

International Migration Outlook 2013

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Foreword

This publication constitutes the thirty-seventh report of the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration. The report is divided into five chapters plus a statistical annex.

Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of recent trends in international migration flows and migration policies. Chapter 2 takes a close look at the impact of the economic crisis on the employment situation of immigrants and highlights major changes in policies to support the integration of immigrants and their children.

Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to special topics. Chapter 3 provides a first-time comparative analysis of the fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries, using data for all European OECD countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the United States. It also includes a comprehensive overview of the literature and the methodological issues involved in estimating the fiscal impact of migration. Chapter 4 provides an overview of discrimination against immigrants and their children in OECD countries – its measurement, incidence and policy solutions – on the basis of empirical literature and policy practices.

Chapter 5 presents succinct country-specific notes and statistics on developments in international migration movements and policies in OECD countries in recent years. Finally, the Statistical annex includes a broad selection of recent and historical statistics on immigrant flows, foreign and foreign-born populations and naturalisations.

This year's edition of the OECD International Migration Outlook is the joint work of staff of the International Migration Division in the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Chapters 1, 2 and 5 are a collective work of the staff of the International Migration Division with contributions from John Salt (University College London, United Kingdom) and Martina Lubyova (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovak Republic) for Chapters 1 and 2 respectively. Chapter 3 was prepared by Thomas Liebig and Jeffrey Mo (Consultant to the OECD). Chapter 4 was prepared by Anthony Heath (University of Oxford, United Kingdom), Thomas Liebig and Patrick Simon (Institut national d'études démographiques, France). Jean-Christophe Dumont edited the report. Research assistance and statistical work were carried out by Véronique Gindrey and Philippe Hervé. Editorial assistance was provided by Sylviane Yvron.

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Editorial

The current situation of high and persistent unemployment in many OECD countries, combined with ageing populations and workforces, has brought back the debate over immigration policy. One prominent issue is the extent to which immigrants may rely on social benefits and public services. Beliefs about this net fiscal contribution of immigrants – how much they pay in taxes in comparison to what they receive in support – are among the main elements shaping public opinion on migration.

According to recent opinion polls, about 50% of citizens in European countries and in Canada believe that immigrants contribute less in taxes than they receive in health and welfare services and that they are a big burden on the public purse and are supported by higher taxes paid by native-born citizens. Similar surveys for the United States show an even higher figure. What accounts for this? One reason is that past immigration was often of low-educated workers, who were not always able to find or maintain their place in the labour market as jobs changed and economies modernised. Although this is much less the case today, old beliefs tend to linger, reinforced in part by the difficulties some children of immigrants have had in schools and the labour market. A second reason is that maintaining stereotypes is the objective of certain groups whose interest is more in making political hay than in proposing concrete solutions for real economic problems. A third reason is that people often forget that a significant part of public expenditure is for public goods such as national defence, whose cost does not increase with the number of immigrants.

Still, in quite a few OECD countries, there is ongoing debate about immigration and the welfare state. There are fears that immigration may put further pressure on the public purse at a time when fiscal consolidation is at the forefront of policy agendas. These fears go well beyond anti-immigrant parties and risk jeopardising efforts to adapt migration policies to the new economic and demographic challenges that many OECD countries will have to face over the coming decades. In this context, it is critical to get a better understanding of the fiscal impact of migration and to confront public perceptions with hard facts.

The OECD has undertaken the first comparative international study of the net fiscal impact of migration, covering a broad range of OECD countries. One benefit of international comparisons is that if the results are all telling more or less the same story, the story is likely to be a true one. The evidence compiled in this publication addresses a number of preconceived ideas. Overall, it shows that the fiscal impact of immigration is close to zero on average over the OECD. It tends to be more negative in countries where the immigrant share of the population receiving pensions is large but is generally proportional to the share of immigrants in the total population. The current impact of the cumulative waves of migration that arrived over the past fifty years is just not that large, whether on the positive or the negative side. In other words, migration represents neither a significant gain nor drain for the public purse. Immigrants are pretty much like the rest of the population in this respect.

But there is more. One can be confident that, with the growing focus on skilled labour migration during the past two decades, recent immigrants are more likely to be net fiscal contributors than preceding waves of immigrants. It is the policies of the past that have contributed to produce less favourable results in certain countries and for certain groups, not necessarily policies today. And certainly not those policies that aim to bring in labour migrants with the needed skills for jobs for which there are not enough domestic candidates.

What else do the results show?

Firstly, although tertiary educated immigrants make a larger net fiscal contribution than low-skilled immigrants, the latter tend to fare better compared with the native-born of the same skill level. This is an important point. Most OECD countries have facilitated migration of highly skilled individuals, but continue to maintain restrictions on recruitments into jobs requiring lower skills, notably because of concerns over possible adverse effects on demand for social services. Our results, however, show that these fears are mainly unfounded, especially as candidates for recruitment for these jobs will be better educated than those of the past and their performance can be expected to compare more favourably with that of resident persons.

Secondly, the age profile of immigrants is one of the main factors explaining cross-country differences in immigrants' net fiscal position. The younger adult immigrants arrive, the more positive their direct fiscal contribution. Why is this the case? Essentially because those who come sooner, all things being equal, have longer working lives during which their net fiscal contribution is usually positive, and also because younger migrants have a greater incentive to invest in education and training, in particular in the host-country language. This implies giving more weight to younger ages in selecting labour migrants. It also means encouraging immigrants to come with their families, so that their children do not fall too far behind in joining educational systems that are often more demanding than the ones they left behind.

Thirdly, it appears that, when immigrants have a less favorable net fiscal position than the native-born, this is not driven by a greater dependence on social benefits, but rather by the fact that with lower wages on average, immigrants tend to contribute less. Most immigrants do not come for social benefits, they come to find work and to improve their lives and those of their families. Employment is a better way to do this than the dole.

Indeed, and lastly, employment appears as the single most important determinant of migrants' net fiscal contribution, especially in generous welfare states. Raising immigrants' employment rate to that of the native-born would result in substantial fiscal gains, notably in European OECD countries. Integration and anti-discrimination policies, to the extent that they can contribute to closing the employment gap between natives and immigrants, can be highly cost effective.

International migration is part of the trends that will continue to shape not only global realities but also national strategies. If the results described above tell us anything, they tell us that more immigration does not necessarily mean more public debt. If the policies of the past fifty years have managed to produce a net fiscal impact that is almost neutral, a world of labour migration that is better managed in accordance with labour market needs, with due attention to integration, can only bring benefits.

Executive summary

Main trends

Immigration flows are rising in OECD countries, but remain well below pre-crisis levels. In 2011, total permanent immigration rose overall in OECD countries from 2010, but was still below four million. Preliminary 2012 data suggest a further increase. Temporary labour migration was essentially stagnant relative to 2010, at just below two million entries. OECD countries continue to attract students from around the world, with the number of international students in 2010 up 6% on 2009.

India and China continue to be important origin countries for immigration into OECD countries, but Poland and Romania appear this year among the top three (after China) because of increased intra-EU mobility. Free circulation within European OECD countries rose in 2011 and is now four times more common in relative terms in the region than migration from elsewhere. Outflows from countries most affected by the crisis, particularly southern European ones, have also accelerated, by 45% from 2009 to 2011.

In 2011, the number of persons seeking asylum in OECD countries rose by more than one-fifth, exceeding 400 000 for the first time since 2003. This trend is confirmed by preliminary 2012 data. The top destination countries are the United States, France and Germany. Largely due to the “Arab Spring”, Italy emerged as the fourth largest receiving country in 2011.

Many governments have become more restrictive towards foreign recruitment, seeking to protect their workforces in face of rising unemployment. However, countries have also introduced measures to ease the situation for foreign workers who have lost their jobs, mainly by allowing them to stay and search for work. More countries are adopting point-based systems, because of the flexibility they provide in the selection of high-skilled candidates. Programmes to attract investors and entrepreneurs are also receiving attention.

Migrants' labour market situation has worsened over the past years, both in terms of levels and compared with the native-born. On average, the unemployment rate of the foreign-born has increased by 5 percentage points between 2008 and 2012, compared with 3 percentage points for the native-born. Long-term unemployment of migrants is becoming a serious challenge in many OECD countries. In 2012, almost one out of two unemployed migrants had been looking for a job for over a year.

Immigrant youth and the low-skilled have been particularly affected by the crisis, but women and high-skilled migrants less so. The impact was strongest on migrants from Latin America and North Africa. Migrants from North Africa in Europe, for example, faced a record high unemployment of 27% in 2012.

The emphasis on and public funds devoted to integration policies vary substantially across countries, despite a common need to support migrants' labour market integration in order to avoid possible long-lasting effects notably on young migrants and native-born children of immigrants. Some countries continued to invest significant public resources in integration initiatives, while others cut back substantially due to the economic recession and fiscal constraints.

The fiscal impact of immigration

The question whether immigrants are net contributors to or a net drain on public finances is widely debated. Estimates suggest their impact is small, generally not exceeding 0.5% of GDP in either positive or negative terms. However, immigrants usually have a less favourable net fiscal position than the native-born, largely because they tend to pay less in taxes and social security contributions and not because of a higher dependence on social benefits.

Immigrants' age profile is an important factor in explaining cross-country differences in immigrants' net fiscal position, and age at arrival is a key element in determining the net present value of immigrants' discounted future net direct fiscal contributions. Despite this, in most migration systems for the selection of labour migrants, age plays a relatively minor role compared with other factors such as work experience, language and education. More generally, differences in the composition of the migrant population by migration category (labour, family, humanitarian) account for a large part of the cross-country variation of migrants' fiscal position relative to that of the native-born.

Employment is the single most important determinant of migrants' net fiscal contribution, particularly in generous welfare states. Raising immigrants' employment rate to that of the native-born would entail substantial fiscal benefits for many European OECD economies.

Discrimination against immigrants

Discrimination against migrants and their children in the labour market and society can damage social cohesion and reduce incentives to invest in education. It can also represent an economic loss to the host country. Measuring discrimination is difficult, but studies suggest that, in order to get invited to a job interview, it is not uncommon for immigrants and their children to have to send more than twice as many applications as persons without a migration background who have otherwise equivalent CVs. Indeed, the biggest impact of discrimination seems to be in the hiring process, although it can also affect subsequent career advancement and wages.

Most OECD countries have taken measures to combat discrimination, although scale and scope vary widely. Most common are legal remedies. A number of OECD countries have also applied "affirmative action"-type policies based on targets and quotas as well as instruments such as anonymous CVs. The evidence suggests that these can effectively combat discrimination, if carefully designed. Diversity policy instruments have also been tested in a number of OECD countries. It is difficult to assess their effectiveness, since it is generally the employers most interested in diversity who participate. Awareness raising seems particularly important to overcome negative stereotypes, which seem to be a key driver of discriminatory behaviour.

Key figures

- Immigration accounted for 40% of total population growth in the OECD area over the period 2001-11.
- Permanent immigration to OECD countries increased 2% in 2011. Preliminary figures show a similar increase in 2012.
- Immigration in the context of free movement in Europe has rebounded by 15% in 2011 after a decline of almost 40% during the crisis (2007-10).
- In Europe, fewer than one out of two immigrant workers are recruited from abroad.
- The number of international students is constantly increasing and exceeded 2.6 million in 2010.
- The share of Asian migrants in migration flows to OECD countries continues to increase, reaching 36% in 2011. This places Asia close behind Europe as a continent of origin.
- The number of asylum seekers in OECD countries increased by more than 20% in 2011 and about 7% in 2012.
- Ten new countries have implemented the EU Directive on the EU Blue Card in 2012; it is now issued by all signatory countries.
- In 2011 and 2012, seven OECD countries modified their system to attract international graduate students into their labour markets.
- On average in OECD countries, immigrants have been more affected than the native-born by rising unemployment with the immigrant unemployment rate going from 8.1% in 2008 to 12.9% in 2012 against a rise from 5.4% to 8.7% for the native-born.
- Between 2008 and 2012, the proportion of immigrants among those unemployed for over a year rose from 31% to 44% in OECD countries.

Chapter 1

Recent developments in international migration movements and policies

The following chapter gives a broad overview of recent developments in international migration movements in OECD countries. It describes permanent immigration flows and changes in status in 2011, before describing the situation with respect to departures. More detail is provided on certain categories of migration, in particular temporary labour migration, international students and asylum seekers. An analysis by origin follows, as well as a picture of the evolution of the foreign-born population over the decade. Two special topics close the overview section, one dealing with labour migrants and the incidence of these who arrive with jobs, the second with family migration of married persons. The policy section that follows describes developments in policies that regulate the entry and stay of foreign nationals in OECD countries. The crisis has had a restrictive effect on labour migration in general, but with attention focused on attracting migrants perceived as bringing benefits to the destination country, such as investors and entrepreneurs, graduating international students and EU Blue Card migration.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Introduction

After a rebound in GDP growth from -3.6% in 2009 to 3.0% in 2010, OECD countries as a whole saw their growth slow down to 1.8% in 2011. However, only a few countries (Greece, Portugal and Japan) actually witnessed a decline in economic output over the year. Notwithstanding the slowdown in output growth, employment grew faster in 2011 (+1.0%) than in 2010 (+0.3%), with only Greece, Portugal, and Spain plus Denmark, Japan and Slovenia showing declines in the level of employment. The improving employment climate did little to dent the level of unemployment, however, which only declined by 0.3 percentage points for the OECD as a whole to 8.0%. This was the consequence of workers who had left the labour force re-entering with what seemed like the prospect of brighter economic conditions. These did not materialise, however, as the recurring debt crisis in the European Union (EU) had a negative impact on employer investment decisions and on consumer confidence.

The economic environment thus was not especially conducive to a strong renewal of labour migration movements in 2011, and the statistics for that year, as will be seen, bear this out. Nonetheless, demographic developments are expected to affect prospects for migration during the current decade, which is witnessing the retirement of the large cohorts of baby-boomers born after World War II and the entry of smaller youth cohorts into the workforce.

This chapter gives a general overview of trends in international migration movements in 2011 and of recent developments in migration policies. It covers total permanent movements into OECD countries, entries by category, temporary labour migration, outflows, asylum movements and movements by country of origin. The second part deals with policies which affect entry and stay in destination countries, in particular with respect to labour migrants, investors and entrepreneurs, international graduates, EU skilled migrants and unauthorised migrants.

Main findings

- Total permanent immigration increased by about 2% overall in OECD countries in 2011 relative to 2010, with the migration picture being a mixed one at the country level. About half of OECD countries showed increases, with Austria and Germany being among the countries which progressed the most. Free circulation within the European Union increased by 15%. Preliminary data for 2012 suggest an increase of 1% overall for the OECD zone compared to 2011.
- Outflows of nationals from the countries most affected by the crisis, in particular the countries of southern Europe, are accelerating, with movements having risen by 45% from 2009 to 2011. Germany and the United Kingdom were the main beneficiaries of these outflows. Preliminary data for 2012 suggest that increases in outflows are continuing.
- Temporary labour migration shows few signs of turning around, with an essentially stagnant picture relative to 2010. Temporary labour migration in the Russian Federation outstrips that for all OECD countries as a whole, almost all of it from Central Asian countries.

- The international migration picture is thus a mixed one, with an increase in immigration, but with flows remaining significantly below pre-recession levels.
- Large countries, China, India and the Philippines in particular, remain important origin countries for immigration into OECD countries. However, movements from OECD countries are also prominent with five of them figuring among the top ten countries of origin. Free circulation within the European Union is about four times more common in relative terms than migration from the rest of the world.
- The foreign-born population represented on average 12.5% of the total population in OECD countries in 2011, an increase of 2.3 percentage points over the past ten years. With demographic developments continuing over the next decades, more and more OECD countries will become similar to countries like Australia and Canada with respect to both the prevalence and diversity of their immigrant populations.
- Scarcely a quarter of married migrants from non-EU countries arrive with their families when they migrate to an EU country. Generally it is still the male spouse who arrives first, to be joined later by his partner and their children.
- Many governments have become more restrictive towards foreign recruitment, seeking to protect their domestic workforces in the face of rising unemployment. But they have also introduced measures to ease the situation for foreign workers who have lost their jobs, mainly by allowing them to stay on and search for work.
- More countries are adopting points-based systems, because of the flexibility they provide in the selection of candidates, generally highly skilled, on the basis of multiple criteria.
- Programmes to attract investors and entrepreneurs are receiving a lot of attention, both to attract “high-value” immigrants, but also to ensure that the programmes are yielding the expected benefits.
- The EU Blue Card Directive has been implemented in many European countries, with conditions varying by country and sometimes alongside continuing national permit regimes.
- Job-search periods for international graduates wishing to stay on for work are being introduced or extended in more and more countries seeking to attract persons in this group as immigrants.
- The “Arab Spring” of 2011, the economic downturn and more limited possibilities for labour migration have focused attention on unauthorised migration and stay and enforcement measures in many countries.

