Hunger Revisited: Entitlement Removal and State-Induced Famine in Zimbabwe

Connor Cavanagh

On 9 November 2008, Morgan Tsvangirai—the leader of Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change—warned that "a million Zimbabweans could starve to death in a year" as a result of deteriorating food security and political deadlock (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2008). The fact that endemic hunger now prevails in a country that once served as the "granary" of southern Africa defies the logic of most traditional famine analyses (Chattopadhyay, 2000, p. 307). Many past examinations of endemic hunger in sub-Saharan Africa have relied on the Malthusian concept of Food Availability Decline (FAD), which focuses on demographic trends and technical failures in food production (Baro & Deubel, 2006). More recently, Amartya Sen's (1976) concept of Food Entitlement Decline (FED) has been advanced as an alternative to Malthusian theories in order to explain famine in situations of food surplus. However, neither theory examines the possibility that states can intentionally create and maintain endemic hunger among certain groups for political or socioeconomic reasons. When famine is state-induced, it can be seen as a form of "structural violence," which is defined as the "physical and psychological harm that results from exploitative and unjust social, political, and economic systems" (Gilman, 1983, p. 8). In the context of Zimbabwe, structural violence is embodied by the state-sanctioned removal of both individual and group "entitlements" to food.

In order to expose the presence of structural violence in Zimbabwe I will analyze inconsistencies between food production and consumption, the historical foundations of current land disputes, and the contemporary politics of state-run food distribution in the country. I will demonstrate that conditions of famine in Zimbabwe have been artificially maintained by the Zimbabwean African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party in order to suppress political dissent and to coerce the population into a relationship of food-dependence with the state. As a corollary, I suggest that the concept of "faminocide," defined as actions which create or aid in the creation of famine (Marcus, 2003, p. 262), should be codified into international law in order to provide a legal framework for the prosecution of those who are found guilty of committing faminocide.

Four critical points inform the framework in which I deliver this argument. First, I challenge the Malthusian concept of Food Availability Decline (FAD) in the Zimbabwean context, which attributes food insecurity to the presence of a rapidly growing population amidst a stagnant or declining agricultural sector (Woodhouse, 1989; Baro & Duebel, 2006; Edkins, 2002). According to this perspective, food availability declines in accordance with population growth and results in diminished food consumption per capita. In a traditional FAD analysis, famine will become inevitable if population growth exceeds agricultural growth. Neo-Malthusian FAD analyses further note the "compounded impacts" which

emerge when several demographic and environmental conditions conspire to create "super-synergized effects" of disastrous proportions (Kent & Myers, 2001, p. 55). Such a synergy could involve environmental natural disasters such as drought or flooding, as well as demographic processes such as rapid population growth. In following such a neo-Malthusian tradition, the World Food Programme (WFP) has recently suggested that chronic food shortages in Zimbabwe are mainly a consequence of irregular weather patterns, the HIV pandemic, and hyperinflation (World Food Programme [WFP], 2008). Although these factors certainly contribute to food insecurity, the WFP's Malthusian-style analysis ignored deliberate government failures to respond to these crises. The two central problems with both Malthusian and neo-Malthusian analyses, therefore, are that they fail to explain endemic hunger under conditions of food surplus or relative agro-climactic stability, and that they largely view hunger as a political and ahistorical phenomenon.

Secondly, I will utilize Amartya Sen's (1980) definition of famine, which identifies starvation as a person's inability to utilize his or her entitlements to food. This is in contrast with a Malthusian understanding of famine, which explains starvation as the direct result of a food shortage per capita. Sen's definition implies that famine is not a technical food production failure; rather, it is the manifestation of a breakdown in the relationship of exchange between consumers and food producers. In other words, famine occurs when consumers lose (or as I suggest, when they are deprived of) the entitlements that they use to procure food from those who produce or distribute it. Such entitlements include: direct production (subsistence agriculture), trade, wage labour, and "inheritance or transfer" of economic resources (Baro & Duebel, 2006, p. 524).

