main source of cash income. The HIES data confirm that the economic well-being of the average Botswana household is predominately, and increasingly, reliant upon wage employment.

Total income in kind, of which own-produce in agriculture is the major component, accounted for less than 20% of total household incomes in both 1985/86 and 1993/94, illustrating that own-produce has long been a relatively minor source of income for the average Botswana household. Even among the rural poor, income from own-produce tends to be a relatively limited source of income. Unlike many other African countries, therefore, own-produce from subsistence farming typically provides only a very modest contribution towards household income in the rural areas.

Poverty

The recent Study of Poverty and Poverty Alleviation in Botswana (BIDPA, 1997) has confirmed that poverty alleviation remains one of the major challenges for human development in Botswana. Poverty is generally associated with lack of income and lack of education, skills and other

human capabilities. Poverty reduces people's choices whereas sustainable human development is intended to enlarge these.

According to the poverty study, some 623 100 people, equivalent to 47% of Botswana's population, were living in income poverty in 1993/94.¹ While this level of poverty is high, there had been an improvement compared with 1985/86 when there were 650 719 people living in poverty, equivalent to 59% of the population. This is shown in *Figures 3.5 and 3.6*.

Poverty is higher and more severe in rural areas and lower and less severe in urban areas. As *Figure 3.6* shows, in 1993/94 some 55% of the rural population was living in income poverty, as compared with 46% in urban villages and 29% in urban areas. In rural areas, 40% of people were 'very poor' and about 15% were 'poor',² while in urban areas only about 9% were 'very poor' and 20% were 'poor'. A limited analysis of income poverty by geographical area indicates that the incidence and severity of poverty is highest in the sparsely populated western and more remote parts of the country. However, in terms of an absolute head count, the greatest concentration of poverty is in the central and north-east districts, which have a higher population and relatively high rates of poverty.

There are differences in poverty rates between male-headed households (MHH) and female-headed households (FHH).

Nationally, 50% of FHH were in poverty in 1993/94, as compared with 44% of MHH. As *Figure 3.7* shows, the poverty headcount rate for FHH was higher than MHH for each settlement type in both 1985/86 and 1993/94. Between 1985/86 and 1993/94 this disparity between FHH and MHH widened.

While the causes of poverty are seen to be many and complex, the poverty study argues that much of Botswana's poverty is structural – rooted in Botswana's narrow economic base and in the social disadvantages that are common among the poor. These problems are greatest in rural areas and urban villages.

¹ Income poverty refers to the inability to command the level of income or expenditure needed to attain a minimum standard of living, as defined by the Botswana poverty datum line.

² The poverty study categorized people as 'very poor' if they had income or expenditure less than that required to purchase the food component of the poverty datum line. People were categorized as 'poor' if they had enough income or expenditure to obtain the food component, but not enough to cover all elements of the poverty datum line.

Box 3.4 continued

Figure 3.5

Poverty Headcount by Gender of Household Head, Botswana 1985/86




Figure 3.6

Poverty Headcount by Gender of Household Head, Botswana 1993/94





Figure 3.7
Poverty Headcount by Settlement Type, Botswana 1993/94

Source : National Human Development Report, Botswana, 1997

V. Human Poverty in SADC

Being poor is usually defined as living below a certain income level or income poverty line. This perspective in analysing and measuring poverty leads to results that do not properly reflect the complex nature of poverty in all its dimensions. From a human development perspective, poverty means the denial of choices and opportunities most basic to human development. A new definition of poverty, or human poverty, has emerged and covers a wide range of deprivations affecting people, not only lack of income. Human poverty involves deprivation in health and survival, lack of knowledge, denial of opportunities for a creative and productive life, social exclusion, lack of freedom, as well as deprivation in income. In simple terms, human poverty can be seen as the denial of human development.

The Human Development Report, 1997 proposed a new way of measuring poverty in developing countries using the Human Poverty Index (HPI). While the HDI measures overall progress in a country in achieving human development, the HPI reflects the distribution of progress and measures backlogs of deprivation in the same dimensions of basic human development as the HDI. The index measures the proportion of the population affected by three key deprivations affecting their lives:

- deprivation in survival – measured by the percentage of people expected to die before age 40;
- deprivation in knowledge – measured by the percentage of adults who are illiterate;
- deprivation in 'economic provisioning' – measured by the percentage of people without access to health services and safe water, as well as the percentage of underweight children under five.

Table 3.8
Human Poverty Index for SADC

SADC HDI Rank Country	HPI Rank 1995	Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) Value (%) 1995	People Not Expected to Survive Total Age 40 (as % of total population) 1995	Adult Illiteracy Rate (%) 1995	Population without Access to		
					Safe Water (%) 1990-96	Health Services (%) 1990-95	Sanitation (%) 1990-96
1 Seychelles	22,0	3	1	..
2 Mauritius	1	12,1	4	17,1	2	0 ^a	0
3 South Africa	13	18,2	1	..	47
4 Swaziland	21	23,3	40	55	30
5 Namibia	5	30,0	26	24,0 ^b	43	41	66
6 Zimbabwe	2	25,2	34	14,9	21	15	48
7 Botswana	4	27,0	31	30,2	7 ^a	11 ^a	45
8 Lesotho	3	25,7	23	28,7	38	20 ^a	62
9 Angola	38	58,0	68	24	84
10 Zambia	6	36,9	42	21,8	73	25 ^a	36
11 Tanzania	7	39,8	31	32,2	62	58	14
12 DRC	8	41,1	30	22,7	58	74 ^a	82
13 Malawi	9	47,7	46	43,6	63	65	94
14 Mozambique	10	48,5	38	59,9	37	61 ^a	46
SADC		39,9	28,8	29,6	41,6	56,9	54,5

a. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country.

b. UNICEF 1998. *The State of The World's Children*, 1998 New York: Oxford University Press

The HPI for the SADC region (see Table 3.8) reveals that 40% of people are living in human poverty. Mozambique has the highest level of human poverty (48,5%), followed by Malawi (47,7%), DRC (41,1%) and Tanzania (39,8%). On the other hand, the country with the lowest level of human poverty is Mauritius (12,1%), followed by Zimbabwe (25,2%) and Lesotho (25,7%).

The high HPI in Mozambique is a result of a high rate of adult illiteracy (59,9%) and a large percentage of people without access to health services (61%). Malawi's HPI is also high mainly due to a low survival rate, high percentage of people without access to safe water (65%) and a high percentage of people without access to health services (65%) and without access to sanitation (94%). The percentage of underweight children in 1990-97 was also high in Malawi (30%), the DRC (34%), Mozambique and Tanzania (27%), and Namibia (26%). Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, and the DRC have a long way to go to ensure people's access to safe water.

The HPI can also be a useful tool for analysis and policy-making when it is disaggregated by region, ethnic group or urban/rural areas. Results from such exercises can assist governments to focus attention on, and allocate resources to, the most deprived regions or groups in a country. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 provide interesting examples from Namibia and Zambia of how this can be done.

Table 3.9

HPI by Language/Ethnic Group in Namibia, Early 1990s

Rank	Language/Ethnic group	HPI value (%)
1	English	8
2	German	10
3	Afrikaans	11
4	Tswana	21
5	Nama/Damara	31
6	Otjiherero	34
7	Lozi/Caprivi	41
8	Oshiwambo	43
9	Rukavango	44
10	San	65

Source: Namibia National Human Development Report, 1997

Table 3.10

Regional HPI Disparity in Zambia, 1996

Rank	Province	HPI value (%)
1	Lusaka	14,2
2	Copperbelt	14,2
3	Southern	21,9
4	Central	22,2
5	Northern	24,6
6	Luapala	24,7
7	North Western	25,5
8	Western	28,4
9	Eastern	30,1

Source: Zambia National Human Development Report, 1997

The HPI has, however, some limitations. Further work is needed to improve it in order to reflect the specific reality of the SADC region. One interesting initiative has been the development of the so-called Human Deprivation Measure (HDM) similar to the one developed for South Asia by Mahbub Ul Haq, 1997, thus far only calculated for South Africa and Zimbabwe. The added benefit of using the HDM methodology is that, while using the same dimensions as the HPI, it also includes a measure for land deprivation (Box 3.5).

Measuring Human Deprivation in South Africa and Zimbabwe

The lack of human capabilities and opportunities in the SADC countries should be reconsidered through a format different from the HPI developed by UNDP's Human Development Report, 1987. A SADC Human Deprivation Measure (HDM) has been introduced in this report. The HDM is an attempt to bring together, in a composite index, the different dimensions of deprivation in human life. The Human Deprivation Measure (HDM) has been designed to measure human deprivation in South Africa and Zimbabwe. As in the case of HPI, this new measure is the reverse side of the Human Development Index (HDI). In the context of Southern Africa, HDM is therefore more representative than the HPI. Just as the HDI extends the GNP measure to include other aspects of human capabilities not captured by income estimates, the HDM extends the measure of income poverty to include the broader characteristics of poverty in the SADC context and deprivation of human capabilities and opportunities. The methodology of the HDM is as given in the Technical Note 4.

The HDM provides an aggregate human measurement of the prevalence of poverty in a community. It also draws attention to deprivation in four essential elements of human life (of which three are already reflected in the human poverty index, HPI, developed by UNDP).

What's the difference between the HPI and the HDM?

The HPI measures the extent of deprivation in three essential dimensions of human life – longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living; the HDM is a more complete version of HPI and it reflects SADC-specific deprivation issues. The HDM also takes account of land deprivation.

Estimates of the HDM have been worked out for only South Africa and Zimbabwe, for which data is available (see Technical Note 4). The HDM value reflects the proportion of people affected by the four key deprivations.

What does the HDM reveal?

The HDM reveals that 19% of people in South Africa are deprived of the four

essential elements of life. In Zimbabwe the HDM is 64%.

A comparison of HDI and HDM values shows how well or poorly the average achievements in a country are distributed as shown in the table below.

South Africa and Zimbabwe are both high-level SADC HDI countries and have almost similar levels of overall human development, but the HDM for South Africa is only 19% while that for Zimbabwe is 64%. This reveals that the fruits of human development are distributed more inequitably in Zimbabwe than in South Africa (except for land distribution).

The HDM also shows progress marked by the income measure of poverty. In Zimbabwe, for example, income poverty is severe at 74%, but the country has made some progress in reducing human poverty, thereby achieving an HDM value of 64%.

Thus, despite the remarkable progress in human development, the backlog of human deprivation remains high.

Human Deprivation Measure (HDM) for South Africa and Zimbabwe

Country	Health Deprivation Measure (%)	Education Deprivation Measure (%)	Income Deprivation Measure (%)	Land Deprivation Measure (%)	Human Deprivation Measure (HDM) (%)	Human Development Index SADC HDI
South Africa	20,0	17,6	23,7	13	19	0,805
Zimbabwe	36,3	25,4	74,0	15	64	0,701

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Databank

VI. Gender Inequality in Human Development

The SADC region has made some progress over the past 30 years in achieving a more equitable distribution between women and men of the benefits of development. Education levels have been steadily rising for women. The gap between women and men in adult literacy has fallen between 1985 and 1990 for most SADC countries.

Despite these achievements, women continue to be poorer than men in the SADC region. Colonial policies, which forbade African women from moving freely into the cities, ensured an immense pool of free labour in rural areas, which made the migration system work (*Figure 3.5*). Buttressed by an ancient African patriarchy which defined women as male property within family and household structures, the colonial state extended patriarchal controls over African women through a combination of various legal and 'cultural' mechanisms. Southern African women were forbidden access to paid employment well into the 1950s, when black men began to move out of domestic service and into 'masculine' occupations like the construction industry, manufacturing and transport.

Although Southern African women were allowed to work as domestic servants for white settlers, a form of employment which was in reality an extension of their reproductive roles, the majority of women remained trapped in poverty stricken tribal trust lands or homelands of the regions. Their main economic role was engaging in subsistence production for the survival of their families. This is the situation that prevails to the present day.

(i) Measuring Gender Inequalities

Gender inequality can be measured by the Gender-related Development Index (GDI). This index captures achievements in the same way that the HDI does (i.e., by examining life expectancy, educational attainment and income) but adjusts the HDI for gender inequality. The greater the gender disparity in human development, the lower the country's GDI relative to its HDI. A SADC-specific GDI has been calculated to better reflect the large disparities in income levels between women and men (*see Technical Note 2*).

Ranking the SADC countries by GDI reveals that South Africa is in first place, followed by Mauritius and Namibia. The lowest GDI is found in Mozambique, followed by Malawi and the DRC (*Table 3.11*).

Table 3.11

SADC Specific Gender-related Development Index

SADC GDI Rank Country	SADC GDI (Value) 1995	SADC GDI Adjusted for Income Inequality (Value) 1995
1 South Africa	0,694	0,565
2 Mauritius	0,688	..
3 Namibia	0,657	0,487
4 Swaziland	0,655	..
5 Zimbabwe	0,634	0,473
6 Botswana	0,631	0,482
7 Lesotho	0,533	0,451
8 Angola	0,477	..
9 Zambia	0,448	0,383
10 Tanzania	0,406	0,367
11 DRC	0,389	..
12 Malawi	0,379	0,309
13 Mozambique	0,332	..
14 Seychelles
SADC	0,488	0,457

SOURCE: SARIPS/SAPES Data Bank

Despite the progress that has been made, more investment in improving the basic capability of women is needed. In comparison to other regions of the world, the SADC region fares poorly, although it is better than the average of Sub-Saharan Africa. The SADC GDI is 22% lower than the average GDI for all developing countries as shown in *Table 3.12* and even lower than East Asia.

Table 3.12
Gender Profile in SADC, 1995


	SADC	Sub-Saharan Africa	East Asia	South Asia	All Developing Countries
Female Education Profile					
Adult literacy (%)	62,3	47,9	74,1	36,9	61,7
1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio	49,2	42	65	52	57
Female Health Profile					
Female life expectancy	54,5	52,2	71,5	62,1	63,6
Maternal mortality rate per 100 000	467,7	975	95	551	488
Total fertility rate	4,9	6	1,9	3,5	3,2
Contraceptive prevalence rate (%)	27,2	16	82	41	56
Female Economic Opportunities					
Earned income share	35	36,2	37,7	24,8	32,4
Women's share of adult labour force, %	42	47	46	34	41
Administrators and managers, 1993	11,23	10	5	3	10
Female Political Participation					
Share of females in parliament	9,2	10 ^a	2 ^a	6,3	8,6
Women in government at ministerial level (%)	6	7	6	4	5
Human Development Indices					
GDI	0,442	0,376	0,665	0,430	0,564
GEM, 1993	0,360	0,279	0,282	0,233	0,351

Source: UNDP, (1998) and Human Development in South Asia, (1997)

a: data for 1994

The GDI and GEM are from the global Human Development Reports and are therefore not comparable to the SADC-specific GDI and GEM. Using the same methodology as in the case with HDI, a special exercise has been conducted to adjust the GDI to better reflect the stark income inequalities in the region (see Table 3.11). Namibia – with one of the most unequal distributions of income – sees its GDI reduced by 25,9% when income inequalities are taken into account. Zimbabwe's GDI falls by 25% and that of Botswana by 23,6%. Tanzania's GDI is reduced by only 9,6% (see Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.8
Difference between GDI and Income-distribution-adjusted GDI, %



(ii) Women's Economic and Political Participation

Although progress has been made in building women's capabilities in terms of education and health, there is a serious delay in creating real political and economic opportunities for women. Lack of female participation can be measured by the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). While the GDI measures overall disparities between women and men in human development, the GEM reveals whether women can take an active part in economic and political life. It tracks the percentage of women in parliament, among administrators and managers and among professional and technical workers, as well as women's earned income share as a percentage of men's.

The GEM for SADC countries reveals that most progress in economic and political opportunities for women has been highest in South Africa, followed by Botswana and Lesotho. The lowest record is in the DRC, followed by Malawi (Table 3.13).


Table 3.13
GEM Ranking for SADC Countries, 1995

Country	SADC GEM Value	SADC GEM Rank	SADC GDI Rank	SADC HDI Rank
South Africa	0,461	1	1	2
Botswana	0,418	2	5	5
Mauritius	0,403	3	2	1
Lesotho	0,389	4	6	6
Zimbabwe	0,352	5	4	4
Swaziland	0,347	6	3	3
Mozambique	0,334	7	10	10
Zambia	0,236	8	7	7
Malawi	0,206	9	9	9
DRC	0,143	10	8	8
SADC	0,39			

Source : SARIPS/SAPES Databank

Women were denied rights to vote in all SADC countries until the 1960s, with the exception of South Africa where women gained the right to vote in 1930. Women's parliamentary representation in the region remains below 20% in all countries except Mozambique (25,2%), South Africa (23,7%) and Seychelles (23,3%) as shown in Annex Table 8. The percentage of women in government at ministerial level in 1995 is highest in Seychelles (31%), Tanzania (16%) and Namibia (10%), but remains below 10% in all other countries (see Annex Table 13).

Figure 3.9:
Percent of Women in Parliament in Selected SADC countries



Source: UN 1991, Women's World

But the extent of political disempowerment of women goes beyond a lack of participation at the higher levels of decision-making. Denied the right to property and having only usufruct access to land through a husband, most women have spent their lives with low levels of literacy and without decision-making power. Women are vulnerable to a number of traditional practices such as inheritance, violence, forced marriages and widowhood rites.

Table 3.14
Introduction of Women's Right to Vote and Election to Parliament in SADC Countries

Country	Year of Women's Right to Vote	Year First Woman Elected to National Parliament
Angola	1975	1980
Botswana	1965	1979
DRC	1967	1970
Lesotho	1965	1965
Malawi	1961	1964
Mauritius	1956	1976
Mozambique	1975	1977
Namibia	1989	1989
Seychelles	1948	1976
South Africa	1930*	1933*
Swaziland	1968	1972
Tanzania	1959	1961
Zambia	1962	1964
Zimbabwe	1957	1980

Source: UNDP (1998)

* Only white women were allowed the franchise and/or parliamentary representation until 1994 with the independence of South Africa.

Although increasing attention has been given to women's issues through activism, campaigns and lobbying of many women's NGOs across the region, the transition from advocacy to actual implementation of gender equality has yet to be made. Women's demand for land, legal protection, and assured bodily integrity, recognition of their personhood in the legal and judicial systems, economic and property entitlements, and participation in decision-making remain unmet.

(Profiles of human development on health, education, women, demography, income and poverty and governance are given at the end of this chapter. These profiles give the progress and deprivations in each of the five areas. The profile for the region was given in Chapter 1.)

VII. Human Development in SADC; Implications for Governance

Human development and good governance are strongly related. The SADC countries with good performance in HDI also generally tend to perform well in governance as shown in Chapter 4. The six leading democracies in the region, namely, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Zimbabwe have the best HDIs in SADC. On the other hand, in general, the countries undergoing structural political and economic problems, including Angola, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, tend to have low HDIs and internal governance constraints. Two exceptions are Lesotho and Swaziland where political problems do not seem to have had a major impact on their human development record. On the basis of these general observations, it is, therefore, appropriate to continue to address the improvement of human development together with improvement in good governance. Indeed, a good government is one that gives priority to the human development of its citizens. It would also appear from the experience of developed countries that high levels of human development provide a good environment for good governance and political stability.

Profile of Human Development – Angola

Progress

Deprivation

HEALTH

- Life expectancy increased by 14 years between 1960 and 1993

- Crude death rate of 19 per 1 000 is the second highest in the region after Malawi with 20.
- The maternal mortality rate is 1 500 per 100 000 live births –the highest rate in SADC region together with Mozambique.

EDUCATION

- 96% of public expenditure on education is to primary and secondary education.

- The adult illiteracy rate stands at 42%. Gross enrolment ratio for persons aged 6–23 years fell dramatically from 54% in 1980 to 31% in 1995.

WOMEN

- Six percent of government officials are women.

- Angola has the second lowest adult female literacy rate at 49%.
- Only 19 female tertiary students per 100 000 women compared to a SADC average of 57.

DEMOGRAPHY

- The fertility rate increased slightly from 6,4 lives births per woman to 6,9 in five years (between 1990 and 1995).

- The projected population growth rate of 3,1% per annum in 1995–2015 will be one of the highest in SADC region.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- The Human Development Index for Angola has increased by 103% since 1990, which is the second highest increase in the region.
- The percentage of rural families with access to safe water has increased from less than 10% to almost 60% during the past two decades.

- 84% of the population were without access to sanitation in 1990–96.

GOVERNANCE

- The Political Governance Settlement of 1992 and subsequent multi-party elections marked a significant condition for peace in Angola.

- Persistent conflict, with UNITA rejecting the latest election results and the recent outbreak of war in some parts of country, threaten peace in the country.

Profile of Human Development – Botswana

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by 19 years between 1960 and 1993.
- Infant mortality rate has declined from 116 per 1 000 live births in 1960 to 64 in 1989 and 40 in 1996.
- Maternal mortality at 220 maternal deaths per 100 000 births is the second lowest in the region after Mauritius. (The SADC average maternal mortality rate is 888 deaths per 100 000 live births.)
- Under-five mortality in Botswana at 50 deaths per 1 000 children under five years old is relatively low compared to other countries in the region.

EDUCATION

- Adult literacy has improved over the years from 44% in 1970 to 70% in 1995.
- Gross enrolment ratios for all levels for the population aged 6–23 years have also increased substantially from 51% in 1980 to 71% in 1995.

WOMEN

- 8,5% of the Members of Parliament are women compared to 12,5% for the SADC region. Although still low, there has been an improvement.
- Gender empowerment, as measured by the GEM, is the second highest in SADC at 0,418.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Botswana's annual population growth rate is projected to decline from 3,3% in the period 1970–95 to 2,1% in the period 1995–2015.
- Urban population annual growth rate is the highest in the SADC region at 11,8% for the period 1970–95. Sixty percent of Botswana's population was residing in the urban areas in 1995.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- The percentage of population with access to safe water in Botswana was high at 93% in 1990–96 compared to the SADC average of 58%.
- Poverty levels in Botswana have been declining from 59% of the population living in income poverty in 1985/86 to 47% in 1993/94.
- Botswana had the fastest GNP annual growth rate in the SADC region of 5,4 in 1980–95.

GOVERNANCE

- The retirement of President Masire in 1998 and the smooth handover to President Mogae is an exemplary act of political maturity in Botswana.

Deprivation

- Life expectancy has decreased from 59,8 years in 1990 to 51,7 in years in 1995.
- Botswana has the second highest HIV/AIDS prevalence for adults aged 15–49 years in the SADC region at 25,1% in 1997 and also of total AIDS cases per 100 000 people of 98,7.
- In 1995 Botswana had the highest cases of tuberculosis in SADC at 390 per 100 000 people.

- Unemployment rate at 21% is still very high in Botswana.
- Illiteracy is highest in the remote areas of Botswana.

- 50% of the female-headed households were income poor in 1993/94 as compared to 44% of the male-headed households in this category and this disparity has widened over the years.

- The fertility rate increased slightly from 6,4 lives births per woman to 6,9 in five years (between 1990 and 1995).

- Poverty levels in Botswana are still very high.
- Poverty is higher in rural areas (55%) than in urban areas (29%).

- The breakdown of the main opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) and growth of generally weak small political parties across the country does not augur well for Botswana's democracy.

Profile of Human Development – DRC

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by 11 years between 1960 and 1993.

EDUCATION

- Adult literacy has increased from 44% in 1970 to 77% in 1995.

WOMEN

- Gender empowerment, as measured by the GEM, is 0,143, the lowest in the region excluding Angola, Seychelles, Tanzania and Namibia.

DEMOGRAPHY

- The DRC's annual population growth rate has declined from 3,3% in the period 1970–95 to 2,9% in the period 1995–2015.

INCOME AND POVERTY

GOVERNANCE

Deprivation

- Life expectancy has fallen from 53 years in 1990 to 52,4 years in 1995.
- The highest % of underweight under fives in the SADC region (34% for the period 1990–97).
- Lowest % of one year olds immunized against measles and tuberculosis in the SADC region of 41% and 51% respectively for the period 1995–95.
- Highest % of population without access to health services in the SADC region of 74% in 1990–95.
- A maternal mortality of 870 deaths per 100 000 live births is very high.

- The % of children not reaching grade 5 is high at 36%. It is the second highest in the SADC region (excluding Angola and Malawi) after Mozambique with 53%.

- Disparity between female and male literacy rate is very high, 68% and 87% respectively.
- Only 5% of the Members of Parliament are women compared to 12,5% for the SADC region. This is the lowest in the region.
- Contraceptive prevalence of 8% for women 15–45 years of age is low compared to 28% for the SADC region.

- A projected annual population growth rate of 2,9% for 1995–2015 is high.
- The fertility rate increased slightly from 6,1 lives births per woman to 6,5 in five years between 1990 and 1995.
- Urban population annual growth rate in the DRC is low at 3,1% in 1970–95 compared to the SADC region average of 5,2%. Only 29% of the DRC's population reside in the urban areas compared to a SADC region average of 34% in 1995.

- The DRC has one of the lowest GNP per capita in the region of US\$120 in 1995. The SADC region average for the same period is US\$1 892.
- The GNP per capita annual growth rate is negative and worsening from -1,3 in 1965–80 to -5,8 in 1980–95.
- The % of the population without access to safe water is high at 58% in 1990–96 compared to the SADC average of 42%.
- The % of the population without access to sanitation is also very high at 82% in 1990–96 compared to a SADC regional average of 55%.

- The DRC was a stable one-party state for the larger part of her independence since 1960.
- Over the years, the one-party state degenerated into personal rule of the late President Mobutu Seseseko. Since then, the DRC has become a scene of major regional conflict and war.

Profile of Human Development – DRC

Progress

GOVERNANCE

Deprivation

- The last attempt at holding elections was in 1993. However, that was not a successful election as turnover was very low and many opposition forces opposed the elections.
- Political parties are not recognized in DRC and the opposition exist in defiance of President Kabila's transitional government. The opposition is highly divided.
- The previous bad governance in DRC has had a major negative impact on the human development record of the country. The current war is not helping the situation either.

Profile of Human Development – Lesotho

Progress

Deprivation

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by 18 years between 1960 and 1993.

- High cases of tuberculosis of 239 per 100 000 people. The SADC region average is 149 cases per 100 000 people.
- A maternal mortality of 598 deaths per 100 000 live births is high.

EDUCATION

- Enrolment ratios have been increased over the years.

- A combined gross enrolment ratio of 56% in 1995 is low.

WOMEN

- 11% of the Members of Parliament are women.

- Disparity between female and male literacy rate is high at 62% and 81% respectively.
- Gender empowerment as measured by the GEM of 0,389 is low.
- Contraceptive prevalence of 23% for women 15–45 years of age can be improved.

DEMOGRAPHY

- The fertility rate decreased from 5,8 lives births per woman to 5,0 in five years between 1990 and 1995.

- A projected annual population growth rate of 2,4% for 1995–2015 is high.
- Only 24% of Lesotho's population reside in the urban areas compared to a SADC region average of 34% in 1995.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- The GNP per capita annual growth rate at 0,9% in 1980–95 is low but positive. It is one of the few SADC countries with a positive GNP per capita annual growth rate.

- The % of the population without access to sanitation is very high at 62% in 1990–96 compared to a SADC region average of 55%.

GOVERNANCE

- The adoption of a new constitution and the subsequent conduct of multi-party elections in 1993 put Lesotho back on the path of democracy since it was hijacked in 1970.

- The internal wranglings in the ruling Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the subsequent splitting off of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy, coupled with the controversial and explosive May 1998 elections, resulted in an attempted military coup, which brought in South African and Botswanan military forces.

Profile of Human Development – Malawi

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by 8 years between 1960 and 1993.

Deprivation

- Life expectancy has fallen from 48 years in 1990 to 41 years in 1995.
- Malawi baby boys have the lowest life expectancy at 41 years in 1995.
- Malawi has the highest crude death rate in the SADC region: 22,4 deaths per 1 000 people in 1995.
- Only two doctors per 100 000 inhabitants.
- Malawi has the highest malaria cases for 100 000 people in the SADC region.
- Malawi's infant mortality rate of 137 infant deaths per 1 000 live births in 1996, although declining over the years, remains very high and is the second highest in the region after Angola.
- Malawi's children are the most stunted in the region (49%) in the period 1984–95.

EDUCATION

- An adult literacy rate of 56% in 1995 has increased from 38% in 1970 but is still one of the lowest in the SADC region.

- Malawi's teacher pupil ratio is the highest in the SADC region at 62 pupils per teacher in 1995.

WOMEN

- Malawi has the highest female economic activity rate as a % of the male rate of 96% for 1995 in the region, excluding Seychelles after Tanzania with 98%.

- Malawi has the second lowest % of women Members of Parliament at 5,6% in the SADC region.
- Gender empowerment, as measured by the GEM, of 0,206, is the second lowest in the region.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Total fertility rate decreased from 7,6 children per woman in 1990 to 6,9 children per woman in 1995.
- Annual population growth rate has declined from 3,1% in the period 1970–95 and is projected to decline to 2,6% in the period 1995–2015.

- Only 13% of the total population live in urban areas.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- 47,7% of Malawi's population are deprived of a long life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Malawi has the second highest level of human poverty in the SADC region after Mozambique with 48,5%.
- 94% of the population of Malawi are without access to sanitation and this is the worst situation in the SADC region.
- GNP per capita annual growth rate has worsened in Malawi from 3,2 % in 1965–80 to -0,7% in 1980–95.

GOVERNANCE

- Since the 1994 elections, Malawi has enjoyed relative political stability and openness far surpassing the Banda one-party era of more than three decades.

- Corruption and economic inefficiency combined with poverty and high inflation does not augur well for the long-term political stability of Malawi.

Profile of Human Development – Mauritius

Progress

HEALTH

- Mauritius baby girls have the highest life expectancy at 74,5 (Seychelles excluded).
- Crude death rates of 6 per 1 000 is the lowest in the region.
- Infant mortality rate at 20 deaths per 1 000 live births and under-five mortality of 23 deaths per 1 000 children in 1996 are both the second lowest in the region after Seychelles.
- Every person has access to health services in Mauritius.
- HIV/AIDS prevalence is lowest in the region at 0,1% of adults aged 15–49 years in 1997 and 0,6 AIDS cases per 100 000 people in 1996.
- Maternal mortality of 112 deaths per 100 000 live births is the lowest in the SADC region excluding Seychelles and Swaziland.

EDUCATION

- 96% of public expenditure on education is to primary and secondary education.
- Adult literacy of 82,9% in 1995 is the third highest in the region.
- An unemployment rate of 5,9% in 1995 is one of the lowest in the SADC region.

WOMEN

- Contraceptive prevalence of 75% in 1990–95 for women aged 15–45 years is very high and the highest in the region. The SADC regional average (excluding Angola, Mozambique and Seychelles) is 33,8 %.

Deprivation

- Second highest cigarette consumption index of 140 cigarettes per adult in 1990–92 in the region (excluding Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Seychelles and Swaziland where there is no data), after Malawi with 165.

- Mauritius women's wages were 65% lower than men's in 1995.
- Disparity between female and male adult literacy of 79% and 87% in 1995 could be improved.
- Low level of women Members of Parliament at 7,6% the SADC region average is 12,5%.
- Gender empowerment, as measured by the GEM, of 0,403, is still low.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Annual population growth rate is falling from 1,2% in 1970–95 to a projected 1,0% in 1995–2015.
- Total fertility rate increased from 1,9 children per woman in 1990 to 2,3 children per woman in 1995.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- Everyone has access to sanitation.
- Only 2% of the population has no access to safe water.
- Deprivation of a long life, knowledge and a decent standard of living at 12,1% is lowest in the SADC region (excluding Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland) at 28%.
- GNP per capita at US\$3 380 in 1995 is the second highest in the region.
- The percentage of rural families with access to safe water has increased from less than 10% to almost 60% during the past two decades.

GOVERNANCE

- Mauritius is more advanced in governance than many countries in SADC. It has a stable democracy, power has changed hands smoothly and political stability has been sustained.
- Female participation in government and other sectors is still very low.

Profile of Human Development – Mozambique

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by 9 years from 1960 to 1993.

EDUCATION

- Adult literacy has increased from 16% in 1970 to 40% in 1995.

WOMEN

- Mozambique has the highest percentage of female Members of Parliament in the SADC region of 25,2% compared to the SADC region average of 12,5%.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Second highest urban population annual growth rate of 10% between 1970–95 after Botswana with 11,8%
- 34% in 1995 of the total population live in urban areas in 1995.

INCOME AND POVERTY

Deprivation

- Life expectancy has fallen from 47,5 years in 1990 to 46,3 years in 1995.
- HIV/AIDS prevalence in adults 15–45 years at 14% is higher than the SADC region average of 12% for 1997.
- Infant mortality rate of 133 deaths per 1 000 live births in 1996 is high and the third highest in the SADC region.
- Under-five mortality at 214 deaths per 1 000 children in 1996 is also high and the third highest in the SADC region.
- A maternal mortality of 1 512 deaths per 100 000 live births is the highest in the SADC region in 1995.
- Mozambique has the second highest % of stunted children in the SADC region of 48% in 1984–95. The SADC region average is 36%.
- The % of the population without access to health services is high at 61% in 1990–95 compared to a SADC region average of 57%.

- Mozambique has the lowest adult literacy in the SADC region of 40%.
- It has the lowest combined gross enrolment ratio of 25% in the SADC region.
- Primary school teacher pupil ratio of 58% is very high and the second highest in the SADC region after Malawi.
- The % of children not reaching grade 5 of 53% is the highest in the SADC region excluding Angola and Malawi. The SADC regional average is 35%.

- Gender empowerment, as measured by the GEM, of 0,334, is low.
- The difference between male and female adult literacy in Mozambique is very large – 23,3% and 57,7% (1995).
- The same applies to the combined gross enrolment ratio which is 29% for males and 21% for females.
- Third lowest number of female tertiary students per 100 000 women of only 21 in 1995 compared to 1 590 in South Africa in the same year.

- Total fertility rate has remained stagnant at 6,3 children per woman from 1990 and 1995.
- Annual population growth rate has also remained stagnant at 2,5% in the periods 1970–95 and projected to remain at 2,5% for the period 1995–2015.
- Mozambique's total fertility rate of 6,3 children per woman is high compared to the SADC regional rate of 4,8 children per woman in 1995.

- 48,5% of Mozambique's population is deprived of a long life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Mozambique has the highest level of human poverty in the SADC region.
- 46% and 37% of the population of Mozambique are with-

Profile of Human Development – Mozambique

Income and poverty (continued)

out access to sanitation and safe water respectively in 1990–96.

The SADC region averages are 55% and 42% respectively.

- Mozambique has the lowest GNP per capita in the SADC region of US\$80 in 1995. The SADC region average is US\$1 892.

- GNP per capita annual growth rate has worsened in Mozambique from 0,6% in 1965–80 to -0.8% in 1980–95.