Recent trends in international migration


In about two-thirds of OECD countries, the working-age share of the total population actually declined in 2011. In situations where growth and job prospects are positive, all things being equal, this can be expected to draw more persons in the working-age population into employment, either from the resident workforce or from abroad, as employers attempt to maintain the level of their workforces. The mobilisation of the domestic workforce is generally considered to be the policy option of choice in response to labour shortages, before recourse is made to recruitment from abroad. Increases in participation, however, are more and more difficult to achieve as participation rises, and

persons drawn into the labour force may not always have the skills required for current available jobs. In consequence, migration is likely to become more prominent over time as a method of adjustment to imbalances in the labour market.

The Great Recession itself has had differential effects on net migration (Figure 1.1), depending on how hard countries were affected by the economic downturn. On average across OECD countries, net migration over the 2008-10 period was still positive, but somewhat less so than it was over the 2005-07 period. This small effect reflects a counterbalancing of net movements between countries that were hard hit by the crisis (Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and those where the effects were much less evident, if at all (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland), and where net migration is even higher over the more recent period than it was prior to the Great Recession.


Figure 1.1. **Average annual net migration rates, 2005-07 and 2008-10**

Per thousand population



Notes: Averages for 2008-10 are based on 2009-10 for Australia and Ireland, on 2008 and 2010 for Japan and on 2008 for Greece.

Source: OECD, *Population and Vital Statistics Database*.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822408>

In Iceland and Ireland, migration movements have even reversed, with gains in excess of 15 persons per year per thousand population over 2005-07 turning into losses of almost six and three persons per year per thousand population, respectively, during 2008-10. Net migration to Spain has remained positive, but the rate has declined by about two-thirds.

In most other countries, increases or declines compared to 2005-07 were relatively modest.

The Great Recession, although it has put a break on movements overall to a certain extent, has thus not fundamentally changed the dynamic of international migration in most countries, which rely more and more on cross-border movements to maintain the size of their workforces.

Permanent immigration in 2011

The overall level of permanent international migration to OECD countries showed scarcely any change in 2011 relative to 2010, rising by only about 2% and remaining below 4 million, for countries for which standardised statistics are available (Table 1.1).¹ Levels remained at 13% below the peak reached in 2007.

Strong increases were recorded in Germany (31%), Austria (27%) and, as well, in Ireland (41%), the country which had shown the strongest decline in immigration as a result of the Great Recession. Other countries with double-digit increases include Finland, Korea, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, for the latter mostly labour migrants from Latin America, arriving despite a continuing difficult economic climate in the country. Nothing illustrates more clearly the effects of chain migration than the current situation in Spain, where migration levels remain above 300 000 even in the presence of high unemployment rates. Almost 45% of this consists of free circulation migrants. Japan also showed a small turnaround of +6% in 2011 after having seen steady decline since 2007. The increase in Japan was in labour migration.

Among the larger immigration countries, the United States showed immigration levels stable relative to 2010 and Italy a further decline of 11%. The fall in Italy has been steady since 2007 and migration levels now stand at 44% below 2007 levels. Immigration into France, at 220 000 entries, is at a recent high, with the increase occurring largely in the category of free-circulation migration. The very large increase observed in the Russian Federation in 2011 is due to a definitional change in Russian statistics, which now acknowledge the presence of substantial numbers of persons admitted as temporary workers having their permits renewed for longer stays.

Both Canada and the United Kingdom also saw reductions in permanent immigration in 2011, by 11% and 17%, respectively, but for reasons which largely had little to do with economic conditions. The drop in the United Kingdom in 2011 reflects a spike in 2010 attributable to acceptances for settlement from a backlog of refused asylum seekers with a long period of stay in the United Kingdom;² the return to normal in 2011 then appears as a fall in immigration. The decline in Canada was also due to a programme to reduce a backlog in 2010, but in permanent immigrant applications, as well as to a policy to cut waiting times for other applicants.

As is evident, the decline over the Great Recession has been stronger outside of the settlement countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, which have modified their immigration targets only slightly, if at all, in response to changes in economic conditions³ and where applicants for immigration ostensibly have not wished to forego their place in the queue while waiting for better times. Immigration in Europe, on the other hand, has a strong component of free-circulation movements, where immigrants can come and go as they please and which has seen much larger falls in movements than other forms of migration, namely almost 40%, from 2007 to 2010.


The international migration picture in 2011 is thus a mixed one, with economic conditions not being especially favourable for a strong resurgence of labour migration. Nonetheless more than half of the countries showed increases in immigration and two large ones showed declines which were largely due to changes in administrative procedures.

Table 1.1. **Inflows of permanent immigrants into selected OECD countries and the Russian Federation, 2007-11**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Variation (%)		% of population
						2011/10	2011/07	2011
Standardised statistics								
United States	1 052 400	1 107 100	1 130 200	1 041 900	1 061 400	2	1	0.34
Spain	691 900	409 600	334 100	300 000	349 300	16	-50	0.76
United Kingdom	343 300	317 300	352 700	388 000	321 200	-17	-6	0.52
Italy	559 200	482 600	384 200	349 900	312 200	-11	-44	0.52
Germany	232 800	228 300	201 500	222 500	290 800	31	25	0.36
Canada	236 800	247 200	252 200	280 700	248 700	-11	5	0.72
Australia	191 900	205 900	221 000	208 500	219 500	5	14	0.97
France	184 500	192 200	182 100	196 300	211 300	8	15	0.33
Switzerland	122 200	139 100	114 800	115 000	124 300	8	2	1.57
Netherlands	80 600	90 600	89 500	95 600	105 600	10	31	0.63
Belgium	50 300	51 200	64 200	64 100	76 500	19	52	0.69
Sweden	74 400	71 000	71 500	65 600	71 700	9	-4	0.76
Norway	43 700	48 900	48 500	55 900	60 300	8	38	1.22
Japan	108 500	97 700	65 500	55 700	59 100	6	-46	0.05
Austria	47 100	49 500	45 700	45 900	58 400	27	24	0.69
Korea	44 200	39 000	36 700	51 100	56 900	11	29	0.11
New Zealand	51 700	51 200	47 500	48 500	44 500	-8	-14	1.01
Denmark	30 300	45 600	38 400	42 400	41 300	-3	36	0.74
Portugal	42 800	71 000	57 300	43 800	36 900	-16	-14	0.35
Ireland	120 400	89 700	50 700	23 900	33 700	41	-72	0.75
Czech Republic	98 800	71 800	39 000	30 500	22 600	-26	-77	0.22
Mexico	6 800	15 100	23 900	26 400	21 700	-18	219	0.02
Finland	17 500	19 900	18 100	18 200	20 400	12	17	0.38
Russian Federation	261 100	284 500	317 100	229 400	412 600	80	58	0.28
Total number of persons (excluding Russian Federation)								
All countries	4 432 100	4 141 700	3 869 100	3 770 500	3 848 200	2	-13	0.36
Settlement countries	1 532 800	1 611 400	1 650 900	1 579 600	1 574 100	0	3	0.42
EU included above	2 573 900	2 190 300	1 929 000	1 886 900	1 951 700	3	-24	0.49
EU free movement	1 192 800	881 500	724 400	719 300	823 900	15	-31	0.21
Annual % change								
All countries		-6	-6	-2	2			
Settlement countries		5	2	-4	0			
EU countries included above		-15	-12	-2	3			
of which EU free movement		-26	-18	-1	15			
National statistics (unstandardised)								
Turkey	29 910
Chile	79 380	68 380	57 060	63 920	76 340	19	-4	0.44
Poland	40 640	41 830	41 280	41 060	41 340	1	2	0.11
Greece	46 330	42 900	46 530	33 370	23 210	-30	-50	0.21
Slovenia	30 470	43 770	24 080	11 230	17 970	60	-41	0.88
Hungary	22 610	35 550	25 580	23 880	22 510	-6	0	0.23
Luxembourg	15 770	16 800	14 640	15 810	19 110	21	21	3.70
Israel	18 130	13 700	14 570	16 630	16 890	2	-7	0.22
Slovak Republic	14 850	16 470	14 440	12 660	8 220	-35	-45	0.15
Iceland	9 320	7 470	3 390	2 990	2 750	-8	-70	0.85
Estonia	1 950	1 930	2 230	1 200	1 680	40	-14	0.13
Total (excluding Turkey)	279 450	288 800	243 800	222 750	230 020	3	-18	0.24
Annual % change		3	-16	-9	3			

Notes: Includes only foreign nationals; the inflows include status changes, namely persons in the country on a temporary status who obtained the right to stay on a longer-term basis. Series for some countries have been significantly revised. Settlement countries include Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823282>

Preliminary part-year data for 2012 tend to confirm this modest increase. The use of statistics based on national data sources makes it possible to give some idea of what the situation for 2012 will look like when the standardised statistics become available (Table 1.2). The countries shown covered 88% of all permanent flows in the OECD area in 2010 and 2011.

Table 1.2. Preliminary trends in international migration in OECD countries in 2012

	2011	2012	% change 2012/11	Period covered 2011/12	Number of months
Australia	210 700	242 400	15	July-June	12
Austria	85 100	99 600	17	January-September	9
Canada	189 100	194 500	3	January-September	9
Czech Republic	18 600	22 000	18	January-December	12
Denmark	48 200	52 900	10	January-October	10
Finland	19 700	18 100	-8	January-October	10
France (excl. EU)	128 100	134 500	5	January-December	12
Germany	842 000	966 000	15	January-December	12
Iceland	2 800	2 800	3	January-December	12
Ireland	33 700	32 100	-5	May-April	12
Mexico	21 500	20 700	-3	January-December	12
Netherlands	163 000	155 700	-4	January-December	12
New Zealand	44 500	42 600	-4	July-June	12
Norway (excl. EU)	24 300	26 300	8	January-October	10
Poland	6 900	6 600	-4	January-June	6
Spain	419 200	354 500	-15	October-September	12
Sweden	67 000	74 100	11	January-November	11
Switzerland	138 600	146 100	5	September-August	12
United Kingdom	500 000	421 000	-16	October-September	12
United States	1 062 000	1 031 600	-3	October-September	12
Total¹	4 150 900	4 178 500	1		

1. The total is the sum of annualised national data.

Sources: OECD *International Migration Database* and national data sources.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823301>

The 2012 statistics, based on national data, point to an increase in migration to OECD countries on the order of 1% for the year, the same as that observed in 2011. This increase would represent roughly an additional 30 000 immigrants for countries of the OECD area. International migration thus remains on a positive growth path for the second consecutive year, but a slow one, much slower than the 13% increase attained from 2006 to 2007 just before the onset of the downturn.

Outflows during the economic crisis

If the Great Recession has seen declines in immigration inflows, it has also witnessed increases in outflows of foreign nationals from the countries where they were residing (Table 1.3).⁴ The lack of economic opportunities seems to have driven a certain number of immigrants to leave the countries to which they had migrated. Note that Table 1.3 does not give a complete picture of the re-migration of immigrants, because it concerns only foreign nationals and thus excludes immigrants who have obtained the nationality of their country of residence. It also gives no indication of where the persons emigrating have gone to, although in most cases, it is likely that they have returned to their country of origin.

Table 1.3. **Outflows of foreign nationals, by country of residence, 2007-11**


	Peak year	Thousands					Percentages	
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Change (peak year/2007)	Change (2011/peak year)
Australia	2010	15.1	16.0	16.8	18.3	17.9	21	-2
Austria	2011	52.6	55.3	66.1	66.4	73.6	26	x
Belgium	2011	38.5	44.9	49.1	50.8	56.6	32	x
Czech Republic	2010	18.4	3.8	9.4	14.9	5.7	-19	-62
Denmark	2010	19.0	23.3	26.6	27.1	..	43	x
Estonia	2009	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6	55	-12
Finland	2008	3.1	4.5	4.0	3.1	3.3	44	-26
Germany	2009	475.8	563.1	578.8	529.6	538.8	22	-7
Hungary	2010	4.1	4.2	5.6	6.0	2.7	46	-56
Iceland	2008	4.0	5.9	5.8	3.4	2.8	46	-51
Ireland	2009	33.4	36.1	52.8	40.3	38.6	58	-27
Italy	2011	14.8	22.1	25.9	28.0	32.4	89	x
Japan	2009	214.9	234.2	262.0	242.6	230.9	22	-12
Korea	2009	163.6	215.7	236.4	196.1	217.7	45	-8
Luxembourg	2010	8.6	8.0	7.3	7.7	7.5	-11	-2
Netherlands	2011	29.0	30.7	35.5	40.2	47.6	38	x
New Zealand	2011	21.4	23.0	23.6	26.3	26.4	23	x
Norway	2011	13.3	15.2	18.4	22.5	22.9	69	x
Slovak Republic	2009	2.0	3.3	3.3	2.9	1.9	66	-42
Slovenia	2009	11.8	7.3	15.1	12.0	..	28	-20
Spain	2010	199.0	232.0	288.3	336.7	317.7	69	-6
Sweden	2011	20.4	19.2	18.3	22.1	23.7	8	x
Switzerland	2010	56.2	54.1	55.2	65.5	64.0	16	-2
United Kingdom	2008	158.0	243.0	211.0	185.0	190.0	54	-22
Russian Federation	2011	47.0	39.5	32.5	33.6	36.8	-29	x
All OECD countries	2009	1 578	1 866	2 016	1 948	1 923	37	-9
% change year-to-year			18	8	-3	-1		

Notes: For Slovenia, the decline from the peak year is measured on the basis of 2010 data. For the calculation of the all-countries change from 2011 to the peak year total, countries for which the outflows are still increasing in 2011 are counted as having zero change.

x: Not applicable.

..: Not available.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823320>

Overall, emigration of foreign nationals from the countries shown increased by about 37% from 2007 to the peak year, which varies from 2008 to 2011 according to the country concerned. For some countries, outflows continued to increase in 2011 (Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). The outflows increased by more than 25% in two-thirds of the countries shown. Only in the Czech Republic, Luxembourg and the Russian Federation does one see a decline. Note, however, that an increase in outflows can be deceptive, because it can reflect an increase in short-term movements, as was likely the case for Germany, a country that was not strongly affected by the crisis and which saw an increase in inflows from 2007 to 2009.


Outflows of foreign nationals have turned around in many countries, declining by 9% overall from peak levels, but have not returned to pre-crisis levels. The declines have been especially strong in the countries of Central Europe and in Iceland. The statistics on outflows thus reinforce what has been shown by other indicators, namely a recovery that is still tentative, with fewer job opportunities for immigrants compared to what was observed in 2007.

As the debt crisis has followed on the heels of the financial crisis in a number of countries, the deteriorating labour market situation in some of them has resulted in an increase in the outflows of their nationals in search of work towards other OECD countries, which have been less affected, if at all, by the economic downturn and debt crisis. This is especially true for the countries of southern Europe, as shown in Table 1.4, which breaks down these flows by the main countries of destination as well.

Table 1.4. **Outflows of nationals from selected OECD countries to main European and other OECD destination countries, 2007-11**

	Index					Number (thousands)
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2011
Country of origin						
Greece	100	106	102	143	236	39
Iceland	100	111	163	165	135	4
Ireland	100	104	174	210	181	21
Italy	100	116	111	132	142	85
Portugal	100	120	98	103	125	55
Spain	100	114	123	173	224	72
Country of destination						
Germany	100	105	116	133	188	78
United Kingdom	100	120	113	174	195	88
Switzerland	100	116	96	102	121	33
Belgium	100	142	146	169	193	15
Netherlands	100	138	144	157	184	12
All other OECD countries	100	109	116	124	129	50
Total	100	115	114	140	165	275

Sources: OECD *International Migration Database* except for the United Kingdom, where statistics are from national insurance number allocations to overseas nationals (year ending March 2012).

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823339>

Movements of Greek and Spanish nationals to other EU countries have more than doubled since 2007, most of this increase having occurred in 2010 and 2011. Outflows of Icelandic and Irish nationals were also significant, but peaked in 2010, as these countries have eased their way into recovery.