Thirdly, this paper extends Sen's (1980) entitlement theory. While it is useful for examining the causes of famine in a situation of food surplus, Sen's analysis as a whole is largely apolitical. I assert that the cause of famine in a Sensian context is *still* a technical failure in food distribution, although it is economic rather than environmental or demographic in nature. Sen essentially sees the collapse of food entitlements as a rather "benign" occurrence and does not "consider the possibility that famines could be a *product* of the social or economic system rather than a consequence of its *failure*" (Edkins, 2002, p. 13, emphasis in original). In effect, Sen's victim-oriented famine analysis fails to uncover a social or political impetus for the facilitation of "entitlement removal." I therefore take the position that it is necessary to extend Sen's entitlement theory in order to reframe it within a perpetrator-oriented rather than victim-oriented analysis. This extension illuminates the political and social motivations for famine, and analyzes them as the outgrowth of sociopolitical processes. As such, it challenges the traditional view of famine as an ahistorical, depoliticized and technical failure, and points to the existence of a category of crimes that can be labeled as "faminogenic." A faminogenic crime, therefore, is one that has caused mass destitution or mortality through the systematic and deliberate removal of entitlements to food (Marcus, 2003). Thus, a perpetrator-oriented analysis of famine would serve to identify individuals or groups responsible for committing faminocide.

Finally, such a radical interpretation of entitlement theory does not assume that formal socio-political violence, such as civil war, is a necessary precondition for faminocide. Although over half of the most devastating sub-Saharan African famines in the twentieth century involved some sort of violent conflict, there are a number of cases in which violence is manifested more subtly (Baro & Deubel, 2006). Famines that involve violent conflict are some of the most devastating in terms of casualties (Baro & Duebel, 2006), but intense social or political struggles do not always translate into

physical political violence, and the absence of direct violence unfortunately does not equal the absence of structural violence in the form of famine facilitation—it just makes such violence harder to detect. Examples abound of famine co-occurring with a food surplus, the production of food for mass export, or environmental conditions which are agro-climactically favourable for the production of food (Sen, 1980; Baro & Duebel, 2006). These co-occurrences are indicators of structural violence.

Zimbabwe is a suitable focus for an extended entitlement analysis because it is not currently experiencing formal civil war, and because the presence of endemic hunger in the country co-exists with clearly evident structural violence. In an observation that is particularly relevant to the paradoxical existence of food insecurity in Zimbabwe, Galtung and Hoivik (1971) note that structural violence is embodied by the processes that produce a "difference between optimal life expectancy and the actual life expectancy" (p. 74). Moreover, Paul Farmer (2004) notes that "the concept of structural violence is intended to study the social machinery of oppression" (p. 307). This paper examines the "social machinery" responsible for the removal of food entitlements in Zimbabwe. Food production and universal access to food commodities are necessary preconditions for an optimal life expectancy, and the fact that they have been neutralized in Zimbabwe suggests that structural violence in the form of state-sponsored entitlement removal is restricting the access of many Zimbabweans to food.

Ironically, Zimbabwe's natural agro-climactic conditions predispose it to effective food production (Keyzer, Sonneveld, & Voortman, 2003; Sanchez, 2002; Chattopadhyay, 2000). It is among the most ideal sub-Saharan geographical locations for agriculture, because the majority of the country enjoys an average growing season of around 150-210 days and an optimal combination of environmental stability and fertile soils, which support the cultivation of a diverse variety of crops (Keyzer et al., 2003). As such, Zimbabwe is considered to be one of the countries that have "the potential of becoming the granary of the African continent" (Keyzer et al., 2003, p. 369). It has even been suggested that high-tech "Green Revolution" methods of yield increase are unnecessary to maintain food security in an agro-climactically favourable country such as Zimbabwe (Sanchez, 2003, p. 2019).