GOVERNANCE

- Mozambique has made major strides towards a multi-party system and pluralist politics in general. The first multi-party election was held in 1994.
- Mozambique is the only other country, besides Malawi, where the ruling party polled less than the combined opposition.
- In 1994, elections voter turnover was very high at 88%.

- The ruling FRELIMO was returned to power but with a weak majority.
- There were several complaints concerning election management.
- Local elections have never taken place and the main opposition, Renamo, threatens to boycott the next elections.

Profile of Human Development – Namibia

Progress

Deprivation

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by 17 years between 1960 and 1993.
- Maternal mortality of 225 deaths per 100 000 population is one of the lowest in the region.
- Total AIDS cases of 165,5 per 100 000 people is highest in the SADC region in 1996.
- Malaria cases of 27 209 per 100 000 people is second highest in the region apart from Malawi with 49 410 cases per 100 000 people.

EDUCATION

- Enrolment ratios have improved significantly since independence from 60% in 1990 to 83% in 1993.
- Total unemployment of 19% is high.

WOMEN

- 15% of Members of Parliament are female compared to the SADC regional average of 12,5%.
- Female unemployment of 21% is higher than that of males of 18% in 1991–96.

DEMOGRAPHY

- 36% of the total population was urban in 1995.
- Population growth at 2,7% for 1970–1995 is high.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- A GNP per capita of US\$2 000 is above the SADC average of US\$1 892.
- GDP per capita gradually rising since 1990 reversing the trend of the 1980s.
- 30% of Namibia's population is deprived of a long life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.
- With a Gini coefficient of 0,70, it is one of the most unequal societies not only in SADC but in the world.
- 66% of the population with no access to sanitation.

GOVERNANCE

- There is respect for the rule of law and general democratic culture being practised in the country.
- The recent constitutional amendment, which extended the term of office of the president, does not augur well for democracy and good governance in Namibia.
- The events in the Caprivi and cross-border movement of Caprivians into Botswana is not good for the country's democracy.

Profile of Human Development – Seychelles

Progress

Deprivation

HEALTH

- Seychelles is the best place to be born in the SADC region because one can expect to live for 72 years.
- A crude death rate of 7,7 deaths per 1 000 in 1995 is the second lowest in the region after Mauritius with 6,6 deaths per 1 000 people.
- Infant mortality rate at 15 deaths per 1 000 live births and under-five mortality of 19 deaths per 1 000 children in 1996 are both the lowest in the region.
- Only 1% of the population has no access to health services in Seychelles.
- In 1993 there were 104 doctors per 100 000 people in Seychelles. It is the highest proportion in the SADC region.
- HIV/AIDS prevalence is very low at 2,7 AIDS cases per 100 000 people in 1995 compared to Namibia with 165,5 AIDS cases per 100 000 people in the same year.
- Lowest tuberculosis prevalence in the region at 12,3 cases per 100 000 population.
- All one year olds are fully immunized against tuberculosis and it was the highest immunization of one year olds against measles in the region (98%).

EDUCATION

- Highest adult literacy in the SADC region (88%).
- Only 3% of the children do not reach grade 5.
- Lowest pupil teacher ratio in the region of 17 in 1995.

WOMEN

- Third highest % of women Members of Parliament at 23,3% compared to the SADC region average of 12,5%.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Annual population growth rate is falling from 1,3% in 1970–95 to a projected 0,9% in 1995–2015.
- Total fertility rate of 3,4 children per woman in 1990 was the second lowest in the SADC region after Mauritius with 1,9.
- 55% of the population resided in the urban areas in 1995 compared to Botswana with the highest % of 60% and a SADC region average of 34%.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- Only 3% of the population has no access to safe water.
- GNP per capita at US\$6 620 in 1995 is the highest in the SADC region.

GOVERNANCE

- Seychelles is among the six stable democracies in the region with Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius and Zimbabwe. A successful multi-party election was held in 1998 and the ruling party was returned to power.
- Three parties were represented in the Seychelles' 1993 parliament.

Profile of Human Development – Seychelles

GOVERNANCE (cont.)

- The voter turnover in the 1993 elections was among the highest in the region at 87%. This small country is exemplary in the area of institutional governance and human development as well.
 - The society is relatively integrated ethnically.
-

Profile of Human Development – South Africa

Progress

Deprivation

HEALTH

- The life expectancy rose dramatically from 49 years in 1960 to 64 years in 1995.
- A crude death rate of 8,4 deaths per 1 000 population in 1995 is the third lowest in the SADC region after Seychelles and Mauritius.
- South Africa has the second lowest % of undernourished children, 9%, after Seychelles (6%) in the SADC region.

EDUCATION

- There is minimal gender inequality in education. Men and women have very close literacy rates of 81,9% and 81,7% respectively.
- Still 35% of children who do not reach grade 5.

WOMEN

- Second highest % of female Members of Parliament of 23,7% after Mozambique with 25,2%.
- Highest number of female tertiary students per 100 000 women of 1 590 in the SADC region.
- Gender empowerment as measured by GEM of 0,461 and, although low, it is the highest in the SADC region excluding Seychelles, Namibia and Tanzania.
- Only 37% of the adult labour force are females in 1995.
- Adult female unemployment of 38% as opposed to the male rate of 22,5%.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Second lowest total fertility rate in the SADC region (excluding Seychelles) of four children per woman in 1995 after Mauritius with 2,3.
- Contraceptive prevalence of 50% of women aged 15–45 in the period 1990–95 is one of the highest in the SADC region (excluding Angola, Mozambique and Seychelles), after Mauritius with 75%.
- Third highest urbanized country in the region after Seychelles and Botswana with 49% of its population residing in urban areas in 1995.
- Annual population growth rate projected to fall from 2,5 % in the period 1970–95 to 2,0% in the period 1995–2015. Has third lowest population growth rate in the region after Mauritius and Seychelles with 1,2% and 1,3% respectively.
- An annual population growth rate of 2,5% is still high.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- Has the lowest % of population without access to safe water in the SADC region of 1% in the period 1990–96.
- Relatively high unequal distribution of income with a Gini coefficient of 0,58 in the period 1991–95.
- Higher unequal land distribution with a land per capita for black farmers of 2,3 hectares and that of white farmers of 1 101,3 hectares. For Zimbabwe, the land per capita for black farmers and white farmers are 0,019 hectares and 2,8 hectares respectively.

GOVERNANCE

- South Africa has a good and impressive system of governance which involves workers, local government and civil society organizations in clearly defined legislation. Relative stability and peace have been achieved.
- GNP per capita annual growth has declined from 3,2% in 1965–80 to -1,0% in 1980–95.
- The South African system has still to stand the test of time, including the transition from President Mandela to Mbeki.

Profile of Human Development – Swaziland

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by 18 years between 1960 and 1993.
- Infant mortality rate has been halved between 1970 and 1996.
- 30% of under-five children still suffer from moderate to severe stunting.
- The % of the total population not expected to survive to age 40 (21%) is the third lowest in the SADC region.

EDUCATION

- Has the third highest combined first, second and third gross enrolment ratio in the region after Namibia and South Africa of 77%.

WOMEN

- 8% of the Members of Parliament are females compared to the SADC average of 12,5%.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Between 1990 and 1995, the total fertility rate has fallen from 6,5 to 4,7 children per woman.
- Annual population growth rate is projected to fall from 2,9 % in the period 1970–95 to 2,5% in the period 1995–2015.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- GNP annual growth rate, although falling from 3,7 in 1965–80 to 1,0 in 1980–95, is still positive.

GOVERNANCE

Deprivation

- Incidence of tuberculosis still high at 240 cases per 100 000 people in 1995.
- 19% of the adults aged 15–49 are HIV positive.
- Immunization of one year olds against measles at 59% is the second lowest in the region after the DRC at 41%.
- Vaccination of one year olds against tuberculosis at 68% is still low.

- Unemployment still high at 22% in the period 1991–96.

- Women still have lower literacy and enrolment ratios than males of 75,6% and 78% in 1995 respectively.
- Only 34% of the labour force are females.
- Female unemployment rate of 23,3% in the period 1991–96 is higher than that of males of 20,7% for the same period.
- Gender empowerment as measured by GEM of 0,347 is low.
- Contraceptive prevalence of women aged 15–45 years is still very low at 20% for the period 1990–95.

- Projected annual population growth rate of 2,5 in 1995–2015 is still high.

- 55% of population have no access to health services. The SADC regional average is 57%.
- 40% of population have no access to safe water; this is high, although slightly below the SADC region average of 41,6%.

- Much remains to be done to reform the system of governance in Swaziland.

Profile of Human Development – Tanzania

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy increased by 12 years between 1960 and 1993.
- Immunization of one year olds against measles is 96%.

EDUCATION

WOMEN

- 17,5% of the Members of Parliament are women, above the SADC region average of 12,5%.
- The earnings ratio of Tanzanian women is the highest in the SADC region at 47,3 while that of men is 52,7%. Tanzania has the smallest disparities between females and males in terms of earnings.

DEMOGRAPHY

- Between 1990 and 1995, the total fertility rate has fallen from 6,5 to 4,7 children per woman.
- Annual population growth rate is projected to fall from 2,9 % in the period 1970–95 to 2,5% in the period 1995–2015.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- The distribution of income in Tanzania is better than that of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Gini coefficient is 0,38 whilst that of Namibia, which is one of the highest in the world, is 0,70.

GOVERNANCE

- Relative stability and major reforms were implemented during the 1990s.

Deprivation

- Life expectancy has dropped from 54,4 years in 1990 to 50,6 years in 1995.
- 58% of the population of Tanzania has no access to health services in the period 1990–95.
- AIDS cases of 95,5 per 100 000 people in 1996 is the third highest in the SADC region.
- Tuberculosis cases at 132,7 per 100 000 people in 1995 is high.
- Third highest % of underweight under fives (27% in 1990–97) in the region excluding Angola.
- Only four doctors per 100 000 people in 1993 compared to Seychelles with 104 and a SADC average of 30.

- Combined gross enrolment ratio of 33% in 1995 is very low.
- Adult literacy rate of 68% in 1995 can be improved.
- At 5%, secondary school gross enrolment was the lowest in the region (excluding Seychelles and Zambia). The SADC average is 44%.

- Large disparity of female and male adult literacy of 57% and 79% respectively.
- Lowest female tertiary students per 100 000 women of 14 in 1995 in the SADC region excluding Seychelles. South Africa has the highest with 1 590 students per 100 000 women.

- Urban population of 24% in 1995 is lower than the SADC region average of 34%.
- A projected annual population growth rate of 2,6 in 1995–2015 is still high.

- 39,8% of Tanzania's population is deprived of a long life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.
- 62% of the population has no access to safe water.
- Tanzania has the second lowest GNP per capita in the SADC region of US\$120 in 1995 compared to the SADC regional average of US\$1 892

- Corruption and economic mismanagement are still reported.

Profile of Human Development – Zambia

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by only 7 years between 1960 and 1993.

EDUCATION

- Adult literacy in Zambia has greatly improved over the years, from 48% in 1970 to 78% in 1995.

WOMEN

- 10% of the Members of Parliament are women.

DEMOGRAPHY

- The total fertility rate decreased from 7,2 children per woman in 1990 to 5,7 children per woman in 1995.
- The annual population growth rate of has been projected to decrease from 2,7% between 1970–95 to 2,5% per annum between 1995 and 2015.

INCOME AND POVERTY

GOVERNANCE

- Relative peace and stability has been achieved after a long period of simmering discontents on the constitutional amendments of 1996.

Deprivation

- Life expectancy has fallen from 54,4 years in 1990 to 42,7 years in 1995.
- Infant mortality and under-five mortality is high at 112 per 1 000 live births and 202 per 1 000 children respectively in 1996.
- A maternal mortality rate of 940 deaths per 100 000 in 1990 is high.
- In 1997, 19% of the population aged 15 to 49 years was HIV positive. It is the third highest in the region after Zimbabwe and Botswana.

- School leaver unemployment is very high with 18% of the persons who had completed grades 10–12 being unemployed in 1996 (the % for males is 15% and for females 36%) compared to a national unemployment rate of 15%. For those whose who had completed grades 8–9, the unemployment rate is 23% (18% for males and 31% for females).

- Gender empowerment, as measured by the GEM, of 0,236, is very low.

- Annual population growth rate at 2,7% in 1970–95 is still high.

- Poverty levels are very high and increasing. 78% of the total population were poor in 1996.
- Poverty is higher in rural areas (89% of the people are poor) than in the urban areas (60%).
- GNP per capita annual growth rate has declined from -1,2% in 1965–80 to -2,4% in 1980–95.

- Fear and abuse of human rights are common and general freedom of speech is very much limited in the country.

Profile of Human Development – Zimbabwe

Progress

HEALTH

- Life expectancy has increased by eight years between 1960 and 1993.

EDUCATION

- Zimbabwe has a very high adult literacy of 85% and it is the second highest in the region after Seychelles.

WOMEN

- Only 15% of the Members of Parliament are women – this is above the SADC average of 12,5%.

DEMOGRAPHY

- The total fertility rate decreased from 5,6 children per woman in 1990 to 4,9 children per woman in 1995.
- The annual population growth rate is projected to decrease from 3,1% between 1970–95 to 2,1% per annum between 1995 – 2015.
- Contraceptive prevalence for women aged 15 – 45 years is the third highest in the region at 48%.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- Stability and peace have been achieved after a bloody post-independence conflict.
- Institutions are in place and rule of law is supreme.

GOVERNANCE

- Relative peace and stability has been achieved after a long period of simmering discontents on the constitutional amendments of 1996.

Deprivation

- Life expectancy has fallen from 59,6 years in 1990 to 48,9 years in 1995.
- In 1997, Zimbabwe had the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence for adults aged 15–49 years at 25,8%.
- Zimbabwe has the second highest cases of tuberculosis in the region at 276 cases per 100 000 people.

- School leaver unemployment is very high at 29% for males aged 20–24 years and 25% for females in the same age group compared to the national unemployment rate of 15%.

- Gender empowerment, as measured by the GEM, of 0,352, is low in Zimbabwe.

- Annual population growth rate at 3,1% in 1970–95 is still high.

- Poverty levels are very high and increasing. 61% of the population were poor in 1995.
- Zimbabwe, with a Gini coefficient of 0,63 in 1995/96, has one of the highest unequal income distributions in the region after Namibia with 0,70.
- Poverty is higher in rural areas (75% of the population were poor) than the urban areas (39%).
- GNP per capita annual growth rate has declined from 1,7% in 1965–80 to -0,2% in 1980–95.

- Government is very strong and parliament very weak.
- Elections are always controversial.
- Political opposition is weak.
- The economic situation and regular strikes threaten stability.





The liberation struggles in Southern Africa were fought for good governance

I. Overview

The peoples of Southern Africa have been struggling for many decades to establish free and fair political systems in their countries. The first step towards attainment of this goal began between 1960 and 1970 with the eight SADC member states of Botswana, the DRC (then Zaire), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia attaining their political independence. The second group of countries, comprising Angola, Mozambique, Seychelles and Zimbabwe attained their independence between 1970 and 1980. The last wave of political independence came between 1990 and 1994 with the independence of Namibia and majority rule in South Africa (*see Chapter 1 Figure 1.3*). The latter period also coincided with major political reforms abolishing the aberrant one-party state system widely adopted by many countries in the region between 1970 and 1980. Three distinct lessons can be derived from the past three decades of independence in the majority of SADC countries. Firstly, the political institutions remained weak and dominated by individual leaders and a few of their closest supporters. Secondly, freedom of expression and association were limited and, thirdly, with the exception of Botswana and Mauritius, public participation was circumscribed and limited to non-competitive elections.

Given the foregoing experience, the major challenge facing Southern Africa peoples in the 1990s is to establish durable systems of governance that will bring about peace and stability to these countries individually and collectively as a region. The challenge of good governance goes beyond political independence and democratization reforms to the critical question of the quality of democracy. This chapter addresses the framework of establishing a system of good governance in this region.

Political reforms must also address the historical legacies of dispossession and inequality within SADC countries

Historical legacies of dispossession, inequality and conflict created difficult conditions which continue to hamper the establishment of sustainable human development and good governance in the region. In the post-independence era, states have sought to correct the situation, or at least to alleviate certain inherited imbalances through reconstruction and reconciliation policies and programmes. It is as a response to these conditions of poverty and underdevelopment, particularly affecting the rural sector, that states have sought to formulate durable and responsive structures of governance. The new states had to design and implement substantial programmes in education, support literacy campaigns and put in place new institutions of local governance. Universal primary education became a common feature of the development programmes of most of the countries in the region. As Chapter 3 showed in greater detail, the record of these states has been a mixed one with regard to issues of social development. In particular, the sustainability of social development programmes was put into question due to the economic crisis outlined in Chapter 2. The post-independence history of this region, however, demonstrates that human development can only be sustainable where good governance prevails. Conditions of authoritarianism, dictatorship and civil conflict are inimical to the creation of conditions for sustainable human development. However, let us begin by attempting to define the concept of governance.

(i) The Concept of Governance

Few concepts have evoked as much discussion and controversy in the 1990s as that of 'governance'. Governance is a concept which has come to mean different things to different institutions and analysts. To some, governance relates to (a) an improvement in public sector management, (b) economic accountability, (c) predictability and the rule of law, and (d) transparency in public affairs. To others it stands for 'good government' characterized by the attributes of accountability, legitimacy and competence. (World Bank, 1998) Governance has also been explicitly linked to democracy. Yet another attempt at synthesis of the definition is that governance 'is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels'. (UNDP, 1997)

Donor countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) have recently tended to use a country's governance performance as one of the criteria to determine their assistance. In this context, governance has henceforth become a political conditionality. In addition, it has been suggested that the exercise of corporate power and authority in the economic realm represent corporate governance. However, despite its centrality in globalization, the concept of corporate governance has not received adequate analytical attention. The notion of 'social governance' has also been used to connote the creation of a vibrant, democratic civil society and its interactions with the state. (Swartz, 1998)

These varying definitions and interpretations attached to the concept of governance reflect, in turn, the differing priorities and stand-points of the various institutions and analysts involved in the development process. Some do not see any connection between governance and democracy while others do. To some, governance does not necessarily entail a popular basis of government nor the broad participation of people in policy-making, while others insist that responsive governance requires these very elements.

This report defines the concept of governance in relation to the historical context and experiences of the countries of the region. Historically, there has always been the exercise of political, economic, administrative, cultural and social authority at various levels in Southern African societies. Governance in one form or another has existed in Southern Africa from the dawn of history. During the 20th century, the quest for better governance has been linked to long drawn-out mass struggles for emancipation from oppressive regimes in the region. Underlying the key messages of the oldest as well as the most recent struggles by the peoples of Southern Africa, have been the twin demands for freedom and participation in all facets of life. Given the foregoing regional context therefore, the accent on 'governance' is not accidental but well rooted in the popular demands of the peoples of Southern Africa. This chapter assesses the extent to which these goals and demands for freedom and participation have been realized.

Governance is largely perceived by most people in the region as being about the enlargement of individual and group participation in the political and economic activities of their societies. In this regard, therefore, the formulation of good policies, the design of inclusive programmes and the provision of broad-based social and economic services to the majority of the population become crucial. Similarly, it requires the formulation of enabling policies and the implementation of programmes which encourage the majority of the population to participate in the economy through paid employment, self-employment and the production of goods and services which improve their livelihoods. For most people in Southern Africa who had no right to elect the government of their choice and who were treated as second-class citizens in their own countries, democracy and governance are about having the right to choose and the right to equal treatment in society.

Good governance has been used by donors as a conditionality for aid

Good governance embraces broader issues of political and social management

Living the Life of Equals

Democracy and good governance are basically about living as an equal in a society of many and different members. They are about ensuring fair treatment, choices and opportunities for all. They are about the protection of fundamental rights. Very often societies take these rights for granted and in the process deny some sections of society the choices and opportunities accorded to others in the same society. Take for instance the following story by one of the authors of this report when he was travelling from one city to another in the region one morning on the assignment of this report. He left on a flight at 7.00am with 17 other passengers. There were, therefore, a total of 18 passengers on board. They were attended by two flight attendants. After a few minutes came an announcement on air that breakfast would be served in a matter of a minute or two. Indeed, within a short while the flight attendants started serving breakfast starting with juice. He was seated alone at

the very back of the plane, close to the serving point. The flight attendant, knowing that there were 18 passengers, started pouring the juice into open plastic type glasses. There were two types of juice – orange and apple. After filling 18 glasses with the juice (presumably nine glasses of orange and nine glasses of apple) she moved to the front seats to begin serving. As she came along, passengers were given the choice of orange or apple. Our colleague very much wanted orange juice. However, he was the last to be served and the only glass of juice left, after serving the 17 other passengers, was apple. She bent forward and said, 'Sir, here is apple juice.' He looked at her, smiled and said, 'I don't have a choice?' She smiled back and they both laughed. He took the apple juice and drank it. This story illustrates vividly what choice and equality of opportunities mean in real life. The passengers in this flight were a small society. They were equal because there were no first or business

class seats in this flight. The flight attendants were giving the appearance of the fact that the passengers were all equally valued customers. But were they? Here is one who did not have a choice of orange or apple. How could the cabin attendant have better handled this situation? Was she constrained by a scarcity of resources – orange juice in this case? Could she have served a few more glasses than 18 only? Or could she have resolved this situation by consulting passengers before serving them?

The struggles for democracy were about just this reality. Governance, too, is about foresight in the way we treat and distribute resources and opportunities in our societies. Our flight attendant assumed wrongly that there were nine people taking orange juice and another nine taking apple. This was not so. Consultation is the key to good governance and democracy.

Historically, bad governance policies, such as those of *apartheid* South Africa, excluded the majority of the people from participating in the governance of the society. Black people were restricted to the agriculture sector as unskilled workers, and alienated from land ownership through legal and coercive measures. Bantu Education ensured that black people served as cheap unskilled and semi-skilled labour. In the other countries of the region, owing largely to gender discrimination, unequal access to education and other social services, women and some ethnic groups were excluded from meaningful economic participation. Today, in most SADC countries, women's participation in the better paying formal sector employment ranges only between 15% and 40% of the total formal sector employment. In contrast, the majority of women are found in the less paying and most precarious subsistence agricultural, informal sector and small-scale business activities. This situation is an outcome of bad governance which perpetuates inequalities whilst increasingly excluding large sections of the population from economic participation. Consequently, the levels of unemployment in the region are currently very high, ranging between 20% and 40% of the labour force and appear destined to increase under the current economic development strategies of restructuring and retrenchment. Related to unemployment are the high levels of poverty, which are estimated at around 40% in most SADC countries.

For women, employment levels in the formal sector tend to be much lower than those of men, and the case of South Africa, which has the largest economy in the region, brings this out most clearly. Women comprise 36% of the total workforce, whilst African women make up only 18% of the workforce. In Lesotho, women account for only 36% of the formally employed. In Mozambique, the closure of a cashew factory led to the loss of 7 000 jobs (most of which were held by women), in an economy already battered by the implementation of strict IMF/World Bank conditionalities. In Swaziland, statistics indicate that women are usually employed in junior positions and thus have lower incomes than their male counterparts. (Mapping Progress, 1998) Overall, across the countries of the region, women have fewer opportunities for formal employment and tend to be the most vulnerable in economic restructuring programmes.

In terms of unemployment, on the other hand, women constitute 48% of the unemployed in South Africa; in Lesotho unemployment among women is reported to be 25,1% and almost 40% of Basotho women are classified as home-makers as compared to 1,5% of men. As the economies of the region adjust in the face of stringent macro-economic policies, the unemployment levels among women are set to rise. Across all sectors, women remain in largely service-related, feminized occupations and professions (teaching, nursing, sales, secretarial and other support services), are paid lower wages and are expected to work long hours. Women are more likely to be the first to be retrenched, being more concentrated in the less skilled occupations as well as not being regarded as 'bread winners'.

The informal sector, which emerged as a space where women could engage in autonomous productive and renumerative activities, has become over-crowded with large numbers of school leavers and unemployed youth, who are also in search of an income. Tanzania, for instance, shows an informal participation rate of 28% of economically active men and only 15% of women. Although women do continue to predominate in the informal sector as entrepreneurs, limited or no access to credit, information and technology, combined with low profit margins, keep women at the bottom of the economic and, consequently, the social ladder.

Political participation without economic participation is both flawed and unsustainable. Good governance is not merely the establishment of multi-party systems of politics or simply the conducting of regular free and fair elections or providing for the supremacy of the rule of law, etc. These are essential elements of democratic governance. However, good governance requires much more, especially as experience has shown that essential elements can be reversed over time. Good governance requires, in addition, efficiently managed public services, corruption-free regulatory institutions and, above all, participatory development by the majority of the people, individually, and through their private and civic organizations. In one of the many recent meetings on the subjects of good governance and sustainable development, the non-governmental organizations meeting in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, resolved that:

'The increasing poverty in our countries is a major threat to the transition to democracy. Furthermore, an important part should be played by the most marginalized groups of society through empowerment in the process of decision-making. The poorest should thus be given more attention in the different phases and mechanisms of this transition. Furthermore, there is the need to satisfy the basic needs of marginalized groups through the creation of employment.'
(NGOs meeting, Ouagadougou, October 26–28, 1996)

Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges for Governance in the DRC

DRC: where it stands now

From a political point of view, there are four main instruments of power in the Democratic Republic of Congo: the gun, meaning the army and other security forces, which were held by the Mobutu regime and are currently controlled by the new government; the money, which was also under Mobutu's control and is now owned by the new government; the support from external powers, which the new government enjoys partially within Africa and partially – albeit not enough – from within the donor community; and the popular support of the current political direction, which is mostly under the control of the traditional democratic opposition.

The new regime's objective and strategy seems to be possessing the gun in order to achieve power, and then utilizing that power to gain money and reinforce external support, and then from there to consolidate the power and the control of the country's resources. In terms of a system of governance, this has some weaknesses and risks:

- (i) no popular participation and a relationship of conflict between the new regime and the population, including other political forces, create a small social and political basis for power;
- (ii) moving from one dictatorial governance system to another – the new regime appears to function in the same manner as the Mobutu regime, with similar circles of power functioning around the president;
- (iii) continuation of former political instability in the country and in the sub-region;
- (iv) internationalization of DRC problems.

One of the most important consequences of the current political situation is the weakening of the state institutional machinery, which is now unable to assume its usual functions, such as security, justice, rule of law, human rights respect, conventional administration, etc. The notion of the state seems to be a myth rather than a reality. Its implosion started at the beginning of the decade and even the new regime has not been able yet to restore it. It is difficult, therefore, to talk about governance and human develop-

ment in the 'institutional absence' of the state, which is one of the three partners in any governance system, the others being the private sector and the civil society.

Concerning economic performance, it is well known that when the new government took over power, the country was in a deep economic and social crisis. Economic growth was negative with more than an 8% decline on an annual basis since the beginning of the decade. This decline has affected all productive sectors: agriculture, mining, industry, transport, energy, economic services, etc. It has also meant a huge and continuous decline of per capita income over the same period. When the formal economy shrank, it affected not only the productive sectors, but also the economic and social infrastructure, which both suffered serious damage. For example, the public provision of health and education services became unavailable.

Public finances fell into total disarray and the budget was out of control. This was characterized by:

- (i) public revenue levels falling from 17% of GDP before independence to less than 5% in 1997;
- (ii) public investment falling from 15% in 1958 to less than 3% GDP in the 1990s;
- (iii) the inability to meet the debt service obligations, with arrears estimated at more than US\$800 million in 1997, which is about 425% of exportation income, and the total external debt at almost US\$14 billion, equivalent to 250% of GDP;
- (iv) a growing recourse to money creation, resulting in hyperinflation.

The balance of payments deficit became chronic and all this resulted in the collapse of the financial system. To overcome this situation, the country needs a governance system which has a vision and a human development strategy. Unfortunately, at present it is difficult to expect any improvement in human and social living conditions for the Congolese population.

On the social side, the deterioration of human capital is one of the biggest problems in the country. Primary school enrolment fell from 95% in 1972/1973 to 77% in 1986/1987 and to 40% in 1995/1996. The health sector has also deteriorated. The government hasn't been

able to cover more than 5% of the recurrent costs during the last ten years, compared to 50% in most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

However, given the institutional decline of the state machinery, people have learned to ignore the state, for example, some parents pay teachers' salaries directly themselves. This can help those who can afford it to survive, however, it does not improve human development to any great extent as most people cannot afford to pay for their own education and health.

What does the future hold?

No political stability, democratic society or human development can be built on the power of guns and money without the full participation and support from the population. Looking to the future, I believe the new regime can be a successful one, but only if it is able to set up and consolidate a different and human development-oriented governance system. The only way to address those issues and lay the foundation for a future politically stable and economically flourishing DRC is to run the transition period on a democratic basis and not to fight it. The old democratic opposition and the civil society can therefore fully contribute to mobilizing people for development endeavours and political consensus building.

Any new government should pay attention to equitable management of the four instruments of power as indicated above. It should design and get consensus on a new institutional framework for the transition period, which will prevent the government from running the country by individual decrees in assuming or implementing executive legislative and judiciary powers. A new government should avoid the internationalization of the DRC's problems by getting external forces out of the country.

On the political side, the government should build a consensus on a sound human development and reconstruction strategy and related operational programmes aimed at reversing the economic and social decline in order to meet the population's basic needs.

On the technical and institutional side, the new governance system should have an

operational programme to re-build a new state machinery, able to carry out classic administrative, judiciary, security and development functions. This is important also for the new national army and national police, which should be national security forces and not geo-ethnic political militia.

Conclusion

To be successful, strategies for SHD should rely on the three important pillars: (i) a sound and good governance system; (ii) an effective and efficient national resource mobilization programme including human, natural and financial resources; (iii) and international co-operation to support national development priorities. Among those pillars, a sound and good governance system is obviously the most important because it is not only part and parcel of the SHD paradigm, but also because it goes beyond the other SHD components and impacts on them through the

political, institutional, economic and social environment it creates.

Therefore a good governance system has to be defined in relation with the pursued objective (i.e Sustainable Human Development), with the results achieved in this way (i.e progress in implementing SHD strategies and programmes), and finally in relation with the operability of the mechanisms that have been set up (i.e effectiveness and efficiency of the interaction between the three actors of good governance: the state, the private sector and the civil society).

DRC history shows clearly that a lack of a good governance system, despite the dynamism of the private sector and the civil society, is the most important factor for the undermining of progress in SHD in the country. On the contrary, human development doesn't seem to have been either a priority or a pre-occupation for the government almost since independence. Results in the SHD situa-

tion are consistent with the governance system that has been and is in place.

Mbaya Kankwenda

II. Measuring Performance in Governance in SADC

A measure of governance (index of democratic governance) has been proposed and developed in this report for the Southern African region. The objective is to assist governments to continuously monitor and evaluate their performance in this regard. This is important if the region is to avoid degenerating into autocracy, authoritarianism, corruption and inefficiency. Such indicators set standards and articulate regional values which member states aspire to attain. It is important that both governance and human development are measured, however difficult it may be to do so. At least two main reasons can be advanced for this. First, measurements impose common meanings and develop consensus on what is being measured. Second, measures are signposts of progress or failure. They are yardsticks against which citizens and their governments can, from time to time, re-visit policies and programmes to determine their performance on the basis of commonly accepted indicators.

As defined in this chapter, governance comprises four components. These are a) political, b) institutional, c) economic and, d) gender empowerment. The first component deals with participation in the process of election of leaders, the values and procedures that guide such elections, the supremacy of the rule of law, the autonomy of local government and existence of a free and active civil society. The institutional component of governance focuses on evaluation of the existence and performance of institutions and processes of government. The economic component is measured by the performance of the economy, participation in the economy by different sections of the population, that is, women, youth, farmers and minority groups. The fourth aspect of governance measures structures, policies and legislation which facilitate the participation

of women in political and decision-making processes (gender component). Each component is discussed below on the basis of a sample of seven SADC countries which responded to the questionnaire on these issues. These countries are then categorized on the basis of performance in the three components of governance. The measure centres on transparency, efficiency, and participation and is called the index of democratic governance (IDG). This measure is a useful tool for setting standards for democratic governance in Southern Africa. (The gender empowerment component was not used because of the lack of data.)

III. The Political Component

This component encompasses the entrenchment of the basic freedoms and rights of both groups and individuals in the constitution of a country, supremacy of the rule of law, existence of an independent judiciary, competitive and broadly inclusive elections, the separation of powers, popular participation through constitutionally enshrined local government, community forums and traditional assemblies, multi-party environment, independent media, etc. An overview of the situation in the region shows that most countries have started embracing some aspects of the political component of governance as follows:

(i) Some Trends towards Better Governance in SADC

The struggles and demands of the inhabitants of Southern Africa over the years have finally achieved one of their major objectives – majority rule. The end of *apartheid* rule in South Africa in 1994 marked a historic watershed in that regard. The minority regime was replaced by a popularly elected government. Currently, most of the states in the region, with the exception of the Kingdom of Swaziland, Angola and the DRC, have both individually and collectively accepted multi-party systems of government. In addition to majority rule in South Africa, Namibia has become an independent multi-party state and Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia have also moved from one-party rule to multi-party systems. Angola and the DRC are still struggling to achieve a relative level of control over internal unrest whilst in a transition to multi-party forms of politics. The aforementioned countries now join Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe which have practised a multi-party system of government for several years. Whilst it is understood that multi-partism is not synonymous with democracy (Mamdani, 1992; Mkandawire, 1992), the relative opening up of political systems by governments in response to people's struggles and demands is a welcome step in the direction of democratic practice, and the creation of participatory societies in Southern Africa.

(ii) Multi-party Elections are Becoming Entrenched

A consensus is emerging within the region that multi-party systems are generally better political arrangements compared to single-party systems. At present, with the exceptions of Swaziland and the DRC, each of the remaining 12 SADC countries has on average four registered political parties. The holding of elections is becoming common practice and a major indicator of political participation by citizens and their political organizations. The table below shows the dates when the latest legislative elections are scheduled in the various SADC countries. While it is difficult to say with certainty that the scheduled elections will take place, it is probable that they will take place in most of the countries.

From this table we observe that three countries had elections in 1998. Lesotho had an election in 1998 which was nullified. Six others will hold theirs in 1999 and two in the year 2000. Zambia and Seychelles will hold their elections in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Nonetheless, three important issues have been raised about the quality of elections in the region. These relate to the organization and management of elections, the competitiveness of political parties, and the effects of the presently dominant first-past-the-post electoral practice. The issues are summed up below.