The main countries of destination are Germany and the United Kingdom, with flows to these two having almost doubled in recent years and reached almost 80 000 or more. Flows to Belgium and the Netherlands, although at lower levels, have also almost doubled, but increases since 2009 are smaller than for Germany and the United Kingdom. Switzerland has showed a more modest increase since 2009 (about 25%), despite being a traditional destination country for several of the crisis countries.

Figures for Germany for 2012 (year ending in September) suggest that movements are accelerating in 2012 for several countries, in particular Greece and Spain, for which movements have reached 34 000 and 28 000 persons, respectively, per year. The increases observed relative to 2011 are 73% for Greek nationals, close to 50% for Spanish and Portuguese nationals and 35% for Italian nationals. Altogether, this represents an increase of almost 40 000 additional immigrants from crisis countries to Germany in 2012 compared to 2011.


The total outflows to Germany for the countries shown has reached 116 000 in 2012 and although these figures cannot yet be described as an exodus from crisis countries, they do represent a significant contribution to workforce entries in Germany.

Outflows of nationals of the same countries to Switzerland also show a increase for 2012, of 26% compared to 2011. Greece and Spain show the largest proportional increases (49% and 42%, respectively), but increases from Italy (26%) and Portugal (21%) are larger in numerical terms, with close to 3 000 additional arrivals.

Permanent immigration by category of entry

As it was at the beginning of the downturn, free circulation has shown itself to be a reactive category of migration since the trough of the downturn, with an increase of 15% in 2011 relative to 2010 (Figure 1.2). More than half of the increase was in Germany, with the migrants coming especially from Romania and Poland, and to a lesser extent, from Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy.

Figure 1.2. **Permanent immigration in OECD countries by category of entry or of status change, standardised statistics, 2007-11**



Note: Excludes the Czech Republic and the countries for which standardised data are not available (see Table 1.1).

Source: OECD International Migration Database.


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Humanitarian migration has increased by 18%, with most of the rise concentrated in the United States; China, Bhutan and Myanmar were the principal countries of origin.

There has been a drop of about 12% in the number of family members accompanying labour migrants, and virtually all of this decline has taken place in the settlement countries and the United Kingdom. This has been associated with declines in labour migration in all of these countries except Australia, which saw a fall in accompanying family members despite an increase in labour migration of almost 10 000 persons. Other countries either have few entries in this category or classify accompanying family members with other family migrants.

Migration to European countries continues to be characterised by free circulation within the European Economic Area (EEA). Indeed, this form of migration represents 45% of all international migration within the EEA countries shown in Figure 1.3. In Norway, Germany and Switzerland, it represents 64%, 68% and 78%, respectively, of permanent international migration. With free circulation, many European countries attain migration levels comparable to the settlement countries of Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

Figure 1.3. Permanent immigration by category of entry or of status change into selected OECD and the Russian Federation, 2011, and total for 2010



Notes: The values are based on standardised data. The OECD average is the unweighted average of the countries presented in the figure excluding the Russian Federation. The European Union values refer to the European Union countries included in the figure.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822446>

All of the large OECD countries and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, showed immigration rates in 2011 below the OECD average, with only Italy and the United Kingdom approaching the OECD average of about six immigrant entries for every thousand persons in the population. In Japan and Korea, permanent immigration levels were at less than one person per thousand population. At the other extreme are New Zealand and Switzerland, where migration levels were at 12 and 16 persons per thousand population, respectively. Both countries also show high emigration levels, however, and so require higher rates of immigration in order to yield the same rate of net migration as other countries.

Family and humanitarian migration within the European Economic Area constitute 45% and 8%, respectively, of total immigration (excluding free circulation) to this area. In the rest of the OECD, the corresponding figures are 65% and 13%. By contrast, labour migration accounts for almost 40% of non-free movement migration to EEA countries covered in Figure 1.3, but only 13% of migration to the rest of the OECD. The latter reflects the weight of the United States, Japan and Mexico, for all of which permanent labour migration is limited.

Temporary labour migration

There is a second element which does not point to a strong economic demand for migration in 2011: temporary labour migration (Table 1.5). It continues to remain significantly below the 2.5 million levels it reached in 2007 and 2008 and was the other type of migration (with free circulation) which had decreased strongly in response to the economic crisis. There is an apparent decline in temporary labour migration in 2011, but this is largely due to large numbers of seasonal migrants in Germany who are no longer being captured in the statistics, because the workers so engaged now tend to fall under the EU free-circulation regime. Were it not for this statistical anomaly, results would have shown little change in 2011 compared to 2010.

Table 1.5. **Temporary labour migration, 2006-11**

Thousands

A. Temporary labour migration in OECD countries						
Type	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Trainees	129	164	146	114	105	114
Working holiday makers	335	397	431	423	419	413
Seasonal workers	578	571	577	521	507	358
Intra-company transfers	104	118	117	106	124	127
Other temporary workers	1 330	1 286	1 235	929	914	950
Total	2 475	2 536	2 507	2 092	2 069	1 963
B. Large programmes in Australia, Germany and the Russian Federation						
Country and programme	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Australia Working holiday makers	114	135	154	188	176	185
Germany Seasonal workers	303	300	285	295	297	168
Russian Federation Licensed workers	157	862
Temporary labour migrants	..	1 185	1 321	1 010	1 103	1 140

Notes: Licensed workers in the Russian Federation are workers from visa-free countries who obtain the right to stay and work by paying a monthly tax. Table 1.5A includes all the countries for which standardised data are available (see Table 1.1) except Australia, Germany and the Czech Republic.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823358>

Intracorporate transfers reached historically high levels in 2011⁵ and working holiday workers remain high, but the mainstream temporary worker programmes as well as seasonal work programmes have increased slightly, if at all.

The numbers for the Russian Federation have been shown separately and not included in the main table, because at somewhat over two million, temporary labour migrants in the Russian Federation are essentially at the same level as all OECD countries as a whole. Most of the increase since 2010 has taken place for license-holders, who are workers from visa-free countries who are allowed to stay and work by paying a monthly tax. The licenses were originally intended for household workers, but seem to be finding a much broader use since being introduced. Workers holding these licenses (known literally as “patents”) are exempted from paying taxes and social security payments. The licenses are valid for one year, at which point a new license must be obtained. The standard temporary migrant programme in the Russian Federation has over 1.1 million workers. In both cases, the overwhelming majority of workers are from Central Asian countries, which were republics in the former Soviet Union.

Other large temporary migrant programmes include the German seasonal worker programme and the Australian working holiday maker programme, each of which involves some 150 000 to 200 000 workers. Working holiday programmes have been introduced in many countries and allow young people to work (at lesser skilled jobs) while vacationing in the country for as long as a year.

The lack of any pick-up in temporary labour migration suggests that employers may well be finding takers among the many workers who lost their jobs during the downturn and who may be more willing to take on jobs that were largely occupied by migrant workers prior to the crisis.

Asylum seeking and humanitarian migration in the OECD area

The number of persons seeking asylum in OECD countries increased by over 20% in 2011, exceeding 400 000 for the first time since 2003 (Table 1.6). The top countries of destination were the United States, France and Germany, with respectively, 61 000, 52 000 and 46 000 asylum seekers. Largely as a consequence of the “Arab Spring”, Italy exceeded 34 000 asylum seekers, making it the fourth largest receiving country in 2011. Note that Italy saw levels of asylum seeking of comparable magnitude in 2008, however, well before the “Arab Spring”.

As has been historically the case, it is among the smaller OECD countries that one sees the highest number of asylum seekers per capita. The number of asylum seekers almost tripled in Luxembourg from 2010 to 2011, making it proportionally the largest receiving country for its population, with over 2 100 requests for a population of a little over half a million. Most of the asylum seekers were from former Yugoslavia. The other significant receiving countries in per capita terms were Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and Austria, which continue to register very high levels of requests at close to 2 000 or more per million population compared to the level for the OECD as a whole (343). This tends to mirror the situation observed for international migration as a whole, where small countries also tend to show much higher per capita migration movements than the larger OECD countries.

The ten largest countries of origin have scarcely changed since 2010, with only Eritrea replacing Sri Lanka in the group. Afghanistan, China, Iraq and Pakistan were the most significant origin countries with from 16 000 to 26 000 requests each. The requests from China are heavily concentrated in the United States, with almost two thirds of asylum requests from China being made there. Brazil has become a destination point for Haitians fleeing the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in that country, with 4 000 requests being registered in 2011, exceeding the combined total for Canada, the United States and France.

The large movements anticipated because of the “Arab Spring” have not materialised, although the Libyan conflict in particular displaced considerable numbers of migrants who were working in Libya, some of whom sought asylum in OECD countries. Indeed, a number of sub-Saharan countries as well as Tunisia, Libya and Syria themselves figure prominently among countries of origin showing significant increases in asylum seeking (Figure 1.4). Large increases were also observed in other countries in the throes of civil conflict, namely Afghanistan, Pakistan and Côte d’Ivoire.

Israel and Korea have seen large increases from 2010 to 2011, although the levels remained relatively modest in Korea. The declines observed from 2010 to 2011 are concentrated essentially in the Nordic countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Table 1.6. **Inflows of asylum seekers by country of destination, 2006-11**

	Average 2006-10	2010	2011	Absolute change 2010-11	% change 2010-11	Asylum seekers per million population (2011)	Permanent humanitarian migrants per million population (2010)	Three top countries of origin of the asylum seekers
Italy	16 480	10 050	34 120	24 070	239	561	71	Nigeria, Tunisia, Ghana
United States	40 390	42 970	60 590	17 620	41	194	435	China, Mexico, El Salvador
Turkey	8 450	9 230	16 020	6 800	74	218	..	Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan
Switzerland	13 410	13 520	19 440	5 920	44	2 524	864	Eritrea, Tunisia, Serbia (and Kosovo)
Germany	26 250	41 330	45 740	4 410	11	557	144	Afghanistan, Serbia (and Kosovo), Iraq
Israel	3 350	1 450	5 750	4 300	297	760	..	Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana
Belgium	14 780	21 760	26 000	4 250	20	2 418	196	Serbia (and Kosovo), Afghanistan, Guinea
France	37 150	48 070	52 150	4 070	8	826	164	Russian Federation, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Armenia
Austria	12 990	11 010	14 420	3 400	31	1 713	564	Afghanistan, Russian Federation, Pakistan
Australia	5 340	8 250	11 510	3 260	40	509	644	Iran, Afghanistan, China
United Kingdom	28 250	22 650	25 460	2 810	12	408	79	Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka
Canada	28 510	22 540	24 990	2 440	11	727	973	Hungary, China, Colombia
Luxembourg	530	740	2 080	1 330	179	4 024	..	Serbia (and Kosovo), The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro
Spain	4 650	2 740	3 410	670	24	73	13	Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Nigeria
Japan	1 190	1 200	1 870	660	55	15	3	Myanmar, Nepal, Turkey
Korea	420	430	1 010	590	138	21	1	Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda
Slovenia	320	250	370	130	52	183	..	Afghanistan, Turkey, Serbia (and Kosovo)
Portugal	160	160	280	120	72	26	5	Guinea, Somalia, Nigeria
Chile	490	260	310	50	17	18	..	Colombia, Cuba, Bolivia
Estonia	20	30	70	40	123	50	..	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Armenia
Iceland	50	50	80	30	49	234	..	Nigeria, Russian Federation, Algeria
New Zealand	290	340	310	-40	-10	69	636	Fiji, Iran, Egypt
Slovak Republic	1 560	540	490	-50	-9	90	..	Somalia, Afghanistan, Georgia
Czech Republic	1 790	980	760	-220	-23	72	..	Ukraine, Belarus, Russian Federation
Mexico	580	1 040	750	-290	-28	7	2	El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala
Hungary	3 090	2 100	1 690	-410	-20	170	..	Afghanistan, Serbia (and Kosovo), Pakistan
Finland	3 540	4 020	3 090	-930	-23	573	588	Iraq, Somalia, Russian Federation
Greece	16 690	10 270	9 310	-960	-9	817	..	Pakistan, Georgia, Afghanistan
Norway	10 710	10 060	9 050	-1 010	-10	1 838	1 082	Somalia, Eritrea, Afghanistan
Ireland	3 650	3 410	2 310	-1 100	-32	510	34	Nigeria, Pakistan, China
Denmark	2 980	4 970	3 810	-1 150	-23	684	381	Afghanistan, Iran, Syria
Poland	7 190	6 530	5 090	-1 450	-22	133	..	Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia
Netherlands	12 640	13 330	11 590	-1 740	-13	695	601	Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia
Sweden	28 210	31 820	29 650	-2 180	-7	3 140	1 279	Afghanistan, Somalia, Serbia (and Kosovo)
OECD total	336 100	350 120	425 530	75 410	22	343	224	Afghanistan, China, Iraq
Selected non-OECD countries								
Brazil	710	1 090	4 980	3 890	358	25	..	Haiti, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau
Bulgaria	850	1 030	890	-130	-13	120	..	Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria
Latvia	40	60	340	270	449	149	..	Georgia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Russian Federation
Lithuania	210	370	410	30	9	123	..	Georgia, Russian Federation, Afghanistan
Romania	800	890	2 060	1 170	132	96	..	Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco
Russian Federation	3 910	3 890	2 290	-1 600	-41	16	11	Afghanistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan

Notes: Figures for the United States refer to "affirmative" claims submitted with the Department of Homeland Security (number of cases) and "defensive" claims submitted to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (number of individuals).

...: Not available.

Source: UNHCR.




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Figure 1.4. **Origin countries with largest changes in number of asylum seekers, 2010-11**



Note: The figure is limited to countries with changes exceeding 2 000 asylum requests.
Source: UNHCR.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822465>

With recognition rates rarely exceeding 20% in OECD countries, asylum seeking is a limited source of permanent immigration in OECD countries. In practice, other sources of humanitarian migration, among them resettlement refugee migration⁶ or admission on the grounds of protection, are also important, especially in the settlement countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Indeed, the latter four countries are the only countries in the OECD for which the number of permanent humanitarian migrants is larger than the number of asylum seekers. Sweden, Norway and Switzerland remain per capita leaders among OECD countries in the number of permanent humanitarian immigrants admitted, but are followed immediately after by Canada, Australia and New Zealand, countries which admit significant numbers of resettled refugees.

Origin countries of international migrants

China remains the most significant country of origin for OECD immigrants, a position it has held throughout the decade except for one year, 2007, when Romania joined the European Union and recorded close to 550 000 emigrants for the year (Table 1.7). With 530 000 emigrants to the OECD in 2011, China accounts for over 10% of immigration into OECD countries. However, this is significantly less than its share of the world's population, which is over 19%. This is a general feature associated with highly populated countries, which tend to have low expatriation rates, regardless of their level of development. Bangladesh, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Japan, Nigeria and the United States share the same pattern. In such large countries, internal markets are large and diverse, which may reduce the impact of certain push-factors that induce emigration in smaller countries, such as geographic isolation or narrower educational, employment or economic opportunities. There are two notable exceptions to this general rule, namely Mexico and the Philippines, for which emigration has been spurred, in the first case, by geographic proximity to a country with a much higher level of income and in the second, by national policies to train persons to satisfy specific labour needs in other countries.