Neo-Malthusian analyses are likewise unable to explain the paradoxical occurrence of famine in Zimbabwe. Although climatic shocks (such as drought and flooding), biosocial disasters (such as the HIV pandemic), and hyperinflation have contributed to food insecurity in the country, government failures to respond to these crises have essentially turned a relatively minor food shortage into a full-blown famine. On several occasions President Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF regime has refused to accept food aid that would have alleviated food shortages, or has even diverted such aid to other countries in the region (Human Rights Watch [HR Watch], 2003, 2004). Moreover, the government has also prevented the distribution of state-owned food aid in ethnic-minority regions such as Matabeleland (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace [CCJP] & Legal Resources Foundation [LRF], 1999). Unfavourable environmental or technical circumstances are therefore not responsible for the presence of endemic hunger in Zimbabwe; rather, I assert that the root causes of artificially-imposed hunger in Zimbabwe lie in the nation's recent history of socio-political conflict.

Farmer (2004) notes that "those who look only to powerful present-day actors to explain misery will fail to see how inequality is structured and legitimated over time" (p. 309). Likewise, any investigation of possible motivations for the facilitation of famine in Zimbabwe would be lacking without acknowledging the lasting implications of British

colonialism. As a colonial power, Britain imposed systems of capitalism and wage-labour on the tribal societies of what is now contemporary Zimbabwe. In the process, capitalism was fused with an ideology of white racial superiority to create a situation in which a "white settler minority class of 4000 commercial farmers with an average of 200 hectares [each] . . . marginalized about 1.5 million peasant families, and other *sub-altern* classes from the access to key resources" (Moyo, 2005, p. 187, emphasis in original). Africans were forced off the most fertile land and onto overcrowded reserves where it was a struggle to produce enough food for mere subsistence. The profound inequality of this racial relationship precipitated a number of land-based revolutionary movements in Zimbabwe, of which the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) emerged as the most significant (Moyo, 2005).

These two groups were divided along ethnic lines: ZANU's support came mainly from the Shona areas of Zimbabwe, whereas ZAPU recruited almost exclusively Ndebele-speaking people (CCJP & LRF, 1999). This ethnic division within the Zimbabwean independence movement would later become the pretext for Robert Mugabe's implementation of faminogenic policies to suppress ethnic dissent. Following a multi-sided civil war between ZANU, ZAPU, and Ian Smith's republican Rhodesian forces, ZANU won the 1980 Rhodesian-Zimbabwean general elections. Shortly afterward, the newly-elected President Mugabe began a campaign of terror to crush any opposition from within the ZAPU movement. In doing so, he created the North Korean trained "5 Brigade," a military force that became known in the Shona vernacular as "*Gukurahundi*" or "the rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains" (CCJP & LRF, 1999, p. 13; Power, 2003, p. 96). Almost immediately after its formation, the 5 Brigade began to "combat malcontents" in regions of Zimbabwe with large Ndebele populations such as Matabeleland (CCJP & LRF, 1999, p. 13). After its official formation in 1983, the 5 Brigade allegedly committed a number of crimes against humanity, including "the mass murder of whole villages, mass rape, and widespread torture" (Howard-Hassman, 2005, p. 502). Ndebele victims were reportedly often "forced to sing Shona songs before being beaten and killed" (Genocide Watch, 2002). However, these examples only show how *direct* violence was used to suppress dissent among the Ndebele population.

Although the 5 Brigade exercised direct violence against minority groups in Zimbabwe, its most powerful weapon was structural violence in the form of artificially imposed famine. Evidence suggests that, in the period between 1984 and 1985, the 5 Brigade forced as many as 400 000 people to the brink of starvation or beyond in the region of Matabeleland alone (CCJP & LRF, 1999). During this period Zimbabwe was experiencing severe drought, but the 5 Brigade actively restricted the distribution of food aid in Ndebele regions of Zimbabwe (CCJP & LRF, 1999). By 1984, regions such as Matabeleland were experiencing "the third consecutive year of drought and people had no food apart from drought relief from donors . . . [however] all drought relief was stopped, and all stores closed" (CCJP & LRF, 1999, p. 14). Structural violence in the form of entitlement removal became a much more useful tool for Mugabe than direct physical violence.