Table 4.1:

Election Dates in SADC Countries

Country	Last Election Date	Latest/Next Election Date
Angola	1994	1999
Botswana	1994	1999
DRC	1993	..
Lesotho	1993	2000
Malawi	1994	1999
Mauritius	1996	1998
Mozambique	1994	1999
Namibia	1994	1999
Seychelles	1993	2003
South Africa	1994	1999
Swaziland	1993	1998
Tanzania	1995	2000
Zambia	1996	2001
Zimbabwe	1995	2000

Sources: SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, (1998) and UNDP HDR, (1998)

(iii) Irregularities in the Electoral Process

It is widely claimed that elections are still generally not well managed when they occur in SADC countries. The party in government is sometimes alleged to have manipulated the elections and the results are thus contested by the opposition parties. Deficiencies in voter registration, ineffectiveness of electoral commissions, allegations of bribery of voters, and vote rigging are some of the frequently given reasons for the non-acceptability of election results by contending parties. To a greater or lesser degree, one or other of these problems have dogged general elections in Angola (1994), Mozambique (1994), Tanzania (1995), Zimbabwe (1995), Zambia (1996) and lately Lesotho (1998). The flawed conduct of elections undermines the legitimacy of both the process and the results. The lack of a clear separation between the regulations governing the electoral process and the role of the incumbent government on the one hand, and the persistence of undue advantage to the party in control of government structure on the other, tends to devalue the legitimacy of the election system in most cases.

Although the average voter turn out for 12 of the SADC countries during the most recent elections in the region (1992 and 1996) was very high at 76%, election irregularities seem to be contributing to apathy amongst voters. Data on eligible voting constituencies is still difficult to access in most countries although estimates from some countries, for instance, Botswana (1994) suggest that around 30% of the population eligible to vote do not bother to register. Some additional 15% to 25% of those who register never turn up to vote. It is evident that voter apathy is a growing phenomenon in the region. Some studies explain this situation in terms of the voters' diminished faith in 'freeness and fairness' of elections, and in the remoteness of the possibility of changing a government through the ballot box. (Sithole, 1992) For instance, only 57% of registered voters turned out at polls at the Zimbabwean legislative elections in 1995 compared to 70% and above in the previous elections.

The formation recently (July, 1998) of regional election commissions in Cape Town, South Africa, is a positive development which should not only further the entrenchment of elections as an objective process of selecting leaders but also help improve the quality of election administration in the region. Such collaborative regional effort must be encouraged and sustained.

The greatest challenge to democratic development in SADC is that of creating meaningful political competition

We recognize the role of opposition parties as a prerequisite for democracy

(iv) Weak Political Opposition

Generally opposition political parties in the different SADC countries are weak and poorly funded. This limits their ability to mobilize support and/or reach out to all constituencies in their respective countries. Difficulties in raising finances to support campaigns and the inability to reach voters through educational material and media channels seem to be the major obstacles in the functioning of effective opposition politics across the region. Limited or no access to official media which tends to be monopolized by the party in government only aggravates the situation. In support of this claim a recent study (Darnolf, 1997) comparing election strategies in Botswana and Zimbabwe during 1994 and 1995 respectively concluded that the media gave opposition parties 'flashlight' coverage while the ruling parties get 'spot light' attention. These two forms of coverage can make a major difference in the outcome of an election, usually in favour of the party given the spotlight coverage. The Ouagadougou NGO meeting already referred to above observed the dangers of weak opposition as follows and recommended:

'We recognize the role of opposition parties as possible future governments, and as a prerequisite to democracy. Thus the opposition parties must be given due respect and recognition and be educated on their roles. We therefore strongly recommend to the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), that it should expand its forum to include opposing and alternative voices as a necessary condition for the realization of true democracy.'

The above are unlikely to be the only and main reasons for poor showing by opposition parties. It appears that others include the lack of organizational skills, the pervasive negative effects of 'the personality cult concept' of the leader and issues relating to inter-ethnic relations which often confine party membership to a specific ethnic following. Thus, as the NGOs' resolution recommends, there is need for training. There is, indeed, a need to address the issue of the effectiveness of political competition more seriously.

We Need Good Governance Too

Good governance responsive to the needs of people provides the best auspices for achieving human development in any country. Human development and good governance must both begin at home, but national efforts to secure human development should have the support of good governance at the global level. Global governance should address those features of the world system that allow rich countries to follow practices that frustrate efforts to end global poverty. The spread of globalization makes this even more necessary.

Globalization has drawn national economies into a tightening web of relationships. The degree of integration is by no means uniform, nor is the distribution of its benefits symmetrical. Some nations are more closely linked than others, while a number of countries seem to have been virtually bypassed by globalization. Though many economies have been able to draw dynamic impulses from globalization (and these include several developing countries), it is the richest countries that have gained most.

Globalization is not a single phenomenon but a cluster of interacting forces – the prominent ones include financial deregulation, market liberalization and advances in information technology. Partial trade liberalization provides telling evidence of the unfair distribution of benefits. It is no secret that it is affluent OECD and a handful of developing countries that are gaining most from the last big round of trade negotiations liberalization – the Uruguay Round of GATT (the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, now replaced by the World Trade Organization). According to World Bank and OECD estimates, the European Union is expected to benefit to the tune of \$80,7 million by the year 2002, with the United States due to gain \$18,8 billion. China is also expected to be an important beneficiary, with a gain of \$37,0 million, but Africa is, expected to be worse off – to the extent of \$2,6 billion.

One of the main benefits of globalization is said to lie in its effect in spurring trade, which is a proven road to economic progress. World trade has been expanding much faster than world output, countries sharing in this growth have seen their trade – exports and imports – increase as a proportion of their gross domestic product.

But the World Bank reported in 1997 that 44 countries out of a total of 93 developing countries monitored had found this gateway to economic progress barred. Their ratio of trade to GDP had, in fact, dropped over the previous decade. Another 17 countries had experienced only moderate increase, and three-fourths of the increase had benefited just eight countries. Through a large part of the developing world, trade has not provided an impetus to economic growth and human development.

A key aspect of globalization is the dominant role of private capital. Private flows have been dwarfing official financial flows to developing countries and in 1996 private capital movements accounted for as much as 85% of total flows to these countries. Developed countries' insurance companies, pension funds, unit and investment trusts, mutual funds have collectively become more important than official aid agencies or multilateral banks as sources of capital for developing nations.

But these private flows have proved very selective and fickle. In 1996 – the peak year for private capital flows to the developing world – 95% of the flows benefited just 26 countries, with the balance, 5%, shared among 140 countries. These private sources have also proved to be guided by short-term considerations; they are liable to pull their money out as fast as they bring it in – and leave countries in the lurch, as has been the recent misfortune of several countries in Asia. Private flows have been sharply curtailed in the wake of the Asian crisis. An IMF estimate suggests that the 1998 figure may be even less than half the numbers for 1996.

Development aid – the main form of financial flows from official sources – has meanwhile been cut back or only just maintained and not increased, except in the case of a few traditionally generous countries such as the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Rich countries have been receding from the target that was set many years ago: to provide 0,7% of their combined GDP. Development aid is at its lowest level since statistics began. Aid from the G7 countries – the top seven industrial nations – averaged just 0,19% of their GDP in 1997. *The Economist* was prompted to point out that America is the global Scrooge, with an aid budget of just 0,08% GDP.

The 1997/98 financial crisis in several Asian countries that had been held up as models of accelerated economic progress, coming within a few years of the crisis in Mexico, suggested that globalization had made the international financial system more unstable, making even star performers vulnerable to devastating shocks. Within weeks, advances in human development achieved over years of effort were wiped out, and many millions of people were abruptly returned to the poverty and deprivation from which they had recently been able to escape. The world's arrangements for economic governance proved incapable of anticipating or preventing this crisis, and efforts to manage it seemed to make matters worse, driving economies into greater disarray and pushing more people into poverty.

These shocks apart, there is evidence that globalization is widening the gap between the rich and the poor in the world. Figures show that the share of global income received by the poorest one-fifth of the world's people was shrinking from 2,3% in 1960 to 1,4% in 1991 and then to 1,1% in 1994, suggesting that the decline had become sharper as globalization advanced in the 1990s. These are decidedly bleak auspices for efforts to achieve human development for the poorest people.

These efforts are also hamstrung by the debt burden – and by rich countries foot-dragging which has delayed the adoption of an enlightened strategy to free the poorest countries from a millstone that drags their people into even deeper poverty. In 1980, the developing world's debts stood at \$600 billion. It has now climbed to \$2,2 trillion – and the annual debt service (interest and repayments of capital) alone amounts to \$270 billion.

Debt payments are only one of the external obstacles which poor countries have to contend with as they try to spur development. The downward pressure on the prices of commodities – economic mainstays for most developing countries – is another. UNDP reported in 1997 that real commodity prices in the 1990s were 45% lower than in the 1980s – and even 10% lower than in the worst times of the Great Depression nearly 70 years back. The least developed countries, generally the poorest, have suffered a 50% drop in their terms of trade since the early 1980s. This has severely constrained their

capacity to import and therefore hindered their development efforts.

All these external circumstances have a bearing on developing countries' chances of success in achieving human development; they also belong within the domain of global governance. They are, however, not being addressed effectively today partly because the institutional arrangements for global governance are inadequate or not representative enough to be responsive to the interests of the poor. It will not be possible through improved governance to eradicate all injustices and inequities in the world's economic functioning. But as better national governance, through monitoring, wise regulation and enlightened policy leadership, has made economic systems fairer and protected the weakest in many countries, so improved global governance can make the world system more hospitable to the efforts of the poor to achieve human development.

There are a number of institutions concerned with global economic governance. They include intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. There are others like the Bank for International Settlements, which links the central banks of several rich countries, the OECD, an organization representing industrial countries, and the Group of 7, their more elite club. ECOSOC has a broad remit and is a representative body but it has been made powerless. The IMF and the World Bank function in important, if narrower, fields, but their voting systems heavily favour rich countries, whose interests consequently influence their policies and prescriptions. Rich countries account for approximately 62% of the votes in the governing bodies of the IMF and World Bank, as against 17% in the UN and 24% in the WTO.

The main gap in the architecture of global governance is of an overarching representative body at the top to oversee and give policy leadership on major economic and financial issues affecting the world. In the absence of such a body, this role has been appropriated by the G7, a grouping of rich countries accountable to no-one but themselves, representing a small and declining proportion of the world's people, and therefore lacking any claim to democratic legitimacy. This unsatisfactory situation has prompted a call, notably by the Commission of Global Governance in its 1995 report, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, and by UNDP's Human Development Report, 1994, for an Economic Security Council within the UN.

Such a body would help to ensure that issues of critical importance to poor nations and poor people – to human development – receive more attention on the world agenda at an appropriately high level, and that it is not just the perspectives of the richer nations that determine world priorities and the course of global action on important economic and financial matters. The UN's Security Council exists to deal with matters of world peace and security – to protect people against war. It is equally important to ensure human security – to protect people against acute poverty and its denial of human potential.

The eradication of poverty, the marginalization of the poorest countries, the worsening debt problem, the deteriorating terms of trade and widening economic disparities are all issues where the global movement must complement and reinforce national efforts to improve human security and achieve human development. Global governance must create the international environment within which individual countries efforts have a better chance of realizing benefits for their people. An Economic Security Council is, of course, not a magic wand to

end all the problems that hold back development. Many issues could be tackled through existing institutions of governance, e.g., tariff escalation that prevents developing countries from processing farm products before export and improving access to finance for countries neglected by private flows. Much could be achieved through the WTO, IMF, World Bank and other agencies of economic governance to improve the prospects for human development worldwide.

The need for global arrangements for economic governance that are more democratic and more development-friendly and for more purposeful action within existing institutions does not diminish the responsibility of developing nations to respect the need for the highest standards of national governance in pursuing development. Countries should work for equity and fairness in domestic arrangements as much as they seek these attributes in global arrangements. They should similarly aim to reduce economic disparities and not allow the benefits of development to accrue disproportionately to the privileged. They should ensure that development policies are responsive to the needs and wishes of people, not imposed from above but evolved through consultation and democratic processes.

There is no doubt that the global setting needs improvement in many respects so that it provides better conditions for human development. But countries should themselves take the maximum advantage of opportunities that the world environment, including globalization, may offer. This entails, among other things, giving high priority to education and the acquisition of skills, for it is clear that developing countries can no longer rely on low-waged unskilled labour in an increasingly competitive global market pervasively influenced by technological change.

Sir Shridath Ramphal

(v) The Current Electoral Regime is Not Building the Much Needed Political Consensus in Individual Countries

The first-past-the-post electoral regime has been questioned for its insensitivity to the diversity of interests and population. This electoral regime has, in many countries, produced a very weak opposition leading to, with a few exceptions, the emergence of dominant-party systems, i.e., systems in which one major political party overwhelmingly dwarfs the other parties in parliamentary representation. This is currently the case with the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, Movement for Multi-party Democracy

(MMD) in Zambia, SWAPO in Namibia, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and many other countries of the region as shown in *Table 4.2*.

Table 4.2
Legislatures are Characterized by One Strong Ruling Party


Country	Last Election Date	Total Elected Seats*	No. of Ruling Party's Seats	% of Ruling Party's Seat
Angola	1994	220	129	58,6
Botswana	1994	40	27	67,5
Lesotho	1993	65	65	100,0
Namibia	1994	78	59*	75,6
Seychelles	1993	34	30	88,0
S. Africa	1994	400	252	63,0
Tanzania	1995	232	186	80,2
Zambia	1996	156	131	84,0
Zimbabwe	1995	120	117	97,5

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Databank.

*The figures exclude specially elected or nominated members of the legislature except for Namibia where we could not obtain disaggregated data


In nine SADC countries, the ruling party controls on average 82% of the elected seats in the legislative assembly as shown in *Table 4.2*. The percentage rises to around 85% when the nominated members of the legislature, usually a prerogative of the leader of the majority party, are added. Basically, these results show the exclusion of many political players from the countries' law-making machinery and thereby jeopardizing the chances of consensus building. This is a serious problem, especially in what are generally gender, ethnic and racially divided societies in the region. These results further explain the weak characteristics of legislatures in most countries in the region. Currently, the exceptions from one-party dominance are Malawi and Mozambique where the combined opposition seats constituted 51,9% (1994) and 48,4% (1994) respectively. (See *Figure 4.1*) A dominant-party status resembles a *de facto* one-party state. Without an effective opposition entrenched in parliament, large majority party regimes share some of the weaknesses of one-party systems. The opposition, which normally comprises parties and independent candidates, hardly ever control more than 30% of seats in the legislature even though the average opposition vote in most countries is around 35%. In general, only one or two of the average four political parties contesting elections in the individual countries ever find their way into the legislature.

Figure 4.1
Ruling Parties' Domination of the Legislation



Source: SARIPS/SAPES Databank

Figure 4.2
Tanzania Votes and Seats in Parliament, 1998



There are different forms of proportional representation, some of which are more effective in terms of relating the votes gained to the number of seats allocated to each party. Internationally, for instance, the Scandinavian form of PR has generally worked better than the Israeli and Italian variants. A careful balancing and weighting, including the setting of the threshold at a reasonably high level, can create stability in the legislature in much the same way as the first-past-the-post electoral system is supposed to.

The PR system also offers a number of advantages which are better suited to

societies emerging from major conflict as is the case with many of the SADC countries. First, PR enables a better relationship between the number of votes and the number of seats by each party during an election. The cases of Botswana in 1994 and Tanzania in 1995 are instructive examples of this. In Botswana, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party obtained 55% of the total votes but came away with 67,5% of the seats in the legislature. The opposition vote, which totalled 45%, was insufficiently represented. The Botswana National Front (BNF), the only opposition party in parliament, scored 37,3% of the popular vote but got only 32,5% of the

seats. This meant that the remaining 8% of the votes polled by other opposition parties did not translate into representation in Botswana's parliament. In Tanzania, during the 1995 legislative elections, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi obtained 59,2% of the popular vote yet it received 80,2% of the seats in the legislature. The remaining 19,8% of the seats were shared disproportionately between CHADEMA (with 6,2% of the votes and 1,3% of the seats); CUF (with 5,0% of the votes and 10,3% of the seats); and NCCR-MAGEUZI which obtained (21,8% of the popular votes but only 6,9% of the seats). These two cases serve as glaring illustration of the inefficiency of simple plurality electoral regimes (Figure 4.2 refers). The case of NCCR-MAGEUZI, in particular, shows that where votes are concentrated in a few constituencies, as was the case with NCCR-M, the gap between the votes polled and seats obtained is even wider.

Second, PR has been shown to better accommodate diverse interests and therefore promote consensus compared to simple plurality (first-past-the-post) system. Third, PR enhances power sharing and allegiance to the political order by leaders of different groups because they have a stake in the arrangement. The foregoing discussion on problems of management during elections, party competition and the current state of single-party dominated and weak legislatures points to the need to make the electoral process more efficient and transparent in order to promote more meaningful participation by citizens and parties in the region.

The gap between the votes and the number of seats opposition parties get in the legislature under the current electoral regimes is wide and unfair to them. It has been common for the opposition parties to poll a substantial total vote, of up to 41% of the total votes (as in Tanzania, 1995), 40% (Zambia, 1996), 38% (Lesotho, 1998), 37,5% (Botswana, 1994), 27% (Namibia, 1994) and 20% (Zimbabwe, 1990). Yet this substantial vote does not translate into a proportionate number of parliamentary seats. (Mushi *et al*, 1997)

This raises questions about the relevance and credibility of the first-past-the-post electoral system. Clearly, it needs to be reviewed in the light of the rise of dominant-party systems despite significant opposition vote. (Beetham, 1994; Matlosa 1998) Issues requiring attention include the question of whether or not political stability can prevail in dominant-party legislatures and whether effective and democratic governance can be ensured under conditions of one-party rule.

It has been argued (Reynolds, 1995) that the time is right to institute proportional representation (PR) into the electoral systems of the region. Proportional representation, however, may not be a panacea to all electoral problems in most SADC countries. One of its shortcomings is the tendency to promote non-constituency representation in the legislature. It also has the tendency to give more power to smaller parties which may use coalitions to eventually determine the stability or instability of the legislature.

(vi) Electoral Politics are Deeply Rooted in Ethnic Identities and Loyalties

In Southern Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, elections are influenced by ethnic identities. Such ethnic partisanship wreaks great havoc in the lives of many Africans. The collapse of the Somali state and the stresses put on Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique and Angola were largely due to ethnic rivalries within those countries. It is therefore necessary to recognize and accept this reality and to develop mechanisms of accommodation for the multi-ethnic communities which exist in each country. While the ethnic factor tends to be more pronounced in some SADC countries, it does pose a challenge to all political systems in the region. In Malawi, for example, political support is divided sharply along the ethnic and regional divide where the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) obtained 46% of the votes in 1994 elections largely because its leader comes from the south where the Yao and Chewa are dominant. On the other hand, the AFORD, which draws its support from the north, got only 19% of the votes. The problems of the war in Angola also reflect ethnic tensions. Support for the ruling MPLA comes mainly from the Kimbundu and UNITA's support comes from the second largest ethnic group – the Ovimbundu (33% of Angola's population). Though, belonging historically to a common ancestry the Kimbundu and Ovimbundu have developed major rifts over the years. Mistrust of each other is a major political problem in Angola.

(vii) Constitutionalism and Constitutional Reforms

The change from single-party to multi-party systems has been accompanied by important constitutional reforms in most countries in the region. This follows after many years of rejection of plural politics by some of the countries of the region. The new reforms have also enhanced the balance of power between the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The new constitutions include provisions on human rights, gender equality, the length and number of terms which the executive head would serve, etc. Political reforms in countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia have been underpinned by these constitutional changes. The constitutions designed and adopted in Namibia and South Africa reflect these changes but also seek to provide the framework for a new political order in those countries. In Zimbabwe, there has been a growing demand for constitutional reform to replace the Lancaster House independence constitution. A great deal of the pressure for such reform comes from civil society organizations led mainly by human rights groups, labour unions and churches. The Zimbabwe government has accepted the need for reform and it is expected that the reform process will commence before the general elections scheduled for 2000. The composition and functioning of the constitution making bodies, i.e., a Constitutional Commission and an electoral Constitutional Assembly should aim at maximum inclusivity and the broadest form of participation. (Hlatshwayo, 1998)

Important aspects of human development include political, economic and social freedoms as well as guaranteed human rights. (UNDP, 1997) It is, therefore, vital that constitutions should enshrine at least the basic political freedoms and human rights. Unfortunately, following the example of colonial and *apartheid* regimes, some countries within the region, have trampled upon these basic rights especially during the era of single-party systems. Detention of political opponents was widespread, and in some instances political violence characterized the electoral process. The rights of all citizens to participate in the political process within the framework of the law is now guaranteed in most constitutions. It is the task of governments to consistently uphold and protect these rights. Constitutional experts have specified different 'generations' of rights. (Chanda, 1998) These are: firstly, political and civil liberties grounded in a notion of

natural rights and a social contract, and, secondly, rights which emphasize economic, social and cultural rights.

The first set of rights should invariably be guaranteed and protected without qualification by states. The second set of rights is equally vital to the consolidation of sustainable human development. The right to be 'free from hunger', to have an adequate standard of living, the rights to education and health care are intrinsic to the attainment of human development but, with the exception of the South African constitution, current constitutional provisions do not yet guarantee this set of generation of rights to citizens in the region. The realization and guarantee of these rights are bound up with the pace and degree of economic and social development in the region.

(viii) Civil Society has Emerged as a Strong Human Rights Watchdog in the Region

Human rights organizations (and in some countries human rights commissions as well) have evolved and established themselves as strong watchdogs safeguarding human rights in the individual SADC countries. In all the countries autonomous human rights organizations such as Ditshwanelo in Botswana, WiLDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa), Afronet in Zambia, ZimRights in Zimbabwe and Legal Aid Centre in Namibia are doing excellent work in the area of human rights monitoring, research, advocacy and education. (See Figure 4.3 and 4.4) In February 1997, these organizations and others met in South Africa where they formed a regional human rights umbrella organization with a secretariat based in Afronet, Zambia. These are positive developments based on the initiative of the civil society. Governments must provide a conducive environment for these to function effectively as they do the good work of educating citizens on their rights.

Civil society organizations play a complementary role in ensuring that citizen rights and freedoms are protected

Regional governments must also support and assist in the development of independent and functioning human rights commissions. In a few countries, the commissions exist only in name and in others they do not exist at all. It is important that these watchdog organizations are established and serve to ensure that the provisions of the constitutions described above are implemented. These organizations do serve an important complementary function to the judiciary and the law enforcement machinery. They should not be seen as opponents of government as is often the case. In fact, they represent both a test for participatory governance and freedom of speech in the individual countries.

Box 4.5

Why Democracies Fail

When elections occur but people do not participate; this happens when people are not educated about democracy and elections, it is like asking people to play a game without telling them all the rules.

When there are few or no organizations to act as watchdogs.

The party and the people in power must be open to criticism and questioning. Those in power should not be allowed to violate rights and freedoms.

When there is a lack of accountability for elected and appointed officials. Elected representatives must be responsible to those who elected them – the citizens of the country.

They must be held accountable for their actions.

When there is no real representation. People must be able to reach their representatives and be heard. Many politicians think that once they are elected, they do not need to maintain contact with voters.

When violence and corruption is used to maintain power. A government should not rely on violence or intimidation to stay in power. When it is the freely expressed desire of the people, the government should be willing to step down peacefully.

When people cannot understand how government works and how they can access the system. People must be able to use the rights and freedom protected by the constitution. They must have access to justice, information on the law and legal representation.

Source: Ditshwanelo, Botswana Centre for Human Rights Training, Booklet in Democracy and Human Rights, n.d.

(ix) The Local Government is not Adequately Recognized and Supported

Effective and participatory governance requires that government structures be brought closer to the general population and that local institutions become channels through which people can both participate, contribute their own resources for development and express their needs to the central authority. However, the history of local government in the region shows that local councils are legislatively, financially and administratively paralysed. Many city and district authorities are highly dependent on central government grants, and when these grants are cut as has happened in many countries in the region in the past 15 years, councils run into serious budgetary deficits. Most councils have no authority to borrow money and /or introduce local taxes which could enable them to undertake the necessary development programmes at local level. Under these conditions, councils have become talk shops with limited links to the local communities. The public itself has low regard and often no expectations of the councils. South Africa has, however, taken the lead in transforming this negative image of local governance. First, local government is enshrined in the constitution of that country. The functions and mandate of the local government, including its 'relative autonomy', are further defined by the legislation. Second, local government has been mandated to play a developmental role which goes beyond traditional service-provider role as is the case in many countries in the region. Third, and related to the last point, local government is seen as an important entry point for popular participation – local democracy. And fourth, local government is given financial authority and support through which it can undertake Local Economic Development (LED) initiatives thereby creating an investment climate and job opportunities at that level. The central governments in SADC must begin to move in this direction in order to release local energies and develop social capital at the local government level and in the general population as a whole. This will ensure that political reforms and efforts towards good governance filter through from the national to the local government level.

Twelve SADC countries were sent a questionnaire to answer a number of questions in the area of constitutions, elections, political institutions and democratic governance. At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to evaluate the state of democratic governance by giving their country points in a 10-point scale. Only seven of the 12 countries responded on time, namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Despite several reminders, the rest of the countries did not reply. The results for the seven, based on the average of self-reported scores and the research team's own evaluation, are presented in *Table 4.5*.

(x) Summary

The creation of multi-partism, the conduct of regular free and fair elections, respect of the constitution as the supreme law of the land and recognition of local government structures are a significant advancement in good governance in SADC countries. The challenge now for these countries is to ensure the consolidation of the system through more effective participation of the people and their organizations. The record is still wanting in most countries. There is still need to institute 'an enabling environment' to assist in the development of strong and competitive political parties and individual citizens in the political process.

Most countries have elements of but not the full bill of rights in their constitutions. Similarly, most of them other than South Africa recognize the role of local government. In most countries, this institution was established through an act of parliament and does not exist as a constitutional requirement.

IV. The Institutional Component: Developing the Culture of Transparency and Accountability

'Good governance, which is fundamental to the transition towards and consolidation of democracy, has been undermined in some countries by corruption, lack of public accountability and transparency, poor management practices and the lack of an independent judiciary, among others.' (NGOs, Ouagadougou, October 26–28, 1996)

This good governance requires a strong institutional infrastructure which implements anti-corruption programmes and monitors activities of government, private sector and civil society organizations (see, for example, the recommendations of the NGOs meetings, Maputo, Mozambique, 1–2 November, 1997 and Washington, USA, 17–18 February, 1998, among others). The GCA has also conducted anti-corruption meetings in Addis Ababa and Accra in 1997 and 1998 respectively. In all these meetings, firm anti-corruption stands were taken by African governments and their civil society organizations.

It is thus necessary to begin to examine the extent to which anti-corruption and human rights monitoring institutions are being put in place in SADC countries. This component of governance includes the establishment of an independent electoral commission, ombudsman/person, auditor general, directorate of economic crime and corruption, human rights commission(s), independent media board and the existence of an active civil society. However, the mere creation of these institutions is inadequate. Their effective functioning is key. In this section five of these are evaluated in each country. This is because, in spite of their diversities of background and experiences, SADC countries are generally beginning to accept that the institutional framework for governance needs to be urgently established and strengthened. The strides already made under the multi-party systems should now be safeguarded through such an institutional framework. The key elements of this framework include:

- independent election commissions;
- independent judiciary;
- independent anti-corruption body;
- independent human rights commission;
- gender main-streaming and implementation structures;
- strong and active civil society.

While some countries have established independent electoral commissions, others have not yet done so. The results in Table 4.5 suggest that where commissions have been appointed by the executive or on a partisan basis, their impartiality and integrity has still to be proven. Moreover, in order to ensure transparency and accountability in the electoral process, election commissions need to be independent. An effort needs to be made to ensure that all parties have access to state resources such as finance, infrastructure and state-controlled media.

Political developments in the region have also underscored the need for an independent judiciary as the basis of fairness which upholds the rule of law, without fear or favour. Furthermore, the experience since independence is that the legislature has tended to be a weak institution vis-à-vis the executive in most countries in the region. This affects the quality of governance. The legislature must become more autonomous and active in the law-making process and ensuring the accountability of the executive.

The significance attached to the respect and observance of human rights has been expressed in the founding of Human Rights Commissions in some countries. These commissions are monitoring institutions on human rights in these countries. It is an encouraging development that countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia have established such commissions. There are calls for the

As already noted in the previous section, a related development has been the proliferation of human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout the region. These organizations are vital groups from within civil society to monitor the observance of human rights and to report on their violations. In almost every country within the region, such NGOs have been founded. The challenge they face is to broaden their role from monitoring to contributing to civic education which raises citizens' consciousness about their rights. This would add value to their present positive contribution towards monitoring of breaches of human rights.

In the past bad governance was a result of corruption and lack of accountability by those in government. Bribery and nepotism in political life ruined many countries as public resources were indiscriminately given to friends and relatives with impunity. In light of this experience, it is increasingly becoming accepted that, in addition to the human rights commissions, a vibrant civil society, political opposition and constitutional safeguards and checks and balances, anti-corruption institutions such as the ombudsman, auditor general, directorate of crime and corruption, independent media board, etc., add value and stability to democratic governance. It is for the same reasons that a number of governments in the region and beyond are establishing these as 'watch-dog' institutions assisting in the maintenance of both law and order and political discipline. In SADC, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa have most of the latter institutions in place.

(i) A New and Better Organized Civil Society has Emerged at National and Regional Levels

This chapter has so far shown that the civil society has historically played a critical role in political reforms in the region. Both the struggles for independence and the most recent ones against one-party state, dictatorship and minority rule were anchored in and driven by civil society organizations in the form of trade unions, women's organizations, churches, civil and human rights groups, media associations, lawyers' associations and other professional and non-professional groups based at community and national levels. Directly and indirectly, through political organizations, civil society in Southern Africa has played a pivotal role in bringing about the current political climate of multi-party forms of government. In the past 10 years or so that civil society has not only continued its monitoring and development roles in individual countries of the region, but it has also developed through a system of networking, a strong regional image which is beginning to be stronger than even 'the SADC official body' itself.

Examples among these regional umbrella bodies are the Southern African Trade Union Co-ordinating Congress (SATUCC) established in 1982. SATUCC supports national trade union centres on matters of trade union legislation, negotiation skills and representation in national and regional tripartite bodies. Another is the Women and Law Regional Research and Advocacy Group formed in the mid-1980s to promote research, generate information and advocate for improvement of the situation of women in the region. Through the research findings, the group has been able to make major inputs on policy reform aimed at improving the situation of women such as their participation in politics and decision-making in general. At the national level, women's organizations are the most effective and articulate organs of civil society. However, the struggles for gender equality are not over. In fact, as the data in the different sections of this report show, the gap is still very large. The reforms in this area must thus be speeded up.

The Election Commissioners and Human Rights Organizations have already made reference to the formation recently of two regional bodies. Although the former does not constitute an organ of civil society, it aims at working closely with civil society organizations engaged in the area of election monitoring and reforms. At the institutional level, too, independent research and training institutions have emerged and are doing important work on democracy, regional integration, peace and security, gender and development, and development policy research and training. The image

emerging from the analysis of the work of civil society organizations in Southern Africa is that these are new, better organized and qualitatively skilful organizations. Unlike their predecessors which were quickly quashed after independence, the new civil society is not willing to be de-politicized and thereby marginalized. Many in the area of environment, media and minority rights have often caused embarrassment to their governments at international level. The new civil society movement has gone beyond the traditional role of welfare support to the poor and most needy into issues of the who, why and how. (For example, who are the poor? Why are they poor? And how they can be taken out of their predicament?) These organizations are into policy advocacy, reform, good governance and development management. In these roles, civil society has become a partner and not an adversary of governments.

(ii) Civil Society is Becoming a Major Partner in Human Development

In addition to its direct input into the governance process, civil society organizations (CSOs) are a significant force in human development programmes. Examples of such CSOs are co-operatives, small farmer organizations, consumer associations, savings and loan clubs, old boys and girls associations, development associations, burial societies, women's groups, SME associations, church-based groups, humanitarian groups, etc. The comparative advantage possessed by these CSOs is their proximity to the grassroots. They are close to their membership, their needs and interests. They play the role of mobilizing the people. In that way, they instil a greater civil consciousness besides contributing to the social capital and material development of a particular society. There exists scope for a closer partnership between states and conventional NGOs in development activities. Local provisioning of literacy, adult education, health, crop extension, micro-enterprise credit, water and social welfare could be done more effectively through the instrumentality of the CSOs. In this way, the developmental role of CSOs complements their political or governance role.

Civil society organizations have their own limitations, of course. Among which is the lack of funds, inadequately trained staff, inefficient management and, in some, lack of internal democracy. These problems are stronger in some organizations than others but they tend to be common and constraining to many civil society organizations nationally and regionally. SADC must continue to support and recognize the need to assist these organizations to become autonomous and effective partners in both governance and development in general.

(iii) Summary

It is always important to remember that political and constitutional reforms are a means to an end, and not an end in themselves. Primarily, they should contribute to a better system of governance in the respective countries in the region. Political reforms grounded in broad legitimacy have greater chances of sustainability. Popular participation in political reforms through constitution-making, referendums and the electoral process, transparent management of national affairs and collaboration with organs of civil society is a vital aspect of good governance and human development in the region.

V. The Economic Component: Economic Management and Participation by Both the State and the People

National economic management and performance are key aspects of governance and they are the aspirations of the peoples of the SADC region. Six key indicators for the economic component of governance are proposed here to measure SADC countries' performance in the economy. They centred around two aspects of **management performance and participation**. These are (a) rate of economic growth, (b) rate of inflation, (c) fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, (d) debt as percentage of export ratio, (e) unemployment rate and, (f) government indigenization policies and programmes. The latter two denote economic participation. However, due to unavailability of data these

two aspects of the measure of economic governance have not been used in the present study. It will be necessary in the future to find this important data set. Although historical research over the past five decades in this region and in other parts of the world shows that the relationship between the political system and the economy is complex and difficult to pre-determine (Turok, 1994), it is becoming increasingly clear that either way political stability creates conditions for economic growth and that economic crises generally tend to result in political instability. The recent events in South East Asia bear evidence to the earlier experience of Southern Africa where changes of government in Zambia, Malawi and South Africa were directly linked to the fiscal crises of the state in those countries.

(i) SADC Needs an Active Reformed State in Economic Management

The aspects of economic governance must focus on the ability of the state to take up and effectively implement an economic reform programme and design economic policies and programmes which facilitate participation of individual citizens and their private organizations in the economy. Particularly the small to medium indigenous private enterprises need to be supported after suffering discrimination and other forms of injustice under the previous regimes. In many ways, this component defines the role of 'the reformed state' in development in the region. Much of the discussion on governance has inevitably centred on the role of the state in the economy. The post-colonial record has been mixed in Southern Africa. The state has played both **positive** and **negative** roles in the economy. In the early years of independence, the state was instrumental and central in the provision of basic infrastructure – such as roads, marketing depots, clinics, dams and schools, mainly to the disadvantaged rural and urban populations. In most states, social sector expenditure was generally impressive during the first decade of independence. The indigenous business class was small in size at the attainment of independence, and the state stepped in to fill the vacuum. This entailed its extensive intervention in ownership and control of the economy. Many parastatal corporations were founded in a diverse range of sectors: from agriculture to mining, from manufacturing to distribution.