Table 1.7. Immigration into OECD countries, top 50 countries of origin, 2007, 2009 and 2011

Origin country	Immigration into OECD countries (thousands)			% of total OECD inflows 2011	% of total world population 2011	Difference (percentage points)	Rank of the difference (203 countries)	Expatriation rate (per million population) in 2011
	2007	2009	2011					
China	518	460	529	10.3	19.4	-9.1	202	394
Romania	549	271	310	6.0	0.3	5.7	1	14 450
Poland	340	220	274	5.3	0.6	4.8	2	7 168
India	212	227	240	4.7	17.7	-13.1	203	196
Mexico	163	180	161	3.1	1.6	1.5	6	1 417
Philippines	168	163	159	3.1	1.3	1.7	3	1 702
United States	116	132	135	2.6	4.5	-1.9	200	432
Germany	150	126	114	2.2	1.2	1.0	10	1 391
Morocco	144	135	110	2.1	0.5	1.7	4	3 443
United Kingdom	149	129	107	2.1	0.9	1.2	7	1 722
Pakistan	74	77	105	2.0	2.5	-0.5	188	605
France	82	93	96	1.9	0.9	1.0	11	1 523
Viet Nam	88	76	94	1.8	1.3	0.6	22	1 072
Bulgaria	74	60	90	1.8	0.1	1.6	5	12 030
Italy	66	73	84	1.6	0.9	0.8	17	1 382
Korea	72	78	70	1.4	0.7	0.7	18	1 454
Russian Federation	67	66	68	1.3	2.1	-0.7	194	477
Peru	110	77	68	1.3	0.4	0.9	12	2 336
Hungary	36	42	67	1.3	0.1	1.2	8	6 687
Colombia	88	70	66	1.3	0.7	0.6	20	1 424
Ukraine	108	78	65	1.3	0.7	0.6	19	1 437
Brazil	107	63	65	1.3	2.8	-1.6	199	332
Dominican Republic	48	63	63	1.2	0.1	1.1	9	6 311
Turkey	58	61	60	1.2	1.1	0.1	64	828
Thailand	47	47	52	1.0	1.0	0.0	105	752
Spain	23	39	51	1.0	0.7	0.3	36	1 108
Portugal	59	43	50	1.0	0.2	0.8	13	4 652
Bangladesh	34	50	49	1.0	2.2	-1.2	196	332
Cuba	43	51	49	1.0	0.2	0.8	14	4 375
Iraq	32	48	48	0.9	0.5	0.5	25	1 507
New Zealand	42	42	44	0.9	0.1	0.8	15	10 061
Iran	27	43	43	0.8	1.1	-0.2	180	575
Canada	35	37	43	0.8	0.5	0.3	34	1 256
Lithuania	14	15	42	0.8	0.0	0.8	16	12 551
Nigeria	38	46	39	0.7	2.3	-1.5	198	243
Greece	13	15	39	0.7	0.2	0.6	21	3 390
Algeria	38	36	35	0.7	0.5	0.2	51	998
Sri Lanka	21	33	35	0.7	0.3	0.4	31	1 689
Haiti	35	29	33	0.6	0.1	0.5	23	3 333
Netherlands	40	32	33	0.6	0.2	0.4	28	1 963
Japan	31	34	33	0.6	1.8	-1.2	197	258
Egypt	22	27	31	0.6	1.2	-0.6	191	378
Slovak Republic	33	25	30	0.6	0.1	0.5	24	5 460
Ecuador	52	42	30	0.6	0.2	0.4	33	2 057
Nepal	17	23	29	0.6	0.4	0.1	55	979
Indonesia	27	22	28	0.6	3.5	-2.9	201	118
Afghanistan	11	18	27	0.5	0.5	0.1	75	873
Australia	32	25	27	0.5	0.3	0.2	45	1 222
Albania	31	34	24	0.5	0.0	0.4	26	7 548
Ethiopia	21	21	24	0.5	1.2	-0.7	193	291


Table 1.7. **Immigration into OECD countries, top 50 countries of origin, 2007, 2009 and 2011 (cont.)**

Origin country	Immigration into OECD countries (thousands)			% of total OECD inflows 2011	% of total world population 2011	Difference (percentage points)	Rank of the difference (203 countries)	Expatriation rate (per million population) in 2011
	2007	2009	2011					
All origin countries	5 407	4 869	5 142	100.0	100.0	x	x	744
All OECD origin countries	1 693	1 585	1 694	32.9	17.9	15.1	x	1 370
All non-OECD origin countries	3 715	3 284	3 448	27.9	34.1	-6.1	x	608
All EU origin countries	1 739	1 310	1 544	30.0	7.2	22.8	x	3 086

Notes: Destination country data are not comparable across countries and may include more short-term movements for some countries than for others. Results should therefore be interpreted with caution. Countries in bold are OECD countries.

x: Not applicable.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

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The highest emigration rates to OECD countries being observed currently are largely from countries participating in free-circulation regimes, such as Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic states and New Zealand, or from a number of Pacific islands (Samoa and Tonga), which benefit from facilitated migration to New Zealand. Indeed emigration from EU origin countries, most of it in the context of free circulation, is some four times more frequent relative to the population of the EU than emigration from the rest of the world and it has remained at high levels compared to other regions of the world despite the continuing difficult economic conditions in many EU destination countries. Other countries with a significant expatriation of their populations are generally small states, often islands, which historically have had high emigration rates and continue to do so, such as Cape Verde, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Although immigration has rebounded from its trough value in 2009, it still remains below the peak value for the OECD as a whole observed in 2007, and this is the case for both emigration from non-OECD countries or from EU countries. Emigration from certain countries, however, in particular China, India, the United States and Pakistan stands above the 2007 levels observed for these countries.


The distribution of immigrants across countries has tended to be relatively stable (Figure 1.A1.1 in annex), with generally limited change in 2011 compared to that observed for the previous ten years. Among the larger changes are the strong declines observed in migration from Ukraine in the Czech Republic and Poland and to a lesser extent in Hungary. Hungary has also seen significant declines in migration from Romania and Serbia. Israel is seeing relatively fewer migrants from the former USSR, Chile from Peru and the Russian Federation from Kazakhstan, the latter being replaced by movements from other countries of central Asia. On the other side of the balance sheet, Romania has seen modest relative increases in a number of countries compared to the past, in particular to Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Portugal. With more difficult labour market conditions in Italy and Spain in particular, Romanians are redirecting their movements to other EU countries.

The United Kingdom, traditionally the top country of origin of selected migrants in Australia and New Zealand, is being overtaken in those countries by China and India. The Philippines has replaced China as the prime source country in Canada and is making progress in Denmark and New Zealand. Finland is seeing a resurgence of Estonian migration, while Iraq is declining in importance as a source country (largely of refugees) for Sweden.

Slovenia is seeing significant relative declines in Bosnian and Serbian migration. And migration from China is continuing to increase in importance in many countries, including Japan, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as Australia.


If origin countries have tended to be relatively stable as immigrant sources for destination countries, continents of origin have seen a somewhat different evolution overall (Figure 1.5). In absolute terms, flows have increased the most from Asia, followed by Europe and Africa, while movements from countries in the Americas and Oceania have remained at almost the same level.

Figure 1.5. **Immigration, 2000 and 2011**



Notes: Destination country data are not comparable across countries and may include more short-term movements for some countries than for others. Results should therefore be interpreted with caution.


Source: OECD International Migration Database.

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The results for Latin America are deceptive, however, because unauthorised movements, in particular to the United States, have been especially large, have declined substantially over the decade and are not covered in these statistics. Thus the significant fall in the share of immigrants from Latin America, from 18% of the total in the year 2000 to 13% of the total in 2011, is actually understated, while the shares of Asian and European migration have risen by 4 and 2 percentage points, respectively. Most migration from Latin America was to Spain and the United States, both countries which were hard hit by the economic downturn, and much of it was labour migration. This explains much of the decadal decline in migration from Latin America.


Despite the strong drop in free circulation since the onset of the economic crisis, migration from Europe has nonetheless increased over the decade. EU enlargement has thus contributed to a higher level of migration within Europe, which has maintained itself, even in the midst of a strong economic downturn. Even a cursory glance at Figure 1.A1.1, which gives for each OECD country the ten most important countries of origin shows a significant concentration of migration movements in a small number of origin countries. The influence of proximity, both geographic and linguistic is evident. On average about one half of total immigration in 2011 was concentrated in just five countries (Figure 1.6), with

Figure 1.6. **Immigrants in the top five origin countries and index of dissimilarity ($\times 100$) of the distribution of immigrants by source country compared to that for all countries as a whole, 2011**



Notes: See Table 1.7. The index of dissimilarity is half the sum of the absolute value of the difference in the distribution of immigrants by source country, compared to that for all countries as a whole. It can be interpreted as the percentage of immigrants which would have to be reallocated in order to make the distribution identical to that of all countries taken as a whole.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822503>

values ranging from a low of 25% in Sweden to close to 65% in Japan and 75% in Korea and Chile, the latter two having one country (China and Peru, respectively) accounting for more than one half of all immigrants.

Generally the distribution of immigrants by source country in a given country differs substantially from that observed for all countries as a whole. Canada, the Netherlands and the United States are the countries whose composition of migration was the closest to that for all countries taken together, but with nonetheless over 40% of immigrants who would have to be reallocated in order for the distribution to coincide with the broader one. The distributions for these countries still show substantial national specificities, with the Philippines and India being prominent origin countries in Canada, Germany and Poland in the Netherlands and Mexico and the Dominican Republic in the United States.

A number of countries stand out in Figure 1.6 by virtue of a reallocation percentage that is substantially larger than the concentration of immigrants would normally lead one to expect. The reason is that such countries have important source countries which are generally not strongly represented elsewhere. This is the case for Iraq and Denmark in Sweden; Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in France; Romania and Morocco in Spain; the United States and Cuba in Mexico; and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the Russian Federation.

International students

International study continues to draw a considerable number of students from around the world to OECD countries. Their number reached 2.6 million in 2010, 20% higher than the average number over the period from 2004 to 2009 and 6% higher than in 2009 (Table 1.8).

Table 1.8. **International tertiary-level students in OECD countries and the Russian Federation, 2004-10**

	Definition of international student (see notes)	Number of international students		2010 relative to average 2004-09	Value relative to population 20-24 × 100	% of total tertiary enrolment	Percentage relative to the percentage of foreign-born in the population	% of international students from OECD countries	
		Average 2004-09	2010					2004-09	2010
Australia	N	204 700	271 200	1.32	16.5	21.2	0.80	13.7	11.6
Austria	N	34 600	53 900	1.56	10.3	15.4	0.96
Belgium	N	25 700	36 100	1.41	5.4	8.1	0.54	43.4	32.7
Canada	N	82 600	95 600	1.16	4.0	6.6	0.33	25.9	26.6
Chile	N	8 800	7 100	0.80	0.5	0.7	0.33	..	8.7
Czech Republic	F	23 000	35 000	1.52	5.1	8.0	1.26	73.1	73.7
Denmark	N	10 500	18 100	1.73	5.5	7.5	0.95	77.8	59.4
Estonia	N	1 000	1 200	1.26	1.2	1.8	0.11	58.2	62.8
Finland	N	8 500	12 400	1.47	3.8	4.1	0.83
France	F	246 700	259 900	1.05	6.6	11.6	1.29	20.7	20.6
Germany	N	179 000	181 200	1.01	3.6	7.1	0.55	34.9	35.7
Greece	F	19 900	26 800	1.35	4.4	4.2	0.38	5.5	6.0
Hungary	N	12 800	15 600	1.22	2.4	4.0	0.85	59.7	54.5
Iceland	N	800	900	1.18	3.8	4.9	0.45	76.9	77.4
Ireland	N	12 900	13 600	1.06	5.1	7.0	0.42	59.4	46.1
Israel	F	..	2 900	..	0.5	0.8	0.03	..	49.9
Italy	F	53 000	69 900	1.32	2.2	3.5	0.40	30.6	19.5
Japan	N	115 200	129 100	1.12	2.0	3.4	1.98
Korea	F	28 500	59 200	2.08	1.8	1.8	1.71	7.4	5.3
Luxembourg	N	..	2 200	..	7.4	41.5	1.07	..	83.0
Netherlands	N	26 900	28 000	1.04	2.7	4.3	0.38	53.6	78.2
New Zealand	N	37 000	37 900	1.02	12.0	14.2	0.60	25.4	29.8
Norway	N	4 300	3 500	0.80	1.1	1.5	0.12
Poland	F	12 400	18 400	1.48	0.6	0.9	0.48	32.2	33.1
Portugal	N	8 600	11 000	1.28	1.8	2.9	0.35	19.9	25.7
Slovak Republic	N	3 000	7 900	2.62	1.9	3.4	..	70.4	84.6
Slovenia	N	1 400	1 900	1.43	1.5	1.7	0.13	14.0	16.3
Spain	N	28 100	56 000	1.99	2.2	3.0	0.20	35.6	32.1
Sweden	N	21 500	31 500	1.46	5.1	6.9	0.46	37.2	24.0
Switzerland	N	33 300	38 200	1.15	8.1	15.4	0.56	68.4	71.2
Turkey	F	19 000	25 800	1.36	0.4	0.7	..	8.9	9.9
United Kingdom	N	335 100	397 700	1.19	9.4	16.0	1.33	40.7	35.3
United States	N	604 700	684 800	1.13	3.2	3.4	0.26	35.9	31.1
OECD average		2 203 500	2 629 400	1.36	4.3	7.2	0.65	39.6	38.6
Russian Federation	F	98 900	154 400	1.56	1.1	1.7	0.22


Notes: The data cover international students enrolled in full-degree programmes. The average is for the period 2004-09 except for Estonia, the Netherlands, Slovenia (2005-09), Canada, France (2006-09), Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Switzerland (2008-09), Ireland, Chile (2009), Greece (2005-08). For the number of international students and the percentage of international students from OECD countries, the OECD average covers only countries for which data are available for both periods.

N: Non-resident students.

F: Foreign students.

..: Not available.

Source: OECD, Education Database.

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International study is often the first step towards an eventual migration, although with many international programmes being given in English, graduating students do not necessarily have a broad range of employment opportunities in a country of study where English is not commonly spoken in the workplace. In countries where a large proportion of the population speaks an international language (the Nordic countries, the Netherlands), the latter can serve as a transition language while the immigrant learns the language of the country, which likely will be necessary in the event of settlement in the country.

Recent estimates suggest that some 15 to 30% of international students tend to stay on (OECD, 2011) in the country where they study, although this may be for family-related reasons (marriage to a resident) as well as work reasons. These estimates, however, may give a distorted and indeed conservative picture of the percentage of graduates who stay on, because they are calculated as a percentage of students who do not renew their student visas, and this may occur because a student fails to complete a study programme and returns home.⁷ Most countries have largely facilitated the stay of graduating international students who wish to remain for work-related reasons, so that the stay rates for this subset of international students may be considerably larger.

Countries have increased the number of international students on average by about a third in 2010 compared to the average number over 2004-09, with Korea, the Slovak Republic and Spain more than doubling the number, while Chile has seen a decline and France, Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand show little gain relative to 2004-09. Denmark is an interesting case. Having introduced tuition fees for international students in 2007, it saw a strong decline in the number of international students enrolled in degree programmes in 2008, from 12 700 to 6 400, but an immediate rebound to the 2007 level the very next year and a further increase to 18 100 in 2010.⁸ The fall in enrolments as a result of the introduction of tuition fees thus seems to have been a momentary interlude.

Table 1.8 provides another measure of the relative importance of international study, namely the number of international students in relation to the resident population of 20-24 year olds, the source population of most tertiary students. This measure is close to or exceeds 10% in only a handful of countries, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, Austria and New Zealand. It averages about 4.3% of the resident population of 20-24 year olds and provides an indication of the possible increase in the size of this age-group if all international students were to stay on. In practice, only about one fourth appear to do so on average, so that the increase actually observed is closer to about 1% of the size of this age group. Contrast this with the 2.3% increase in the total foreign-born population observed on average over the 2000-10 decade. In other words, at current stay rates, the incidence of international study would need to increase substantially in order to become a significant source of migration in many countries.

One might expect international study to be even more international or global in character than is migration at large, but this turns out to be the case in only a few countries. International students generally account for a smaller share of tertiary students than does the foreign-born population of the population at large. Only in the Czech Republic, Japan, Korea, France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom are international students overrepresented among tertiary students relative to the number of foreign-born persons in the population. The first three of these countries have languages of limited international use and rather modest foreign-born populations and have made concerted efforts to attract international students as a potential source of highly skilled migrants, while France and the

United Kingdom have substantial basins of speakers of their languages outside their borders. Finland and Hungary, on the one hand, and Australia and Austria, on the other, partake of the general characteristics of these two respective groups and also show high ratios of international tertiary enrolment relative to the prevalence of the foreign-born population.

The modest level of internationalisation of higher education compared in general to that of the population at large illustrates well the challenge of study at a high level in what may often be a second or even third language for international students. It undoubtedly has spurred the development of university programmes in English in many countries around the world wishing to participate more fully in trans-national educational and skill mobility.

Finally, international study involves many students from outside the OECD area. Approximately 60% of international students, on average, are from non-OECD countries and this has scarcely changed over the recent past. The percentage is only slightly lower at 58% in European Union countries, where international students from other EU countries are entitled to the same tuition fees as residents.

The foreign-born population

The foreign-born population in OECD countries has increased by about 30 million persons over the 2001-11 decade to reach over 111 million persons, an increase of some 25 to 30%.⁹ This accounted for 40% of the total population increase in the OECD over the period and significantly more than this with regard to the working-age population, where immigrants are heavily concentrated. The proportion would be even higher if children born to immigrants were included. The United States, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom together accounted for over 60% of this increase.