By October of 1987, Mugabe's oppression of the Ndebele groups of Zimbabwe had become sufficiently brutal to coerce ZAPU into a veiled surrender, which came in the form of the 1987 Unity Accord (CCJP & LRF, 1999). The synthesis of ZANU and ZAPU was acknowledged in the renaming of ZANU as the ZANU – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), implying that the merger served the interest of national unity. Officially, the Unity Accord was a mutual reconciliation of ideological differences between the

ZANU and ZAPU parties, but in reality it implied the consolidation of national power under Mugabe, and the suppression of ethnic minority dissent. Without ZAPU, Ndebele Zimbabweans became quite vulnerable to the 5 Brigade's "*Gukurahundi*" campaign, which was designed to crush ethnically based political dissent (Power, 2003, p. 96).

Samantha Power (2003) notes that because "most blacks [in Zimbabwe] remained dispossessed two decades after independence, politics and land became inseparable" (p. 86). Indeed, the vast majority of Zimbabweans now secure food entitlements either directly through subsistence production or through wage labour on a commercial farm (Howard-Hassman, 2005). As a result, the rural classes are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in food entitlement decline (or removal). Furthermore, as this rural peasantry also constitutes the majority in Zimbabwean democracy, the major political parties must co-opt them to some extent in order to ensure victory in national elections. As a result, the government is often forced to buy votes with promises of land reform in an endeavor to diminish the relevance of the opposition's populist rhetoric. According to Mugabe, land reform would correct colonial injustices by redistributing to smallholding peasant farmers the land previously consolidated into huge white-owned agribusinesses (BBC, 2002).

The declining popularity of the ZANU-PF party in the period leading up to the 2002 national elections caused Robert Mugabe to pursue such a populist election campaign. In this case, the familiar rhetoric of land reform was actually implemented, but with an ulterior motive that was again decidedly 'faminogenic' (Howard-Hassman, 2005). Mugabe authorized land invasions of white owned farms by the black peasantry in a supposed attempt to correct the injustices of the colonial era. As noted by Samantha Power in 2003, however, "nearly two-thirds of these [white] farmers had bought their land after independence, and thus held titles issued not by Ian Smith or the British colonial regime but by the Mugabe government" (p. 88). These "land invasions" led to the unemployment of approximately 200 000 farm workers, who together with their families "constituted about a million and a half to two million people" that became destitute (Howard-Hassman, 2005, p. 501).

The new occupants of previously white-owned farms "often had no idea how to farm, or were subsistence peasants not able to produce for market," while any remaining white farmers were "ordered to vacate their farms immediately and were even forbidden to finish cultivating their crops" (Howard-Hassman, 2005, p. 502). As many as 4000 large white-owned farms were shut down as a result of the land reforms, but Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party elite maintained that the ensuing food shortages were mainly the result of "drought" (Cable News Network [CNN], 2002). It also soon became apparent that the land reforms were characterized by rampant corruption and mismanagement, as the best farms were "allocated to Mugabe's affluent comrades, including the police commissioner, the ex-commander of the 5 Brigade, and a Minister already charged with fraud and corruption" (Windrich, 2002, p. 1187).

After the land reforms took place, Mugabe "distributed state-owned food only to his political supporters and withheld it from those who he thought might vote against him in the farcical periodic elections still held in Zimbabwe . . . [he] also refused to permit international agencies to bring food into the country to feed the starving" (Howard-Hassman, 2005, p. 502). Indeed, conditions of food insecurity continued to prevail in the years after the 2002 land reforms, but on May 12, 2004, Mugabe's government declared that Zimbabwe did not "require general food aid from the international community or food imports in 2004-5" (HR Watch, 2004, p. 6). This statement blatantly contradicted several

expert analyses that predicted an imminent food crisis as a result of continually increasing food insecurity in the country (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004; Mathys, 2004; HR Watch, 2004). Theoretically, it could be argued that the food insecurity was simply the consequence of drought and a poorly managed agricultural reform. However, the fact that Mugabe and ZANU-PF actively prevented food aid from reaching certain groups or areas of the country indicates a sociopolitical motive for the perpetuation of hunger. ZANU-PF did not create the drought, but they did capitalize on conditions of fragile food security in order to perpetuate hunger among certain elements of the population. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the land reforms were engineered by ZANU-PF in order to intensify an already existing food deficit. I would concur with Howard-Hassmann (2005) that "the core cause of the food deficit situation in Zimbabwe in the early years of the twenty-first century was clearly the interests and ambitions of Mugabe and his henchmen" (p. 502). The manner in which the ZANU-PF party distributed maize and other food aid between 2002 and 2008 reinforces this point.