The positive results of the post-colonial state's intervention in the economy were analysed in Chapter 3. It was shown there that major strides have been made in social and human development particularly in the period immediately following the independence of the different states in the region. The areas of education, health, water supply, sanitation, housing and general rural development have been substantially improved since the mid-1960s. This solid social development foundation, as we showed in Chapter 3, is now being threatened by the negative effects of HIV/AIDS, the current economic crisis, unemployment, deepening poverty and persistent inequalities common amongst most countries in SADC.

However, negative results of state invention too cannot be ignored. The post-colonial state did over-extend itself. This over-extension reached crippling proportions in deficits due to a combination of relatively high social expenditure, rise in inflation propelled by the upswing in prices of petroleum products in the mid-1970s and diminishing government revenues due to deteriorating international commodity market prices of minerals and agricultural products which form the backbone of most SADC economies. This led to economic crises characterized by deficits in balance of trade and budgets and a heavy debt burden. All these happened at the time when foreign aid and foreign direct investment were reducing for most countries (see Chapter 2). Good governance in Southern Africa must, out of necessity, focus on the ability of the state to come out of this trap and avoid such traps in the future.

(ii) The Post-colonial State Failed Economically because of Inefficiency and Bad Policies and Not Due to Investment in Social Development

Critics of the post-colonial state in Africa question macro-economic and industrial approaches which allowed for a high level of government intervention in aspects such as

the determination of interest and exchange rates, trade tariffs and so forth. State intervention, the critics argue, has disturbed markets, encouraged rent-seeking, and resulted in unproductive use of scarce resources. Instead of 'market failure', they point to the problems of 'state failure' in the economy. (Swartz, 1998) In relation to the public sector, these critics point to the inefficiency of the large, unwieldy and outdated bureaucracies and nationalized industries that had developed as a result of state intervention. They strongly favour a general reduction of the scope of state involvement in the regulation of market economies, particularly in macro-economic management, a shift from 'import-based' to 'export-oriented' trade policies; commercialization and/or privatization of state industries and functions that could otherwise be efficiently provided for by the market. These neo-liberal analysts argue for the reduction in the size and role of the public sector. The state, they claim, is not fit as an 'economic doer', but should act as an economic 'facilitator' and 'enabler' for market forces to generate. By the mid-1980s, the notion of the 'minimalist' state enjoyed widespread currency in the industrialized world and, increasingly, as policy prescriptions of these countries and the IFIs such as the Bretton Woods institutions to the 'developing' world.

(iii) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are Necessary but Inadequate for the Required Transformation of the Economy

Economic reforms attempted in the region during the 1980s bore the hallmark of prescriptions which sought to curtail the role of the state in the economy. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) typically enjoined governments to cut public services heavily. Social expenditure was drastically curtailed. Expenditure on infrastructural development in the public sector was also cut heavily. This was accompanied by substantial retrenchment of workers in the public service sector. Only Botswana and Swaziland were not implementing either the World Bank-IMF type SAPs or their own designed structural adjustment programmes in mid-1990s. Countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and also South Africa have undertaken such significant cuts in public expenditure and retrenchments in the work-force. This has had immediate negative consequences in the social sectors (health and education) in particular. (Sanders et al, 1997) The private sector has also been adversely affected by the weakened role of the state in the provision of 'an enabling environment' in the form of infrastructure and related investment incentives. Adjustment measures have clearly weakened the capacity of the state to 'deliver' the basic services and infrastructure to enable the private sector to thrive.

This is why, in the 1990s, the 'neo-liberal' perspective itself has come under growing attack. Critics point to neo-liberals' tendency to portray the role and capacities of 'state' and 'markets' in a set of simplistic either/or oppositions and to its failure to concede the remarkable achievements of state intervention in economic reconstruction, combating poverty and raising of living standards in the post-Second World War period. They also noted its tendency to exaggerate problems of 'state failure' without sufficiently acknowledging 'market failures', for example, in social provisioning and instability typical of recent situations in South East Asia.

It is therefore scarcely surprising that the debate on state intervention in the economy has now come full circle. The earlier policy position on the drastic 'rolling back' of the state has been revised by one of the major proponents of the neo-liberal approach:

'As so often happens with such radical shifts in perspective, countries sometimes tended to overshoot the mark. Efforts to re-balance government spending and borrowing were unco-ordinated, and the good was as often cut as the bad. To meet their interest obligations, countries in debt squeezed critically important programmes in education, health and infrastructure as – or more than – they cut low-priority programmes, bloated civil service and money-losing enterprises. Cuts came primarily in capital budgets and, in Africa, in operating and maintenance outlays further reducing the efficiency of investment. The result, seen most starkly

in Africa, was neglect of the state's vital functions, threatening social welfare and eroding the foundation of market development'. (World Bank, 1997)

There has therefore been a paradigm shift in the state's role in the economy. It is now generally accepted that 'development without an effective state is impossible' in the economy. (World Bank, 1997) The consequences of the rejection of the state have succeeded in shifting attention from the sterile debate of 'state versus market' to the fundamental issue of state effectiveness in development.

It is against this paradigm shift that we can discuss the issues of state reform and governance in Southern Africa. To begin with, it should be admitted that states have often in the past committed serious mistakes in economic policy both before and during adjustment programmes. This had a telling effect on the pace of growth which was low in 1980s and early 1990s. This mix of economic policy needed urgent review. Countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Swaziland and Namibia which have not had to implement adjustment programmes committed fewer mistakes, hence the absence of pressure to seek lending from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Nevertheless, the levels of social sector support are lower than the level of current demand in countries such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. There is substantial scope for expansion in state infrastructural support for economic activities in the region. Similarly, there remains much room for improvement in the delivery of public services. Currently, most states in the region lack effective capacity in both policy planning and implementation.

More resources are required for the social sector

Table 4.3 shows that the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have major economic problems which resulted in low indices in the economic component. The strengthening of the state's capacity for delivery provides strategic advantages in tackling the challenge of development, including human development. With limited budgets, growing populations and declining levels of foreign aid, SADC countries in particular and developing countries generally must find more effective ways of governing. By drawing on a larger network of structural resources, states can broaden both their capacity and resource bases for development intervention. On the one hand, this opens the way for mobilizing external agents in the provision of certain types of services. On the other hand, it enables greater focus on core responsibilities of governments. This is the key difference with earlier models of state-led development.

The state can be an effective instrument in bringing together and directing the resources and energies of societal and community groups which would otherwise act disparately. Provided it is strategic and focused, state intervention can provide a powerful incentive for development. (Swartz, 1998) For this reason, it is crucial for the emergence of democratic governance, structures and processes.

Capable government, in short, is central to good governance. If governments adopt a flexible, focused and creative approach to policy-making, they are more effective development agents. 'Flexibility' requires less bureaucratic or rigid rules of engagement and an ability to rapidly adapt institutions and policies to new economic and social circumstances. 'Strategic focus' requires distinguishing between those things it is good in (core competencies) – and improving its capacity in these areas and those things which it is not good at doing (non-core functions) that can be provided externally. 'Creativity' requires networking, partnership and the ability to effectively draw on the resources and energies of external agencies (private sector, development agencies, in short, civil society) in development.

Table 4.3

Components of the Economic Index, SADC Countries (Based on the Averages of the Period 1993–96)

Country	Index of Economic Growth (5 yrs av)	Index of Budget Deficit as % of GDP (5yrs av)	Index of Debt as % of GDP (5yrs av)	Economic Index
Angola	0,58	0,70	0,2	0,49
Botswana	0,70	1,00	0,8	0,83
DRC	0,23	0,80	0,2	0,41
Lesotho	0,92	1,00	0,6	0,84
Malawi	0,67	0,95	0,4	0,67
Mauritius	0,78	1,00	0,8	0,86
Mozambique	0,81	0,95	0,0	0,59
Namibia	0,70	0,95	0,9	0,85
Seychelles	0,61	0,90	0,7	0,74
S. Africa	0,58	0,90	0,8	0,76
Swaziland	0,64	0,95	0,8	0,80
Tanzania	0,61	0,95	0,1	0,55
Zambia	0,34	0,80	0,1	0,41
Zimbabwe	0,57	0,80	0,6	0,66

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Databank; See Technical Note for calculations.

(iv) The Development Challenge of the Reformed State is to Transform the Economy, Promote Growth and Redress Inequalities

The specific challenge of government, especially in developing countries, is to balance strategies for achieving ‘bottom-up’ development (aimed at uplifting the lives of the poor) with high-growth economic strategies. Growth without spreading the wealth base to empower the poor is as unsustainable as ‘growthless strategies’. Balancing these imperatives, however, should not be at the expense of the need to focus on ‘bottom line’ objectives – fighting poverty and promoting the interests of the poor in all areas of social and economic life. This is especially crucial where the wealth gap is wide. This is more so where, as a result of extreme inequalities, social pre-conditions (e.g., education, skills, living conditions, etc.) for effective participation by the poor in the mainstream society and economy does not exist. In this context, a ‘bottom-up’ perspective requires:

- a) long-term investment in public education systems;
- b) transformation of learning systems and curricula to enable socially relevant and lifelong education and training;
- c) strong support for an adequate public health-care system;
- d) supporting high-growth and labour-intensive industries;
- e) ensuring spread of technologies to the poor and marginalized;
- f) creating physical infrastructure for economic development;
- g) ensuring poor communities have access to opportunities and wealth in the economy;
- h) setting and enforcing minimum protection against exploitation in employment;
- i) introducing and enforcing indigenization policies and programmes which empower citizen-owned businesses, women, youth and indigenous population groups.

(v) The Private Sector has an Important Role to Play in Economic Management and Good Governance

Everywhere in the world evidence shows that successful economic development always begins with the existence of a critical mass of a business class. It is this class that usually forms partnership with international capital and promotes a solid national economic base. The emergence of the African indigenous business class, whether in agriculture or industry was, as shown in Chapter 2, ‘nipped in the bud’ by a colonial state inimical to

African development. After independence, many states in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular, failed to recognize the importance of nurturing an indigenous bourgeoisie. Instead, the state policies and programmes became both hostile and frustrating to the small sections of the middle class which showed the potential of becoming an indigenous bourgeoisie.

With the foregoing experience in mind, Southern African states must develop and facilitate the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class. Indigenization programmes in Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and now being started in South Africa must be given all the necessary support. This is particularly important given low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the region. The national or even the regional bourgeois class must emerge and take an active role in both economic management and good governance by investing locally, supporting social development programmes and providing the much needed employment for the increasing labour force.

(vi) The International Community is Indebted to Southern Africa and Must Contribute to Good Governance and Human Development Programmes in the Region

In Chapter 2 it was shown that 90% of Southern African exports go to destinations outside the region. Most of these go to Europe, North America and lately South East Asia as well. In fact, this region has been tied to the international commodity market for over two centuries now. The latter is characterized by unequal terms of trade which have, over the years, disadvantaged developing countries of which Southern Africa is part. The introduction of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to which most SADC countries are signatories and the demand for new forms of global governance should serve not only to level the international playing fields but encourage developed countries to increase their ODAs and FDI in SADC. SADC is one region where the high levels of poverty and unemployment cannot be sustained for too long. The aspirations and expectations of the people for better education, health, employment, peace and personal security are high yet the dwindling resources of most states fall far below meeting these aspirations and expectations. Through SADC, the international community can support good governance and human development in the region.

(vii) Summary

The foregoing discussion of the role of the state and economic reforms highlight the need for the state to transform the type of economic structure inherited from the colonial era and thus far retained with little modifications. It also points to the need to significantly contribute to building social capital required for the poor and marginalized to gain a foothold in the mainstream economy. The new interventions should aim to move beyond 'welfare' to building self-reliance through economic empowerment. For this to happen though the state must emerge out of the current economic crises, promote employment intensive strategies and, at the same time, sustain the political environment conducive for major economic reforms.

VI. The Gender Component of Governance

Since the mid-1990s, the UNDP has come up with a gender empowerment measure (GEM) to assess the extent of female participation in political institutions, decision-making structures and the economy. SADC countries have performed differently in this area since it was invented. *Table 3.13* presents the SADC performance in GEM in 1995.

(i) Gendering Constitutions and the Law

Most constitutions in the countries of the region make sweeping reference to women's rights. However, with the exception of South Africa in particular, together with Zimbabwe and Namibia to a lesser extent, which have enshrined gender-specific

guarantees relating to women's rights, none of the other constitutions ensures gender equality in a substantive manner. Some countries have made limited amendments to their constitutions to reflect more of a rhetorical presence of women's rights, as in the case of the Zimbabwe constitution through Amendment 14, 1996, but, in the main, the laws in the SADC countries remain fundamentally biased against women, reinforcing discrimination and exclusionary practices which continue to exclude women from the full enjoyment of citizen rights. These gendered laws are widely underpinned by cultural notions and practices which entrench the subordination of women and deny them the status of persons in their respective societies.

At the level of laws and conventions governing women's rights in the various social sectors, the persistence of dual legal systems (customary and Roman Dutch/common law) presents an additional hurdle in the quest for gender equality, particularly as most customary law is patriarchal and sexist. Such customary law often applies to matters like property ownership, marriage and divorce, matters affecting the status of women (social status laws), including the status of widows and children, child custody, legitimacy, and adoption, and intestate succession and administration of intestate estates. In Swaziland, widows were not allowed to vote in the recent election because of traditional practices which exclude them from this fundamental political right as citizens of that country. In many of the SADC countries, women continue to contest the predominance of backward cultural practices on their rights as citizens.

A country like Zimbabwe, which made important strides in women's rights during the early years of independence – especially in the areas of inheritance, maintenance, majority standing for women, and political participation at the local level – has nonetheless also seen reversals in the form of constitutional amendments which pose a new threat to women's freedoms. Amendment 14 is a case in point. In South Africa, while the constitution guarantees every citizen equality before law, customary law is still upheld. This means that the majority of women who live under customary law are not seen as equal citizens under the country's civil code because the constitution recognizes customary law and allow individuals to participate in the culture of her/his choice. Namibia has made some overtures towards dealing with the contradictions which this dual legal system presents by passing the Traditional Authorities Act (1995), which requires that traditional authorities promote affirmative action for women by appointing them to decision-making positions. However, the law has no enforcement mechanisms, no allocation of funds and offered no support for women taking on new roles as leaders. (Mapping Progress, 1998) Constitutional and legal change must go beyond the rhetoric of gender equality to ensure full participation by women in the political process.

A very critical legal issue which directly affects women's right to life, is the issue of unwanted pregnancies. In all cases in the region, with the exception of South Africa, the termination of unwanted pregnancies remains criminalized and a dangerous hazard to the lives of women of all ages, races and classes. Hundreds of thousands of women die every year from illegal abortions and unwanted pregnancies, making this a critical health and human development issue. South Africa remains the only country in Africa which has extended this right to its female citizens without the needless encumbrances which accompany other national legislations, by passing the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act in February, 1997. Although this legislative action has set a new watershed in terms of women's struggles for reproductive rights in the region and on the continent, it nonetheless remains highly contested by groups with contrary interests and beliefs. South Africa has also enacted legislation to address women's rights to equal participation in decision making, safety, education and employment.

Another area where legal change affecting the status of women has been forthcoming in the countries of the region is in the area of protection for women against violence in the home as well as in public spaces. All the countries of SADC have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), but none has transformed the substantive clauses of the Convention into nationally binding legislation.

The African Charter for Human and People's Rights establishes binding obligations for states' parties and the result of Article 18(3) is to transform the non-binding declamatory character of such declarations into legally binding instruments, thus incorporating as law the normally persuasive value of international declarations concerned with the rights of women. (WILDAF, 1998) Despite the existence of these regional and global instruments, none of the SADC governments has complied with the spirit of Art. 18 (3) of the African Charter. (Gender and SADC, 1997)

Another critical legal issue facing women in the region is that of gendered violation, which pervades both the home and public sphere. The statistics are horrifying across the region, with South Africa taking the lead in terms of the numbers of women who are raped, assaulted and killed on a daily basis. Studies on femicide in the region (in Zambia, Tanzania, Swaziland, South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana) show rising incidents of woman-killing, and although women's NGOs have focused substantial financial and other material resources on resolving this problem, the safety of women remains a very serious problem throughout. (See Table 4.4) Child abuse is also on the increase in all the SADC countries, reflecting the depth of the problem at the family and community levels. In Zimbabwe, one in three females from the age of 16 is physically assaulted, including kicking and beating; one in two is psychologically abused; one in three sexually abused; while another one in three is economically abused.

Table 4.4
Reported Rape and Femicide in Selected SADC Countries

Cases of Reported Rape:

Botswana:	712 from January to December 1996
Mauritius:	7 766 from 1994-96 (includes cases of domestic violence)
Namibia:	611 for 1993 and 741 for 1994
South Africa:	5 705 from January to August 1996
Zambia:	634 in 1991 and 831 in 1994

Femicide cases recorded up to 1995:

Botswana:	853
Zimbabwe:	249
Zambia:	263
South Africa:	74
Swaziland:	90

(ii) Women and the Judiciary

The number of women within the judicial systems of the SADC countries remains very poor, and the case of South Africa brings out this problem most graphically. 'There are no women among the 18 judges of the appellate division of the Supreme Court. Two out of 10 constitutional court judges (20%) are women. There is one woman out of five land claims court judges (20%) and 10 out of 186 judges in the divisions of the Supreme Court (6%) are women. Among magistrates, two out of 36 chief magistrates, more than half (56%) are women. There are no women among the 10 attorneys-general. Of 80 senior prosecutors, 28 (35%) are women. Of the total number of 1 606 prosecutors, 679 (42%) are women.' (Mapping Progress, 1998)

Although South Africa has only recently become independent, these trends are quite typical, and, in some instances, far worse than is shown above. There are no women Supreme Court judges in all of the countries, and Botswana only recently appointed a woman out of a complement of six judges. Zimbabwe has three women judges.

However, there has been some progress in terms of a response to the problem of gender violence at the level of both the civil society, the state and the legal systems in particular. The formation of child-friendly courts in countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa, mark an important progression towards protecting children who have been abused. Mauritius passed a law in 1997 recognizing domestic violence as a criminal

Women's participation in the judiciary is very low in SADC

offence punishable by law, and all the countries of SADC have, in some way, acknowledged that violence against women is a matter for the criminal justice system to deal with.

Although civil society activism has called for more stringent sentencing of men who abuse and kill women and children, the courts remain basically hostile to such claims, and continue in many cases to favour male sexual deviance. The cases of South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania which have recently enacted legislation aimed at punishing male sexual violence against women and children are important landmarks which have, nonetheless, resulted in heated national debates about African 'culture' and issues of masculinity. The guarantee of economic and social rights is central to the achievement of gender equality for women in Africa.

At the regional level, a Gender and Development declaration was signed by all SADC heads of state, stating the importance of gender equality in the development process, and committing the respective state machineries to the process of empowering women, especially poor and/or rural-based women. Most of the countries are in the midst of preparing or finalizing their national gender policies/plans, and the SADC Secretariat has assumed a more prominent and active role in the support of initiatives at the local and regional levels, working more closely with NGOs and government ministries in 'mainstreaming' gender. Whilst the pace has remained relatively slow and without much success, especially within the SADC regional sectors in particular where gender remains largely unintegrated, nonetheless, the indications are that Southern Africa as a region is heading for a new era in terms of women's visibility in all fields of human endeavour. The emergence of organizations which are openly supporting women's demands for equal rights as well as raising awareness around the issues of sexuality, sexual abuse and HIV/AIDS, is also an important indicator of the changes which are occurring at the level of gender relations in the region.

*SADC governments
have signed
a gender
and
development
declaration*

(iii) Women's Political Status in the Region

The integration of women into the political process in the region is one of the areas where significant progress has been made in recent times. Impressive numbers of women have entered the political arena in South Africa (25% of parliamentarians are women), 17 women senators out of a 90-seat house, and 102 women in the provincial legislatures out of 425 seats. Zimbabwe has only 21 women parliamentarians out of 150 after 18 years of independence, and only 38 female councillors out of 1 377. The political quota system is still only a political pronouncement, without any legal instruments to support it in a political environment which has becoming increasingly fragile. Women have little or no representation on the major commissions and boards dealing with issues of land and resource allocation. In Mozambique, where women are actively engaged in the reconstruction of that country after many years of civil strife and war, there are 63 women in a house of 250 members. Women also make up 15% of cabinet ministers, and the Frelimo Party has adopted quotas for one-third women on their candidacy list to improve women's participation in decision making. In Namibia, women make up 15% of parliamentarians, while in Botswana there are only four women making up 9,5% of membership of the national legislature, and only 15% of the local authorities. (Mapping Progress, 1998)

*Women's
participation
in political
decision is
low in SADC*

In Malawi, there are only 10 women members of parliament out of a total house of 177 members, one woman minister and two women deputy ministers. No woman holds a diplomatic position within the Malawi foreign service. Swaziland had only two women parliamentarians before its recent elections, only six women senators out of 24 members, and none of the ministers is a woman. There are only four women principle secretaries out of a complement of 18. Mauritius has only one woman permanent secretary out of 25 men; three senior women ministers out of 23, and one female ambassador, out of 15 men. Zambia, Lesotho and Tanzania follow this trend, with even less to report in terms of the visibility of women in the political process.

Overall, the political and economic status of women in the region still leaves much to be desired, and will require the concerted action and support, in financial and infrastructure terms, from governments, civil society players and development partners.

VII. Classifying SADC Countries According to Performance on the Governance Criterion

Four components have been used to assess SADC countries' performance based on assessment of recent studies and on the basis of data included in the annexes of this report. Each category has been awarded a value on a scale as shown below and the average value of the three have been added to form the single index of democratic governance (IDG).

Seven countries – Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe – have been rated and ranked below in terms of the degree of existence of participatory values and culture, institutional infrastructure, regulatory monitoring institutions and basic economic indicators (see Technical Note for the calculation of index of democratic governance based on this description). For these countries, responses to a questionnaire were quantified and summarized as shown in *Table 4.5*.

Several studies have recently been conducted on performance of SADC countries in the areas of political and economic reforms. (SADC, 1998) On the whole, these assessments noted a positive trend in the region evident in adoption of pluralist politics and economic structural adjustment programmes. A combination of these factors and related improvements in commodity price markets has resulted in the present low but positive economic growth in almost all the SADC countries.

Combining the results of these recent assessments with the authors' own analyses, SADC countries were classified on the governance scale as shown below. It is evident that the index cannot practically reflect the breadth and complexity of the issues it is trying to measure. But it is used here to help stimulate debate and clarify these issues.

Table 4.5
The Index of Democratic Governance for Selected SADC Countries

Country	IDG Rank	Political Component	Institutional Component	Economic Component	Total IDG
Namibia	1	0,80	0,75	0,85	0,80
Botswana	2	0,74	0,70	0,83	0,76
South Africa	3	0,60	0,70	0,76	0,69
Zimbabwe	4	0,70	0,60	0,66	0,65
Zambia	5	0,80	0,68	0,41	0,63
Lesotho	6	0,40	0,60	0,84	0,61
Malawi	7	0,53	0,42	0,67	0,54

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Databank

The seven countries are ranked with Namibia as number one with an IDG of 0,80 followed by Botswana with 0,76 and South Africa third at 0,69. Zimbabwe is fourth at 0,65, Zambia is in the fifth position at 0,63 while Lesotho is sixth at 0,61 and Malawi seventh at 0,54. The IDG seems to capture the human development and governance situation of these countries fairly well. In both economic growth and human development ranking, Botswana and Namibia are always close. Both countries perform better than the other five on the table. On the other hand, South Africa out-performs Zimbabwe while the latter out-performs Zambia. With the exception of South Africa, the other two

countries are characterized by small populations, internally small markets, and stable democracies and economies. They have all round good performance in the different components of the measure and provide good lessons for the region in that their good governance has had close correlation with high levels of economic growth and a better record of human development. Botswana and Namibia have enjoyed stable export revenues from minerals mainly the protected diamond market. This can make a major difference in the balance of payments as category four above shows. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe have diversified economies enjoying export markets of manufactured goods. They also have broad and participatory political systems. The seven countries have continued to make efforts to further open up their political and economic institutions for further growth and development. All of them have recently been building a number of institutions such as the ombudsman, independent electoral commission, media board and strengthening the constitutions to meet the demands of the opposition. These countries, although they still have to do more themselves particularly in gender empowerment and poverty reduction, constitute models of good governance in the region. Notwithstanding historical and other specific variations and experiences, all the other countries have much to learn from the countries in this group.

Table 4.6

Relationship between Good Governance and Human Development

Country	IDG Rank	Index of Democratic Governance	SADC Human Development Index
Namibia	1	0,80	0,72
Botswana	2	0,76	0,68
South Africa	3	0,69	0,78
Zimbabwe	4	0,65	0,68
Zambia	5	0,63	0,47
Lesotho	6	0,61	0,60
Malawi	7	0,54	0,41

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Databank

The results in *Table 4.6* show that there is a strong positive relationship between good governance and human development of 0,76.* What is not certain is the causal relationship between the two. Countries with good IDGs also have above average HDIs. For instance, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe are consistently above 0,65 in both IDG and HDI. Lesotho and Zambia have lower IDGs and HDIs. Both these two countries have a recent history of economic and political difficulties which must have had a direct impact in their performance. Malawi has the lowest IDG and HDI.


VIII. Conclusion

SADC countries have made significant progress in establishing stable multi-party systems. Most countries now have rich and innovative constitutions. A number of institutions supportive of a pluralist competitive political culture have been established. Basic rights and freedoms have been extended to individuals and organizations in most countries. All these are positive development and create an environment of peace and co-existence. However, more work remains to be done to translate constitutional provisions on fundamental freedoms and rights into political culture and practice of these societies. Governance is clearly an important requirement for peace and political stability. It is a process that involves long-term construction of institutions, organizations and processes that when mature provide a critical framework for human security. These factors have to be taken into account when comparing performance across the region. However, clearly, a major difference in performance also came from differences in values of tolerance, management skills and discipline on fiscal matters of individual countries. Countries in the region can thus learn from one another's experience.

*The correlation coefficient measures the relationship between good governance and human development. The correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to 1. A correlation coefficient of 0,76 shows a strong positive relationship.


While it is difficult to say conclusively what the direction of the relationship between good governance and human development is, the evidence here shows a strong relationship. The relationship is no doubt a complex one and elicited a massive amount of literature which, to date, is still inconclusive. But having said that, the relationship between good governance and economic growth is difficult to dispute. The experiences of this region provide valuable lessons in this regard.

Figure 4.3
Different Types of Human Rights



Source: Adapted from Ditshwanelo, Booklet on Human Rights Education, (1991)

Figure 4.4
Democracy Components



Source: Adapted from Ditshwanelo, Booklet on Human Rights Education, (1991)



I. Overview

The analysis of this report has shown that the theme of good governance and human development in the SADC region is very relevant. These two issues are critical pre-conditions for a peaceful and prosperous Southern Africa. The long struggles for freedom, equality and development in the region underscored the desire for the peoples of this region to live better lives. There have been some encouraging trends in the region to move towards the goal of creating a peaceful and integrated region in Southern Africa. In the past three decades, most states were successful in laying a good foundation for human development. This commendable human development record is currently being reversed by the economic crisis engulfing most of SADC, coupled with the HIV/AIDS pandemic which is also affecting many of the countries in the region. Since 1990, Southern Africa has witnessed major political reforms. Twelve (86%) of the SADC member states have adopted a multi-party system of government. The remaining two are under pressure from their citizens to do the same.

This closing chapter does three things. First, it highlights the main messages of this report. Second, it makes recommendations on the general issues raised by the main chapters of the report. And third, it assigns a new agenda of human development and good governance to the SADC regional organization.

II. Human Development and Good Governance

(i) Human Development

Achievements and Setbacks in Education

- SADC countries have achieved high levels of literacy over the past three decades. The adult literacy rate in SADC has increased by 22% – from 48% in 1970 to 70% in 1995. Although in 1995 the range was wide, from 88% for Seychelles to 40% for Mozambique, 10 (71%) SADC member states had adult literacy above 70%.
- Although still low when compared to South East Asia and Latin America, and in relation to adult literacy, combined gross enrolments at 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels averaged 52% for SADC in 1995. Some eight (56%) of SADC countries had combined gross enrolments above 60% in 1995. However, for the SADC gross enrolment percentage all levels increased only marginally from 38% in 1980 to 39% in 1995.
- Two key questions, however, remain to be answered about educational attainment in SADC. First, is the question of sustainability and further improvement of the present levels. More than half of the SADC countries are going through mild to severe structural economic problems leading to widespread adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) and consequent cuts in educational budgets especially at tertiary educational levels. Only Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles and Namibia have relatively stable macroeconomic environments which are contributing to expansions in the education sector.

- Although governments, international donor agencies and financial institutions have come up with several ameliorative programmes to protect the social sector in developing countries in general, and SADC countries in particular (in 1998 more than 80% of SADC countries were implementing poverty alleviation programmes parallel to SAPs), it is evident from the analysis of this report that such poverty alleviation programmes do not lead to expansion in the education sector.
- The second question has to do with the functionality of the those who have received adult literacy and higher educational qualifications over the years. Limited job opportunities and lack of industrialization resulting in high levels of unemployment in the region is resulting in some sections of the population losing their literacy skills. Loss of literacy is a threat to past achievement in education in the SADC countries. Thus, educational attainment in SADC may not have the same impact on the economy as it did in Asian economies.

Poverty alleviation programmes are not adequate for needed development in the education sector

Declining Life Expectancy

- Life expectancy has improved significantly since the 1960s. Although the latest HIV/AIDS adjusted figures show SADC life expectancy to have increased by only 10 years from 42 to 52 years over a 35-year period from 1960 to 1995, in actual fact, some individual countries had reached 70 years before the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 1995, SADC life expectancy stood at 52 years. The range was from 72 years for Seychelles to 41 years for Malawi. Since the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS in the mid-1980s, some SADC countries have lost earlier gains in life expectancy. Some countries, such as Botswana, have lost up to 10 years due to AIDS.
- Between 1960 and 1996 infant mortality in SADC dropped from 131 per 1 000 live births to 59. With the exception of Malawi and Zambia, where poverty related conditions have kept infant mortality high, high levels of infant mortality are concentrated in the war-torn countries of Angola and the DRC, as well as in Mozambique. Clearly, war and poverty are two of the major causes of death in the SADC region. On the whole, mortality rates have reduced; this would indicate improvements in the health and nutritional statuses of the population.

Improvements in life expectancy are being eroded by the HIV/AIDS pandemic

Persistent Economic Difficulties

- Growth in employment, especially in the first two decades following independence of most countries in the region, has had a major impact on the standard of living and reduction in poverty. In 1995, the adjusted real GDP per capita income (PPP\$) for SADC was \$1 099, the highest per capita being Seychelles at \$2 029 and the DRC being the lowest at \$355. However, eight (56%) of the countries had per capita incomes above \$1 800.
- These relatively high per capita incomes do not, however, reflect the true quality of life in the region. The countries of Southern Africa have some of the most skewed income distributions in the world. Income inequality is large both between and within countries. This inequality is rooted in the historical discriminatory policies of past regimes and is particularly pronounced in former white settler countries. In particular, inequality of income is highest in Namibia, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe where the Gini coefficient is above 0,58. Income inequalities are lower in countries which pursued socialist/welfarist programmes in the early years of independence such as Tanzania and Zambia. Both inequality and poverty are threats to economic growth and political stability in a number of SADC countries. In Zimbabwe, for instance, small-scale communal area based farmers have been invading privately owned large farms over the past 16 years since that country's independence in 1980.

SADC has some of the most unequal distributions in the region

Poverty and Inequality

Income poverty afflicts some 31% of the SADC population. Poverty is particularly great among the rural population and those in low income urban settlements. Between 1989

and 1994 some 86% of the population of Zambia was reported to live below the poverty datum line of that country. In Tanzania, half the population was living below the national poverty line between 1989 and 1994. Across the SADC region, the population living in poverty averages 31%. Poor rainfall, the increasing harshness in the environment, the shortage of agricultural land in some countries coupled with poor technologies and the lack of capital for most rural households all narrow people's choices and exacerbate human deprivation in SADC.

The Gender Gap is Still Wide in Spite of Progress

There is encouraging improvement in the educational enrolment of females at all levels

- There has been general progress towards gender equality. Many SADC countries have instituted legislation, established the institutional machinery, policies and programmes towards improving the conditions of women in the region. In qualitative terms, there has been an improvement in the conditions of women. In 1995, female gross enrolment in SADC was 92% of males for primary education and 86% for secondary. At these levels of education, women are clearly closing the inequality gap. However, at tertiary education level the gap is still much wider. In 1995, for instance, women's gross enrolment in natural science tertiary education was only 19%. The health status of women has improved over the years. However, maternal mortality in SADC is still very high at 888 per every 100 000 births in 1995. In economic as in political terms women's participation in SADC countries is low. The percentage of adult women who were economically active was only 49% in 1990, compared to 72% for men.

Good Progress in Infrastructural Development and Trade Initiatives

- General infrastructural development, though still low in individual countries, has improved in the region as a whole. SADC development projects including major road networks, for example, the Beira corridor linking Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe with Mozambique as well as the Trans-Kalahari road linking Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa with Namibia have had a significant facilitative impact on regional trade and quick access to the sea by the landlocked countries.
- Recent trade protocols and other efforts towards intra-SADC trade and south-south trade strategy point to a positive economic scenario. There is evidence that both at individual country and collective levels, countries in Southern Africa are determined to fight underdevelopment and associated human misery. These achievements are, however, currently being eroded by the current economic crises caused by, or reflected in, the low levels of economic growth, high inflation rates, low flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas development assistance (ODA) coupled by the heavy debt burden.

The Threat of Debt

- Debt is weakening the SADC countries' capacity to achieve the goals of human development. It is important that the historical burden of poverty, inequality and unemployment facing most SADC countries is reversed. The latter problems are affecting mainly women and youth and resulting in social and economic malaise of different kinds.

Military Expenditure is Still a Major Consumer of Scarce Resources

Military expenditure constitutes close to 5% of SADC budgets and it is much higher than health expenditure

The prospect of peace dividends whereby resources previously devoted to war and other military activities would be diverted to human development as a result of end of hostilities in SADC are slim. In 1985, SADC countries spent an average of 3,4% of their GDP (compared to 3,3% on health in 1990) on defence expenditure. Ten years later, in 1996, this percentage had been reduced only slightly to 2,2% across the region. Between 1990 and 1991, SADC military expenditure constituted 41% of combined education and health expenditure. The leading military spenders in 1985 were Angola (15,1%), Mozambique (8,5%), Lesotho (4,6%) and Tanzania (4,4%). In 1996, the leaders were

Botswana (6,7%), Angola (6,4%), Lesotho (5,0%), Zimbabwe (3,9%), Mozambique (3,7%) and Namibia (3,0%). The eruption of conflicts in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998 in which several SADC member states are involved is bound to escalate military expenditure across the board and further shift the resources away from human development and building structures of good governance in the region.