The picture across countries, however, is a highly diverse one (see Figure 1.7), with some countries actually showing declines in the number of foreign-born persons (Estonia, Poland and Israel), others very little change in the per cent of the foreign-born (Mexico, Chile, Japan, Korea), while still others have shown unprecedented increases in the presence of immigrants in their populations. This is especially the case in Ireland and Spain, which have seen increases of almost 8 percentage points in the prevalence of foreign-born persons residing within their borders. In proportional terms, this increase over a decade is equivalent to the entire immigrant population of a country like France. Slovenia, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, New Zealand and Luxembourg also showed substantial increases over the same period, from 4 to 6 percentage points each.

On average, in 2011 immigrants accounted for 12.5% of the total population of OECD countries, with 16 countries showing percentages above this level. Nine show percentages above 15. At current rates of increase, at least one-fourth of the population of the average OECD country will be of immigrant origin within a generation.¹⁰ In long-standing countries of migration, such as Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand and Switzerland, this proportion is already largely exceeded. With demographic developments continuing over the next decades, more and more OECD countries will become homes to diverse populations coming from all over the globe in the years to come.


Special topics

The following sections concern special analyses of immigration, both labour- and family-related. The first, concerns labour migration and recruitment, in particular the extent to which labour migrants are actually recruited from abroad. The second deals with the nature of family migration.

Figure 1.7. **Foreign-born population, 2001 and 2011**
Percentages of the total population



Notes: Data for Germany, Greece, Japan, Korea and Mexico are for 2000 and 2010; for Chile and the Russian Federation, 2002 and 2010; for Slovenia, 2002 and 2011. Data for France exclude persons born abroad who were French at birth. Sources: OECD *International Migration Database* except Japan and Korea in 2011 (UN Population division) and Greece in 2011 (Eurostat). 2011 data for France are estimates.

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Are labour migrants recruited from abroad?

In so-called “demand-driven” labour migration systems, workers in principle cannot migrate to a country for employment unless they are in possession of a job offer. This is the situation which prevails in European countries, the United States, Japan and Korea as well as in the temporary migration programmes of almost all countries. In other countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, candidates for permanent migration need not have a job offer in order to be selected and invited to immigrate; however, having such an offer generally facilitates the selection by granting the candidate additional points, a minimum number of which must be accumulated before the candidate is eligible for immigration.

It is generally the case that employers want to see and interview candidates for employment before making a hiring decision. In the absence of a direct contact, they may obtain information from trusted third parties, such as agencies, friends or relatives or they may have information by virtue of the fact that worker is being transferred from a branch of the same enterprise in another country. Alternatively, they may resort to telephone, teleconference or Internet-based interviews.¹¹

Still, not all labour migrants are recruited directly from abroad. Some may be former international students who search for and find work after completion of their studies and are then allowed to change status and to stay on as labour migrants. Others may come as tourists and shop around for work or be invited by an employer for an interview and be hired for a job while in the country. Still others may be unauthorised and be hired illegally “off-the-street”, even if information about job opportunities with particular employers may have been transmitted to them in the origin country.

A recent data source makes it possible to examine to what extent declared labour migrants in Europe are indeed arriving with a pre-negotiated job. The 2008 Immigrant Module of the European Union Labour Force Survey asked immigrants to specify the reason they mostly had for migrating to the country. Included among the responses were family formation (migration for marriage), accompanying family (of workers, refugees, students, etc.), family reunification, study, international protection, intra-corporate transfer, work reasons (arrived with a job or without) and other reasons.¹² In principle, then, persons who change status and become labour migrants should not in principle appear as labour migrants.


In practice, however, the reason specified by a migrant in responding to such a question may not necessarily correspond to the reason specified in the residence permit granted upon entry. Since entry and stay are regulated, sometimes strictly, the avenue chosen by an immigrant may be sometimes a matter of expedience rather than a reflection of the real reason for emigrating. Some persons wishing to work, for example, may request asylum upon entry, which gives them the right to remain in the country while their case is considered. Others may marry a legal resident abroad and then migrate with the spouse in order to find work in the country of the spouse; they may also specify that they came for work reasons. Finally unauthorised migrants generally come for work reasons and may indicate this if asked why they came in a survey, regardless of the permit they receive if eventually regularised. One might therefore expect, given these situations, that the proportion of persons who indicated work-related reasons for migrating in the labour force survey and who did not have a job upon arrival may be significant. This is especially the case in free-circulation regimes, where there are no obstacles to entry.

The data show not only that this group is significant but also that in many countries, relatively modest percentages of persons declaring themselves as having arrived for work reasons indicated having a job before arrival (Figure 1.8). Generally, the percentages are higher for OECD labour migrants (about 50% on average) than for non-OECD migrants (over 30% on average), with the exception of Ireland and the United Kingdom, for which movements of EU migrants arriving without jobs following the enlargement of the European Union has reversed the standard pattern. The percentages are especially low in the countries of southern Europe, which have seen considerable unauthorised migration as well as, in the past, visa-free entries of non-EU migrants. Because the reason for migration is specified by the migrant rather than reflecting the nature of the first permit obtained, however, it is difficult to interpret these results.


They may reflect the fact that many migrants did not formally enter as labour migrants, for whom the holding of a job offer is normally a prerequisite in these countries,¹³ or that a considerable proportion of labour recruitment does indeed take place within the country of hiring, rather than from abroad.

No doubt the truth lies somewhere in between. It is almost certainly the case that few employers hire workers without first having interviewed them or obtained information from someone who has. Employer recruitment practices may thus be biased, in principle and also in practice, in favour of in-country hiring, whether the employer hires legally or not. Immigrant networks being efficient transmitters of information about jobs and labour markets back to origin countries, persons interested in migrating may well find it opportune to try their chances in the country of destination, rather than wait for an invitation to an interview to arrive, with no iron-clad guarantee of employment in the end. This was undoubtedly in part the rationale for the introduction of supply-driven migration

Figure 1.8. **Self-declared labour migrants who indicated they had found a job before arrival, by region of birth, 2008**



Source: European Union Labour force Survey – ad hoc module on the labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants, 2008 (Eurostat).

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systems, in which immigrants are asked to submit an application for migration. Those chosen on the basis of their characteristics are then invited to immigrate and to enter the labour market in the country of destination in the same way as residents.

If the practice of hiring labour migrants within the country seems to be common practice in demand-driven systems as well, then the differences between demand- and supply-driven migration systems may not be as great as generally thought. Where they differ more substantially is in the conditions of stay offered upon entry, which is indefinite in the case of the supply-driven systems of Australia and Canada, but of limited duration when tied to a specific job offer in other countries. Indeed the uncertainty associated with a limited-duration permit may induce potential migrants to try their chances alone, before bringing in their families. This is the subject of the next section.


Family migration – who arrives first?

Over the recent past many OECD countries have eased restrictions concerning spousal migration, making it easier for highly skilled labour migrants to come with their spouses and families and granting work rights to spouses upon arrival.¹⁴ In practice, however, not all labour migrants arrive with their families, even when there are no restrictions, because their intended stay may not be a prolonged one; because they may prefer to leave their families in the country of origin, either entirely or until they have a clearer idea of the way of life in the destination country; or finally, because a family move may not be possible to organise before the start of employment in the destination country. Likewise humanitarian migrants who were at risk in their countries of origin may initially flee alone, with plans to bring in their families once their refugee status is recognised. Migrants who are regularised or who return to the origin country to marry are other situations which may result in potential family reunification some time after the arrival of the original migrant in the destination country.

Because labour force surveys generally involve the interviewing of all members of a household selected into the sample, it is possible to identify situations in which an immigrant arrives before, after or the same year as his or her spouse. If one restricts oneself to situations in which the spouse who arrives later does so in the year in which the survey is conducted, then one can plausibly assume that for married migrants, the marriage took place before the arrival. At worst, it took place in the year of arrival. This reduces the possibility of distortions that could arise if one looked at the entire immigrant stock, because of the possibility that immigrants may meet in the country of residence and marry several years after arrival, which would not constitute family migration. We also restrict our attention to situations in which both spouses are foreign-born.


Generally, migrant spouses from non-EU countries arrive separately (77% on average) more often than they do together (Figure 1.9). For EU migrants, the situation is more balanced with almost half of immigrant couples on average arriving together. Whether this is attributable to restrictions on family migration for migrants from outside the EU is unclear. Most countries have relaxed rules regarding this, especially for highly skilled migrants, so there is no *a priori* reason why one would expect this result. The choice of coming alone or as a family may well be the decision of the immigrant, but it may be influenced by the perceived stability of the status of residence granted upon arrival.¹⁵

Figure 1.9. **Order of arrival of married immigrant women, compared to that of their spouses, 2006-10 entries**



Note: Samples for other countries were either too small to be usable or did not allow the identification of household members.

Sources: European Union Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); United States: American Community Survey, 2010.

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
EU couples arrive together more than 60% of the time in the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Austria. At the other extreme, non-EU couples arrive together less than 20% of the time in Italy, Spain, Austria and France.

For the United States, fully 40% of female married migrants arrived with their spouses, a surprising result, given the importance of family migration in the United States. However, green card statistics indicate that spouses and children of foreign citizens have accounted

for only about 40% of total family migration on average over the five years ending in 2012. Other family migration categories involve parents, adult siblings and sons and daughters of American citizens, who are allowed to come in with their spouses and apparently seem to do so.

If one examines family reunification cases separately, then one sees that women arrive first on average about 26% of the time among non-EU couples and 22% of the time among EU couples (Figure 1.10). The values range from about 10 to 30%, with Ireland an outlier for non-EU couples. In the United States married women arrive first about 20% of the time. Although women in an origin country household may be the initial emigrants more often than was the case in the past, in OECD countries this appears to still remain very much a minority phenomenon. The male spouse thus continues to be the initial or principal migrant most of the time among married immigrants.

Figure 1.10. **Family reunification cases in which the wife arrives first**



Note: Samples for other countries were too small to be usable.

Sources: European Union Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); United States: American Community Survey, 2010.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822579>

The nature of arrival of the immigrant family may be a matter of policy interest if it is associated with the educational or labour market outcomes of immigrants or their children. It is known, for example, that the later immigrant children arrive, the lower are their results on international student assessments such as PISA (OECD, 2012).¹⁶ Later arrival may make the integration of children more difficult because of language learning difficulties or entry into an educational system which may be more demanding than that in the origin country. This may in turn have effects on their eventual labour market outcomes. Empirical results on outcomes by mode of family arrival may have bearing on whether or not immigrants should be encouraged and/or provided incentives to migrate as families.

Migration policies

During the last decade or so a number of countries have fundamentally revised their migration legislation in response to evolving patterns of migration and to the changing political environment. A prevailing theme in recent years has been the practice of locating

migration policy within broader labour market and demographic objectives although in the last three to four years demographic objectives *per se* seem to have become less important. Last year's report drew attention to ways in which governments were adopting new comprehensive migration policy frameworks in the form of national migration strategies. Examples were Poland, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, and Lithuania, as well as Mexico's 2012 creation of a migration policy unit to advance its policy proposals. This process has continued. All OECD countries already have policies in place to deal with migration flows, and new legislation tends to be fine tuning rather than fundamental innovation. It appears that countries are using the current relatively stable migration situation generally both to take a hard look at how their current strategies are working and to look forward to what might be required in the years ahead.

Countries are taking stock and looking forward by means of strategic reviews

For the most part strategies and proposed legislation have two main purposes: to modernise existing systems and to develop integrated approaches which include both the regulation of flows and measures to integrate better immigrant populations in their societies. Often the horizon is a five-to-fifteen year period.

Finland and Ireland have carried through strategic reviews of policies. The Finnish government is drawing up a comprehensive strategy, due for completion in mid-2013, anticipating the volume and nature of immigration required by Finland, and the impact on Finnish society. It has a number of key objectives: managing the labour market; ensuring equal rights for all employees; improving employment opportunities for people from an immigrant background; pursuing a more successful integration policy; a faster processing of asylum applications; and fighting discrimination. The preparation, co-ordinated by the Ministry of the Interior, involves a wide range of stakeholders, including municipalities, labour market organisations, the church, and immigrant groups.

During 2011, the Irish government published a migration strategy for 2011-14 to adapt the Irish immigration system and contribute to economic recovery. Specific programme commitments include policies to support and facilitate the integration of legally-resident immigrants into Irish society via stakeholder consultation, a review of approaches to migrant integration, combating racism and promotion of integration measures.

The Czech Republic, Romania and the Russian Federation have carried out strategic reviews, and the Slovak Republic has passed new and comprehensive legislation on residence. The Czech Republic is preparing a new comprehensive law relating to the entry and stay of foreigners. Among its main principles are the rights of immigrants to access social security, protection of labour market rights and reinforcement of integration policy. In 2011, a new five-year inter-departmental national strategy for immigration control was approved by the Romanian government. The main objectives are the prevention of irregular migration, better asylum processing and the social integration of foreigners. The Russian Federation has been looking further ahead. In June 2012, its government approved a new migration policy strategy for the period to 2025. The main objectives are a more logical and transparent system of residence permit issuance and a points-based system for economic migration. Foreigners will also be allowed to change their status in the Russian Federation without obligatory exit from the country that is currently required.

The new Act on Residence of Aliens in the Slovak Republic is aimed mainly at improving procedures related to the management of migration and the integration of immigrants; guaranteeing rights and freedoms of EU nationals, their family members and

non-EU/EEA country nationals during their entry and residence in the Slovak Republic; and linking entry control with entitlement to residence permits. The former system of long-term and permanent residence permits was simplified and it is now easier to convert a five-year residence permit to a permanent residence permit.

Chile is developing a five-year migration policy with three strategic objectives: to modernise the administrative process of residence applications; publish a new immigration law; and address the status of asylum seekers as soon as they arrive in the country.

The United States has restarted discussion of comprehensive immigration reform following the 2012 elections. A number of alternative bills have been drafted, with the main elements covering backlog reduction, regularisation for undocumented immigrants, expansion of the skilled temporary and permanent migration channels, creation of new quota exemptions for skilled workers and graduating students, and changes to the temporary worker programme for agricultural and other sectors. The outcome of this legislative activity is not yet clear.

Economic migration

As the recession has unfolded a number of trends have become manifest. While attention is still focused on endemic skill shortages, lack of demand from employers has reduced pressure to recruit from abroad. At the same time, governments, seeking to protect their domestic workforces in the face of rising unemployment, have become more restrictive towards foreign recruitment. They have also introduced measures to ease the situation for foreign workers who have lost their jobs, mainly by allowing them to stay on and search for work. The role of sponsors has also come under scrutiny. A growing trend has been for governments to adopt more rigorous measures against irregular migrants as well as agents who facilitate their entry and employers who hire them.

Recruitment of skilled migrants is more and more selective

For much of the last decade and especially since the onset of the economic crisis, member countries have become increasingly selective in their labour immigration, targeting the highly skilled. The objective is to recruit those who are perceived to offer the most economic benefit to the country. This trend continues. Both Australia and Canada have introduced several new measures into their permanent migration programmes designed better to select the sorts of skilled immigrants who, on the basis of past evidence, seem most likely to succeed.

A new Ministerial Advisory Council on Skilled Migration in Australia advises the government on addressing current and future skill shortages. A new and more selective procedure has been adopted to make the system more efficient. Persons wishing to immigrate are now required to submit an online expression of interest. Only those receiving an invitation may lodge a visa application. The types of employer-sponsored visas have been simplified and the documentation required from employers sponsoring a skilled migrant on certain visas has been reduced. In a separate agreement, it has become easier for Australian employers to recruit American workers in licensed occupations, such as electricians and plumbers. During 2012 Australia also simplified its visa system, reducing the number of Skilled Migration visas from 27 to 11, and applying simpler and more standardised criteria across a number of skilled entry programs. The number of Temporary Work visa types was also reduced from 17 to 8. The smaller visa group allows

clients to more easily select the appropriate visa as existing provisions have been consolidated to reflect broader purposes of stay. Simplification of the Visitor visa programme is currently under consideration.

Canada eliminated the occupation list under which applicants to the Federal Skilled Worker programme could be admitted without a job. Canada has also initiated consultations with a view to improving labour selection procedures to make the system more responsive to the needs of employers. Proposals include better language proficiency, more emphasis on younger migrants and redirecting the points system towards factors more likely to contribute to success in the Canadian labour market. A pilot programme assists newcomers with the costs associated with foreign credential recognition processes.

Employer needs have also driven change in Luxembourg where, in January 2012, new legislation introduced a more proactive approach to the recruitment procedure for salaried workers from non-EU/EEA countries.