ZANU-PF proved successful in winning the 2002 national elections, but the fallout from the land invasions caused untold misery for the majority of Zimbabweans. By October of 2003, "half of Zimbabwe's population of nearly fourteen million was considered food insecure [which means] living in a household that is unable to obtain enough food to meet basic needs" (HR Watch, 2003, p. 5). In response to the rapidly rising levels of food insecurity, Mugabe's government established the Task Force on Maize Distribution, which was supposedly intended to support smallholding farmers during the transitional land reform period until they once again became self-sufficient in the production of food staples. According to Human Rights Watch—one of the only international NGOs which has carefully documented the "politicization" of food aid in Zimbabwe—"the government's grain importation and distribution program is widely criticized for political bias; lack of transparency and accountability; and excessive levels of corruption and mismanagement" (HR Watch, 2003, p. 38). Essentially, maize quickly became another mechanism Mugabe and ZANU-PF could use to buy support and thereby perpetuate the food insecurity they themselves had artificially created.

The official mandate of Mugabe's Task Force on Maize Distribution was to "import maize and sell it domestically at a subsidized price" (HR Watch, 2003, p. 39). The maize was to be sold through local leaders such as chiefs, as well as local shops and wholesalers, and distributed—supposedly—on an equal opportunity basis. The reality, of course, was much different, and the distribution process was marred by violence, intimidation, and corruption (Howard-Hassman, 2005; HR Watch, 2003; Power, 2003). Evidence suggests that large quantities of maize were actually distributed from ZANU-PF party headquarters, where party membership was a prerequisite for the ability to make a purchase (HR Watch, 2003). Zimbabweans who wished to purchase grain from ZANU-PF locations were also forced to sing ethnic-majority Shona songs, to denounce the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and to chant slogans such as "Down with whites!" (Power, 2003, p. 90). Maize shortages therefore enabled Mugabe's ZANU-PF party to humiliate ethnic minority groups, to ensure ZANU-PF support, and to crush dissent within Zimbabwe.

The distribution of maize also indicates that food not only advanced political interests but also promoted the accumulation of private wealth among the ZANU-PF elite. In fact, the government took direct action to ensure that some food shipments never reached the segments of the population that they were intended for (HR Watch, 2003). Some of the maize intended as food aid for famine-stricken regions of Zimbabwe

was actually exported to Malawi, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (HR Watch, 2003). In other cases, food aid was simply seized by various ZANU-PF factions once it entered the country, and sold on the black market at a "hefty profit" (HR Watch, 2003, p. 42). Thus, the surplus value from the sale of food aid was used to fortify the very structures of the ZANU-PF party that were artificially maintaining conditions of food insecurity in the country.

More recently, the 2008 presidential elections in Zimbabwe involved a number of now-familiar themes: violence, intimidation, corruption, and the use of hunger as a political weapon (HR Watch, 2008; International Crisis Group, 2008). Nonetheless, the international community was infused with hope that the elections would be free and fair. Prior to the election, however, Mugabe launched a food-bribing campaign of gargantuan proportions, which concentrated on buying the votes and loyalty of the police, military, and bureaucracy in addition to the rural population (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2007). The results of the election were widely disputed, but first-round results showed that the MDC won by a narrow margin (Economist, 2008). The victory did not deliver its promised hope, and widespread violence ensued in the immediate aftermath of the election, which eventually resulted in the mediation of the two parties by South African President Thabo Mbeki, and the creation of a "coalition government," composed of both ZANU-PF and Tsvangirai's MDC (Economist, 2008, p. 57).