(ii) Good Governance

Good Progress towards Pluralist Politics but Opposition Parties Need Developing

- SADC states undertook widespread constitutional reforms aimed at increased citizen participation between 1990 and 1998. Most countries have held multi-party elections. However, the second round of multi-party elections started on a bad note. Both Zambia's elections in 1997 and Lesotho's in 1998 were marred by controversy, boycotts and allegations of corruption.
- Six countries – Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa – are due to hold elections in 1999. Multi-party elections have, however, not yet produced effective competition in SADC. Over 70% of the countries have ruling parties which control over 80% of the seats in the legislature. The forthcoming elections in the region look destined to reproduce and further entrench de facto one-party parliamentary systems in SADC.
- Elections are also marred by some irregularities in spite of the existence of independent electoral commissions in a number of countries. There is need to improve the management of elections including modification of the first-past-the-post electoral system.
- Generally speaking, political opposition is weak and often divided on ethnic and ideological lines. The existing culture of fear, and dominance of the use of media by ruling parties, do not help to advance the development of opposition parties.

Major strides have been made in democratization

New Institutions Emerging but Not Yet Effective

- A number of SADC countries have evolved 'watchdog' institutions such as independent media boards, independent electoral commissions, ombudsman and anti-corruption directorates. These have been added to the already existing ones such as the auditor general, civil service commission, human rights commission, etc. The key to the success of these institutions, however, lies with the development of a strong opposition, a vibrant civil society and a mature and investigative free media. These developments are only beginning to emerge in a number of SADC countries and need to be supported legislatively, financially and morally.

New institutions of governance need strengthening

The Civil Society Is a Factor of Importance in Governance

Across the SADC region and in individual countries, civil society has reorganized and strengthened. Myriads of local, national and regional civil society organizations/non-governmental organizations have emerged. The latter are making significant positive contributions at political and developmental levels.

- Civil society organizations which include workers, students, women's and environment groups are targetting the poor, needy, weak and neglected groups in society.

The private sector is still weak and unorganized. A more conducive environment for private sector development and participation is required.

III. Recommendations for Sustained Human Development and Good Governance in SADC

The foregoing messages from the analysis of this report require that SADC works out an agenda for addressing the identified constraints to human development and good governance in the region. There are a number of issues raised here which require both the actions of the individual SADC member states and that of the region as a collective. In particular, SADC must develop a regional human development strategy and programme with clearly defined targets. In the area of governance, too, there is need for standards and values to be defined at regional level. This analysis is based on the assumption that the key to regional integration is the development of a high degree of consensus based on common values and standards of performance which, at the same time, respect diversity and variation. In this section, some recommendations on the key issues are presented to assist SADC develop mechanisms of handling these at the regional level.

(i) Education and Training

Adult literacy, education and training are critical elements of human development. Education in this region, as in other parts of the world, has had a positive impact on the lives of individuals, communities and nations. Almost all countries in SADC recognize the importance of education as a vehicle for improving the living conditions of the population. In the past three years many countries in SADC adopted international conventions on educational development and are now putting emphasis on universal basic education, strengthening technical post-secondary training, etc. Some of the countries such as Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, among others, are undergoing major educational reforms.

SADC should:

Use the opportunity of education protocols to intervene more clearly in the process of educational reform in the region. There is need to develop a regional education and training policy which will encourage cost sharing, exchange of experience and collaborative technical research. In particular, SADC should set standard targets for gross enrolments at all levels and assist member states achieve these. Cost effectiveness of education must also be a major consideration in the regional policy.

(ii) Health Policy and Combating HIV/AIDS

A lot that has been achieved by individual states in the area of health is currently threatened by the twin problems of HIV/AIDS and declined public revenue. HIV/AIDS is widespread in the region and the countries of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia are among some of the most affected countries in Africa. There is no sign of decline in the spread of HIV and the impact on life expectancy is already widely felt. As pointed out in the report, some countries in the region have already lost up to 10 years in life expectancy. HIV/AIDS comes at the wrong time when public revenues are on the decline for most countries in the region. Low levels of economic growth, low rates of investment and limited private resources within the region all constrain sustained investment in health. All this when maternal and infant mortality as well as nutrition-based illnesses are still high and threaten life in most SADC countries.

SADC should:

Set up a regional task force to work with international organizations in the area of health to develop comprehensive regional intervention programmes against HIV/AIDS. New initiatives on health financing must also be developed focusing more on women and children at the regional level. The regional organization must set long-term goals in human development and encourage member states to work towards attaining these.

(iii) Poverty and Inequality

Poverty is persistent and growing in the face of declining opportunities. Current low levels of economic growth and past exclusionist development strategies have marginalized a large section of the population and rendered them unemployed or, at best, underemployed. Because of the shortage of land, technology, skills and capital, many people in the region cannot keep themselves fully engaged in productive activities. The continuing structural economic and political exclusion of many citizens and local organizations from the control of major economic assets does not augur well for either good governance or human development.

SADC should:

- a) Set up a fund at regional level to complement poverty alleviation programmes of individual member states. This will enable the co-ordination of both fund raising and implementation of these programmes.
- b) SADC should adopt a regional policy of redressing historical deprivation and inequality in land and other economic assets. The recent debate on the land question in Zimbabwe is not unique. This debate must be pursued at a regional level and resources identified to help the most affected countries.
- c) SADC should help member states revise macro-economic development strategies so that they address the issues of growth, equity, participation and freedom sensitively and comprehensively.

Growth

Everyone in Southern Africa agrees that neither the individual countries nor the region as a whole have taken enough advantage of past opportunities availed by global markets. With growing populations and shifting emphasis on traditional trade commodities, the states, private sector and citizens, through their organizations and families, need to increase productivity and reach high and sustained levels of production in strategic goods and services including in technology. Both the state and private sector have a major role individually and collectively to play in facilitating growth, investing in the right areas and re-structuring production to increase productivity. The regional organization, however, remains key to successful economic development by laying down physical and political infrastructure, policy framework, procedures and standard values.

Equity

Part of the past failures and overall poor performance in individual countries and the region as a whole are derived from an inequitable distribution of productive resources ranging from land and technology, to capital, skills and training. This process marginalized women, youth, civil society, rural populations and many more who became dependants of the state and the donor community. It is these large sections of the population that have to be brought back to the centre of development by providing them with both skills and other resources required for development. The state, the private sector, private families and the regional and international community must work diligently and in concert to provide assistance to restructure SADC's economic and social systems.

Participation

As other nations, the people of this region desire to participate in its development. The citizens may individually lack the skills and other resources but they have labour power and social capital. They have the experience of the environment, the norms and values, languages and cultures including techniques which need to be continuously developed and articulated to their changing environment. Paternalistic development approaches are not ideal for either political stability or human development. Already, through a myriad of civil society organizations, the people of this region have organized themselves and are building schools, roads, clinics, protecting the environment and safeguarding rights and freedoms. At the regional level, they have formed research and advocacy networks which are advancing important reforms in the state and economy in the interests of citizens.

The regional organization and individual member states are, in the context of the activities of civil society and non-governmental organizations, lagging behind. SADC should, therefore, move faster to promote and facilitate regional integration beyond states and head of states/government meetings. Establishing a regional fund for NGO support, poverty alleviation and forums for discussions at the level of civil society will go a long way in strengthening regional identity and networking. The recent establishment of the SADC gender unit and continuing efforts to establish a SADC council of NGOs must be speeded up and also strategically defined with the regional vision.

Freedom

Freedom goes hand in hand with equity and participation. In the past, the same strategies that excluded the majority of the population from development also denied them the right to organize and mobilize themselves. Hence, as pointed out in Chapter 1, in this region the struggle for democracy and development have, throughout, been intertwined. It is, however, evident that in spite of recent rapid political development towards plural politics, some countries in the region still lag behind and their citizens live under constant intimidation. SADC has to develop regional standards of governance and enforce them by sanctioning those countries still denying their citizens basic human rights.

(iv) More Political Reforms Needed

Inadequate reforms at the political level can lead to frustrations related to limited political pluralism. This in turn poses a threat to political stability and threatens the region with a return to the era of one-party dictatorships. Failure at the political and social levels to integrate all members of society in the decision-making processes of the individual countries coupled with the lack of regional standards to guide member-states on issues of democratic standards, electoral regimes, participatory development and corporate governance, are inimical to sustained political reforms of recent years.

SADC should:

- a) Develop standards along the lines of the Harare Declaration of 1996 which articulates what SADC requires of member states in the area of governance.
- b) Develop alternative electoral systems and encourage member states to use these to promote the social and political integration of the most racially and ethnically diverse and divided societies.
- c) Revisit its security strategy in the region and work towards the setting up of a regional peace-keeping force. This force could work in close collaboration with UN peace-keeping missions and other regional organizations like NATO.

(v) Gender Development

Much has been done in the area of gender at national and regional levels. However, much more remains to be done.

SADC should:

Continue to support and guide member states in the implementation of international conventions on gender equality and participation of women. In addition, SADC should set targets and standards for gender equality for the 21st century.

(vi) The Role of and Support for Non-Governmental Organizations

A lot has been said to show that NGOs are a permanent part of the national and regional political and economic landscape. The contributions of NGOs in political reforms and human development related activities in this region is widely documented.

SADC should:

Develop a regional framework for supporting the development of NGOs in the region. The formation of the NGO Forum is welcome but much more attention needs to be paid to NGOs' involvement in decision-making and consultation at both regional and national levels.

IV. Strengthening the Regional Organization

The idea of a regional community with a large market, free flow of goods, services and investment is appropriate for both human development and good governance in SADC. However, after almost 15 years, the Southern African regional structure is still rudimentary and ineffective. The growing tendency towards the concentration of development in already comparatively developed parts of the region is not likely to promote regional integration and a conducive environment for investment and trade. SADC should, therefore, work out programmes at the regional level which will seek to homogenize investment and trade regimes and allow for a free flow of capital, labour and technology.

The political and economic performance of many African states in the post-Second World War period has raised major questions about the viability of the state as a development unit. In Africa, the bad performance in both politics and economy suggests that the state may not alone achieve sustainable development and political stability. While it is true that in South East Asia, it was the smallest states of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, which performed relatively well in the recent past, as opposed to bigger ones of India, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, the former are small in geographical size but comparatively larger in populations.

On the contrary, in Southern Africa, the relatively successful states of Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have very small populations of less than two million people each. In fact, the six share between them 7,3 million people which constitutes 4% of the region's 186,3 million people. These small states currently enjoy political stability, economic growth and comparatively better per capita incomes in the region. However, their ability to sustain the current growth levels and political stability is questionable unless the regional strategy succeeds. Firstly, because these states have very small populations which cannot provide a threshold internal market for economic diversification. Secondly, their growth is dependent on one or two strategic economic activities such as diamonds (Botswana and Namibia), tourism (Seychelles) or the export of a few manufacturing commodities (Lesotho, Mauritius and Swaziland) and thirdly, they have a high dependence on exports outside the region which makes them more susceptible to fluctuations in the global markets.

In spite of their highly conducive conditions for foreign investment including low company tax, tax holiday facilities, in-country credit schemes, etc., these small states have not been able to attract much foreign investment. It is becoming clear that their success will depend on the positive changes at a macro-political level and the economic environment of the region. Thus, the region must do much more beyond infrastructural development to create a conducive investment environment at the regional level. This will benefit both the ailing economies of the medium and large countries as well as the small states.

Globalization is yet another good reason why SADC should become a stronger organization. Globalization or the process of deepening integration of the world economy characterized by a rapid flow of trade and investment, sophisticated technology and homogenization of cultures and behavioural patterns, etc., has both positive and negative impacts on countries. Globalization brings opportunities for more investment, efficiency and relatively low cost technology, speeds up communication and much else. But globalization is also disruptive and can exclude those ill-equipped to take advantage of it. Many countries and individual citizens in Southern Africa are not well placed to take advantage of the benefits of globalization. They are more likely to be excluded than included. We see regional human development and good governance programmes as a mechanism through which the region, individual states and their citizens must prepare themselves to take full advantage of globalization.

V. Conclusion

This chapter has summarized the findings of this report. It has shown that SADC's performance in human development and good governance requires improvement. In some areas, past gains are being lost. In others, new developments such as in multi-party reforms are reproducing past tendencies of one party de facto control of society. It has been recommended, in the light of all these, that SADC takes up the challenges at a regional level. In order to do this, however, the SADC secretariat will need greater mandate, and more human and financial resources.



Note On Statistics

This report presents data on broad aspects of human development and governance. The data is presented as part of the narrative and also a statistical annex. The sources are mainly the United Nations and its agencies, the SADC country national sources, SADC, and the African Development Bank. The sources of all data used in the statistical annex are given in this annex and also as references in the narrative part of the report. The process of compiling data started with the development of a statistical booklet which was circulated to the various SADC national statistical offices for updating, gap filling and endorsement. The response from the statistical offices was very low. The problems faced in the compilation and analysis of statistics included unavailability of data, lack of comparability of data across time and countries, outdated data and inaccuracies in some of the data sets.

There are still too many data gaps in human development and governance statistics for most SADC countries, as is evident in many of the annex tables. This is especially so in areas such as income distribution, employment, environment and gender. SADC countries with insufficient data should make efforts to fill the gaps to enable meaningful monitoring of human development and governance in the region. SARIPS/SAPES Trust is setting up a databank for the SADC region in order to make socio-economic and political data readily available to users in the region and from outside.

In the statistical annex, SADC countries are listed in descending order of their HDI value.

Aggregated data is compiled mainly from the weighted arithmetic mean and where appropriate from the median and harmonic and geometric means. Aggregates are only presented in cases when at least two-thirds of the total SADC population is covered.

The following signs have been used:

..	Data not available
...	Not applicable
*	Weighting not done because population is less than two-thirds of the SADC region.
(.)	Less than half the unit shown
1990-95	Indicates that data was collected during one of the years shown.
1990/95	Indicates an average for the years shown.

Note

The population estimates for the nine SADC countries listed below are adjusted for the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS as incorporated in the 1996 revision of the United Nations database World Population Prospects

1950-2050 by the United Nations Population Division. In these countries, HIV seroprevalence had reached 2% or more in 1994 and the absolute number of infected adults was large. Countries include: Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Technical Notes

This section presents the methodology for the SADC human development indices and what these indices reveal in terms of intra-regional disparities and similarities. These indices are:

- the Human Development Index (HDI);
- the Gender-related Development Index (GDI);
- the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM);
- the Human Poverty Index (HPI).

Some vital issues in the assessment of human development in SADC countries are of particular importance in the region and need to be reflected in the indices. These are:

- inequality of income distribution;
- very pronounced gender inequality;
- inequality of land distribution (for some countries).

The global UNDP indices were, therefore, adapted to the SADC situation producing:

- the SADC-specific HDI;
- the SADC-specific GDI;
- the SADC-specific GEM.

The maximum value of the income component in the HDI and GDI has been modified in order to make it region specific and the SADC average real GDP per capita has been used as the income threshold level. For some countries, income inequality has been adjusted using the Gini coefficient in the HDI. The aversion for inequality between women and men has been reinforced in the GDI and GEM calculations by increasing the parameter from 2 to 5.

As an alternative to the HPI, the Human Deprivation Measure (HDM) has been presented in the report, covering two countries. The HDM assumes four essential elements of human life in the context of SADC. These components are health, education, income and land deprivation.

The HPI and HDM measure the proportion of people in the community who are left out of progress while the HDI measures progress in a country as a whole. Thus, a comparison of HDI and HPI or HDM values shows how well (or how poorly) distributed the achievements of a country are. The HPI reveals deprivation that would otherwise be masked in income measures of poverty and the HDM complements the HPI by reflecting deprivation of land.

In addition to the adjustments to the HDI, GDI, GEM and HDM a new index has been compiled which attempts to assess achievements in good governance, namely, the Index of Democratic Governance (IDG).

The IDG focuses on participatory development and good governance, and its components are political, institutional, economical and gender related.

The SADC-specific HDI, GDI and GEM values are not comparable to the global indices because of the income adjustments made. Comparisons are only possible in the rankings and values within the region.

Experience during the compilation and analysis of data for this report points to several priorities:

- The first priority must be to come to an agreement on a core set of human development indicators specific to SADC countries. This core set of indicators should be as uniform as possible to allow for comparisons to be made over time and between countries. Having this core set is essential and will require active co-operation among countries.
- The second priority is to deal with a general problem concerning the creation of these indices. There is an aggregation problem of the various indices related to different statistical methodology or sources. There is also a problem of missing data and lack of comparable data, for example, in the case where different countries are using poverty lines calculated using different methodologies. These problems require the establishment of a regional databank in order to have a uniform source of data.
- Thirdly, we need to gain experience and learn from the closer partnerships with more countries and with the Human Development Office of UNDP.

Technical Note 1

Constructing the human development index for SADC

The HDI is based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios (one-third weight); and standard of living, as measured by real GDP per capita (PPP\$).

For the construction of the index, the following fixed minimum and maximum values have been used for each of these indicators.

- Life expectancy at birth: 25 years and 85 years;
- Adult literacy: 0% and 100%;
- Combined gross enrolment ratio: 0% and 100%;
- Real GDP per capita (PPP\$): US\$100 and US\$25 000 (PPP\$).

The SADC maximum GDP per capita of US\$25 000 (PPP\$) is based on the assumption that if Mauritius, which has the highest income in the SADC region at US\$13 294 (PPP\$), maintains an average annual growth rate of 2% for the next 30 years, its GDP per capita will reach the level of US\$25 000 (PPP\$).

For any component of the HDI, individual indices can be computed according to the general formula:

$$\text{Index} = \frac{\text{Actual } x_i \text{ value} - \text{minimum } x_i \text{ value}}{\text{Maximum } x_i \text{ value} - \text{minimum } x_i \text{ value}}$$

Where x_i is the value of the i^{th} indicator in a particular country.

The construction of the HDI is illustrated using **Zambia** and **Mauritius** as examples:

	Zambia	Mauritius
Life expectancy (years)	42,7	70,9
Adult literacy rate (%)	78,2	82,9
Combined gross enrolment ratio (%)	52,0	61,0
Real GDP per capita, PPP\$	986	13 294

Life expectancy index

$$\text{Zambia} = \frac{42,7 - 25}{85 - 25} = \frac{17,7}{60} = 0,295$$

$$\text{Mauritius} = \frac{70,9 - 25}{85 - 25} = \frac{45,9}{60} = 0,765$$

Educational attainment index

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Zambia} \\ \text{Literacy index} \end{array} = \frac{78,2 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0,782$$

$$\text{School enrolment index} = \frac{52 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0,520$$

$$\text{Educational attainment index} = \frac{2(0,782) + (0,52)}{3} = 0,695$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Mauritius} \\ \text{Literacy index} \end{array} = \frac{82,9 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0,829$$

$$\text{School enrolment index} = \frac{61 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0,610$$

$$\text{Educational attainment index} = \frac{2(0,829) + (0,61)}{3} = 0,756$$

The income index

The HDI adjusts real income above a certain threshold, the underlying assumption being that people need a certain income to attain a decent standard of living and that income beyond a certain level has a diminishing marginal utility. The SADC average income has been taken as the threshold level (y^*), and any income above this level is discounted using the following formulation based on Atkinson's Formula for the utility of income:

$$\begin{aligned} W(y) &= y^* \text{ for } 0 \leq y \leq y^* \\ &= y^* + 2[(y - y^*)^{1/2}] \text{ for } y^* \leq y \leq 2y^* \\ &= y^* + 2(y^{1/2}) + 3[(y - 2y^*)^{1/2}] \text{ for } 2y^* \leq y \leq 3y^* \\ &= y^* + 2(y^{1/2}) + 3[(y - 2y^*)^{1/2}] + n\{[1 - (n - 1)y^*]^{1/n}\} \\ &\quad \text{for } (n - 1)y^* \leq y \leq ny^* \end{aligned}$$

where $W(y)$ = adjusted per capita income
 y^* = threshold per capita income (US\$1 800) (PPP\$)

To calculate discounted value of the maximum income of \$25 000 (PPP\$), the Atkinson's Formula is used:

$$W(y) = y^* + 2(y^{1/2}) + 3(y^{1/2}) + \dots + 13(y^{1/2}) + 14((25\,000 - 13y^*)^{1/2})$$

This is because US\$25 000 (PPP\$) is between $13y^*$ and $14y^*$. Then the discounted value of the maximum income of US\$25 000 (PPP\$) is US\$2 164 (PPP\$).

Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) index

Since Zambia's real GDP per capita at US\$986 (PPP\$) is below the threshold level it does not need any adjustment.

Thus the adjusted real GDP per capita indices for Zambia and Mauritius will be:

For Mauritius the real GDP per capita at US\$13 294 (PPP\$) is above the threshold but less than eight times the threshold and it is calculated as follows using Atkinson's Formula:

$$W(y) = y^* + 2(y^{1/2}) + \dots + 6(y^{1/6}) + 7(y^{1/7}) + 8(13\,294 - 7y^*)^{1/8}$$

The adjusted real GDP for Mauritius is US\$2 029 (PPP\$)

$$\text{Adjusted real per capita index, Zambia} = \frac{986 - 100}{2\,164 - 100} = 0,429$$

$$\text{Adjusted per capita income, Mauritius} = \frac{2029 - 100}{2\,164 - 100} = 0,935$$

SADC Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI is the simple average of the life expectancy index, educational attainment index and the adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) index, and so is derived by dividing the sum of these three indices by three.

$$\text{Zambia HDI} = \frac{0,295 + 0,695 + 0,429}{3} = 0,473$$

$$\text{Mauritius HDI} = \frac{0,765 + 0,756 + 0,935}{3} = 0,819$$

SADC HDI adjusted for income inequality

The income distribution in the SADC countries are skewed. It is necessary to adjust the income component of the HDI for income inequality. Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient (G). The adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) is multiplied by a factor $(1 - G)$ so as to give more income weight to those countries with low income inequalities. The adjustment of income for inequality has been derived for eight countries where the Gini coefficient is available.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Zambia} & \\ \text{Adjusted real GDP per capita} & \text{US\$986} \\ \text{Gini coefficient} & 0,46 \\ \text{GDP per capita adjusted for income inequality} & = 986(1 - 0,46) \\ & = 532 \end{array}$$

$$\text{Income adjusted for inequality index} = \frac{532 - 100}{2\,164 - 100} = 0,209$$

$$\text{Zambia HDI adjusted for income inequality} = \frac{0,295 + 0,697 + 0,209}{3} = 0,400$$

Technical Note 2

The Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

The GDI uses the same variables as the HDI. The difference is that the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement between women and men. (For a detailed explanation of the GDI methodology see Technical Note 1 in the *UNDP Human Development Report, 1995*). For this gender-sensitive adjustment, we used a weighting formula that expresses a high aversion to inequality; setting the weighting parameter at five, given the broad disparity between women and men in the SADC region. (The UNDP GDI weighting parameter is two.)

The GDI also adjusts the maximum and minimum values for life expectancy, to account for the fact that women tend to live longer than men. For women, the maximum value is 87,5 years and the minimum value 27,5 years; for men the corresponding values are 82,5 and 22,5 years.

Calculating the index for income is fairly complex. Female and male shares of earned income are derived from data on the ratio of the average female wage to the average male wage and the female and male percentage shares of the economically active population aged 15 and above. We used the earned income given in the Human Development Report, 1998. Before income is indexed, the average adjusted real GDP per capita of each country is discounted on the basis of the disparity in the female and male shares of earned income in proportion to the female and male population shares.

The indices for life expectancy, educational attainment and income are added together with equal weight to derive the final GDI value.

Illustration of the GDI methodology

We chose Swaziland to illustrate the steps for calculating the gender-related development index. The parameter of inequality aversion equals five. (Any discrepancies in results are due to rounding.)

Percentage share of total population

Females	51
Males	49

Percentage share of the economically active population

Females	37
Males	63

Life expectancy at birth (years)

Females	61,1
Males	56,5

Adult literacy rate (percent)

Females	75,6
Males	78,0

Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (percent)

Females	75,4
Males	77,7

Percentage share of earned income

Females	32,6
Males	67,4

Adjusted real GDP per capita: PPP\$1 867

Step One

Computing the equally distributed life expectancy index

Life expectancy index

Females	$(61,1 - 27,5)/60 = 0,560$
Males	$(56,5 - 22,5)/60 = 0,567$

The equally distributed life expectancy index

$$\{[(\text{female population share} \times (\text{female life expectancy index})^{-4}) + (\text{male population share} \times (\text{male life expectancy index})^{-4})]^{-1/4}\}$$

$$[0,51(0,560)^{-4} + 0,49(0,567)^{-4}]^{-1/4} = 0,563$$

Step Two

Computing the equally distributed educational attainment index

Adult literacy index

Females	$(75,6 - 0)/100 = 0,756$
Males	$(78 - 0)/100 = 0,780$

Combined gross enrolment index

Females	$(75,4 - 0)/100 = 0,754$
Males	$(77,7 - 0)/100 = 0,777$

Educational attainment index

$2/3(\text{adult literacy index}) + 1/3(\text{combined gross enrolment index})$

Females = $[2(0,756) + 1(0,754)] / 3 = 0,755$

Males = $[2(0,78) + 1(0,777)] / 3 = 0,779$

The equally distributed educational attainment index

$$\{[(\text{female population share} \times (\text{female educational attainment index})^{-4}) + (\text{male population share} \times (\text{male educational attainment index})^{-4})]^{-1/4}\}$$

$$[0,51(0,755)^{-4} + 0,49(0,779)^{-4}]^{-1/4} = 0,767$$

Step Three

A. Computing proportional income share

Female and male proportional income shares

Female share of earned income/female population share
 $0,326/0,51 = 0,64$

Male share of earned income/male population share
 $0,674/0,49 = 1,37$

B. Computing the equally distributed income index

The weighting parameter ($e = 5$) is applied

$$\{[(\text{female population share} \times (\text{female proportional income share})^{-4}) + (\text{male population share} \times (\text{male proportional income share})^{-4})]^{-1/4}\}$$

$$[0,51 (0,64)^{-4} + 0,49 (1,37)^{-4}]^{-1/4} = 0,755$$

$$0,755 \times 1\,867 = 1\,409$$

$$(1\,409 - 100)/(2\,164 - 100) = 0,635$$

Step Four

Computing the gender related development index (GDI)

$$1/3(0,563 + 0,767 + 0,635) = 0,655$$

Technical Note 3

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

The GEM uses variables constructed explicitly to measure the relative empowerment of women and men in political and economic spheres of activity.

The first two variables are chosen to reflect economic participation and decision-making power: women's and men's percentage shares of administrative and managerial positions and their percentage shares of professional and technical jobs. These are broad, loosely defined occupational categories. Because the relevant population for each is different, we calculated a separate index for each and then added the two together. The third variable, women's and men's percentage shares of parliamentary seats, is chosen to reflect political participation and decision-making power.

For all three variables we use the methodology of population-weighted ($e - 1$) averaging to derive an equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) for both sexes taken together. Each variable is indexed by dividing the EDEP by 50%.

An income variable is used to reflect power over economic resources. It is calculated in the same manner as for the GDI except that unadjusted rather than adjusted real GDP per capita is used. The maximum value for income is thus PPP\$25 000 and the minimum PPP\$100.

The three indices – for economic participation and decision making, political participation and decision-making; and power over economic resources – are added together to derive the final GEM value.

Illustration of the GEM methodology

We chose Malawi to illustrate the steps in calculating the GEM. The parameter of inequality aversion, e , equals five. (Any discrepancies in results are due to rounding.)

Step One

Computing indices for parliamentary representation, administrative and managerial, and professional and technical positions.

Percentage share of parliamentary representation

Females	5,6
Males	94,4

Percentage share of administrative and managerial positions

Females	4,8
Males	95,2

Percentage share of professional and technical positions

Females	34,7
Males	65,3

Percentage share of population

Females	51
Males	49

Computing the EDEP for parliamentary representation
 $[0,49(94,4)^{-1} + 0,51(5,6)^{-1}]^{-1/4} = 6,6$

Computing the EDEP for administrative and managerial positions
 $[0,49(95,2)^{-1} + 0,51(4,8)^{-1}]^{-1/4} = 5,7$

Computing the EDEP for professional and technical positions
 $[0,49(65,3)^{-1} + 0,51(54,4)^{-1}]^{-1/4} = 40,3$

Indexing parliamentary representation
 $6,6/50 = 0,13$

Indexing administrative and managerial positions
 $5,7/50 = 0,114$

Indexing professional and technical positions
 $40,3/50 = 0,8$

Combining the indices for administrative and managerial, and professional and technical, positions
 $(0,114 + 0,8)/2 = 0,46$

Step Two

Computing the index for share of earned income

Percentage share of economically active population

Females	49
Males	51

Percentage share of earned income

Females	42
Males	58

Unadjusted real GDP per capita PPP\$773

Female and male proportional income shares

Females	$0,42/0,51 = 0,82$
Males	$0,58/0,49 = 1,18$

Computing the equally distributed income index

$$[0,49(1,18)^{-1} + 0,51(0,82)^{-1}]^{-1/4} = 0,93$$
$$0,93 \times 773 = 719$$
$$(719 - 100)/(25,000 - 100) = 0,025$$

Step Three

Computing the GEM

$$[1/3(0,025 + 0,46 + 0,13)] = 0,206$$

Technical Note 4

The Human Deprivation Measure (HDM)

The HDM concentrates on deprivation in four essential elements of human life in the context of SADC. Some of these are already reflected in the human poverty index (HPI) developed by UNDP. These are longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living (the percentage of underweight children below age five years only) to which we add two more measures of deprivation: income deprivation and land deprivation. The deprivation of health is defined as a composite of the two following variables: the vulnerability to death at a relatively early age (it is represented by the percentage of people not expected to survive to age 40) and the percentage of underweight children below the age of five.

The second deprivation measure is the education deprivation (being excluded from the world of reading and communication). It is represented by the percentage of adults who are illiterate

and the number of children out of school. The number of children out of school is measured by the inverse of the net primary school enrolment ratio, which is the percentage of children of primary school-going age who are not enrolled in school.

The third deprivation measure is the income deprivation. It is represented by the percentage of population below a poverty line as given by a particular country. (For South Africa, the World Bank figure which defines the income poor as those persons whose incomes are below the national poverty line has been used.) For Zimbabwe, the income poor are those persons whose incomes are below the Total Consumption Poverty Line. (Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, 1995)

Another relevant indicator of deprivation, particularly in the context of SADC, is the land per capita distribution between white and black farmers (the ratio of land per capita for blacks to the land per capita for whites (or between poor people and rich people) is the basis for the estimate. According to this indicator, the proportion of people who are in deprivation of land is estimated. Unfortunately, information is only available for South Africa and Zimbabwe. It reflects deprivation of capabilities for poor people.

The four measures of deprivation mentioned above (health, education, income and land) are calculated and aggregated into a weighted average for the two SADC countries whose information is available. The methodology for such a measurement is given below, using South Africa and Zimbabwe as examples. [This HDM is quite close to the human deprivation measure (HDM) developed by Mahbub ul Haq in *Human Development in South Asia* (1997)]

Human Deprivation Measure, 1995

South Africa

Health Deprivation Measure

South Africa (total population: 41,5 million)	
People not expected to survive to age 40	4,94 million
Underweight children below age five	3,44 million
Total	8,38 million

Health Deprivation Measure is :
8,36 million/ 41,5 million = 20%

Education Deprivation Measure

South Africa (total population: 41,5 million)	
Illiterate adults	6,92 million
Children aged six to 12 years (10 million)	
Out of school children (reverse of primary school net enrolment ratio)	0,40 million
Total	7,32 million

Education Deprivation Measure is :
7,32 million/ 41,5 million = 17,6 %

Income Deprivation Measure

South Africa (total population: 41,5 million)	
Income poor	9,8 million
Total	9,8 million

Income Deprivation Measure is :
9,8 million/ 41,5 million = 23,7%

Land Deprivation Measure

Land per capita for blacks	(2,3 hectares/cap)
Land per capita for whites	(1 101,3 hectares/cap)

South Africa	(total population: 41,5 million)
Black farmers	5,23 million
Land Deprivation Measure is :	
5,23/41,5	= 13%

To arrive at the HDM value, the Atkinson Formula is used so that the average calculated takes into account the effect of various deprivations and is not just a simple arithmetical mean. The following formula is applied:

$$X_a = (p_1 X_1^{1/e} + p_2 X_2^{1/e} + p_3 X_3^{1/e} + p_4 X_4^{1/e})^{1/(1/e)}$$

Where X_a is the average required, X_1 , X_2 , X_3 , and X_4 are the four deprivations which are given equal weights of 0,25, each represented by p_1 , p_2 , p_3 and p_4 and $e = 5$. Note that instead of taking the deprivation values of 20; 17,6; 23,7 and 13% respectively, we take the reverse values (100 minus value) of 80; 82,4; 76,3 and 87% in order to be able to use the formula more accurately. In South Africa's case:

$X_a = (0,25 \times 0,80^{1/5} + 0,25 \times 0,824^{1/5} + 0,25 \times 0,763^{1/5} + 0,25 \times 0,87^{1/5})^{1/4}$
Which is equal to 81%. Therefore 100 – 81 = 19% is the human deprivation measure (HDM) of South Africa.

Zimbabwe

Health Deprivation Measure

Zimbabwe (total population: 11,2 million)	
People not expected to survive to age 40	3,81 million
Underweight children (under five)	0,25 million
Total	4,06 million

Health Deprivation Measure is :
4,06 million/11,2 million = 36,25%

Education Deprivation Index

Zimbabwe (total population: 11,2 million)	
Illiterate adults	0,91 million
Out of school children (reverse of primary school net enrolment ratio)	1,94 million
Total	2,85 million

Education Deprivation Measure is :
2,85 million/ 11,2million = 25,44%

Income Deprivation Index

Zimbabwe (total population: 11,2 million)	
Income poor (74%)	8,3 million
Total	8,3 million

Income Deprivation Measure is :
8,3million/11,2 million = 74%

Land Deprivation Index

Land per capita for blacks	(0,019 hectares/cap)
Land per capita for whites	(2,8 hectares/cap)
Zimbabwe (total population: 11,2 million)	
Black farmers	1,7 million

Land Deprivation Measure is :
1,7/11,2 = 15%

$X_a = (0,25 \times 0,637^{1/5} + 0,25 \times 0,746^{1/5} + 0,25 \times 0,26^{1/5} + 0,25 \times 0,85^{1/5})^{1/4}$
Which is equal to 36%. Therefore 100% – 36% = 64% is the human deprivation measure (HDM) of Zimbabwe.

Technical Note 5

Constructing an Index of Democratic Governance

The Index of Democratic Governance is calculated by the arithmetic mean of the four indices of political, institutional, economic and GEM components. The political and institutional indices were calculated from responses to a survey questionnaire from the countries and from the SARIPS/SAPES Trust's own assessment. The questionnaire is given below.

The GEM component has not been used in this case because of lack of data for some countries. However, when this component is added, it brings the index down for all the countries showing generally low performance in this component.