Elsewhere language and salary conditions have become more stringent. In 2011 the Netherlands tightened its Highly Skilled Migrants Scheme. The Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service now has the option of rejecting a residence permit if the salary of the migrant is disproportionately high for relevant employment. A new law in the Russian Federation, coming into operation in December 2012, requires labour migrants to have passed a test of Russian language proficiency. This is a prerequisite for obtaining a work permit for foreign nationals from countries with no visa requirement to enter the Russian Federation, who intend to work in the service sector, retail trade and housing maintenance.

A more comprehensive selection process has been put in place by the United Kingdom government. In pursuit of an overall reduction in net immigration, it introduced a series of measures affecting skilled migration during 2011 (reported last year) and 2012. Prospective workers need to have a graduate level job, speak an intermediate level of English and meet specific salary requirements – unless they earn over GBP 150 000 per year. The skill level was increased so that a number of middle-level management jobs such as IT technicians and security managers were no longer open to non-EEA migrant workers. However, the rules for businesses with respect to the advertising of highly paid or PhD jobs were relaxed in order to reduce bureaucracy. Companies need not advertise such jobs through the public JobCentrePlus system, when they are unlikely to get applicants; however, they will have to advertise more widely elsewhere.

Australia imposed more restrictions on its temporary skilled worker visa in February 2013. Among the measures taken, the burden of proof on employers that a shortage exists has been increased, English language requirements for certain positions have been raised, and the salary exemption has been increased from AUD 180 000 to 250 000.

In early 2013, Norway eliminated its job-search permit for skilled foreigners, as well as its salary-based permit for skilled workers (which provided an exemption from other evidence of qualification), as refusal rates were high and the programmes were considered at risk for abuse, rather than a means to ensure access to skilled workers.

A number of other countries, mainly in eastern and Southern Europe, have introduced more general measures to restrict labour immigration through work permit systems in response to the economic crisis. The Czech Republic made work permit issue more restrictive in 2011, but eased conditions for those whose permits expired but wished to stay on. Employer requirements for sponsoring foreign workers were also made stricter. The

issue of work permits for unqualified non-EEA workers was stopped and proof of qualifications required from those applying for skilled employment. In order to encourage the highly skilled, graduates were given a two-year work permit while for non-EU/EEA-country nationals with secondary education it was for one year. However, those with expired work permits may stay on to look for another job if they have at least two years residence, and may change the nature of their activity: self-employed investors or entrepreneurs may become salaried employees and vice versa. Turkey, in 2010, imposed salary and workforce ratio thresholds on employers wishing to recruit from abroad, although exemptions were announced in 2011. Lithuania reduced its occupation shortage list from 60 in 2008 to four in 2011 and the Romanian government limited the number of work authorisations for foreigners in 2012, especially for posted workers for whom no social insurance is paid in Romania. Bulgaria has made it more difficult for employers to recruit foreign workers by extending the scope of the labour market test required prior to submitting an application for a foreign worker.

In Spain, no new major measures have been introduced but because of the crisis, existing ones are being applied in a more restrictive way. The occupation shortage list has been reduced and only temporary contracts may be offered by employers. Employers must take account of the national economic situation and advertise job opportunities for at least 25 days through the national public employment service instead of the previous 15 days.

Change in Switzerland has been driven less by the crisis and more by a significant rise in the number of workers coming in from eastern European EU states. The federal government has reintroduced a quota system for the authorisation of permits, activating a clause in its agreement with the EU which allows it to do this. Coming into force in May 2012, provisionally for one year, it applies only to workers from these countries who enter Switzerland to take up long-term employment for a year or more, or to those who take up residence as self-employed.

Some countries are still seeking to bring in skilled labour

Germany, the Slovak Republic and Hungary are thinking about or have adopted measures predominantly to attract new skilled migrants. Germany introduced more favourable criteria for admission of skilled foreign workers in mid-2012, extending exemptions from the labour market test and granting default labour market test approval after two weeks in the case of no response. It also introduced a job-search permit granting up to six months to foreigners holding recognised tertiary-level qualifications, and stepped up its public communication efforts with a new website. In order to help determine its labour market needs, the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is developing a “Jobmonitor”, a mechanism to determine current and future manpower needs by sector, qualifications and region. As from 2013 the “Jobmonitor” will provide information about manpower demand and supply up to 2030. Meanwhile, a new Act in the Slovak Republic simplifies application procedures for work permits by the highly skilled in order to attract them to come to the country. Applicants may be granted a residence permit valid for two to three years if they have satisfied all legal requirements. Hungary has simplified and shortened work-permit issuance by requiring fewer documents from employers, from the beginning of 2013.

A major problem countries face in attracting and selecting skilled migrants is the assessment of foreign qualifications. Several countries have announced measures to help deal with the problem. Germany is implementing its new law on the recognition of foreign

qualifications, with a website and orientation centres. Sweden has set up a new agency to assess foreign qualifications and their correspondence to those of Sweden. Ireland has established a new qualifications authority to facilitate the recognition of foreign qualifications. In Austria, information-points offering counselling services for the recognition and validation of foreign qualifications were established country-wide in early 2013. In order to surmount credit barriers a pilot project in Canada offers small loans of a few thousand dollars to immigrants applying for diploma recognition to cover the expenses, particularly for those who need costly bridging courses.

The move to points-based systems continues to spread

The last few years have seen considerable extension of points systems to select new labour migrants. Following the example of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, some European member countries states have adopted points-based systems (PBS) for selecting immigrants. In most cases the systems are closely linked to shortage lists, with more points available for shortage occupations. Since 2008, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria have introduced PBS in both their demand- and supply-led routes of entry. Japan and Korea are the most recent countries to establish them. In 2012, Japan introduced a points-based system for three groups of highly-skilled foreign professionals: those engaged in advanced academic research, others in advanced professional and technical activities and in advanced administrative and management activities. The allocation of points is based on academic background, business career and annual income, and a sufficient score grants foreign nationals a residence status which allows them to stay in Japan for a longer period. Japan's new residence management system, introduced in July 2012, extends the maximum period of stay from three to five years. The period of validity of re-entry permits is also extended, so that foreign nationals who have valid passports and residence cards and who re-enter Japan within one year from their departure do not need to apply for re-entry permits.

Korea introduced a points system in 2011, which has subsequently come into operation, for both skilled and unskilled workers. Professional migrant workers already in Korea are granted long-term residence visas without restriction of employment, if they earn sufficient points. The points are based largely on age, education level, Korean language proficiency and income level. Those meeting the standards of the PBS may then bring into Korea their spouse and children who may also receive residence status. However, stay is initially limited to a maximum of three years, but is renewable.

In general, policy measures for low-skilled temporary and seasonal flows are more targeted

While most OECD states continue to support policies designed to bring in the skills required, temporary work programmes and the agencies involved in them are increasingly scrutinised. The need for temporary and less-skilled migrants continues although countries are now much less active in implementing new schemes than in the past and are likely to impose more conditions on entry. For example, Canada has taken steps to become more selective in accepting low-skilled workers. In 2011, a minimum language threshold and mandatory language testing for low-skilled provincial nominees were established. It is currently examining how best to improve its temporary foreign worker programme, to increase responsiveness to employer needs while ensuring it acts as a complement rather than providing competition for work programmes for Canadian and permanent resident workers.

Where new schemes have been introduced it is usually in relation to certain occupational sectors. In May 2011, the Australian Government announced the implementation of Enterprise Migration Agreements, a new temporary migration initiative to help address the skill needs of the resources sector. EMAs are customised, immigration programmes for large scale resource projects. They are designed to help ensure peak workforce needs are met, easing capacity constraints and ensuring that a project's economic and employment benefits are realised.

The care sector is one where several governments have been active. Canada has introduced a change to allow live-in caregivers working in Canada to obtain open work permits sooner. Carers can now obtain open work permits once they have applied for permanent residence, after fulfilling the obligations of their initial work permit. Israel too has reviewed its procedure for foreign care workers but, unlike in Canada, in a more restrictive way. The notice of resignation period for them is now longer than that provided for in the law for an Israeli worker or for any other foreign worker. They are also prevented from transferring from one part of the country to another.

In 2012 both Denmark and Norway changed their regulations on au pairs to make them more conditional. Previously the scheme in Denmark had been extended to include care for the elderly but the practice reverted to allowing au pairs to work only in host families with at least one child under 18. To safeguard the rights of au pairs and prevent their exploitation as cheap domestic labour, Norway established an independent information and counselling service for au pairs and host families and introduced sanctions against host families violating the provisions of the au pair scheme.

Seasonal agricultural labour policy moved in different directions in Australia and the United Kingdom. Development considerations in origin countries underlay the Australian government's extension, now implemented, of its Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme. The objective of this scheme is both to contribute to economic development in Pacific countries through remittances and by giving employment experience and training to seasonal workers and to help growers in the Australian horticultural industry who demonstrate they cannot source local labour. In contrast, the United Kingdom is intending to wind up its Seasonal Agricultural Workers scheme in December 2013 when transitional arrangements for Bulgarians and Romanians, currently the only nationalities taking part in it, expire. In October 2012, the British government announced it had no plans to open the scheme to Croatians when Croatia joins the EU in July 2013.

Elsewhere, countries have responded to economic conditions by introducing additional restrictions on temporary workers, affecting periods of stay and return. In 2011, the Dutch government further restricted the issue of temporary work permits to migrants from outside the EU. Also the minimum period that a labour migrant from non-EU/EEA countries must have before he or she can work without a permit in the Netherlands was increased from three to five years. In 2012, Turkey announced that immigrant workers would have to apply for a residence permit if they stayed in Turkey more than three months during a period of six months; in practice this meant they could only engage in permit-free employment three months in every six.

In order to protect domestic applicants for jobs, the Czech government limited to six months extensions of work permits for jobs where a lower qualification than secondary education with leaving certificate was specified. The length of permits generally is determined by the type of movement. Seasonal workers to the Czech Republic may stay for three to six months, intra-company transferees for up to three years and others for a

maximum of two years, provided their salaries were at least as high as the minimum monthly wage for the country as a whole. Finally, more strict rules have been introduced to regulate private employment agencies.

In Spain, workers who are hired from their country of origin for seasonal or harvest work must return to that country once the harvest or seasonal work has been completed. If they fulfil this commitment to return home, they receive preferential treatment in future recruitment, by being offered jobs directly.

Some countries have introduced policies to facilitate temporary and seasonal flows

Two countries, Italy and Korea, have eased entry conditions for seasonal and low-skilled workers in order to speed up processes and reduce bureaucracy for employers. New rules on seasonal work performed by immigrants in Italy liberalise mobility, allowing seasonal workers to accept new seasonal work opportunities, with the same employer or with another, once the contract for which entry into the country was authorised has been completed, provided that the limit of nine months' stay in Italy is respected.

Korea has eased restrictions on stay by unskilled workers. A new Act passed in 2012 allows unskilled workers to be re-employed for a further four years and ten months providing there is a three-month mandatory interval abroad. Second, employers may now more easily re-hire returning unqualified migrants. Third, a points system has been introduced allocating quotas of migrant workers to employers. The points are both needs-based – taking labour shortages into account – and merit-based, taking account of respect of relevant labour laws. Fourth, to get into the job applicant pools, potential migrants must already take a Korean language test, and in the case of applicants for agriculture, livestock and fishery, may also take optional skills tests. Now optional skills tests are being extended to applicants for jobs in manufacturing, allowing migrants to provide evidence of their skill and increase their chances of being selected for employment.

Bilateral agreements on selected labour flows continue, particularly in Eastern Europe. Bulgaria intends to continue its policy of seeking work opportunities abroad for Bulgarian workers in countries outside the European Union. In 2011 a bilateral employment treaty was concluded with Israel for a period of three years. Potential workers apply through local labour offices in Bulgaria and should comply with several requirements: this is their first job in Israel; they are between 25 and 40 years old and are in good health; they have three years experience and a relevant diploma. The workers receive equal treatment and enjoy full rights as regards social security, working conditions, holidays and so on. In 2011, Israel also signed a bilateral agreement with Thailand for agricultural workers and in 2012 one with Sri Lanka. Hungary continues to extend its working holiday maker agreements, announcing one with New Zealand in 2012 and opening negotiations with Canada and the Korean Republic. In October 2012, the Russian Federation signed an agreement with Tajikistan to increase the period that Tajik nationals can work in the Russian Federation from one to three years. It signed an agreement with Moldova in November 2012 for intergovernmental co-operation in the field of labour migration to provide better conditions of legal employment and better collection and exchange of information on migrant workers temporarily employed in the Russian Federation and Moldova.

Investors and entrepreneurs are welcome

In the recent past Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Romania and the United Kingdom are among countries that developed policies to attract these “high

value” immigrants. The trend continues. Three countries have taken steps to encourage those who can show evidence of entrepreneurial talent and a successful business history to come and settle. Australia has reduced the range of business skills visas in order to provide a clearer pathway to permanent residence and introduced an innovative points test which includes financial metrics, registered patents, evidence of trademarks and evidence of export trade. In order to encourage high net worth people seeking investment immigration it has introduced a Significant Investor visa which targets those willing to make an investment of at least AUD 5 million in the Australian economy. There are also concessions on visa requirements, such as no age or points test requirements and a reduced residence qualifying period in Australia.

In April 2012 two new immigration initiatives aimed at attracting non-EEA migrant entrepreneurs and investors became operational in Ireland. The Immigrant Investor Programme provides for approved participants and “immediate” family members to enter Ireland on multi-entry visas and to remain for an initial period of five years (generally) with permission renewable after two years. The financial commitment ranges from EUR 500 000 to EUR 2 million. The Start-Up Entrepreneur Programme provides for a broadly similar residency for business development purposes for approved migrants with an innovative business idea for a “High Potential Start Up” and with funding of EUR 75 000. No job creation targets are set initially.

Chile’s “Start-up Chile” programme takes a different approach, providing up to USD 40 000 funding and a one-year visa to selected entrepreneurs, as well as business incubator services, and has been running since 2010.


In July 2011 the government of the United Kingdom launched a new route for exceptionally talented migrants (“internationally recognised as world leaders in their field”) in science, humanities, engineering and the arts who wished to work in the United Kingdom. Such migrants do not require sponsorship by an employer but do require the endorsement of an appropriate designated competent body for their particular field. The competent bodies are the four main national professional societies for the arts, humanities, science and engineering.

EU Blue Cards are in vogue but conditions apply

Ten countries, especially in Eastern Europe, have incorporated the EU Blue Card Directive into their domestic legislation since last year’s report: the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria. In some cases, the Blue Card runs alongside the existing system, in others it replaces it. A number of countries have specified certain conditions that applicants must meet, especially in relation to salary levels and which vary from country to country (Figure 1.11).

Although the EU Directive indicates that the salary threshold should be 1.5 times the average salary, the benchmark salary varies. In the Czech Republic, it is the average for the country; in Finland it must be higher than the average wage; Italy specifies the minimum level set for the State’s medical expenses contribution exemption (about EUR 25 000); and in the Netherlands a gross annual salary of at least EUR 60 000. Other conditions applied include duration of the contract (minimum of one year in the Czech Republic); period of work (at least one year in the intended occupation in Finland); experience (university education or history of five years professional employment in the Slovak Republic; completed a higher education programme in the Netherlands). In some cases the card is


Figure 1.11. **European Union Blue Card thresholds, required salary as a percentage of the average annual gross income of full-time employed, 2010-12**



Notes: Thresholds are calculated for the top bracket, in most cases shortage occupations are subject to a threshold of 80% of the main threshold, although the shortage threshold may be set lower.

1. Spain applies the threshold based on average salary for each sector; threshold shown is for average income overall.

Source: Data on average annual gross income of full-time employed: OECD Database on wages; EU Blue Card thresholds from official national publications for the first year of application and using 2012 exchange rates for non-euro currencies.

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linked with entitlement to a permanent residence permit. The five years of legal residence needed to obtain this status in Italy can be obtained summing together legal residence periods as EU Blue Card holders in both Italy and another member state. However, in the Netherlands it is easier to obtain a residence permit based on the continuing Dutch Highly Skilled Migrant Scheme than on an EU Blue Card.

International students

The internationalisation of higher education is continuing, although new programmes and policies for attracting international students may be less frequent than in the past. In part this may be because many countries already have policies in place to attract them, for example, new measures in Finland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and Lithuania, reported last year. In part, too, it reflects the concern in some countries that some overseas students are taking advantage of international study opportunities to pursue other objectives (for example, work) and that there is cause to tighten up on entry visas and stay permits.