A seemingly unbreakable stalemate has emerged within this coalition government, which has allowed conditions of famine to continue to ravage the Zimbabwean population. These conditions are what caused Morgan Tsvangirai to note that "at least a million Zimbabweans could starve to death in a year because of political deadlock" (BBC, 2008). Despite the deadlock, ZANU-PF is maintaining artificially constructed conditions of food insecurity to accomplish its political goals and maintain its grip on power. The party continues to systematically remove the food entitlements of most Zimbabweans in order to oppress them into total compliance. Although it is clear that Robert Mugabe is responsible for perpetuating conditions of famine in Zimbabwe, how he and ZANU-PF can be held responsible for their faminogenic crimes has yet to be determined.

David Marcus (2003) has suggested an international legal framework for the prosecution of political leaders responsible for faminogenic crimes. He recommends the following two-tier definition of "famine crimes," in which:

> An individual commits a first-degree famine crime by knowingly creating, inflicting, or prolonging conditions that result in or contribute to the starvation of a significant number of people . . . [And/Or] an individual commits a second-degree famine crime by recklessly ignoring evidence that the policies for which he or she bears responsibility for creating, inflicting, or prolonging are leading to the starvation of a significant number of people. (p. 262)

The codification of famine crimes into international law would not only constitute a means with which to prosecute famine-perpetrators, but would also create a value-laden term which could be used to motivate Western governments and international organizations to take anti-famine action. Marcus (2003) contends that if the term faminocide was institutionalized to refer to mass murder through the facilitation of hunger, the international community would no longer be able to "take advantage of the currently scattered state of the law to shield itself from honestly confronting those responsible for mass starvation" (p. 280). Similarities can be drawn with the codification of the concept of genocide into international law: when invoked, it has profoundly affected the responsiveness of NGOs, activist organizations, and other civil society groups to crisis situations.

In examining relationships of food production, food distribution, and land tenancy with an extended entitlement approach, this paper has shown that conditions of famine in Zimbabwe have been both artificially constructed and perpetuated by the state. In the process, it has shown that Malthusian, environmental, and other "technical failure" theories of famine causation do not adequately explain the presence of famine in Zimbabwe. Although certain phenomena such as drought or epidemics may limit a country's capacity to produce food, the neo-Malthusian analyses which emphasize these factors often ignore the role of human agency in transforming a naturally-occurring food shortage into a full-blown famine. The limitations of such theories are explicit in the paper's arguments. Given that such theories do not provide adequate explanation in the context of Zimbabwe, they may likewise fail to do justice in other cases of famine.

Furthermore, an analysis of the political, socioeconomic, and historical foundations of social conflict in Zimbabwe has yielded compelling evidence that Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF party is responsible for the systematic removal of food entitlements. The imposition of such conditions of food entitlement removal can be interpreted as an example of a "faminogenic crime," which has an inherently political or socioeconomic motive (Marcus, 2003, p. 262). Unfortunately, there is little that the international community can do to end endemic hunger in Zimbabwe until the concepts of 'faminocide' and 'faminogenic crimes' are codified in international law. This paper suggests, therefore, that the legal codification of 'faminocide' should be a priority in order to prevent future faminogenic crimes, and to advance the mandate of the international community to combat gross human rights abuses across the globe. To realize this goal there is also a need for academic inquiries which explore state complicity in human rights abuses and provide new theoretical frameworks for delineating such complicity.

References

Baro, M., & Deubel, T. F. (2006). Persistent hunger: Perspectives on vulnerability, famine, and food security in sub-Saharan Africa. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *35*, 521-538.

British Broadcasting Corporation. (2002, March 17). Mugabe pledges rapid land reform. *British Broadcasting Corporation News.* Retrieved February 19, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1877156.stm

British Broadcasting Corporation. (2008, November 9). Tsvangirai 'warns of starvation.' *British Broadcasting Corporation News.* Retrieved November 9, 2008, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7718225.stm

Chattopadhyay, R. (2000). Zimbabwe: Structural adjustment, destitution and food insecurity. *Review of African Political Economy, 27*(84), 307-316.

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace & Legal Resources Foundation. (1999). *Breaking the silence, building true peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988.* Retrieved February 23, 2009 from http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf

Cable News Network. (2002, June 24). New crisis for Zimbabwe farmers. *CNN World News.* Retrieved February 16, 2009, from http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/06/24/zimbabwe.farmers/index.html

The Economist. (2008). They agree to talk, but nobody knows where it will lead. *The Economist, 387*(8590), 56-57.