(a) Political component:

Supremacy of the rule of law
Regular participatory elections
Bill of rights entrenched
Constitutionally entrenched elected local government

(b) Institutional component:

Existence of IEC
Corruption, transparency and accountability body
Human Rights Commission (HRC)
Independent judiciary
Free and active civil society organizations

(c) Economic component:

Economy growth (mean of latest five years)
Budget deficit as % of GDP (mean of latest five years)
External Debt as % of GDP (mean of latest five years)
% of labour force unemployed
Indigenous policies/programmes (Not used due to lack of data)

The economic growth index has been computed according to the general formula (see section on HDI above) considering the latest five years and taking a maximum at 10% and a minimum at - 10%.

For the budget deficit index and the debt deficit index we use the same methodology for both. A score has been given to each country according to their surplus or deficit considering the average latest five years and on the basis of the scale below. The final scoring is the average of SARIPS/SAPES Trust scoring and the country scoring. In fact, from a questionnaire form the countries were asked to give a score between 0 and 10 to assess their political institutions. Each question is followed by an invitation to comment.

Scale for the budget balance scoring:
(given an acceptable deficit of -6% of GDP)

Range	Score
>0	10/10
-6 to 0	9,5/10
-10 to -6,99	9/10
-20 to -10,99	8/10
-30 to -20,99	7/10
-40 to -30,99	6/10
-50 to -40,99	5/10
-60 to -50,99	4/10
-70 to -60,99	3/10
-80 to -70,99	2/10
-90 to -80,99	1/10
<-90	0

Scale for the external debts scoring:
(given a average SADC at 90% of GDP)

Range	Score
0	10/10
1 to 9,99	9/10
10 to 29,99	8/10
30 to 59,99	7/10
60 to 89,99	6/10
90 to 99,99	5/10
100 to 124,99	4/10
125 to 149,99	3/10
150 to 174,99	2/10
175 to 200	1/10
>200	0

(d) Gender component (GEM)

(See Technical Note 3)

Questionnaire

A. Political/Constitutional

1. Does your country give supremacy to the rule of law? Yes/No. In practice, is this constitutional provision followed? What do you see as problems in this area?
2. Is the bill of rights/basic rights and freedoms enshrined into your country's constitution? Yes/No.
3. If so, are these always respected? Do the rights include: (a) civil/political; (b) socio-economic; (c) environment and cultural rights? (Circle as appropriate.)
4. Are elections regular and fair? Yes/No.
5. Roughly what are the major concerns about elections in your country?
.....
.....
6. Are all parties actively participating in elections? Yes/No.
7. If not, who are not participating and why?
.....
.....
8. Is local government recognized in the constitution of your country? Yes/No. Or is it simply recognized by legislation or both? (Circle as appropriate.)
9. On a scale of 10 points, how would you rate your country's performance in the area of political and constitutional development? Give mark out of 10 and justify.
.....
.....
.....
.....

B. Institutional Component

10. Does your country have an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)? Yes/No.
11. Is the IEC accepted as objective? Yes/No. What are the main reservations?
12. Is the judiciary independent? Yes/No. How can you tell? Quote examples of major cases.
13. Is there a Human Rights Commission in your country? Yes/No.
14. Is the Human Rights Commission active and free? Yes/No. Give examples for your answer.
15. Does the country have an anti-corruption body? What is it called? How would you rate its performance on a scale of 10 points and why?
16. How would you rate overall performance in institutional development and performance on a 10-point scale? Justify your answer.
.....
.....
.....

Table	Indicator	Aggregation method/Source
1.	SADC-specific human development index	
	Life expectancy at birth, years, 1995	Median
	Adult literacy rate, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean /Population 15+
	Combined 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd level gross enrolment ratio, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Adjusted real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	Adjusted real GDP per capita adjusted for income inequality, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	Life expectancy index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	Adult literacy index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Combined 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd level gross enrolment index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Education index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	GDP per capita index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	GDP per capita adjusted for inequality index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	SADC human development index value, 1995	Arithmetic Average#
	SADC human development index adjusted for income inequality, 1995	Arithmetic Average#
	Global human development index value, 1995	Arithmetic Average
	SADC human development index adjusted for income inequality, rank, 1995	...#
	Global human development index rank, 1995	...
2.	Global human development index	
	Life expectancy at birth, years, 1995	Median
	Adult literacy rate, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Population 15+
	Combined 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd level gross enrolment ratio	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Adjusted real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Life expectancy index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Education index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	GDP index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Human development index value, 1995	Arith. Mean of Components
	Human development index, rank	...
3.	SADC-specific gender related human development index	
	Life expectancy at birth, female and male, years, 1995	Median
	Adult literacy rate, female and male, years, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Population 15+
	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, female and male, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population (male/female)
	Earned income share, female and male, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Economically active population (male/female)#
	Equally distributed life expectancy index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	Equally distributed education index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	Equally distributed income index, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	Equally distributed income index adjusted for income inequality, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	SADC GDI value, 1995	Arithmetic Average#
	SADC GDI value adjusted for income inequality, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population#
	Global GDI value, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean
	SADC GDI rank, 1995	...#
	Global GDI rank, 1995	...#
4.	Global gender related human development index	
	Global gender related human development index (GDI) rank, 1995	...
	Life expectancy at birth, female and male, years, 1995	Median
	Adult literacy rate, female and male, years, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Population 15+
	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, female and male, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
	Earned income share, female and male, %, 1995	Arithmetic Average
	Global GDI value, 1995	Arith. Mean of Components

5. Poverty

Human poverty index rank	...#
Human poverty index (HPI-1), value, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
People not expected to survive total age 40 (as % of total population), 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Adult illiteracy rate, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Population 15+
Population without access to safe water, %, 1990–96	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Population without access to health services, %, 1990–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Population without access to sanitation, %, 1990–96	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Under-weight children under age five, %, 1990–97	Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop. Under 5
Children not reaching grade 5, %, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop. Under 15
Refugees by country of asylum, thousands, 1996	Sum
Real GDP per capita (PPP\$), richest and poorest 20%, 1980–94	*
Percent of population below income poverty line, US\$1 a day (1985 PPP\$), 1989–94	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Percent of population below national poverty line, 1989–94	*
% of population below 2/3 of national per capita income, urban and rural, 1991–95	*
Gini coefficients, 1991–95	*

6. Gender empowerment measure

Gender empowerment measure rank	...#
Seats held in parliament, %, women	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total members of parliament#
Administrators and managers, %, women	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Female Pop.#
Professional and technical workers, %, women	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Female Pop.#
Earned income share, % to women	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Female Pop.#
SADC Gender empowerment measure value	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Female Pop.#
Global Gender empowerment measure value	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Female Pop.

7. Trends in human development

Life expectancy at birth, years, 1960 and 1995	Median
Infant mortality rate, per 1 000 live births, 1960 and 1996	Harmonic Mean
Population with access to safe water, %, 1975–80 and 1990–96	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Underweight children under age five, %, 1975 and 1990–97	Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop. Under 5 yrs
Adult literacy rate, %, 1970 and 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Population 15+
Gross enrolment ratio for all levels, % aged 6 to 23, 1980 and 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1960 and 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population

8. Governance profile

Date of last elections	*
Members of parliament elected or appointed	*
Total members of parliament	Sum#
Percent female members of parliament	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total members of parliament#
Voter turn out last election, %	Harmonic Mean
Political parties represented in parliament	*#
Year first woman elected or nominated to national parliament	*

9. Population trends

Estimated population, millions, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, and 2015	Sum
Annual population growth rate, %, 1970–1995, 1995–2015	Geometric Mean
Female as a % of total population, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population [∞]
Population doubling rate, at current growth rate, 1995	...
Crude birth rate, per 1 000 population, 1990 and 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Crude death rate, per 1 000 population, 1990 and 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Dependency ratio, %, 1995	Harmonic Mean
Total fertility rate, number, 1995	Harmonic Mean
Maternal mortality rate, deaths per 100 000 live births, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Female 15–45 yrs [∞]
Contraceptive prevalence, % women 15–45 years, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Female 15–45 yrs

10. Growing urbanization

Urban population as a % of total, 1970, 1995 and 2015
Urban population annual growth rate, %, 1970–95 and 1995–2015
Largest city
Population of largest city, thousands, 1995

Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Geometric Mean
...
Sum

11. Education

Primary gross enrolment ratio, total, %, 1995
Primary gross enrolment ratio female as a % of male, 1995
Secondary gross enrolment ratio, total, %, 1995
Secondary gross enrolment ratio, female as a % of male, 1995
Net primary enrolment ratio, 1995
Tertiary, natural and applied science enrolment, as a % of total tertiary, 1995
R and D scientist and technicians, per 1 000 people, 1990–96
Public expenditure on education, as a % of GNP, 1985 and 1995
Public expenditure on education as a % of total government expenditure, 1993–95
Public expenditure on primary and secondary education, as a % of all levels, 1990–95
Public expenditure on higher education, as a % of all levels, 1990–95
Primary school starting age, 1990
Duration of primary school, 1990
Expenditure per student, as a % of GNP per capita, 1994 primary,
secondary, 1995 and tertiary, 1980 and 1995
Primary pupil teacher ratio, number of pupils per teacher, 1995
Secondary pupil teacher ratio, number of pupils per teacher, 1992–94

Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop 5–14
Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop 5–14
Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop 10–24
Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop 10–24
Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop 5–14
Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop 15–24 yrs
*
Weighted Arith. Mean/GNP
Harmonic Mean
Harmonic Mean
Harmonic Mean
Arithmetic Average[¥]
Arithmetic Average[¥]
*§

Harmonic Mean[∞]
*∞

12. Women's access to education

Primary female net enrolment ratio, %, 1992 and 1995
Primary female net enrolment index (1985=100), 1995
Secondary female net enrolment, ratio, %, 1995
Secondary female net enrolment, index (1985=100), 1995
Female tertiary students, per 100 000 women, 1995
Female tertiary students, index (1985=100), 1995
Female tertiary natural and applied sciences students, as a % of female students, 1995

Harmonic Mean
Harmonic Mean
*
*
Harmonic Mean
*

13. Women's participation in political and economic life

Economically active population, 15 years and above, 1990
Female administrators and managers, %, 1992–96
Female administrators and managers, as a % of male, 1990
Female professional and technical workers, %, 1992–1996
Female professional and technical workers, as a % of males, 1990
Female clerical and sales workers, %, 1990
Female clerical and sales workers, as a % of male, 1990
Female service workers, %, 1990
Female service workers, as a % of male, 1990
Women in government as a % of total, 1995
Women in government, at ministerial level, %, 1995
Women in government, at sub-ministerial level, %, 1995

Harmonic Mean[≈]
Weighted Arith. Mean/Female Pop
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Female Pop
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Female Pop
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Female Pop
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Harmonic Mean
Harmonic Mean
Harmonic Mean

14. Health

One year olds fully immunized against tuberculosis, %, 1995–96
One year olds fully immunized against measles, %, 1995–96
AIDS cases, per 100 000 people, 1996
HIV/AIDS prevalence, adults 15–49 years, %, 1997
Tuberculosis cases, per 100 000 people, 1995
Malaria cases, per 100 000 people, 1994
Cigarette consumption per adult, (1970–72=100), 1990–92
Doctors per 100 000 people, 1993
Nurses per 100 000 people, 1993
Hospital beds, per 1 000 people, 1994

Weighted Arith. Mean/One year old Pop
Weighted Arith. Mean/One year old Pop
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Harmonic Mean
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population[§]

People with disabilities, as a % of total population, 1985–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Public expenditure on health, as a % of GNP, 1960, 1990 and 1991–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/GNP
Private expenditure on health as a % of GDP, 1990–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/GNP ^{\$}
Total expenditure on health as a % of GDP, 1990–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/GNP ^{\$}
Health expenditure per capita PPP\$, 1990–95	Weighted Arith. Mean ^{\$}
15. Child survival and development profile	
Infant mortality rate, per 1 000 live births, 1960, 1989 and 1996	Weighted Arith. Mean/One year old Pop
Under five mortality rate, per 1 000 children under five, 1996	Weighted Arith. Mean/Pop Under 5 years
Births attended by trained health personnel, %, 1990–96	Weighted Arith. Mean/Births
Maternal mortality rate, per 100 000 live births, 1990	Weighted Arith. Mean/Women 15–45
Mothers exclusively breastfeeding at three months, %, 1990–96	Weighted Arith. Mean/Women 15–45
Mothers exclusively breastfeeding at six months, %, 1990–96	Weighted Arith. Mean/Women 15–45
Oral dehydration therapy use rate, %, 1990–97	Harmonic Mean
Low birth weight of infants, 1990–94	Harmonic Mean
Percentage of under-five children suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition underweight, 1980–88 and 1990–97	Weighted Arith. Mean/Children under 5
Percentage of under-five children suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition, Wasting, 1984–95.	Weighted Arith. Mean/Children under 5 [∞]
Percentage of under-five children suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition, stunting, 1984–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/Children under 5 [∞]
16. Labour force and employment	
Adult labour force as a % total population, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Labour force participation rate, 1990	Harmonic Mean [∞]
Women's share of adult labour force, % of population 15 years and above, 1970 and 1995	Harmonic Mean
Percentage of labour force in agriculture, industry and services, 1970 and 1990	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Population under 14 in the labour force as a % of population 10–14 years, 1995	Harmonic Mean [∞]
Age dependency ratio, 1995	Harmonic Mean [∞]
Unemployment rate, female, male and total, % 1991–96	*≠
17. Food security	
Daily per capita supply of calories, 1970 and 1995	Harmonic mean
Per capita supply of cereals, total (kg) 1994/95	Harmonic mean
Per capita supply of cereals, change (%) 1970–95	Arithmetic Average
Daily per capita supply of fat, total (grams) 1994/95	Harmonic mean
Daily per capita supply of fat, change (%) 1970–95	Arithmetic. Average
Daily per capita supply of protein, total (grams) 1994/95	Harmonic mean
Daily per capita supply of protein, change (%) 1970–95	Arithmetic. Average
Food production per capita index (1980=100) 1996	Harmonic mean
Food imports as % of merchandise imports, 1993	*
Food aid in cereals, thousands of metric tons, 1994–95	Sum
Food consumption as % of total household consumption, 1980–85	Harmonic mean
18. Agriculture	
Agricultural production index,(1989=100), 1995	Harmonic Mean [∞]
Value of agricultural exports, millions of US\$, current prices, 1995	Sum [∞]
Fertilizer use, thousands of metric tons, 1994	Sum [∞]
Fertilizer imports, thousands of metric tons, 1993	Sum [∞]
Area under major crops, thousands of hectares, 1994	Sum [∞]
Incidence of drought, 1995	... [∞]
Agricultural yields by major crops, thousands of hectograms per hectare, 1980,1990 and 1995	... [∞]
Volume of food output, thousands of metric tons, 1980, 1990 and 1995	... [∞]
Nominal producer prices, local currency per kilogram, 1980, 1990 and 1993	... [∞]

19. Environment

Land area, 1 000 hectares 1995
 Forest and woodland, as a % of land area, 1995
 Internal renewable water resources per capita, cubic meters per year, 1998
 Annual fresh water withdrawals, as a % of water resources, 1987–95
 Annual fresh Water withdrawals, per capita, cubic metres, 1987–95
 Annual rate of deforestation, %, 1990–95
 Annual rate of reforestation, %, 1980–90
 Carbon dioxide emissions per capita, metric tons, 1995
 Loss of mangroves, %, 1980–90
 Share of arable land, %, hectares per capita, 1994–96

Sum
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Land Area
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Land Area
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Land Area
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
 Harmonic Mean
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population

20. National income accounts

GDP, US\$ billions, 1995
 Agriculture, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Industry, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Services, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Private consumption, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Government consumption, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Gross domestic investment, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Gross domestic savings, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Tax revenue, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Central government expenditure, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Exports, as a % of GDP, 1995
 Imports, as a % of GDP, 1995

Sum
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP

21. Trends in economic performance

GNP, US\$ billions, 1995
 GNP per capita, US\$, 1995
 GNP annual growth rate, %, 1980–95
 GNP per capita annual growth rate, %, 1965–80 and 1980–95
 Average annual rate of inflation, %, 1985–95 and 1995
 Exports as a % of GDP, % annual growth rate, 1980–94
 Tax revenue as a % of GDP, % annual growth rate, 1980–92
 Overall budget surplus/deficit, as a % of GDP, 1980 and 1995

Sum
 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GNP
 Weighted Arith. Mean
 Harmonic Mean
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
 Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP

22. Money and banking

Money supply, US\$ millions, 1995
 Quasi-money supply, US\$ millions, 1995
 Net foreign assets, US\$ millions, 1995
 Domestic credit, millions of US\$, 1995
 International reserves, US\$ millions, 1995
 Exchange rate, local currency per US\$, period average, 1995
 Deposit rate, %, 1995
 Discount rate, %, 1995
 Interest rate, %, 1995

Sum^Ω
 Sum^Ω
 Sum^Ω
 Sum^Ω
 Sum^Ω
 ...^Ω
 Harmonic Mean^Ω
 Harmonic Mean^Ω
 Harmonic Mean^Ø

23. Financial inflows and outflows

Total external debt, US\$ billions, 1995
 Total external, as a % of GNP, 1995
 Debt service ratio, debt service as a % of exports of goods and services, 1980 and 1995
 Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received, net disbursements, US\$ millions
 Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received, net disbursements, as a % of 1995 GNP, 1996
 Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received, net disbursements, per capita US\$, 1996

Sum
 Weighted Arith. Mean/ Total Population
 Harmonic Mean

 Sum

 Weighted Arith. Mean

 Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population

Net foreign direct investment, as a % of GNP, 1993–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/GNP
Trade as a % of GNP, 1993–95	Weighted Arith. Mean/GDP
Export-import ratio, exports as a % of imports, 1995	Harmonic Mean
Terms of trade, (1987=100), 1995	Harmonic Mean
Current account balance before official transfers, US\$ millions, 1995	Sum
24. Military expenditure	
Defence expenditure US\$ millions at 1995 prices, 1985 and 1996	Sum
Defence expenditure as a % of GDP, 1985 and 1996	Sum
Defence expenditure, per capita, US\$ 1995 prices, 1985 and 1996	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Military expenditure as a % of combined education and health expenditure, 1960 and 1990–1991	Weighted Arith. Mean
Total armed forces, thousands, 1996	Sum
Total armed forces, index (1985=100), 1996	Harmonic Mean
25. Access to information and communication	
Radios, per 1 000 people, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Televisions, per 1 000 people, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Printing and writing paper consumed, metric tons per 1 000 people, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Main telephone lines, per 1 000 people, 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Cost of a local call US\$ per 3 minutes, 1996	Harmonic Mean
Road/Pop ratio, 1 000 kilometers per 1 million people, 1990	Harmonic Mean
Paved primary roads, kilometers per 1 million people, 1992	Harmonic Mean
Percentage of roads in good condition, 1989	Harmonic Mean
Post Offices, per 100 000 people, 1995	Harmonic Mean
26. Energy use	
Total electricity consumption, millions of kilowatt hours, 1995	Sum
Electricity consumption, index (1980=100), 1995	Harmonic Mean
Per capita, kilowatt hours, 1980 and 1995	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
Traditional fuel consumption, as a % of total consumption, 1980 and 1994	Harmonic Mean
Household energy from fuel wood, %, 1990	Harmonic Mean
Total commercial energy use, oil equivalent, 1 000 metric tons, 1980 and 1994	Sum
Commercial energy use, oil equivalent, per capita, kilograms, 1980 and 1994	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population
GDP output per kilogram, US\$, 1980 and 1994	Harmonic Mean
Net commercial energy imports, as a % of energy consumption, 1980 and 1994	Weighted Arith. Mean/Total Population

Sources: HDR98 for all indicators except:

- # SARIPS/SAPES-DB
- ∞ ADIR97
- ¥ UNESCO
- ≈ Women's World Trends and Statistics, 1970-90
- ≠ National Statistical Offices
- Ω SSAC
- Ø IFS98
- § WDR98

Table 1
SADC specific human development index

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (%)	Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio (%)	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)	Adjusted GDP real per capita (PPP\$)	Adjusted real GDP per capita for income inequality
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	72,0 ^a	88,0 ^a	61	7 697	1 955	..
2	Mauritius	70,9	82,9	61 ^b	13 294	2 041	..
3	South Africa	64,1	81,8	81	4 334	1 907	793
4	Swaziland	58,8	76,7	77	2 954	1 874	..
5	Namibia	55,8	76,0 ^c	83	4 054	1 901	570
6	Zimbabwe	48,9	85,1	69	2 135	1 842	682
7	Botswana	51,7	69,8	71 ^b	5 611	1 929	866
8	Lesotho	58,1	71,3	56 ^b	1 290	1 223	538
9	Angola	47,4	42,0 ^c	30 ^b	1 839	1 818	..
10	Zambia	42,7	78,2	52 ^b	986	986	532
11	Tanzania	50,6	67,8	33	636	636	394
12	DRC	52,4	77,3	41 ^b	355	355	..
13	Malawi	41,0	56,4	76 ^b	773	773	311
14	Mozambique	46,3	40,1	25	959	959	..
SADC		52,1	70,8	51,8	1 800	1 099	598

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy index	Adult literacy index	Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment index	Education index	GDP per capita index	GDP per capita adjusted for income inequality index
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	0,783	0,880	0,610	0,790	0,903	..
2	Mauritius	0,765	0,829	0,610	0,756	0,935	..
3	South Africa	0,652	0,818	0,810	0,815	0,878	0,341
4	Swaziland	0,563	0,767	0,770	0,768	0,856	..
5	Namibia	0,513	0,760	0,830	0,783	0,876	0,229
6	Zimbabwe	0,398	0,851	0,690	0,797	0,841	0,281
7	Botswana	0,445	0,698	0,710	0,702	0,890	0,374
8	Lesotho	0,552	0,713	0,560	0,662	0,576	0,227
9	Angola	0,373	0,420	0,300	0,380	0,830	..
10	Zambia	0,295	0,782	0,520	0,695	0,429	0,209
11	Tanzania	0,427	0,678	0,330	0,562	0,260	0,143
12	DRC	0,457	0,773	0,410	0,652	0,124	..
13	Malawi	0,267	0,564	0,760	0,629	0,326	0,101
14	Mozambique	0,355	0,401	0,250	0,351	0,416	..
SADC		0,465	0,708	0,518	0,642	0,484	0,243

Table 1
SADC specific human development index (cont.)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC HDI (value)	SADC HDI adjusted for income inequality (value)	Global HDI index (value)	SADC HDI adjusted for inequality (rank)	Global HDI index (rank)
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	0,826	..	0,845	..	1
2	Mauritius	0,819	..	0,833	..	2
3	South Africa	0,782	0,603	0,717	1	3
4	Swaziland	0,729	..	0,597	..	6
5	Namibia	0,724	0,508	0,644	2	5
6	Zimbabwe	0,679	0,492	0,507	3	7
7	Botswana	0,679	0,507	0,678	4	4
8	Lesotho	0,597	0,480	0,469	5	8
9	Angola	0,528	..	0,344	..	12
10	Zambia	0,473	0,400	0,378	6	10
11	Tanzania	0,416	0,377	0,358	7	11
12	DRC	0,411	..	0,383	..	9
13	Malawi	0,407	0,332	0,334	8	13
14	Mozambique	0,374	..	0,281	..	14
SADC		0,530	0,450	0,458		

a. UNICEF 1998 *The State of the World's Children* 1998, New York: Oxford University Press
b. First or second level data, or both, have been estimated by UNESCO

Table 2
Global human development index

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (%)	Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio (%)	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)	Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$)
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	72,0	88,0 ^a	61,0	7 697	1 964
2	Mauritius	70,9	82,9	61,0 ^b	13 294	2 029
3	South Africa	64,1	81,8	81,0	4 334	1 911
4	Swaziland	58,8	76,7	77,0	2 954	1 867
5	Namibia	55,8	76,0 ^a	83,0	4 054	1 907
6	Zimbabwe	48,9	85,1	69,0	2 135	1 836
7	Botswana	51,7	69,8	71,0 ^b	5 611	1 936
8	Lesotho	58,1	71,3	56,0 ^b	1 290	1 290
9	Angola	47,4	42,0 ^a	30,0 ^b	1 839	1 812
10	Zambia	42,7	78,2	52,0 ^b	986	986
11	Tanzania	50,6	67,8	33,0	636	636
12	DRC	52,4	77,3	41,0 ^b	355	355
13	Malawi	41,0	56,4	76,0 ^b	773	773
14	Mozambique	46,3	40,1	25,0	959	959
SADC		52,1	70,8	51,8	1 800	1 099

Table 2
Global human development index (cont.)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Global HDI value	Global HDI rank
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	0,78	0,79	0,96	0,845	1
2	Mauritius	0,77	0,76	0,98	0,833	2
3	South Africa	0,65	0,82	0,68	0,717	3
4	Swaziland	0,56	0,77	0,46	0,597	6
5	Namibia	0,51	0,78	0,64	0,644	5
6	Zimbabwe	0,40	0,80	0,33	0,507	7
7	Botswana	0,45	0,70	0,89	0,678	4
8	Lesotho	0,55	0,66	0,19	0,469	8
9	Angola	0,37	0,38	0,28	0,344	12
10	Zambia	0,30	0,70	0,14	0,378	10
11	Tanzania	0,43	0,56	0,09	0,358	11
12	DRC	0,46	0,65	0,04	0,383	9
13	Malawi	0,27	0,63	0,11	0,334	13
14	Mozambique	0,35	0,35	0,14	0,281	14
SADC		0,465	0,650	0,267	0,458	

a. UNICEF 1998: *The State of the World's Children* 1998, New York: Oxford University Press
b. First or second-level data, or both, have been estimated by UNESCO

Table 3
SADC specific gender-related human development index

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Combined primary secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	74,5	67,7	78,8	87,1	61,1	58,2
3	South Africa	67,2	61,2	81,7	81,9	82,9	75,4
4	Swaziland	61,1	56,5	75,6	78,0	75,4	77,7
5	Namibia	57,0	54,6	74,0 ^a	78,0 ^a	84,9	78,7
6	Zimbabwe	49,9	47,9	79,9	90,4	65,3	69,7
7	Botswana	53,1	50,1	59,9	80,5	71,6	69,0
8	Lesotho	59,5	57,0	62,3	81,1	61,0	51,3
9	Angola	49,1	45,9	29,0 ^a	56,0 ^a	27,5	31,8
10	Zambia	43,4	41,9	71,3	85,6	48,5	55,0
11	Tanzania	52,0	49,2	56,8	79,4	32,1	33,4
12	DRC	54,0	50,7	67,7	86,6	32,3	48,4
13	Malawi	41,4	40,5	41,8	72,0	71,4	79,7
14	Mozambique	47,8	44,8	23,3	57,7	20,5	29,0
SADC		53,1	50,1	62,8	79,0	48,7	53,2

Table 3
SADC specific gender-related human development index (cont.)

		Equally distributed					
SADC HDI Rank	Country	Earned income share (%)		Life expectancy index 1995	Education index 1995	Income index 1995	Income index adjusted for income inequality 1995
		Female 1995	Male 1995				
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	25,60 ^b	74,40 ^b	0,768	0,750	0,545	..
3	South Africa	30,90 ^b	69,10 ^b	0,653	0,809	0,621	0,233
4	Swaziland	32,60	67,40	0,563	0,767	0,635	..
5	Namibia	34,00 ^b	66,00 ^b	0,511	0,779	0,681	0,171
6	Zimbabwe	37,60 ^b	62,40 ^b	0,394	0,787	0,721	0,236
7	Botswana	38,90 ^b	61,10 ^b	0,441	0,686	0,764	0,317
8	Lesotho	30,50	69,50 ^b	0,552	0,656	0,391	0,145
9	Angola	39,20 ^b	60,80 ^b	0,373	0,328	0,730	..
10	Zambia	39,30	60,70	0,287	0,683	0,376	0,181
11	Tanzania	47,30	52,70	0,425	0,537	0,257	0,141
12	DRC	36,40 ^b	63,70 ^b	0,455	0,618	0,095	..
13	Malawi	42,00 ^b	58,00 ^b	0,255	0,582	0,300	0,091
14	Mozambique	41,90 ^b	58,10 ^b	0,353	0,262	0,382	..
SADC		38,70	61,30	0,462	0,612	0,389	0,819

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC GDI (value)	SADC GDI adjusted for income inequality (value)	Global GDI (value)	SADC GDI (rank)	Global GDI (rank)
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	0,688	0,506	0,753	2	1
3	South Africa	0,694	0,565	0,680	1	2
4	Swaziland	0,655	0,427	0,573	4	5
5	Namibia	0,657	0,487	0,620	3	4
6	Zimbabwe	0,634	0,473	0,497	5	6
7	Botswana	0,631	0,482	0,657	6	3
8	Lesotho	0,533	0,451	0,457	7	7
9	Angola	0,477	..	0,331	8	11
10	Zambia	0,448	0,383	0,372	9	9
11	Tanzania	0,406	0,367	0,354	10	10
12	DRC	0,389	..	0,376	11	8
13	Malawi	0,379	0,309	0,325	12	12
14	Mozambique	0,332	0,205	0,624	13	13
SADC		0,488	0,457	0,442		

a. UNICEF 1998: *The State of the World's Children 1998*, New York: Oxford University Press

b. No work data available, an estimate of 75%, the mean for all countries with wage available, was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage

Table 4

Global gender-related development index

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Global GDI (rank) 1995	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1995		Adult literacy rate (years) 1995	
			Female	Male	Female	Male
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	1	74,5	67,7	78,8	87,1
3	South Africa	2	67,2	61,2	81,7	81,9
4	Swaziland	5	61,1	56,5	75,6	78,0
5	Namibia	4	57,0	54,6	74,0 ^a	78,0 ^a
6	Zimbabwe	6	49,9	47,9	79,9	90,4
7	Botswana	3	53,1	50,1	59,9	80,5
8	Lesotho	7	59,5	57,0	62,3	81,1
9	Angola	11	49,1	45,9	29,0 ^a	56,0 ^a
10	Zambia	9	43,4	41,9	71,3	85,6
11	Tanzania	10	52,0	49,2	56,8	79,4
12	DRC	8	54,0	50,7	67,7	86,6
13	Malawi	12	41,4	40,5	41,8	72,0
14	Mozambique	13	47,8	44,8	23,3	57,7
SADC			53,1	50,1	62,8	79,0

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Combined primary secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%) 1995		Earned income share		Global GDI (value) 1995
		Female	Male	(%) 1995 Female	(%) 1995 Male	
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	61,1	58,20	25,60 ^b	74,40 ^b	0,753
3	South Africa	82,9	75,40	30,90 ^b	69,10 ^b	0,680
4	Swaziland	75,4	77,70	32,60	67,40	0,573
5	Namibia	84,9	78,70	34,00 ^b	66,00 ^b	0,620
6	Zimbabwe	65,3	69,70	37,60 ^a	62,40 ^b	0,497
7	Botswana	71,6	69,00	38,90 ^b	61,10 ^b	0,657
8	Lesotho	61,0	51,30	30,50 ^b	69,50 ^b	0,457
9	Angola	27,5	31,80	39,20 ^b	60,80 ^b	0,331
10	Zambia	48,5	55,00	39,30	60,70	0,372
11	Tanzania	32,1	33,40	47,30	52,70	0,354
12	DRC	32,3	48,40	36,40 ^b	63,70 ^b	0,376
13	Malawi	71,4	79,70	42,00 ^b	58,00 ^b	0,325
14	Mozambique	20,5	29,00	41,90 ^b	58,10 ^b	0,264
SADC		48,7	53,25	38,69	61,31	0,442

a. UNICEF 1998: *The State of the World's Children 1998*, New York: Oxford University Press

b. No wage data available, an estimate of 75%, the mean for all countries with wage data available, was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage

Table 5
Poverty

SADC HDI Rank	Country	HPI (rank) 1995	Human poverty index (HPI-1) value (%) 1995	People not expected to survive total age 40 (as % of total population) 1995	Adult illiteracy rate (%) 1995	Population without access to		
						safe water (%) 1990-96	health services (%) 1990-95	sanitation (%) 1990-96
1	Seychelles	22,0	3,0	1,0	..
2	Mauritius	1	12,1	4,0	17,1	2,0	0 ^a	0
3	South Africa	13,0	18,2	1,0	..	47,0
4	Swaziland	21,0	23,3	40,0	55,0	30,0
5	Namibia	5	30,0	26,0	24,0 ^b	43,0	41,0	66,0
6	Zimbabwe	2	25,2	34,0	14,9	21,0	15,0	48,0
7	Botswana	4	27,0	31,0	30,2	7,0 ^a	11,0 ^a	45,0
8	Lesotho	3	25,7	23,0	28,7	38,0	20,0 ^a	62,0
9	Angola	38,0	58,0	68,0	24,0	84,0
10	Zambia	6	36,9	42,0	21,8	73,0	25,0 ^a	36,0
11	Tanzania	7	39,8	31,0	32,2	62,0	58,0	14,0
12	DRC	8	41,1	30,0	22,7	58,0	74,0 ^a	82,0
13	Malawi	9	47,7	46,0	43,6	63,0	65,0	94,0
14	Mozambique	10	48,5	38,0	59,9	37,0	61,0 ^a	46,0
SADC			39,9	28,8	29,2	41,6	56,9	54,5

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Under- weight children under age five (%) 1990-97	Children not reaching grade 5 (%) 1995	Refugees by country of asylum (thousands) 1996	Real GDP per capita (PPPS)	
					poorest 20% 1980-94	richest 20% 1980-94
1	Seychelles	6 ^a	3
2	Mauritius	16	1
3	South Africa	9	35	22,6	516	9 897
4	Swaziland	10 ^a	22	0,6
5	Namibia	26	18	2,2
6	Zimbabwe	16	24	0,6	420	6 542
7	Botswana	15 ^a	11	0,2
8	Lesotho	16	21	..	137	2 945
9	Angola	9,4
10	Zambia	24	16	131,1	216	2 797
11	Tanzania	27	17	498,7	217	1 430
12	DRC	34	36	676,0
13	Malawi	30	..	1,3
14	Mozambique	27	53	0,2
SADC		19	26	1 342,9		

SADC HDI Rank	Country	% of population below income poverty line US\$1 a day (1985 PPP\$)	National poverty line	% of population below 2/3 of national per capita income		Gini coefficients
		1989-94	1989-94	Urban	Rural	
		1989-94	1989-94	1991-95		1991-95
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	..	11,0
3	South Africa	23,7	..	41,0	82	0,58
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia	0,70
6	Zimbabwe	41,0	26,0	0,6	..	0,63 ^d
7	Botswana	34,7 ^a	0,55
8	Lesotho	50,4	26,0	0,56
9	Angola
10	Zambia	84,6	86,0	16,0	75	0,46
11	Tanzania	16,4	50,0	20,0	52	0,38
12	DRC
13	Malawi	42,1	0,60 ^c
14	Mozambique