The pressures of recession on the domestic workforce have also led to some reassessment of post-study entry into the labour market by overseas graduates, although for the most part countries are still in favour of post-study stay. In addition, new higher education models are being developed, among them online degrees, franchising and overseas campuses, which affect demand for higher education in foreign countries. New developments have focused on two areas: recruitment of students, but with more stringent entry conditions; and post-study employment.

International students are in favour, with some exceptions

Three countries have introduced new measures to attract international students. Finland's strategy to increase the internationalisation of its higher education institutions has been further developed. Its aim is to develop an internationally competitive and attractive higher education and research community in Finland, and to increase the number of exchange students and foreign students pursuing a degree. As a result of a reform of the Nationality Act in 2011, foreign students are now able to gain Finnish citizenship much earlier since the time studied in Finland may be taken into account.

New Zealand also put in place a reduction in bureaucratic entry barriers. International students are no longer required to provide a full medical certificate, unless there are identified risk factors, but they must hold acceptable medical insurance as a condition of their visa. Raising the profile of its higher educational system internationally underlies Lithuania's programme since 2011 to improve the quality of its higher education institutions. The programme makes entry for students and lecturers who are non-EU/EEA-country nationals easier by reducing bureaucratic barriers to the issuance of visas and residence permits.

Four countries have changed their visa systems for international students, introducing constraints on their recruitment and entry. For the most part the changes are designed to limit stay after completion of studies. The Australian government has introduced the Genuine Temporary Entrant requirement, which explicitly addresses whether the individual circumstances of a student visa applicant indicate that their intention is for a temporary stay in Australia. Under new legislation in the Slovak Republic, a study permit which covers students in secondary and tertiary education is limited to a maximum of six years. A new and tighter immigration regime for international students in Ireland, begun in 2011, introduced a differentiated approach between degree courses and those at the language or non-degree level as well as limiting periods of stay according to the type of course followed. In general, non-EEA student permission will be limited to seven years in total for degree-level courses and three years for sub-degree level. Interim arrangements for current students affected by the change were provided for.


As part of its efforts to reduce international student numbers in order to meet its net migration target, the United Kingdom has focused its attention on the educational institutions themselves. The process began in 2011 and continued in 2012. The main thrust of policy in 2011 was closer monitoring of institutional sponsors of international students to ensure that only *bona fide* ones could recruit overseas. In 2012, further restrictions were introduced. Work placements were restricted to one-third of the course, unless the course is at degree level and the sponsor is a higher education institution or the student is on a study abroad programme; the time students can spend at degree level is limited to five years, with certain exemptions for longer courses and doctorates at higher education institutions.

Post-study international graduates are sought after, for the most part

A constant policy theme in the last few years has been to encourage international graduates to stay on and take up or search for work. They are regarded as well qualified, international in outlook and possessing an ability to live and work in different cultures and environments. This trend largely continues. During 2011 and 2012, seven countries have introduced changes designed to attract international graduates into their labour markets, with only the United Kingdom in the opposite direction.

Post-graduation job-search extensions have been increased in other countries, including Germany, which increased its post-graduation job-search period to up to 18 months. Ireland grants access to the labour market after graduation for six or twelve months depending on the level of course followed. Many OECD countries now offer such post-graduation possibilities (Figure 1.12). While the United States does not have a post-graduation job-search permit, it does grant 12 months optional practical training to graduates, during which they can be employed if approved by their university; the extension can be up to 27 months for those in STEM (science, technology, engineering, math) occupations, the list of which was expanded in 2012.

Figure 1.12. **Maximum duration of job-search periods for post-graduate schemes in different OECD countries**



Source: National legislations.

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In an attempt to create a reservoir of highly qualified manpower with domestic qualifications, Germany is developing a comprehensive strategy to recruit foreign students to German vocational and university-level programmes and encourage them to stay after graduation. Employers offer targeted counselling and information services to attract more young people from abroad to come and train in vocational jobs in Germany. There is support for placements into workplace-based vocational training or into a skilled job in shortage occupations, currently doctors and other health professionals, engineers and technical specialists, jobs in the hotel and catering sector.

Other countries have introduced a range of other measures. Australia's new post-study work visa arrangements are to come into effect in early 2013 as a new post-study work stream. The new visa allows overseas students who do not meet the criteria for a permanent general skilled migration visa to remain in Australia for 18 months to gain skilled work experience or improve their English language skills. Finland grants a new temporary residence permit to allow international students to stay and seek employment for a maximum of six months after graduation, while graduates from Czech universities can now obtain a work permit for two years. Three countries differentiate between types of degree. In 2012, Canada made it easier for foreign nationals studying at the PhD level to stay on and

PhD students and recent graduates are now eligible to apply for permanent residence through the Federal Skilled Worker Programme. Despite the economic crisis, the Irish government has continued to liberalise its approach to post-study postgraduates. It has announced plans to allow them to work in Ireland for a year after completion of studies, with “high-value” research students allowed to bring their families to Ireland if staying for more than two years. In 2011 Korea introduced measures to encourage international students to enter the labour market after graduation. They may be granted a job-seekers visa for six months, which can be extended up to one year for those with a bachelor degree and two years for a masters or doctorate degree.

In contrast to most other states the United Kingdom has actively deterred international graduates from non-EEA countries from entering the labour market after completion of studies. The post-study route (Tier 1) was closed in 2012, although a route into sponsored graduate employment through Tier 2 of the points-based system was maintained. In a partial policy reversal, however, the government announced in December 2012 that international students with PhDs could stay and look for work for a limited period.

Irregular migration

Irregular migration continues to occupy policy makers

In light of the economic crisis and the gradual reduction in the means of legal entry, countries are sensitive to the perception that their borders are under increasing pressure from irregular migrants. At the same time they face humanitarian challenges posed by the need to cope with often large numbers of irregular migrants in their labour markets and societies. These provide the main *foci* for recent measures to deal with both the causes and consequences of irregular migration. For countries in the proximate region, the situation in Syria presents a major challenge. The increased cases of illegal crossing of the border with Turkey have resulted in strengthened border control there, while Bulgaria and Turkey have launched joint border control patrols on their common border.

Several countries have introduced or extended policies to crack down on the various middlemen behind human smuggling and trafficking. Since June 2011, Canada has targeted unscrupulous immigration consultants and representatives who seek to defraud and victimise. It has also taken measures to deal with marriage fraud and deter people from using relationships of convenience to circumvent immigration laws. The Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act of June 2012 introduces measures which make it easier to prosecute human smugglers, impose mandatory minimum prison sentences on convicted smugglers and hold ship owners and operators accountable for the use of their ships in human smuggling operations. In a similar vein, Lithuania introduced new measures in 2012 against fictitious enterprises and other fraudulent means for obtaining visas or residence permits.

The Czech Republic's new national strategy to combat the problem includes preventing exploitation of victims in the workplace and the development of appropriate legal instruments to combat criminal activities, alongside identification of groups at greatest risk, and the education of professionals who are in contact with the victims. New legislation in Luxembourg in 2012 is designed to combat trafficking of migrants and contains new proposals to target employers of illegal migrants. Carriers are also under scrutiny. Commercial airlines operating flights to New Zealand became liable in 2012 for infringement fees for breaching certain immigration-related obligations, while Romania is focusing its efforts to combat irregular migration and trafficking on train transport and tourist areas.

In contrast, Israel has focused pressure on irregular migrants themselves rather than employers. A new unit has been formed to examine the legal status of foreign workers, detain those illegally present or not in compliance with the terms of their permit, and remove them from Israel. It has tackled illegal infiltration in its south by expediting completion of a fence on the Israel-Egypt border and expanded detention facilities.

The Netherlands, France and the Russian Federation have focused their efforts on the criminality involved. In 2011, the Netherlands announced that those guilty of human trafficking or providing work for illegally residing immigrants would be prosecuted for these offences. France has tightened its legislation on irregularity and increased the grounds for deportation. The detention period before deportation has been extended from 32 to 45 days with 30 days allowed for voluntary departure, except in cases of risk of the person not leaving. The deportation order can also be accompanied by the prohibition of a return to French territory of from two to five years. In the summer of 2012, the Russian Federation proposed a draft law which stipulated harsher penalties (including criminal ones) for illegally crossing the state border and/or organising irregular migration. The prison term for committing these crimes was increased from two years to five with a possible five to ten years in certain circumstances.

Better information is being used to combat irregular migration

The collection and use of biometric information is growing, along with increased co-operation between countries. Ireland and the United Kingdom have signed a joint agreement reinforcing the Common Travel Area and agreed on the exchange of information such as fingerprint biometrics and biographical details, particularly from “high risk” countries, as part of the visa issuing process. In October 2011, Switzerland became a participant in the Schengen Visa Information System, adding biometric information to its existing personal records of individuals.

New Zealand has also introduced, from October 2011, general biometrics provisions for its visas. This allows the capture and storage of biometric facial images, the exchange with partner countries of face and fingerprint biometric information on criminal deportees and the collection and use of fingerprints from quota refugees and foreign nationals suspected to be in breach or intending to breach its immigration laws. In tightening its measures against illegal migrants, in September 2012 the government brought into force provisions allowing entry and inspection of records of education providers; entry and search of specific areas at the border; entry and search relating to deportation; the possibility of detention; and the collection of biometric information from someone who is liable for deportation or turnaround, for the purpose of arranging their departure. The Finnish four year (2012-15) action programme against illegal migration is based on co-operation between different departments and authorities and preventive action across borders and at Finnish missions abroad. Finland has also joined other states in introducing biometric residence cards to prevent and combat illegal immigration and illegal residence by creating a reliable link between the residence permit and its holder. Now only the applicant can personally apply for a residence permit, with fingerprints being stored in a national database.

Elsewhere, formal cross-border agreements to exchange information have been signed. A Canada-United States action plan, launched in December 2011, enhances verification of visitor identities, pre-arrival screening of visitors to North America, and the management of flows of people across the joint border.

Ireland's first formal visa waiver programme was announced in May 2011 as a pilot and extended for four years in March 2012. It aims to provide visa-free travel to Ireland for certain categories of persons in possession of a valid UK visa and who are nationals of one of the countries covered by the scheme. The two countries have also agreed to collaborate on information sharing in the prevention of trafficking in human beings. Ireland has also agreed with Nigeria to co-operate in combating human trafficking. During 2011-12 Hungary signed bilateral agreements on the readmission of persons residing illegally in Hungary with several Balkan states, the Russian Federation and Georgia. In February 2011, Turkey and the EU concluded a readmission agreement. In December 2011, the governments of Romania and the Russian Federation established a readmission protocol for the joint return of irregular migrants.

Countries are adopting policies to deal with irregular migrants in a humanitarian way

Most regularisation programmes in recent years have been at the level of the individual or relating to small groups, for example, in clearing backlogs of cases. The latter type continues. In 2011, Poland instituted a third regularisation of foreigners staying illegally in the country. A Greek law in January 2011 opens the possibility of regularisation for irregular migrants or rejected asylum seekers who can prove that they have been living in Greece for the past 12 years. Those receiving permits under this new law, initially for one or two years, are allowed to work as employees or as self-employed if they have in the past held a self-employment stay permit. In addition, irregular migrants for whom expulsion is not possible, either because of their health or because their identity cannot be established, receives six-month provisional renewable stay permits. During the waiting period, the Greek state is obliged to provide decent accommodation and living conditions, or in alternative the migrants in question are allowed to work.

In Poland a regularisation procedure took effect in January 2012 for certain groups of illegally residing foreigners, which resulted in more than 9 500 applications being filed in the course of the first half of 2012. By the end of 2012, 40% of these were examined by the local authorities of first instance (*"voivodship governors"*). Almost 3 000 permits were granted and more than 900 applications were refused.

Although there has been no regularisation in the United States since 1986, the Obama administration has taken administrative steps which include providing temporary relief from deportation for young unauthorised migrants. Various conditions apply, including: the individual must have come to the United States under the age of 16; have continuously resided there for at least five years; is currently in school or has graduated from high school; has obtained a general education development certificate; is an honourably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; has not been convicted of a felony; does not pose a threat to national security or public safety; and is not above the age of thirty. Individuals who meet the eligibility requirements cannot be removed for a two-year period, subject to renewal, and can apply for work authorisation.

Three countries have brought in measures to encourage irregular migrants to leave, but with alleviating circumstances for the most vulnerable. Since 2011, irregular migrants leaving Italy voluntarily are guaranteed individual counselling and organisation of the return trip, plus an allowance for initial resettlement to be paid prior to departure, and assistance in initial reception and labour market orientation upon return. The Netherlands has introduced measures to make illegal stay in the Netherlands less attractive, making it punishable by a fine or detention. However, providing assistance to illegal persons is not

prohibited so that churches and charity organisations can continue to provide support to illegal aliens who have exhausted all legal options. As a consequence of fiscal restrictions, Spain has ended the right of irregular migrants over 18 to have free access to basic health services but this is still available persons in an emergency situation, such as a pregnancy or birth.

Family migration

For a decade or more, countries have tended to pay less policy attention to family reunification and formation, and to the family members of other migrants, than they have to economic migration and asylum. In Europe this is in part owing to the Human Rights Act which constrains to some extent how restrictive governments can be because of its provisions concerning rights to family life. As more attention is paid to the integration of migrants the family stream has come under more scrutiny in the last few years, in general becoming more restrictive.

Family migration policies continue to become generally more restrictive but there are exceptions

In the last few years there has been a trend for policies to restrict family migration or to discourage persons who wish to migrate with their families, by raising the income criteria for family reunification and by introducing language and other tests for family members. Such measures restricting family migration create some tension: on the one hand, there is pressure to respect human rights commitments signed by many countries; on the other hand, there are concerns raised with respect to the ability of migrants to integrate, settle and speak the host country's language(s). At the same time, however, some changes have tended towards a more liberal approach. Canada, for example, has generally tightened up on family sponsorship but in order to deal with the large backlog and lengthy wait times in the Family Class, it has increased by over 60% the number of sponsored parents and grandparents admitted in 2012 and launched a Parent and Grandparent Super Visa, to allow such persons to visit their families in Canada for an extended period of time.

Various avenues have been used to narrow conditions for family reunion and formation. They include more rigorous conditions imposed on sponsors, more stringent residence and maintenance conditions and action to prevent abuse.

The United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark have tightened up on sponsorship by relatives in the host country. The United Kingdom's new family migration policy, in operation from July 2012, is designed to minimise family migration as part of the government's overall target to reduce total net migration. Its focus is broad, requiring a wide range of conditions to be met covering whether the relationship is genuine, whether the sponsor can properly support their partner and any dependents financially, and whether the partner is able to integrate into British society. New financial requirements set a minimum gross annual income threshold of GDP 17 600 for a person sponsoring settlement in the United Kingdom of a non-EEA partner. In addition, from October 2013, all applicants for settlement, unless otherwise exempt, will be required to pass the "Life in the United Kingdom" test and present an English-language speaking and listening qualification. Measures to tighten control and eliminate abuse also cover forced marriages, sham marriages and deportation of criminals. For example, the minimum probationary period for a non-EEA partner is to be five years instead of two. Finally, new strict regulations relating to the elderly relatives of foreign citizens or foreign-spouse/partners of British citizens make their family reunification very difficult.

Regulatory amendments in force in Canada from November 2011 strengthen the bar on family sponsorships for sponsors been convicted of certain offences. From March 2012, new regulatory amendments bar new permanent residents sponsored as a spouse, common-law or conjugal partner from abandoning their sponsor soon after becoming a permanent resident, then seeking to sponsor a new spouse or partner. The measures are designed to deter people in new relationships from using their previous relationship to gain quick entry to Canada as permanent residents, when they have no intention of staying with their sponsor.

New rules coming into force in Denmark in May 2012 revoke the former points requirements and abolish the fee for applying for family reunification, replacing them with a strict set of rules. Foreign nationals may obtain a residence permit for Denmark if they have a spouse, cohabitant or registered partner already resident in Denmark. Both must be at least 24 years old, and the couple's combined attachment to Denmark must be greater than to any other country. The applicant must pass a new Danish language test within six months after being granted a residence permit. Self-sufficiency, housing and financial security requirements apply. Other conditions relate to the sponsor's residence status in Denmark. The marriage or partnership must also be valid under Danish law. Other migrants must meet stringent requirements in order to qualify for a permanent residence permit: being 18 years of age or over; having already lived in Denmark legally for at least five years; having no criminal record; having passed a Danish language test; and holding regular full-time employment and/or being enrolled in an educational programme in Denmark for at least three of the five years.