Edkins, J. (2002). Mass starvations and the limitations of famine theorizing. *IDS Bulletin, 33*(4), 12-18.

Farmer, P. (2004). An anthropology of structural violence. *Current Anthropology, 45*(3), 305-325.

Food and Agriculture Organization. (2004, July 5). *Special report: Zimbabwe.* Retrieved February 23, 2009, from ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/J2650e/J2650e00. pdf

Galtung, J., & Hoivik, T. (1971). Structural and direct violence: A note on operationalization. *Journal of Peace Research, 8*(1), 73-76.

Genocide Watch. (2002, February). Politicide watch: Zimbabwe. *Genocide Watch.* Retrieved on February 16, 2009, from http://www.genocidewatch.org/ zimbabwepoliticidewatch.htm

Gilman, R. (1983). Structural violence. *In Context, 4*, 8-9.

Howard-Hassman, R. E. (2005). Genocide and state-induced famine: Global ethics and western responsibilities for mass atrocities in Africa. *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 4*(3-4), 487-516.

Human Rights Watch. (2003). Not eligible: The politicization of food in Zimbabwe. *Human Rights Watch, 15*(17A), 1-56. Retrieved February 23, 2009, from http:// www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe1003.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2004). The politics of food aid in Zimbabwe. *Human Rights Watch, 12*, 1-17. Retrieved February 23, 2009, from http://www.hrw.org/legacy/ backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe/2004/zimbabwe0804.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2008). "They beat me like a dog": Political persecution of opposition activists and supporters in Zimbabwe. *Human Rights Watch,* August, 1-23. Retrieved March 3, 2009, from http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ reports/zimbabwe0808_1.pdf

International Crisis Group. (2008). Zimbabwe: Prospects from a flawed election. *International Crisis Group Africa Report, 138,* 1-31. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/southern_africa/ 138_ zimbabwe_prospects_from_a_flawed_election.pdf

Kent, J. & Myers, N. (2001). Food and hunger in sub-Saharan Africa. *Environmentalist, 21*(1), 41-69.

Keyzer, M. A., Sonneveld, B. G. J. S., & Voortman, R. L. (2003). African land ecology: Opportunities and constraints for agricultural development. *AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment, 32*(5), 367-373.

Marcus, D. (2003). Famine crimes in international law. *The American Journal of International Law, 97*(2), 245-281.

Mathys, E. (2004). *Community-managed targeting and distribution of food aid: A review of the experience of Save the Children UK in sub-Saharan Africa.* London: Save the Children. Retrieved February 23, 2009, from http://www.savethechildren. uk/en/ docs/Community-managed_targeting_and_distribution_of_food_aid.pdf

Moyo, S. (2005). Land and natural resource redistribution in Zimbabwe: Access, equity, and conflict. *African and Asian Studies, 4*(1-2), 187-223.

Phimister, I., & Raftopoulos, B. (2007). Desperate days in Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy, 34*(113), 573-580.

Power, S. (2003). How to kill a country. *The Atlantic Monthly, 292*(5), 86-100.

Sanchez, P. A. (2002). Soil fertility and hunger in Africa. *Science, New Series, 295*(5562), 2019-2020.

Sen, A. (1976). Famines as failures of exchange entitlements. *Economic and Political Weekly,* August, 1273-1280.

Sen, A. (1980). Famines. *World Development, 8*, 613-621.

Windrich, E. (2002). Then and now: Reflections on how Mugabe rules Zimbabwe. *Third World Quarterly*, *23*(6), 1181-1188.

Woodhouse, P. (1989). From green revolution to food security in sub-Saharan Africa. *Food Policy,* February, 7-12.

World Food Programme. (2008, February). *Protracted relief and recovery operation Zimbabwe 10595.0* (Publication No. WFP/EB.1/2008/9/1). Retrieved February 23, 2009, from http://one.wfp.org/eb/docs/2008/wfp150181~1.pdf