SADC

- a. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country
b. UNICEF 1998: *The State of the World's Children 1998*, New York: Oxford University Press
c. Estimated by SARIPS/SAPES Trust
d. Central Statistical Office, Zimbabwe, *Poverty in Zimbabwe 1995/96*, Zimbabwe Government Printers, Harare, forthcoming

Table 6
Gender empowerment measure

SADC HDI Rank	Country	GEM (rank)	Seats held in parliament (% women)	Administrators and managers (% women) ^a	Professionals and technical workers (% women) ^a	Earned income share (% women)	SADC GEM value 1995	Global GEM value 1995
1	Seychelles	..	23,3
2	Mauritius	6	7,6	22,6 ^d	38,4 ^d	25,6 ^b	0,403	0,419
3	South Africa	1	23,7	17,4 ^c	46,7 ^c	30,9 ^b	0,461	0,531
4	Swaziland	7	8,4	25,7	60,3	32,6	0,347	0,366
5	Namibia	..	15,3	34,0 ^b
6	Zimbabwe	5	14,7	15,4 ^c	40,0	37,6 ^b	0,352	0,429
7	Botswana	2	8,5	36,1 ^c	61,4 ^c	38,9 ^b	0,418	0,455
8	Lesotho	3	11,2	33,4 ^c	56,6 ^c	30,5 ^b	0,389	0,450
9	Angola	..	9,5	39,2 ^b
10	Zambia	8	9,7	6,1 ^c	31,9	39,3	0,236	0,303
11	Tanzania	..	17,5	47,3
12	DRC	10	4,6	9,0	16,6	36,4 ^b	0,143	0,211
13	Malawi	9	5,6	4,8 ^c	34,7 ^c	42,0 ^b	0,206	0,255
14	Mozambique	4	25,2	11,3 ^c	20,4 ^c	41,9 ^b	0,334	0,430
SADC			12,53	12,62	31,92	27,6	0,39	0,28

- a. Data refer to latest available year b. No wage data available, An estimate of 75% of the mean for all countries with data available, was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage
c. Carried over from UNDP, *Human Development Report, 1997*, New York: Oxford University Press
d. Refers to International Standards Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 1998, which is not strictly comparable with the ISCO-1968 Classification, See selected definitions,

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Infant mortality rate (per 1 000 live births)		Population with access to safe water (%)	
		1960	1995	1960	1996	1975-80	1990-96
1	Seychelles	..	72,0	..	32 ^c	..	97 ^a
2	Mauritius	59,2	70,9	70	20	99	98
3	South Africa	49,0	64,1	89	50	..	99 ^a
4	Swaziland	40,2	58,8	157	68	..	60 ^a
5	Namibia	42,5	55,8	146	60	..	57 ^a
6	Zimbabwe	45,3	48,9	109	49	..	79 ^a
7	Botswana	46,5	51,7	116	40	..	93 ^a
8	Lesotho	42,9	58,1	149	96	17	62
9	Angola	33,0	47,4	208	170	17	32
10	Zambia	41,6	42,7	135	112	42	27
11	Tanzania	40,5	50,6	147	93	39	38
12	DRC	41,3	52,4	153	128	19	42
13	Malawi	37,8	41,1	206	137	51	37
14	Mozambique	37,3	46,3	190	133	..	63 ^a
SADC		41,6	52,1	131	59	58	

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Underweight children under age of five (%)		Adult literacy rate(%)		Gross enrolment ratio for all levels (% age 6-23)		Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)	
		1975	1990-97	1970	1995	1980	1995	1960	1995
1	Seychelles	..	6 ^a	..	88	7 697
2	Mauritius	32	16	65	83	48	61	2 113	13 294
3	South Africa	..	9	70	82	2 984	4 334
4	Swaziland	..	10 ^a	49	77	59	72	1 182	2 954
5	Namibia	..	15 ^b	..	76	4 054
6	Zimbabwe	25	16	66	85	41	68	937	2 135
7	Botswana	..	15 ^a	44	70	51	71	474	5 611
8	Lesotho	20	16	47	71	52	56	346	1 290
9	Angola	42	54	31	..	1 839
10	Zambia	17	24	48	78	46	48	1 172	986
11	Tanzania	25	27	37	68	44	34	272	636
12	DRC	..	34	44	77	46	38	..	355
13	Malawi	19	30	38	56	33	67	423	773
14	Mozambique	..	27	16	40	29	25	1 368	959
SADC		19	48	71	38	39	39	1 592	1 800

a. African Development Bank, 1998, *Selected Statistics on African Countries*

b. UNDP 1997, *UNDP and UNAIDS, 1997 Namibia Human Development Report 1997, The Impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia*

c. Data refer to 1995

Table 8
Governance

Governance								
SADC HDI Rank	Country	Date of last elections	Members of Parliament		Voter turn out last election (%)	Political parties represented in parliament	Year first woman elected (E) or nominated (N) to national parliament	
			elected (E) or appointed (A)	Total				1995 % female
1	Seychelles	07 1993	E+A	43	23,3	87	3	1976E
2	Mauritius	12 1995	E+A	66	7,6	80	5	1976E
3	South Africa	04 1994	E	400	23,7	87	7	1933E
4	Swaziland	09 1993	E+A	95	8,4	..	1	1972E
5	Namibia	12 1994	E+A	104	15,3	75	5	1989E
6	Zimbabwe	04 1995	E+A	150	14,7	57	2	1980E
7	Botswana	10 1994	E+A	44	8,5	77	2	1979E
8	Lesotho	05 1998	E	80	11,2	72	1	1965N
9	Angola	09 1992	E	220	9,5	91	11	1980E
10	Zambia	11 1996	E+A	155	9,7	40	4	1964E
11	Tanzania	10 1995	E+A	275	17,5	..	5	1961
12	DRC	10 1993	E	738	4,6	1970E
13	Malawi	05 1994	E	177	5,6	80	3	1964E
14	Mozambique	10 1994	E	250	25,2	88	3	1977E
SADC				2 797	12,5	71,9		

Table 9
Population trends

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Estimated Population (millions)							
		1960	1970	1980	1990	1992	1993	1995	2015
1	Seychelles	..	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1
2	Mauritius	0,7	0,8	0,9	1,0	1,0	1,1	1,1	1,4
3	South Africa	17,4	22,5	28,8	36,9	38,7	39,7	41,5	61,8
4	Swaziland	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,7	0,8	0,8	0,9	1,4
5	Namibia	0,8	0,8	1,0	1,4	1,4	1,5	1,5	2,5
6	Zimbabwe	3,8	5,3	7,2	9,8	10,4	10,7	11,2	16,8
7	Botswana	0,5	0,6	0,8	1,1	1,2	1,3	1,5	2,2
8	Lesotho	0,9	1,1	1,4	1,8	1,9	2,0	2,0	3,3
9	Angola	4,8	5,6	7,3	9,5	10,1	10,3	10,8	19,8
10	Zambia	3,1	4,2	5,5	7,2	7,5	7,8	8,1	13,2
11	Tanzania	10,0	13,7	18,8	25,7	27,4	28,3	30,0	49,9
12	DRC	15,3	20,3	28,1	38,9	41,5	42,8	45,5	80,9
13	Malawi	3,5	4,5	6,1	8,3	8,8	9,1	9,7	16,1
14	Mozambique	7,5	9,4	12,0	15,4	16,2	16,6	17,3	28,3
SADC		68,6	89,3	118,6	157,8	167,1	171,9	181,2	297,2

Table 9
Population trends (cont.)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Annual population growth rate (%)		Female as percentage of population	Population doubling rate (at current growth rate)	Crude birth rate (per 1 000 population)	Crude death rate (per 1 000 population)	Crude birth rate (per 1 000 population)	Crude death rate (per 1 000 population)
		1970-1995	1995-2015			1990	1990	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	1,3	0,9	48,7	2059	..	8,0	27,1	7,7
2	Mauritius	1,2	1,0	50,2	2059	18,0	6,0	20,1	6,6
3	South Africa	2,5	2,0	50,3	2026	31,0	9,0	30,4	8,4
4	Swaziland	2,9	2,5	50,6	2020	47,0	12,0	37,8	10,0
5	Namibia	2,7	2,4	50,3	2023	43,0	11,0	36,7	11,9
6	Zimbabwe	3,1	2,1	50,1	2028	41,0	10,0	38,8	14,1
7	Botswana	3,3	2,1	51,5	2026	46,0	11,0	36,1	12,0
8	Lesotho	2,6	2,4	51,0	2023	41,0	12,0	36,2	11,0
9	Angola	2,7	3,1	50,6	2015	47,0	19,0	49,3	18,9
10	Zambia	2,7	2,5	50,6	2023	51,0	13,0	43,3	17,9
11	Tanzania	3,2	2,6	50,5	2025	50,0	13,0	42,2	14,0
12	DRC	3,3	2,9	50,6	2021	46,0	14,0	46,5	14,0
13	Malawi	3,1	2,6	50,8	2022	56,0	20,0	49,2	22,4
14	Mozambique	2,5	2,5	50,9	2022	45,0	18,0	43,9	18,1
SADC		2,5	2,1	50,5		43,4	13,3	41,0	13,9

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Dependency ratio (%)	Total fertility rate (number)	Total fertility rate (number)	Contraceptive prevalence (%) (women 15- 45 years)	Maternal mortality rate, (deaths per 100 000 live births)
			1990	1995	1990-95	1995
1	Seychelles	..	3,4
2	Mauritius	50,5	1,9	2,3	75	112
3	South Africa	71,5	..	4,0	50	404
4	Swaziland	84,3	6,5	4,7	20	..
5	Namibia	85,3	..	5,1	29	225
6	Zimbabwe	88,9	5,6	4,9	48	570 ^a
7	Botswana	84,6	6,7	4,7	33	220
8	Lesotho	85,5	5,8	5,0	23	598
9	Angola	102,3	6,4	6,9	..	1 500 ^a
10	Zambia	101,9	7,2	5,7	25	940 ^a
11	Tanzania	94,2	7,1	5,7	18	748
12	DRC	100,0	6,1	6,5	8	870 ^a
13	Malawi	98,2	7,6	6,9	22	620
14	Mozambique	92,8	6,3	6,3	..	1 512
SADC		84,8	5,1	4,8	28,1	837

a. Refers to 1990

Maternal mortality data is from the African Development Bank, 1998 *Selected Statistics on African Countries*, 1998

Namibia maternal mortality rate is from UNDP 1997, *UNDP AND UNAIDS, 1997, Namibia Human Development Report 1997, The Impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia*

Table 10
Growing urbanization

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Urban population (as a % of total)			Urban population annual growth rate(%)		Largest City Population (thousands)	
		1970	1995	2015	1970-1995	1995-2015	City	1995
1	Seychelles	26	55	67	4,3	2,0	Victoria	30
2	Mauritius	42	41	49	1,1	1,9	Port Louis	145
3	South Africa	48	49	56	2,6	2,7	Cape Town	2 727
4	Swaziland	10	31	47	7,8	4,7	Mbabane	56
5	Namibia	19	36	53	5,4	4,4	Windhoek	187
6	Zimbabwe	17	32	46	5,7	3,9	Harare	1 410
7	Botswana	9	60	89	11,8	4,1	Gaborone	165
8	Lesotho	9	24	39	6,9	5,0	Maseru	400
9	Angola	15	31	44	5,7	4,9	Luanda	2 081
10	Zambia	30	43	52	4,1	3,4	Lusaka	1 317
11	Tanzania	7	24	38	8,6	5,0	Dar-es-Salaam	1 747
12	DRC	30	29	39	3,1	4,6	Kinshasa	4 241
13	Malawi	6	13	23	6,4	5,3	Blantyre	430
14	Mozambique	6	34	52	10,0	4,7	Maputo	2 212
SADC		25	34	45	5,2	3,9		17 148

Table 11
Education

Gross enrolment ratio						Tertiary, natural and applied science enrolment (as % of total tertiary)
SADC HDI Rank	Country	Primary		Secondary		Net primary enrolment ratio
		Total (%)	Female as (% of male)	Total (%)	Female as (% of male)	
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	45
2	Mauritius	107	99	62	107	..
3	South Africa	117	97	82	116	57
4	Swaziland	122	95	52	96	22
5	Namibia	133	102	62	118	5
6	Zimbabwe	116	97	44	80	23
7	Botswana	115	103	56	107	24
8	Lesotho	99	114	28	155	25
9	Angola
10	Zambia	89	93	28	62	..
11	Tanzania	67	97	5	83	39
12	DRC	72	69	26	59	..
13	Malawi	135	90	6	57	18
14	Mozambique	60	71	7	56	50
SADC		104	92	44	86	42

Table 11
Education (cont.)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	R & D scientists and technicians (per 1 000 people)	Public expenditure on					Primary school starting age 1990
			Education (as % of GNP)		Education (as % of total government expenditure)	Primary and secondary education (as % of all levels)	Higher education (as % of all levels)	
		1990-96	1985	1995	1993-95	1990-95	1990-95	
1	Seychelles	..	10,7	7,5	16,3	60	13	..
2	Mauritius	0,5	3,8	4,3	17,3	74	17	5
3	South Africa	1,2	6,0	6,8	20,5	82	15	6
4	Swaziland	..	5,9	8,1	21,7	63	28	..
5	Namibia	9,4	21,3	81	7	7
6	Zimbabwe	..	9,1	8,5	..	78	17	6
7	Botswana	..	6,8	9,6	20,5	80	12	7
8	Lesotho	..	4,3	5,9	12,2	82	17	6
9	Angola	..	5,1	..	10,7	96	4	6
10	Zambia	..	4,7	1,8	..	60	23	7
11	Tanzania	..	4,4	..	11,4	74	17	7
12	DRC	..	1,0	6
13	Malawi	..	3,5	5,7	15,0	76	17	6
14	Mozambique	..	4,2	..	12,0	66	10	7
SADC			5,8	6,6	15,2	73	12	6

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Duration of Primary 1990	Expenditure per student (as a % of GNP per capita)			Primary pupil teacher ratio (No. of pupils per teacher)	Secondary pupil teacher ratio (No. of pupils per teacher)
			Primary 1994	Secondary 1995 ^a	Tertiary 1980		
					1995	1995	1992-94
1	Seychelles	17	12
2	Mauritius	6	15,6 ^a	..	163,0	22	..
3	South Africa	7	32,3	37	28
4	Swaziland	33	..
5	Namibia	7	..	44	..	32	..
6	Zimbabwe	7	18,9	39	259,8	39	30
7	Botswana	7	13,6 ^a	..	665,5	26	16
8	Lesotho	7	12,6	51	642,0	49	..
9	Angola	4
10	Zambia	7	10,6 ^a	9	762,3	39	..
11	Tanzania	7	11,1 ^a	..	2 195,3	37	18
12	DRC	6	748,9	45	23
13	Malawi	8	9,6	145	1 136,7	62	..
14	Mozambique	5	58	..
SADC			7	13,6		34	

a. Refers to 1980

Table 12
Women's access to education

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Female net enrolment						Female tertiary, natural and applied science students (as % of female students)
		Ratio (%)	Primary	Index (1985=100)	Secondary	Index (1985=100)	Female Tertiary students Per 100 000 women	
			Ratio (%)		Ratio (%)		Index (1985=100)	
		1992	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	33
2	Mauritius	94,0	96	96,0	537	..
3	South Africa	93,0	96	..	57	..	1 590	38
4	Swaziland	93,0	96	120,0	493	16
5	Namibia	93,0	894	31
6	Zimbabwe	..	82 ^a	369	14
7	Botswana	100,0	99	105,0	48	192	392	26
8	Lesotho	75,0	71	88,0	21	117	255	21
9	Angola	19	..
10	Zambia	..	75	88,0	14	..	141	243
11	Tanzania	..	48	86,0	14	233
12	DRC	47,0	50	..	18	..	63	..
13	Malawi	48,0	100	244,0	2	..	50	15
14	Mozambique	37,0	35	74,0	5	..	21	21
SADC		66,5	69	99,7			57	19

a. Refers to 1994

Table 13
Women's participation in political and economic life

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Economically active population 15 years and above Estimated economic activity rate (%)		Female administrators and managers (%)	Female administrators and managers (as % of male)	Female professional and technical workers (%)	Female professional and technical workers (as % of male)	Female clerical and sales workers (%)
		1990	1990					
		1990	1990	1992-96	1990	1992-96	1990	1990
1	Seychelles	29,0	40,0	58,0	139,0	59,0
2	Mauritius	29,0	84,0	23,0	17,0	38,0	71,0	31,0
3	South Africa	45,0	75,0	17,0	21,0	47,0	88,0	..
4	Swaziland	53,0	87,0	26,0	17,0	60,0	119,0	54,0
5	Namibia	83,0	24,0	21,0	26,0	41,0	69,0	..
6	Zimbabwe	44,0	88,0	15,0	18,0	40,0	67,0	34,0
7	Botswana	42,0	85,0	36,0	57,0	61,0	159,0	60,0
8	Lesotho	65,0	91,0	33,0	50,0	57,0	130,0	59,0
9	Angola	52,0	87,0
10	Zambia	33,0	87,0	6,0	7,0	32,0	47,0	58,0
11	Tanzania	77,0	89,0
12	DRC	45,0	85,0	9,0	10,0	17,0	20,0	..
13	Malawi	57,0	89,0	5,0	5,0	35,0	53,0	33,0
14	Mozambique	79,0	91,0	11,0	13,0	20,0	26,0	..
SADC		49,2	71,9	12,7	14,5	31,7	46,5	42,4

Table 13
Women's participation in political and economic life (cont)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Female clerical and sales workers (as % of male)	Female service workers (%)	Female service workers (as % of male)	Total ^a (%)	Women in government At ministerial level ^a (%)	At sub- ministerial level ^a (%)
		1990	1990	1990	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	143	59	141	21	31	19
2	Mauritius	44	41	70	7	4	8
3	South Africa	..	66	196	7	9	6
4	Swaziland	116	45	82	7	0	13
5	Namibia	7	10	6
6	Zimbabwe	52	30	42	11	3	19
7	Botswana	151	70	238	11	0	15
8	Lesotho	144	68	209	14	7	16
9	Angola	6	7	6
10	Zambia	136	22	29	9	7	9
11	Tanzania	9	16	5
12	DRC	2	3	0
13	Malawi	58	28	39	6	5	7
14	Mozambique	13	4	15
SADC		77,3	32,2	47,8	6,7	5,7	8,9

a. Including elected heads of state and governors of central banks

Table 14
Health profile

SADC HDI Rank	Country	One-year-olds fully immunized against		Aids cases (per 100 000 people) ^a	HIV/AIDS prevalence (Adults 15-49 years (%) ^b	Tuberculosis cases (per 100 000 people)	Malaria cases (per 100 000 people)
		Tuberculosis (%) 1995-96	Measles (%) 1995-96	1996	1997	1995	1994
1	Seychelles	100	98	2,7	..	12,3	..
2	Mauritius	87	61	0,6	0,1	13,7	3
3	South Africa	95	76	1,7	12,9	209,6	25
4	Swaziland	68	59	28,3	18,5	239,8	..
5	Namibia	79	61	165,5	19,9	100,3	27 209
6	Zimbabwe	74	77	79,3	25,8	275,5	2 964
7	Botswana	67	82	98,7	25,1	390,0	2 089
8	Lesotho	55	82	16,4	8,4	239,1	..
9	Angola	74	65	1,0	2,1	73,8	6 377
10	Zambia	100	93	46,9	19,1	157,7	498
11	Tanzania	96	81	95,5	9,4	132,7	343
12	DRC	51	41	4,3	7,8	88,1	..
13	Malawi	95	89	36,6	14,9	198,0	49 410
14	Mozambique	83	67	12,6	14,2	103,6	..
SADC		75,6	68	30,4	11,6	149,0	5 546,8

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Cigarette consumption per adult (1970-72=100)	Doctors (per 100 000 people)	Nurses (per 100 000 people)	Hospital beds (per 1 000 people)	People with disabilities (as % of total population)
		1990-92	1993	1993	1994	1985-95
1	Seychelles	..	104	417
2	Mauritius	140	85	241	3,1	2,6
3	South Africa	128	59	175
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia	..	23	81
6	Zimbabwe	61	14	164	0,5	2 ^c
7	Botswana	1,6	4,0
8	Lesotho	..	5	33
9	Angola	100	1,3	..
10	Zambia	86	1,6
11	Tanzania	97	4	46	0,9	..
12	DRC	123	1,4	..
13	Malawi	165	2	6	1,6	2,9
14	Mozambique	124	0,9	..
SADC		105	30	114	1,2	2,3

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Public expenditure on health (as % of GDP)			Private expenditure on health (as a % of GDP)	Total expenditure on health (as a %) of GDP)	Health expenditure per capita (PPP\$)
		1960	1990	1991-95	1990-95	1990-95	1990-95
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	1,5	..	4,2	1,7	3,4	408
3	South Africa	0,5	3,2	3,6	4,3	7,9	396
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia	3,9	3,7	7,6	303
6	Zimbabwe	1,2	3,2	2,1	4,2	6,5	122
7	Botswana	1,5	..	1,9	1,4	3,1	171
8	Lesotho	1,0	..	3,5
9	Angola	4,0
10	Zambia	1,0	2,2	..	0,7	3,3	31
11	Tanzania	0,5	3,2	2,8
12	DRC	..	0,8
13	Malawi	0,2	2,9	2,3
14	Mozambique	..	4,4	4,6
SADC		1,14	3,3	3,5	3,5	7,2	296

a. The numbers of reported cases in adults and children,

b. UNAIDS 1998, *Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases*,

c. Source: Ministry of Public Service and Social, Labour and Social Welfare, *Zimbabwe Poverty Assessment Study Survey 1995*, 1997 Government Printers, Zimbabwe

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Infant mortality rate (per 1 000 live births)			Under-five mortality rate (per 1 000 children under 5 years)	Births attended by trained health personnel (%)	Maternal mortality rate (per 100 000 live births) ^a
		1960	1989	1996	1996	1990-96	1995
1	Seychelles	..	18	15	19	99	..
2	Mauritius	70	22	20	23	97	112
3	South Africa	89	..	50	66	82	404
4	Swaziland	157	115	68	97	55	..
5	Namibia	146	103	60	77	68	225
6	Zimbabwe	109	63	49	73	69	570 ^a
7	Botswana	116	64	40	50	78	220
8	Lesotho	149	97	96	139	40	598
9	Angola	208	173	170	292	15	1 500 ^a
10	Zambia	135	78	112	202	51	940 ^a
11	Tanzania	147	103	93	144	53	748
12	DRC	153	81	128	207	..	870 ^a
13	Malawi	206	147	137	217	55	620
14	Mozambique	190	173	133	214	25	1 512

SADC **131** **116** **105** **140** **54** **888**

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Mothers exclusively breast- feeding at 3 months (%)	Mothers exclusively breast- feeding at 6 months (%)	Oral dehydration therapy use rate (%)	Low- birth weight of infants (%)	Percentage of under five children suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition		
		1990-96	1990-96	1990-97	1990-94	under weight	wasting	stunting
						1980-88	1990-97	1984-95
1	Seychelles	55	10	6	6	2
2	Mauritius	55	16	..	13	24	16	14
3	South Africa	9	3
4	Swaziland	87	37	99	10	..	10	1
5	Namibia	86	22	66	16	..	26	9
6	Zimbabwe	92	16	60	14	12	16	6
7	Botswana	90	41	..	8	15	15	..
8	Lesotho	..	54	84	11	16	16	2
9	Angola	..	3	..	19
10	Zambia	99	13	99	13	28	24	5
11	Tanzania	90	40	91	14	48	27	6
12	DRC	99	32	90	15	28	34	10
13	Malawi	..	11	78	20	24	30	5
14	Mozambique	93	..	83	20	..	27	..

SADC **88,4** **27** **81** **13** **20** **19** **4** **36**

a. Maternal Mortality date is from the African Development Bank, 1998 *Selected Statistics on African Countries, 1998*
 Namibia maternal mortality rate is from UNDP and UNAIDS, 1997, *Namibia Human Development Report 1997, The Impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia*

Table 16
Labour force and employment

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Adult labour force (as % of total population) 1995	Labour force participation rate 1990	Women's share of adult labour force (% age 15 years and above)		Percentage of labour force in					
				1970	1995	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
				1970	1995	1970	1990	1970	1990	1970	1990
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	42	28,4	20	31	34	17	25	43	41	40
3	South Africa	39	24,4	33	37	31	14	30	32	39	55
4	Swaziland	36	20,0	34	37	65	39	13	22	22	38
5	Namibia	41	24,9	39	41	64	49	15	15	21	36
6	Zimbabwe	46	26,2	44	45	77	68	11	8	12	24
7	Botswana	44	23,5	55	46	82	46	5	20	13	33
8	Lesotho	41	25,8	40	37	43	40	36	28	21	32
9	Angola	46	24,9	47	46	78	75	7	8	15	17
10	Zambia	41	23,0	44	45	79	75	7	8	14	17
11	Tanzania	51	26,0	51	49	90	84	3	5	7	11
12	DRC	42	23,8	45	43	75	68	11	13	14	19
13	Malawi	48	27,4	50	49	91	87	4	5	5	8
14	Mozambique	52	27,4	50	49	86	83	6	8	8	9
SADC		44	25	40	43	61	63	8	14	13	24

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Under 14 year olds in the labour force (as a % of pop, aged 10-14 years) 1995	Age dependency ratio 1995	Unemployment rate ^a		
				Female	Male	Total
					1991-96	
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	3,0	0,5	9,9 ^b	3,9 ^b	5,9 ^b
3	South Africa	..	0,7	38,0	22,5	..
4	Swaziland	13,8	0,9	23,3	20,7	21,8
5	Namibia	21,7	0,9	21,0	18,0	19,0
6	Zimbabwe	29,4	0,8	15,0	15,0	15,0
7	Botswana	16,9	0,8	21,0
8	Lesotho	22,1	0,8
9	Angola	27,1	1,0
10	Zambia	16,3	1,0	16,0	15,0	15,0
11	Tanzania	39,5	0,9
12	DRC	29,6	1,0
13	Malawi	35,2	1,0
14	Mozambique	33,8	0,9
SADC		15,0	0,8			

a. Unemployment rate data are from the National Statistical Offices

b. Data is for 1997

Table 17
Food security

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Daily per capita supply of calories		Per capita supply of cereals ^a		Daily per capita supply of fat		Daily per capita supply of proteins	
		1970	1995	Total (kg)	Change (%)	Total (grams)	Change (%)	Total (grams)	Change (%)
		1970	1995	1994/95	1970-95	1994/95	1970-75	1994/95	1970-95
1	Seychelles	1 826	2 311	107	-11	74	106	77	57
2	Mauritius	2 322	2 886	167	11	87	74	79	58
3	South Africa	2 807	2 865	184	2	77	12	72	-3
4	Swaziland	2 346	2 660	153	5	48	12	63	-3
5	Namibia	2 149	2 093	126	25	35	-20	59	16
6	Zimbabwe	2 222	1 961	154	-16	49	-4	46	-26
7	Botswana	2 101	2 140	135	-9	48	9	69	-9
8	Lesotho	1 986	1 965	185	-7	32	33	58	-5
9	Angola	2 071	1 904	61	-18	37	6	43	-7
10	Zambia	2 140	1 915	159	-9	30	-27	51	-20
11	Tanzania	1 749	2 003	107	67	31	15	49	17
12	DRC	2 158	1 870	35	..	31	-9	31	-16
13	Malawi	2 340	2 026	158	-17	27	-40	55	-26
14	Mozambique	1 886	1 675	81	17	31	7	32	-9
SADC		2 122	2 108	105	3	40	12	52	2

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Food production per capita index (1980=100)	Food imports (as % of merchandise imports)	Food aid in cereals (thousands of metric tons)	Food consumption (as % of household consumption)
		1996	1993	1994/95 ^c	1980-85
1	Seychelles	97	..	0 ^f	..
2	Mauritius	120	13 ^c	2 ^c	24
3	South Africa	79	6	..	34
4	Swaziland	76	..	1	..
5	Namibia	64	..	26 ^c	..
6	Zimbabwe	85	18 ^b	4	40
7	Botswana	95	..	7	25
8	Lesotho	89	..	15	..
9	Angola	90	..	217 ^d	..
10	Zambia	97	..	11	36
11	Tanzania	80	..	118	64
12	DRC	84	..	83	..
13	Malawi	78	..	204	30
14	Mozambique	83	..	320	..
SADC		85		763	33

a. Amount of cereals, fat and protein available for human consumption per capita supplies represent the average supply available for the population as a whole and do not necessarily indicate what is actually consumed by individuals

b. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading

c. The time reference for food aid is the crop year July to June

d. Refers to 1993

e. Refers to 1992

f. Refers to 1991

Table 18
Agriculture

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Agriculture production (Index 1989=100)	Value of agricultural exports millions of US\$ (current prices)	Fertilizer use (Thousand of metric tons)	Fertilizer imports (Thousand of metric tons)	Area under major crops (Thousand of of hectares)	Incidence of drought
		1995	1995	1994	1993	1994	1995
1	Seychelles	107	2 ^a	7	No
2	Mauritius	100	383 ^a	29	24	106	No
3	South Africa	76	1 691 ^a	832	157	13 179	Yes
4	Swaziland	80	261 ^a	13	12	191	Yes
5	Namibia	93	132 ^a	662	Yes
6	Zimbabwe	67	629 ^a	171	55	2 878	Yes
7	Botswana	94	97	1	1	420	Yes
8	Lesotho	78	13	6	6	320	Yes
9	Angola	86	1	10	8	3500	No
10	Zambia	82	27 ^a	59	83	5 273	Yes
11	Tanzania	85	265 ^a	40	50	3 500	..
12	DRC	85	51 ^a	4	4	7 900	No
13	Malawi	93	282 ^a	36	86	1 700	Yes
14	Mozambique	97	32 ^a	7	3	3 180	Yes
SADC		86	3 866	1 208	489	42 816	

a. Refers to 1993

Table 18
Agriculture

Agricultural yields by major crops
(Thousands of hectograms per hectare)

Country/Crop							
Angola	1980	1990	1995	Botswana	1980	1990	1995
Coffee (green)	2,2	0,2	0,2	Sorghum	2,2	2,5	3,8
Maize	6,0	2,7	3,4	Maize	2,6	2,9	3,3
Millet	7,1	5,7	1,6	Millet	1,4	2,2	2,5
Wheat	5,8	10,0	16,7				
Cassava	33,8	37,5	41,5				
Sweet Potatoes	91,7	86,5	90,9				
DRC				Lesotho			
Coffee (green)	..	3,3	3,0	Wheat	9,7	8,0	5,0
Palm oil	4,0	Dry Peas	8,3	2,5	4,0
Maize	8,2	8,2	8,4	Dry Beans	5,7	2,0	3,3
Rice	69,0	8,0	7,2	Maize	9,6	11,0	6,8
Cassava	..	80,7	83,3	Sorghum	9,7	10,0	6,7
Plantains				
Malawi				Mauritius			
Tobacco Leaves	8,6	7,8	3,5	Sugar Cane	577,7	730	702,7
Tea	16,7	18,8	3,1	Potatoes	120,0	180	190,0
Groundnuts	7,1	7,0	0,3	Onions
Cotton Lint				
Maize	12,2	10,0	13,5				
Sorghum	6,7	4,8	6,1				
Cassava	58,4	23,4	26,7				
Mozambique				Namibia			
Cotton Lint	Wheat	20,0	13,3	15,0
Tea	10,5	6,7	7,5	Maize	12,3	12,6	8,3
Maize	5,4	4,5	6,8				
Rice (Paddy)	8,3	8,7	8,7				
Cassava	41,4	43,0	42,4				
South Africa				Swaziland			
Maize	25,5	25,1	13,2	Sugar Cane	1 070,0	1 038,4	999,5
Wheat	9,1	11,2	15,4	Cotton Lint	10,2	9,5	..
Sugar Cane	660,2	664,8	576,7	Maize	13,6	10,3	12,7
Sorghum	28,8	11,9	16,0				
Barley	8,8	18,5	24,0				

Table 18
Agriculture (cont.)

Agricultural yields by major crops
(Thousands of hectograms per hectare)

Country/Crop				Zambia	1980	1990	1995
Tanzania	1980	1990	1995	Cotton	3,0	3,0	4,7
Coffee	4,2	4,2	3,6	Tobacco Leaves	10,0	8,0	5,4
Cotton Lint	Sunflower Seeds	9,0	4,5	5,0
Tea	10,7	13,8	11,6	Maize	16,9	14,3	14,2
Maize	12,3	15,0	15,5	Wheat	50,0	42,3	27,8
Rice	11,9	19,2	15,1	Cassava	50,0	50,5	52,2
Sorghum	6,9	9,7	12,2				
Millet	7,6	11,2	10,9				
Cassava	107,3	132,1	102,0				
Zimbabwe							
Tobacco Leaves	19,5	21,7	24,1				
Cotton	18,6	12,5	6,7				
Sugar Cane	1 011,2	966,6	1 159,7				
Maize	13,4	17,2	6,0				
Wheat	50,3	58,2	20,8				

Table 18
Agriculture

Volume of food output by major food crop
(Thousands of metric tones)

Country/Crop

Angola	1980	1990	1995	Botswana	1980	1990	1995
Maize	360	180	235	Livestock	3 853
Millet	57	63	62	(1000 heads)			
Cassava	1 150	1 650	1 700	Rabbits/Chickens	913
Sweet Potatoes	165	165	200	(1000s)			
				Sorghum	29	38	38
				Maize	12	12	5
				Millet	2	2	2
DRC				Lesotho			
Palm Oil	168	179	181	Wheat	28	33	2
Maize	594	1 008	1 170	Dry Peas	4	8	2
Rice	234	392	425	Dry Beans	5	3	2
Cassava	13 087	18 715	17 500	Maize	106	172	27
Plantains	1 563	2 097	2 262	Sorghum	59	36	10
Malawi				Mauritius			
Groundnuts	177	37	32	Sugar Cane	4 564	5 548	5 200
Maize	1 186	1 343	1 661	Potatoes	12	18	19
Sorghum	20	15	45	Dry Onions	2	3	4
Cassava	292	145	200				
Mozambique				Namibia			
Cashew Nuts	71	23	30	Wheat	2	4	3
Rice	380	453	734	Maize	32	29	15
Maize	75	96	113				
Cassava	3 600	4 056	4 178				
Seychelles	Swaziland			
				Sugar Cane	2 782	3 842	3 798
				Citrus (Oranges)	45	35	35
				Maize	97	94	76
South Africa							
Maize	10 896	8 709	4 670				
Wheat	1 470	1 730	2125				
Sugar Cane	14 062	18 083	16 782				
Sorghum	701	293	291				
Barley	60	241	300				

Table 18
Agriculture (cont.)

Volume of food output by major food crop
(Thousands of metric tones)

Country/Crop

Tanzania	1980	1990	1995	Zambia	1980	1990	1995
Maize	1 726	2 445	2 567	Sunflower seeds	28	20	16
Sorghum	510	368	839	Maize	937	1 093	738
Rice	291	740	723	Wheat	10	55	50
Millet	340	200	411	Cassava	290	520	600
Cassava	4 828	7 792	5 969				

Zimbabwe

Sugar Cane	2 528	3 093	3 943
Maize	1 511	1 972	840
Wheat	191	326	83

Table 18
Agriculture

Nominal producer prices
(Local currency per kilogram)

Country/Crop

Angola	1980	1990	1993
Coffee	..	135,0	..
Maize	..	11,5	..
Millet	4,0	10,0	..
Wheat	4,5	17,5	..
Cassava	..	7,7	..
Sweet Potatoes	2,5	14,0	..

Botswana	1980	1990	1993
Groundnuts (in shell)	0,2	0,7	1,4
Sorghum	0,1	0,3	0,4
Maize	0,1	0,3	0,4

DRC

Coffee	4,0	440,5	..
(Arabica green beans)			
Palm oil	21,0	247,7	..
Rubber (natural)
Cocoa (beans)
Maize	1,2	106,4	..
Rice (paddy)	2,0	119,4	..
Cassava	1,3	34,7	..
Plantains	2,9

Lesotho

Wheat	0,2
Beans	0,5
Peas	0,4
Maize	0,1
Sorghum	0,2

Malawi

Tobacco (flue-cured)	0	0	..
Tobacco (Northern			
Division dark-fired, G2)	0,4	2,5	2,8
Tea (Dry leaves)	0	0	..
Groundnuts (shelled)	0,3	0,9	2,2
Cotton (Seed cotton)	0,2	0,8	..
Maize	0,1	0,3	0,5
Sorghum	0,1	..	0,8
Rice	0,1	..	0,9
Cassava	0

Mauritius

Sugar Cane
Tea	16,4
Maize (12% moisture)	2,0	13,5	5,0
Rice (paddy 14% moisture)	1,4	4,8	..
Potatoes	2,2	3,1	4,7
Onions	4,2	7,1	7,6

Mozambique

Cashew nuts	7,5
Cotton (seed, prime grade)	11,0
Tea	25,6
Maize
Rice	6,2
Cassava	2,0

Namibia

Wheat	..	0,5	0,7
Maize (white)	..	0,4	0,6

Table 18
Agriculture (cont.)

Nominal producer Prices
(Local currency per kilogram)

Country/Crop	1980	1990	1993	1980	1990	1993
Seychelles			
Swaziland				South Africa		
Sugar Cane (Sucrose)	0,0	Maize	0,1	0,3
Citrus	0,2	0,5	..	Wheat	0,2	0,5
Pineapple	0,0	0,4	..	Sugar Cane	0,0	0,1
Cotton (seed cotton)	0,3	Sorghum	0,1	0,2
Maize	0,1	Barley	0,2	0,4
Zambia				Tanzania		
Cotton (seed cotton)	0,5	9,7	..	Coffee (Arabican	9,0	..
Tobacco (Virginia)	1,6	60,0	..	parchment)		
Sunflower (seeds)	0,3	6,4	..	Cotton (seed cotton)	3,2	41
Maize	0,1	3,2	..	Tea (Green leaves)	1,5	..
Wheat	0,2	5,2	..	Maize	1,0	13
Cassava	..	3,2	..	Sorghum	1,0	..
				Rice (Paddy)	1,8	26
Zimbabwe				Millet	1,5	..
Tobacco	2,7	6,5	..	Cassava	0,7	..
Cotton (seed cotton)	0,7	1,4	..	(grade 1, Makopa)		
Sugar Cane			
Maize	0,2	0,2	..			
Wheat	0,3	0,5	..			

Table 19
Environment

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Land area (1 000 ha) 1995	Forest and woodland (as % of land area) 1995	Internal renewable water resources per capita (cubic meters per year) 1998	Annual fresh water withdrawals As a % of water resources 1987-95	Per capita (cubic meters) 1987-95	Annual rate of deforesta- tion (%) 1990-95	Annual rate of reforesta- tion (%) 1980-90	Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (metric tons) 1995
1	Seychelles	45	0
2	Mauritius	203	5,9	1 915	16,3 ^a	410	0	2	1,3
3	South Africa	22 104	7,0	1 011	29,7	359	0,2	2	7,4
4	Swaziland	1 720	8,5	2 836	24,9 ^a	1 171 ^a	0	..	0,5
5	Namibia	82 329	15,0	3 751	4,0	179	0,3
6	Zimbabwe	38 685	22,5	1 182	8,7	136	0,6	2	0,9
7	Botswana	56 673	24,6	1 870	3,9	84	0,5	..	1,5
8	Lesotho	3 035	0,2	2 395	1,0	30	0	16	..
9	Angola	124 670	17,8	15 376	0,3	57	1,0	1	0,4
10	Zambia	74 339	42,2	9 229	2,1	216	0,8	6	0,3
11	Tanzania	88 359	36,8	2 485	1,5	40	1,0	8	0,1
12	DRC	226 705	48,2	19 001	(.)	10	0,7	10	(.)
13	Malawi	9 408	35,5	1 690	5,3	98	1,6	8	0,1
14	Mozambique	78 409	21,5	5 350	0,6	40	0,7	4	0,1
SADC		906 684	28,6	7 520	3,9	120	0,7	7,3	2,5

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Loss of mangroves (%)	Share of arable land (hectares per capita)
		1980-90	1994-96
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	..	0,09
3	South Africa	50	0,40
4	Swaziland	0	..
5	Namibia	0	0,51
6	Zimbabwe	0	0,27
7	Botswana	0	0,27
8	Lesotho	0	0,16
9	Angola	50	0,28
10	Zambia	0	0,59
11	Tanzania	60	0,11
12	DRC	50	0,17
13	Malawi	0	0,17
14	Mozambique	60	0,17
SADC		54	0,25

a. Data refer to an earlier year or period than that specified in the column heading

Table 20
National income accounts

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Consumption					
		GDP (US\$ billions)	Agriculture (as a % of GDP)	Industry (as a % of GDP)	Services (as a % of GDP)	Private (as a % of GDP)	Government (as a % of GDP)
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles	0,5	7 ^b	16 ^b	77 ^b
2	Mauritius	4	9	33	58	65	12
3	South Africa	136	5	31	64	61	21
4	Swaziland	1	14 ^b	45 ^b	41 ^b	64	27
5	Namibia	3	14 ^a	29 ^a	56 ^a
6	Zimbabwe	7	15 ^a	36 ^a	48 ^a
7	Botswana	4	5	46	48	45	32
8	Lesotho	1	10	56	34	85	23
9	Angola	4	12	59	28	9	47
10	Zambia	4	22	40	37	88	9
11	Tanzania	4	58	17	24	97	10
12	DRC	6,1	30 ^b	36,5 ^b	33,5 ^b
13	Malawi	1	42	27	31	76	20
14	Mozambique	1	33 ^a	12 ^a	55
SADC		177	9	32	59	59	20

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Gross domestic investment (as a % of GDP)	Gross domestic savings (as a % of GDP)	Tax revenue (as a % of GDP)	Central government expenditure (as a % of GDP)	Exports (as a % of GDP)	Imports (as a % of GDP)
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	25	22	18	23	58	62
3	South Africa	18	18	..	33	22	22
4	Swaziland	17	9	83	91
5	Namibia	41
6	Zimbabwe
7	Botswana	25	23	..	38	49	52
8	Lesotho	87	-9	..	33	21	117
9	Angola	27	43	74	58
10	Zambia	12	3	13	17	31	40
11	Tanzania	31	-7	30	68
12	DRC
13	Malawi	15	4	29	40
14	Mozambique
SADC		18	16,8		30,5	24,7	26,3

a. Data refer to a year other than that specified in the column heading
b. Data refer to 1990

Table 21
Trends in economic performance

SADC HDI Rank	Country	GNP (US\$ billions)	GNP per capita (US\$)	GNP annual growth rate (%)	GNP per capita annual growth rate (%)		Average annual rate of inflation (%)	
		1995	1995	1980-95	1965-80	1980-95	1985-95	1995
1	Seychelles	0,5	6 620	3,3	4,6	2,3
2	Mauritius	3,8	3 380	5,7	3,7	4,6	8,8	4,2
3	South Africa	130,9	3 160	1,3	3,2	-1,0	13,9	10,2
4	Swaziland	1,1	1 170	4,2	3,7	1,0	..	7,1
5	Namibia	3,1	2 000	..	0,6	..	10,4	4,7
6	Zimbabwe	5,9	540	2,8	1,7	-0,2	20,9	23,4
7	Botswana	4,4	3 020	8,8	9,9	5,4	11,5	9,2
8	Lesotho	1,5	770	3,4	6,8	0,9	13,4	7,9
9	Angola	4,4	410	..	0,6	..	169,5	1184,1
10	Zambia	3,6	400	0,6	-1,2	-2,4	91,5	46,2
11	Tanzania	3,7	120	..	0,8	..	32,3	34,0
12	DRC	5,3	120	-2,7	-1,3	-5,8	..	542,0
13	Malawi	1,6	170	2,4	3,2	-0,7	22,1	76,0
14	Mozambique	1,4	80	1,1	0,6	-0,8	52,2	44,2
SADC		171,2	1 892	1,5	3,0	-0,7	25,0	28,5

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Exports as a % of GDP (% annual growth rate)	Tax revenue as % of GDP (% annual growth rate)	Overall budget surplus/deficit (as % of GDP)	
		1980-94	1980-92	1980	1995
1	Seychelles	-6,62 ^a	-4,32 ^a
2	Mauritius	1,6	1,2	-10,30	-1,40
3	South Africa	0,8	2,0	-2,30	-6,20
4	Swaziland	6,10	-0,60
5	Namibia	0,29 ^b	-4,80
6	Zimbabwe	0,6	3,0	-10,90	-10,90 ^a
7	Botswana	..	1,1	-0,20	1,84 ^a
8	Lesotho	1,0	4,1	-12,16 ^a	3,00 ^a
9	Angola	-10,42 ^a	-35,20 ^a
10	Zambia	-0,4	..	-18,50	-2,90
11	Tanzania	-7,00	-3,90 ^a
12	DRC	0,90 ^a	-10,14 ^a
13	Malawi	-1,7	..	-15,90	-5,00 ^a
14	Mozambique	-2,6	..	-17,72	-5,00
SADC		0,7	-3,0	-6,6	

a. Source: African Development Bank, *Selected Statistics on African Countries*, 1998
b. Refers to 1985

Table 22
Money and banking

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Money supply (US\$ millions) 1995	Quasi money supply (US\$ millions) 1995	Net foreign assets (US\$ millions) 1995
1	Seychelles	70,38	183,84	26,19
2	Mauritius	550,48	2 563,22	1 080,20
3	South Africa	30 811,02	44 711,02	-4 931,13
4	Swaziland	100,04	238,09	289,26
5	Namibia	501,97	785,56	-86,66
6	Zimbabwe	1 301,36	604,80	-340,65
7	Botswana	299,37	851,99	4 404,33
8	Lesotho	143,44	165,58	460,06
9	Angola
10	Zambia	265,63	364,43	-1 255,44
11	Tanzania	745,15	573,32	-359,35
12	DRC	268,99	111,47	-1 253,63
13	Malawi	144,71	126,73	77,23
14	Mozambique	543,91	80,23	-188,79
SADC		35 746,45	51 360,28	-2 078,71

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Domestic credit (US\$ millions) 1995	International reserves (US\$ millions) 1995	Exchange rate (local currency per US\$), period average 1995
1	Seychelles	338,24	27,12	4,76
2	Mauritius	2 666,39	867,40	17,39
3	South Africa	91 870,52	4 301,00	3,63
4	Swaziland	90,44	298,20	3,63
5	Namibia	1 539,94	220,98	3,63
6	Zimbabwe	2 366,77	735,20	8,66
7	Botswana	-1 714,80	4 764,36	2,77
8	Lesotho	-88,37	456,74	3,63
9	Angola	1 585 610,13
10	Zambia	2 199,99	133,50	857,23
11	Tanzania	1 207,25	270,20	574,76
12	DRC	95,81	157,43	7 024,43
13	Malawi	172,77	110,55	15,28
14	Mozambique	98,89	195,32	9024,30
SADC		100 843,84	12 638	

Table22
Money and banking

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Deposit rate (%) 1995	Discount rate (%) 1995	Interest rate (%) 1995
1	Seychelles	9,22	..	15,76
2	Mauritius	12,23	11,4	20,81
3	South Africa	13,54	15,0	17,9
4	Swaziland	10,25	15,0	18,0
5	Namibia	10,84	17,5	18,51
6	Zimbabwe	25,92	29,5	34,73
7	Botswana	9,98	13,0	14,29
8	Lesotho	13,34	15,5	16,38
9	Angola
10	Zambia	42,13 ^a	72,5 ^b	45,53
11	Tanzania	24,63	47,9	42,83
12	DRC	..	125	..
13	Malawi	37,27	50	47,33
14	Mozambique
SADC		14,5	21	22

a. Refers to 1996
b. Refers to 1993

Table 23
Financial inflows and outflows

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Total external debt		Debt service ration (debt service as a % of exports of goods and services)		Total net official development assistance (ODA) received (net disbursements)		
		US\$ billions	As a % of GNP			US\$ millions	As a % of 1995 GNP	Per capita US\$
		1995	1995	1980	1995	1996	1996	1996
1	Seychelles	0,2	19	3,7	259
2	Mauritius	1,8	46	9	9	20	0,5	18
3	South Africa	361	0,3	9
4	Swaziland	0,3	31	2,8	34
5	Namibia	189	5,4	122
6	Zimbabwe	4,9	79	4	..	374	6,0	34
7	Botswana	0,7	16	2	3	81	1,9	56
8	Lesotho	0,7	45	2	6	107	8,6	54
9	Angola	11,5	275	..	13	544	19,4	51
10	Zambia	6,9	191	25	174	614	19,4	68
11	Tanzania	7,3	207	21	17	894	23,2	30
12	DRC	13,1	167	3,2	4
13	Malawi	2,1	167	28	26	501	35,3	51
14	Mozambique	5,8	444	..	35	923	72,2	57
SADC		55,3	138,3	5	10	4 825	3	27

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Net foreign direct investment (as a % of GNP)		Export - import ratio (exports as a % of imports)		Terms of trade (1987=100) 1995	Current account balance before official transfers (US\$ millions) 1995
		(as a % of GNP)	Trade (as a % of GNP)				
		1993-95	1993-95	1995	1995		
1	Seychelles	10,6	129
2	Mauritius	0,4	120	95	103	-22	..
3	South Africa	(.)	44	90	111	-3 500	..
4	Swaziland	5,5	186
5	Namibia	1,5	110	91	..	50	..
6	Zimbabwe	0,7	74	84	84	-425	..
7	Botswana	1,6	101	115	152	342	..
8	Lesotho	1,6	138	65	..	108	..
9	Angola	9,6	132	78	86	-769	..
10	Zambia	1,7	71	89	85
11	Tanzania	4,3	96	56	83	-629	..
12	DRC	(.)
13	Malawi	0,1	69	45	87	-450	..
14	Mozambique	2,8	102	36	124
SADC		1,0	56	68	99	-5 295	

Table 24
Military expenditure

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Defence expenditure						Military expenditure (as a % of com- bined education and health expenditure		Total armed forces	
		US\$ millions (1995 prices)		As a % of GDP		Per capita (US\$ 1995 prices)		1960	1990-91	Thous- ands 1996	Index (1985=100) 1996
		1985	1996	1985	1996	1985	1996				
1	Seychelles	11	10	2,1	3,1	168	144	0,3	25
2	Mauritius	3	60	0,3	2,3	3	52	4	4	1,3	130
3	South Africa	3 922	2 506	2,7	1,8	117	58	26	41	137,9	130
4	Swaziland	11
5	Namibia	..	71	3,0	..	42	23	8,1	..
6	Zimbabwe	232	232	3,1	3,9	28	20	..	66	43,0	105
7	Botswana	51	224	1,1	6,7	47	147	..	22	7,5	188
8	Lesotho	63	31	4,6	5,0	41	15	..	48	2,0	100
9	Angola	883	441	15,1	6,4	101	40	..	208	97	196
10	Zambia	55	58	1,1	1,8	8	6	42	63	21,6	133
11	Tanzania	191	83	4,4	2,5	9	3	4	77	34,6	86
12	DRC	111	166	1,5	2,8	4	4	..	71	28,1	59
13	Malawi	29	23	1,0	1,2	4	2	..	24	9,8	185
14	Mozambique	326	61	8,5	3,7	24	3	..	121	11,0	70
SADC		5 877	3 966	3,4	2,2	41,8	21,5		41	402,2	85

Table 25
Access to information and communication

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Radios (per 1 000 people)	Televisions (per 1 000 people)	Printing and writing paper consumed (metric tons per 1 000 people)	Main telephone lines (per 1 000 people)	Cost of a local call (US\$ per 3 minutes)
		1995	1995	1995	1995	1996
1	Seychelles	548	184	3,5	178	..
2	Mauritius	367	192	11,1	131	0,06
3	South Africa	316	101	16,6	95	0,09
4	Swaziland	163	96	..	21	..
5	Namibia	140	29	..	51	..
6	Zimbabwe	89	27	1,8	14	0,03
7	Botswana	131	24	..	41	0,03
8	Lesotho	37	7	..	9	0,04
9	Angola	34	51	0,2	6	..
10	Zambia	99	64	0,5	8	0,25
11	Tanzania	276	16	0,5	3	0,08
12	DRC	98	41	(,)	1	..
13	Malawi	256	..	0,1	4	0,04
14	Mozambique	38	3	(,)	3	0,04
SADC		178	46	6,61	26	0,05

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Road/pop. ratio (1 000 km/1m people)	Paved primary roads (km/1m people)	% of roads in good condition	Post Offices (per 100 000 people)
		1990	1992	1989	1995
1	Seychelles	7,1
2	Mauritius	1,7	1 549	95	9,4
3	South Africa	5,0	1 394
4	Swaziland	3,5	..	35	8,3
5	Namibia	28,7	2 722
6	Zimbabwe	8,9 ^a	1 406	70	2,8
7	Botswana	7,0	1 976,9	94	12,8
8	Lesotho	2,8 ^b	452	53	..
9	Angola	7,9	0,7
10	Zambia	4,8	795	40	..
11	Tanzania	21 ^a	142	39	3,7
12	DRC	3,8 ^a	..	20	1,3
13	Malawi	3,2	277,8	56	..
14	Mozambique	2,5	342,6	19	1,6
SADC		0,0	501	39	2,3

a. Refers to 1991
b. Refers to 1992

Table 26
Energy use

		Electricity consumption Total						Household energy from fuelwood ^a (%)
SADC HDI Rank	Country	(millions of kilowatt hours)	Index (1980=100)	Per capita (kilowatt hours)		Traditional fuel consumption (as % of total consumption)		
		1995	1995	1980	1995	1980	1995	1990
1	Seychelles	128	256	794	1 753
2	Mauritius	1 120	240	482	1 003	44	38	60
3	South Africa	188 975	189	3 025	3 992	4	4	..
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia
6	Zimbabwe	10 350	142	1 020	925	34	37	..
7	Botswana	36	..	57
8	Lesotho
9	Angola	1 870	125	214	173	47	69	85
10	Zambia	6 310	98	1 125	781	55	73	86
11	Tanzania	1 738	227	41	58	84	91	89
12	DRC	4 898	113	161	108	80	..	94
13	Malawi	803	196	66	83	89	90	89
14	Mozambique	1 164	26	364	67	73	91	83
SADC		217 356	106	994	1 107	24	22	78

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Commercial energy use (oil equivalent)				GDP output per kilogram (US\$) ^b		Net commercial energy imports (as a % of energy consumption)	
		Total (1 000 metric tons)		Per capita (kg)		1980	1994	1980	1994
		1980	1994	1980	1994				
1	Seychelles	70	122	1 110	1 691	3,2	2,9	100	100
2	Mauritius	339	431	351	387	3,7	6,3	94	92
3	South Africa	60 511	86 995	2 074	2 146	1,3	1,0	-14	-35
4	Swaziland	191	232	338	264	2,2	3,0	19	22
5	Namibia
6	Zimbabwe	2 797	4 722	399	438	1,5	1,4	28	24
7	Botswana	384	549	426	387	2,1	4,7	32	55
8	Lesotho
9	Angola	937	931	133	89	..	7,0	-722	-2 576
10	Zambia	1 685	1 296	294	149	1,3	1,8	32	31
11	Tanzania	1 023	975	55	34	..	4,5	92	83
12	DRC	1 487	1 902	55	45	4,4	..	1	1
13	Malawi	334	370	54	39	3,2	3,4	70	59
14	Mozambique	1 123	619	93	40	1,4	3,3	-15	74
SADC		70 881	99 144	611	888	2,0	2,6	-15,8	-48,7

a. Data are omitted for countries delivering less than 20% of household energy from fuelwood.
b. Estimated real GDP (at 1987 prices) divided by kilograms of oil equivalent of commercial energy.

Selected Definitions

Administrators and managers Includes legislators, senior government administrators, traditional chiefs and heads of villages and administrators of special interest organizations. It also includes corporate managers such as chief executives and general managers as well as specialized managers and managing supervisors, according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1968).

Births attended by trained health personnel The percentage of births attended by physicians, nurses, midwives, trained primary health care workers or trained traditional births' attendants.

Budget surplus/deficit (overall surplus/deficit) Central government current and capital revenue and official grants received, less expenditure and net government lending.

Central government expenditures

Expenditures, both current and capital, by all government offices, departments, establishments and other bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central authority of a country.

Children reaching grade 5 Percentage of children starting primary school who eventually attain grade 5 (grade 4 if the duration of primary school is four years). The estimate is based on the Reconstructed Cohort Method, which uses data on enrolment and repeaters for two consecutive years.

Cigarette consumption per adult Estimated by the World Health Organization (WHO) according to this formula: the sum of production and imports minus exports divided by the population aged 15 years and older. This measure of apparent consumption has been adjusted for consumption of bidis and rolled tobacco as well as smuggling, but not for stocks kept by the trade.

CO₂ emissions Anthropogenic (human originated) carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the production of cement. Emissions are calculated from data on the consumption of solid fuels, liquid fuels, gaseous fuels, and flaring. Combustion of different fuels releases CO₂ at different rates. For the same level of energy consumption, burning oil releases about 1,5 times the amount of CO₂ released by burning natural gas; coal consumption releases about twice the CO₂ of natural gas. During cement manufacturing cement is calcined to produce calcium oxide. In the process 0,498 metric ton of CO₂ is released for each ton of cement production.

Commercial energy Commercial forms of primary energy – petroleum (crude oil, natural gas liquids and oil from non-conventional sources), natural gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite and other derived fuels) and primary electricity (nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal and other) – all converted into oil equivalents.

Commercial energy use Refers to domestic primary commercial energy supply, and is calculated as indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and international marine bunkers.

Contraceptive prevalence rate The percentage of married women of child-bearing age who are using, or whose husbands are using, any form of contraception, whether modern or traditional.

Crude birth rate Annual number of births per 1 000 population.

Crude death rate Annual number of deaths per 1 000 population.

Current account balance The difference between (a) exports of goods and services (factor and non-factor) as well as inflows of unrequited transfers exclusive of foreign aid and (b) imports of goods and services as well as all unrequited transfers to the rest of the world.

Daily calorie supply per capita The calorie equivalent of the net food supplies in a country divided by the population, per day.

Debt service The sum of principal repayments and interest payments on total external debt.

Defence expenditure All expenditure, whether by defence or other departments, on the maintenance of military forces, including the purchase of military supplies and equipment, construction, recruitment, training and military aid programmes.

Deforestation The permanent clearing of forestlands for shifting cultivation, permanent agriculture or settlements; it does not include other alterations such as selective logging.

Dependency ratio The ratio of the population defined as dependent – those under 15 and over 64 – to the working-age population, aged 15–64.

Disability As defined by the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH) issued by the World Health Organization (WHO), disability is a restriction or lack of ability (resulting from impairment) to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being. Impairment is defined as any loss of psychological, physiological or anatomical structure and function. The World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons monitors the implementation of national action to enhance the socio-economic opportunities and integration of disabled persons.

Disbursement The release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or services for, a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources or of goods or services, valued at the cost to the donor. For activities carried out in donor countries, such as training, administration or public awareness programmes, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred to the service provider or the recipient. They may be recorded as gross (the total amount disbursed over a given accounting period) or net (less any repayments of loan principal during the same period).

Doctors Refers to physicians and includes all graduates of any faculty or school of medicine in any medical field (including practice, teaching, administration and research).

Economically active population All men or women who supply labour for the production of economic goods and services, as defined by the UN System of National Accounts, during a specified time period. According to this system, the production of economic goods and services should include all production and processing of primary products (whether for the market, for barter or for own-consumption), the production of all other goods and services for the market and, in the case of households that produce such goods and services for market, the corresponding production for own-consumption.

Education expenditure Expenditure on the provision, management, inspection and support of pre-primary, primary and secondary schools, universities and colleges,

vocational, technical and other training institutions, and general administration and subsidiary services.

Employees Includes regular employees, working proprietors, active business partners and unpaid family workers, but excludes homemakers.

Enrolment ratio (gross and net) The gross enrolment ratio is the number of students enrolled in a level of education – whether or not they belong in the relevant age group for that level – as a percentage of the population in the relevant age group for that level. The net enrolment ratio is the number of students enrolled in a level of education who belong in the relevant age group, as a percentage of the population in that age group.

Exports of goods and services The value of all goods and non-factor services provided to the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel and other non-factor services.

Fertility rate (total) The average number of children that would be born live to a woman during her lifetime, if she were to bear children at each age in accord with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.

Food aid in cereals Cereals provided by donor countries and international organizations, including the World Food Programme and the International Wheat Council, as reported for that particular crop year. Cereals include wheat, flour, bulgur, rice, coarse grain and the cereal components of blended foods.

Food production per capita index The average annual quantity of food produced per capita in relation to that produced in the indexed year. Food comprises nuts, pulses, fruit, cereals, vegetables, sugar cane, sugar beets, starchy roots, edible oils, livestock and livestock products.

Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditures) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of zero represents perfect equality while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.

Government consumption Includes all current expenditure for purchases of goods and services by all levels of government. Capital expenditure on national defence and security is regarded as consumption expenditure.

Gross domestic investment Outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories.

Gross domestic product (GDP) The total output of goods and services for final use produced by an economy, by both residents and non-residents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. It does not include deductions for depreciation of physical capital or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Gross national product (GNP) Comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labour and capital), less similar payments made to non-residents who contribute to the domestic economy.

Gross national product (GNP) per capita growth rates Annual GNP per capita is expressed in current US dollars, and GNP per capita growth rates are average annual growth rates computed by fitting trend lines to the logarithmic values of GNP per capita at constant market prices for each year in the period.

Health expenditure Public expenditure on health comprises the expenditure, both current and capital, by all government offices, departments, establishments and other bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central authority of a country on hospitals, clinics and maternity and dental centres with a major medical component; on national health and medical insurance schemes; and on family planning and preventive care. The data on health expenditure are not comparable across countries. In many economies private health services are substantial; in others public services represent the major component of total expenditure but may be financed by lower levels of government. Caution should therefore be exercised in using the data for cross-country comparisons.

Health services access The percentage of the population that can reach appropriate local health services on foot or by local means of transport in no more than one hour.

Immunized The average vaccination coverage of children under one year of age for the antigens used in the Universal Child Immunization (UCI) Programme.

Income share The distribution of income or expenditure (or share of expenditure) accruing to percentile groups of households ranked by total household income, by per capita income or by expenditure. Shares of population quintiles and the top decile in total income or consumption expenditure are used in calculating income shares. The data sets for countries are drawn mostly from nationally representative household surveys conducted in different years during 1978–92. Data for the high-income OECD economies are based on information from the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), the Luxembourg Income Study and the OECD. Data should be interpreted with caution owing to differences between income studies in the use of income and consumption expenditure to estimate living standards.

Infant mortality rate The annual number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1 000 live births. More specifically, the probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age times 1 000.

Inflation rate Measured by the growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator for each of the periods shown. The GDP deflator is first calculated by dividing, for each year of the period, the value of GDP at current values by the value of GDP at constant values, both in national currency. This measure of inflation, like others, has limitations, but it is used because it shows annual price movements for all goods and services produced in an economy.

International reserves (gross) Holdings of monetary gold, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the reserve positions of members in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities expressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods and services these could pay for at the current level of imports.

Labour force: See *Economically active population*

Life expectancy at birth The number of years a new born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life.

Literacy rate (adult) The percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.

Low-birth-weight infants The percentage of babies born weighing less than 2,5 grams.

Mangroves Part of the coastal ecosystems that line a quarter of the world's tropical coast lines and provide important nursery areas and habitats for fish and shellfish species. Human activities contributing to the loss and degradation of mangrove habitat include

over harvesting, land clearing, mining, pollution, damming of rivers and conversion to aquaculture ponds.

Maternal mortality rate The annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100 000 live births. According to the Tenth International Classification of Diseases, a maternal death is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and the site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management, but not from accidental or incidental causes. This complicated definition and the relative infrequency of maternal deaths in a short period (such as one or two years), except in a very large population samples, led to misclassification and underreporting in many countries. To address this problem, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) developed a new set of estimates for 1990 that adjusted available data for underreporting and miscalculation and included a model to predict values for countries with no reliable national data. These estimates should be seen as a recalculation of the previous (1991) revision rather than as indicative of trends since then. They cannot be used to monitor trends on a year-to-year basis, but provide a baseline estimate against which it will be possible to assess progress by 2003.

Military expenditure: See Defence expenditure

Multilateral official development assistance (ODA) Funds contributed in the form of ODA to an international institution with governmental membership that conducts all or a significant part of its activities in favour of development and aid recipient countries. A contribution by a donor to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency. ODA received by aid recipient countries is considered multilateral if it comes from multilateral agencies such as multilateral development banks (the World Bank, regional development banks), UN agencies and regional groupings (certain European Union and Arab agencies).

Nurses All persons who have completed a programme of basic nursing education and are qualified and registered or authorized by the country to provide responsible and competent service for the promotion of health, prevention of illness, care of the sick and rehabilitation.

Occupation The classification of occupations brings together individuals doing similar work, irrespective of where the work is performed. Most countries have supplied data on the basis of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The actual content of occupational groups may differ from one country to another owing to variations in definitions and methods of data collection.

Official development assistance (ODA) Grants or loans to countries and territories on Part I of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) that are undertaken by the official sector, with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective – and at concessional financial terms (if a loan, at least 25% grant element). Figures for total net ODA disbursed are based on OECD data for DAC member countries, multilateral organizations and Arab states.

Oral rehydration therapy use rate The percentage of all cases of diarrhoea in children under age five treated with oral rehydration salts or an appropriate household solution.

Primary education Education at the first level (International Standard Classification of Education – ISCED – level I), the main function of which is to provide the basic elements of education, such as elementary schools.

Private consumption The market value of all goods and services, including durable products (such as cars, washing machines and home computers), purchased or received

as income in kind by households and non-profit institutions. It excludes purchases of dwellings but includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings.

Pupil teacher ratio Number of pupils per teacher.

Professional and technical workers Physical scientists and related technicians, architects, engineers and related technicians, aircraft and ship's officers, life scientists and related technicians, medical, dental, veterinary and related workers, statisticians, mathematicians, systems analysts and related technicians, economists, accountants, jurists, teachers, workers in religion, authors, journalists and related writers, sculptors, painters, photographers and related creative artists, composers and performing artists, athletes, sports people and related workers, and professional, technical and related workers not elsewhere classified, according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1968).

Purchasing power parity (PPP\$) The purchasing power of a country's currency: the number of units of that currency required to purchase the same representative basket of goods and services (or a similar basket of goods and services) that a US dollar (the reference currency) would buy in the United States. Purchasing power parity could also be expressed in other national currencies or in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

Quasi-Money equals the sum of time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than central government.

Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) The GDP per capita of a country converted into US dollars on the basis of the purchasing power parity of the country's currency.

Reforestation The establishment of plantations for industrial and non-industrial uses; it does not, in general, include regeneration of old tree crops, although some countries may report regeneration as reforestation.

Refugees According to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, refugees are persons who – owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion – are outside their country of nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of their former habitual residence, are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugees also include selected groups of internally displaced persons, returnees and others of concern to or assisted by the UNHCR.

Safe water access The percentage of the population with reasonable access to safe water supply, including treated surface water or untreated but uncontaminated water such as that from springs, sanitary wells and protected boreholes.

Sanitation access The percentage of the population with reasonable access to sanitary means of excreta and waste disposal, including outdoor latrines and composting.

Scientists and technicians Scientists refers to scientists and engineers with scientific or technological training (usually completion of third level education) in any field of science who are engaged in professional work in research and development activities, including administrators and other high-level personnel who direct the execution of research and development activities. Technicians refers to persons engaged in scientific research and development activities who have received vocational or technical training for at least three years after the first stage of secondary level education.

Secondary education Education at the second level (International Standard Classification of Education – ISCED – Level 2 and 3), based on at least four years of

previous instruction at the first level and providing general or specialised training school, secondary school, high school, teacher training school at this level and vocational or technical school.

Tax revenue Compulsory, unrequited, non-repayable receipts for public purposes –including interest collected on tax arrears and penalties collected for non-payment of late payment of taxes – shown net of refunds and other corrective transactions.

Terms of trade The ratio of a country's index of average export prices to its index of average import prices.

Tertiary education Education at the last level (International Standard Classification of Education – ISCED – level 5, 6 and 7), such as universities, teachers colleges and higher professional schools – requiring as a minimum condition of admission the successful completion of education at the second level or evidence of the attainment of an equivalent level knowledge.

Total external debt The sum of public, publicly guaranteed and private non-guaranteed long-term external obligations, short-term debt use of IMF credit. The data on the debt are from the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System, supplemented by the World Bank estimates. The system is concerned solely with developing economies and does not collect data on external debt for other groups of borrowers or from economies that are not members of the World Bank. Dollar figures for debt are in US dollars converted at official exchange rates.

Traditional fuels Includes fuelwood, charcoal, biogasses and animal and vegetable waste.

Under-five mortality rate The annual number of deaths of children under age five per 1 000 live births averaged over the previous five years. More specifically, the probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1 000 live births.

Underweight (moderate and severe child malnutrition) The percentage of children under age five who are below minus two standard deviations from the median birth-weight for age of the reference population.

Unemployment All persons above specified age who are not in paid employment or self-employed, but are available and have taken specific steps to seek paid employment or self-employment.

Urban population Percentage of the population living in the urban areas as defined according to the national definition used in the most recent population census.

Water resources, internal renewable The average annual flow of rivers and aquifers generated from endogenous precipitation.

Water withdrawals Includes those from non-renewable aquifers and desalting plants but does not include losses from evaporation.

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