France, the Netherlands and Sweden have targeted false relationships established with the purpose of obtaining a residence permit. France now penalises such *mariages gris*, a resident foreigner based deliberately attempts to deceive the authorities, by refusing to renew the residence permit. The Dutch government introduced measures in September 2011 to limit family reunification and formation to the core family, defined as partners who are married or have a registered partnership and their underage children. A one-year waiting period for those who wish to bring in their partner has been introduced, during which the partner is expected to integrate (abroad) before arriving in the Netherlands. Finally, the required term to qualify for continued independent stay has been increased from three to five years in order to prevent sham marriages. Sweden has tightened its rules on proof of identity for applications for residence permits on the basis of family ties. However, in view of the difficulties faced by some applicants because of the state of affairs in their home country, a new ruling in February 2012 allows strict identity requirements to be waived in some cases if the applicant can prove probable identity, a situation applying largely to family members from Somalia.

New Zealand's new procedure for family residence policies, introduced in July 2012, involves a two-stage process, similar to its skilled migrant category. It reduces the administrative time needed to deal with full applications. It requires an expression of interest, which is placed in a pool and may be drawn if it meets selection criteria. Numbers drawn reflect the number of places available for approval each year. Applicants must meet generic criteria including English language, health and character requirements. They then apply under one of two tiers, depending on the level of financial resources they (or their sponsor) have available; the amount required has been raised to a figure twice the median wage. Tier One applicants are prioritised for drawing from the pool. The Sibling and Adult Child Category has been closed because it did not generate sufficient economic benefit for New Zealand.

Compared with most other family policy developments, those in Austria and Hungary in 2011 make it easier for some family members to enter or obtain access to the labour market. The introduction of the points system (Red-White-Red card) in Austria in 2011 has led to minor changes in family migration. Now family reunification quotas continue to apply only for citizens of non-EU/EEA countries who are residing in Austria on the basis of a quota. Family members of those entering through the points system are no longer subject to a quota. Previously in Hungary, family members or partners were subject to a labour market test before they could take up employment. Now, after one year of legal stay in Hungary, family members fall under the same employment authorisation rules as their sponsor so may enter the labour market.

Asylum

Ten years ago, discussions on migration were dominated by debate on asylum seekers and the unfounded claims related to these. Asylum has since slipped down the list of topical subjects for member states, perhaps because there are fewer of them, because more countries share the load and because there is more cross-border co-operation. One significant challenge today, identified by a number of countries, is a backlog of asylum requests that have accumulated over the years. Countries are, however, active in reducing these backlogs, but question about whether resources are sufficient to deal with it remain pertinent.

Humanitarian policies are being streamlined and there is a general trend towards deterrence

Asylum policy has not generally been an object of policy interest, except in certain locations and circumstances, for some years. This situation seems to be changing. More countries are taking steps to deter asylum seekers from arriving and/or are introducing measures to hasten their subsequent departure or are providing better reception conditions while cases are being considered. Often the two go together.

Australia is a case in point. During 2011 and 2012, it announced a number of measures designed to support asylum seekers arriving irregularly by sea. Those deemed not to pose risks following initial health, security and identity checks are considered for community placement while their asylum claims are assessed. Those given bridging visas have the right to work and can access necessary health services. At the same time the government took action to deter asylum seekers risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia and set up an independent panel to recommend action. In addition to working with Indonesia and Malaysia towards a managed regional system, recommended measures included applying a “no advantage” principle to ensure that no benefit is gained through circumventing regular migration arrangements; changes to family reunion arrangements for asylum seekers who arrive in Australia irregularly; increasing the size of the Humanitarian Programme to 20 000 places; and improving regional processing capacity by re-establishing facilities in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. So far, the last two of these have been implemented.

Both Hungary and Austria have made the legal framework for granting residence permits to rejected asylum seekers generally more restrictive. Legislative changes in Hungary in 2011 were aimed at faster and more efficient asylum procedures and the earlier detection of unfounded claims. The right to remain in Hungary was restricted to the time needed to examine first asylum requests, to speed the expulsion of those staying illegally and not entitled to international protection. In Austria, from July 2011 a one-week mobility

restriction outside the asylum reception centre was introduced for new asylum arrivals. However, asylum seekers who have had their claim rejected by the asylum court are automatically provided with legal counselling and support on further steps to take.

Both France and Norway have tackled abuse of the asylum process while Finland is promoting voluntary return. In order to prevent fraud, a change to the asylum rules in France means that an application will be refused if it is found that the applicant has made several claims under different identities. In order to prevent criminal asylum seekers who are deported from later re-enter Norway, new instructions for making an exemption from the Dublin procedure for such persons have been implemented. Under legislative amendments due to be submitted to Parliament in 2013 Finland is encouraging the return to their home country or other country of permanent residence of non-EU/EEA-country nationals whose asylum application has been rejected or cancelled.

Seven countries have introduced reforms which ease the conditions of stay of asylum seekers while their cases are being examined and which also concern those who are granted refugee status. The reforms generally relate to access to the labour market and to residence permits. Denmark is in the process of implementing a law, agreed in September 2012, which will allow asylum seekers to take up employment and residence outside the refugee centres after six months, on the condition that they co-operate with the authorities. The focus is on improving the chances of their integration if they are later granted asylum and to promote voluntary return of those asylum seekers who receive a refusal. Counselling on return home will be available for rejected asylum seekers, with financial support for those returning voluntarily, together with an extension of the deadline to leave Denmark in order to give more time to prepare for departure.

In 2011, Chile's first law relating to asylum seekers came into operation. It formalises procedures and establishes the fundamental principles of protection. Those whose applications are formally recognised receive a temporary residence permit for a period of eight months which may be renewed for an additional eight-month period if their application is still in process. This visa expires when the case is resolved and, if the decision is positive, a permanent residence permit may be granted. In January 2011, the Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection was enacted in Mexico. It harmonises Mexican law with the United Nations Convention of 1951. Bulgaria has amended its legislation to allow refugees to receive the status of long-term residents, on the same conditions as for other non-EU/EEA citizens, after five years of residence. In June 2012 Luxembourg established conditions and procedures for granting social support for asylum seekers. A new law for managing asylum was voted by the Greek Parliament in January 2011 but is not yet fully implemented although several reception centres have been completed.

Three countries have approached the issue of vulnerability. Both Finland and Hungary have taken action on unaccompanied minor asylum seekers. New legislation, which came into force in Finland in September 2011, prohibits the detention of asylum seekers who are unaccompanied minors, while persons in this same group in Hungary are placed in child protection institutions. Lithuania has clarified in law its definition of what constitutes a vulnerable person, with changes coming into effect in February 2012. The same law makes social assistance available to persons who received subsidiary protection in the country.

Several countries have streamlined their systems in order to speed up the asylum process, to reduce caseloads and to be in a position to deport failed claimants sooner. In February 2011 the Dutch government announced a number of policy changes to be

implemented over the next two years, to simplify the system. For example, applications on asylum and humanitarian grounds will be assessed simultaneously in the initial asylum application and the protection policy for specific groups will be abolished. Most of the proposals are restrictive. Requests for regular residence permits (e.g. employment, family migration or study) must be submitted abroad in order to prevent asylum seekers from starting a regular residence procedure if their asylum application has been rejected. The burden of proof will rest with the applicant who must be able to demonstrate that he or she needs protection, especially when there are no travel documents. Second or subsequent applications must contain new facts and the possibility of legal aid is reduced if there is a negative outcome. Family members joining an asylum seeker will no longer be granted asylum status automatically, but will be treated like regular migrants.

In September 2012, a major revision to the existing law on asylum came into force in Switzerland. It is no longer possible to submit an application for asylum at a Swiss representative agency abroad; neither will those claiming prejudice, or who are conscientious objectors or deserters deemed to be refugees. However, if being a conscientious objector or a deserter will result in a disproportionately severe punishment on the grounds of ethnic origin, religion, nationality, belonging to a particular social group or having particular political opinions, then the right to asylum in Switzerland can be offered. Since the summer of 2012, the processing of asylum applications from European “safe countries” has been speeded up and decisions delivered more rapidly, normally within 48 hours of the first interview.

A new Korean Refugee Act comes into force in July 2013. It will simplify the appeals process, allow an application to be filed at the port of entry, give the applicant the right to receive the assistance of an attorney, shorten the maximum period of determining refugee status to six months, permit the resettlement of a refugee outside the territory of Korea and provide those granted asylum more social and economic security than before.

The effects of the “Arab Spring” continue

To cope with the exceptional flow of citizens from countries affected by events connected with the so-called “Arab Spring” (in particular from Tunisia and Libya), Italy has taken a set of co-ordinated actions.

A humanitarian state of emergency was declared by the Italian Government in February 2011, with the drafting of a migrant reception plan to provide assistance for up to 50 000 people. In April 2011 the Italian Government decided to grant residence permits for humanitarian reasons lasting a period of six months, with work rights, to all citizens from north African countries coming to Italy from the beginning of the year. This decision related almost exclusively to immigrants from Tunisia, while persons fleeing from the internal conflict in Libya were not granted any immediate temporary or humanitarian protection, but were made to present international protection applications. However, in June 2011, a memorandum was signed by Italy and the Libyan National Transitional Council, in which the parties confirmed the commitment to co-managing the migratory phenomenon, including stronger departure controls.

Emigration and return

Diaspora policies continue to attract some attention, especially for skilled emigrants

Despite the economic crisis, some countries continue to seek ways of encouraging their skilled diaspora to return. In 2011 the government of Israel began offering Israeli scientists

incentives to return to Israel, including benefits similar to those granted to new immigrant scientists. Italy, facing increasing immigration of workers under 40, is seeking to attract them back. Those who return having spent at least three years abroad benefit from fiscal advantages if they remain in Italy for at least five years. Although one of the main aims of Bulgaria's new migration strategy is to encourage the return of Bulgarians abroad, with the economic crisis in the country less emphasis is being put on this by the government.

A new approach towards its emigrant citizens was adopted by Lithuania in 2011. Although as in Bulgaria the policy to promote return of Lithuanian citizens to the homeland remains, the target group has been expanded to include those of its citizens who do not intend to return to Lithuania, as well as those who are of Lithuanian descent or have other links with the country. The aim is to encourage emigrants from Lithuania to preserve their national identity and to promote the involvement of the emigrants in the political, economic and cultural life of Lithuania. The policy encourages Lithuanians to return to Lithuania and turn the brain drain process into a brain exchange, by involving the emigrants in exchange and dissemination of information.

Notes

1. A significant portion of labour migration flows to Korea have been reclassified as temporary in the data for this country. Although these flows often tend to be of long duration (five years or more), the workers have no rights of family reunification and cannot change employer. Settlement is in principle not allowed.
2. Under OECD definitions of permanent immigration, asylum seekers appear as permanent migrants only if they are accepted as refugees or are allowed to settle, which does not necessarily occur in the year when they arrive in the country.
3. The first three of these were, in any event, much less hit by the economic crisis than many other countries.
4. The statistics in Table 1.3 are based on national data and thus are not entirely comparable across countries. In particular they differ in the extent to which they cover departures of persons having stayed in the countries shown for short periods. The totals are summed over countries with different coverage of outflows, so should be taken as indicative.
5. Not all intra-corporate transfers appear as temporary migrants. In some countries, those transferred on long-term assignments are given permits which are indefinitely renewable and so are categorised as permanent migrants.
6. Resettled refugees are persons who are unable to return to their country and are assisted in moving to a safe third country. They often live in refugee camps in countries bordering their own. Countries can opt to resettle such refugees, but there is no treaty or obligatory commitment to do so.
7. Stock-to-flow ratios for student visas, which provide an approximate indication of average study duration of exiting students, tend to give values of between one and two years, which seem short compared to the usual duration of an undergraduate study programme. This may imply that the programmes in which they are enrolled are short ones or that many international students drop out before completion. Student visa data systems do not normally carry information on whether or not a student has successfully completed a programme of study.
8. 90% of the decline in 2008 occurred among students from OECD countries, while 60% of the rebound was attributable to this same group.
9. These figures exclude the Slovak Republic and Turkey, for whom no data on the foreign-born were available.
10. "Of immigrant origin" means either immigrants or offspring of immigrants.
11. In Korea and Spain, lists of "potential immigrants" are compiled in collaboration with labour authorities in countries of origin, and employers may draw from these pools of candidates.
12. About 15% of non-OECD immigrants did not opt for one of the standard replies or gave no answer to the question about the reason they mostly had for coming to the country.

13. Persons declaring themselves as labour migrants, but who did not have a job upon arrival, show very high employment rates, far more similar to those of other labour migrants than to the employment rates of family or humanitarian migrants.
14. For European countries, attention is focused here on so-called “third-country” immigrants, that is, immigrants from non-EU countries.
15. It is not known here whether the original migrant came for work or humanitarian reasons, or arrived as a child or an adult.
16. PISA is the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (www.oecd.org/pisa/).

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ANNEX 1.A1

Figure 1.A1.1. **Changes in inflows of migrants by country of origin, selected OECD countries and the Russian Federation, 2001-10 and 2011**

2011 top ten countries of origin as a percentage of total inflows




Figure 1.A1.1. **Changes in inflows of migrants by country of origin, selected OECD countries and the Russian Federation, 2001-10 and 2011 (cont.)**

2011 top ten countries of origin as a percentage of total inflows





Figure 1.A1.1. **Changes in inflows of migrants by country of origin, selected OECD countries and the Russian Federation, 2001-10 and 2011 (cont.)**

2011 top ten countries of origin as a percentage of total inflows



Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822636>

Chapter 2

Recent labour market trends and integration policies in OECD countries

The first part of this chapter provides detailed evidence on the labour market outcomes of migrants in OECD countries relative to those of their native-born peers. It shows that the employment outcomes of the foreign-born vary greatly across countries but also across demographic groups, with certain groups of migrants being in particularly critical situations. A discussion follows on whether the recent economic developments have affected the progress made by migrants over the past decade. The chapter continues with some evidence on the representation of migrants in new hires. The second part of the chapter describes the latest developments in integration policies in the OECD. It highlights the importance of integration policies in national agendas and the increasing attention paid to the labour market integration of migrants as the means to improve economic performance and mitigate social pressures.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Introduction

Evidence suggests that the world economy has not recovered yet from the recent economic crisis. An ongoing recession in Europe and slow growth in the United States leave scant hope for a quick recovery of the labour markets. The recent economic crisis and its dramatic effects on the labour markets of many OECD countries have led to in particular increasing labour market marginalisation for the most vulnerable groups. Among these groups, immigrants have been heavily affected, and often to a greater extent than their native-born peers.

The first part of this chapter analyses the recent labour market trends of immigrants in order to understand where they stand both relative to their native-born peers and relative to their outcomes prior to the crisis. Has the recent deterioration in outcomes in some countries reversed the progress made by the foreign-born over the past decade? What have been the relative outcomes of the foreign-born in countries less, or not, affected by the downturn? How are different groups of migrants faring today? Finally, what is the position of immigrants in new hires in OECD countries? These are some of the questions that this chapter tries to address. The second part of the chapter presents an overview of the main trends in integration policies in OECD countries.

Main findings

- The labour market situation of migrants has worsened over the past four years, in absolute terms and relative to the native-born. The unemployment rate of the foreign-born rose by 5 percentage points between 2008 and 2012, whereas for the native-born the increase was more modest: 3 percentage points.
- The crisis further widened the gaps in the labour market outcomes of migrants across OECD countries. The situation is particularly troubling in Spain and Greece, with the greatest increases in overall unemployment. Countries such as Norway, Austria, Australia, Luxembourg and Switzerland experienced little or no increase in unemployment between 2008 and 2012. In Germany, unemployment declined for both the foreign- and the native-born but more so for the former.
- The recent economic developments have extensively affected the progress that migrants have made in many countries over the past decade. The situation reversed starkly in some of the countries where migrants were showing higher employment rates than natives prior to the crisis (e.g. Spain and Ireland). In other countries however, migrants have continued to close the gap with natives over the past decade.
- The labour market outcomes of migrants differ greatly across groups. Youth and the low-skilled have been the most affected, while women and high-skilled migrants have been spared, to some extent, the effects of the recession. The distribution of different groups of migrants across sectors and countries has determined their exposure to shock. The personal characteristics and the prior labour market experience of migrants are likely to affect their vulnerability to worsening economic conditions.

- Migrants from Latin America and North Africa seem to be the most heavily affected by the crisis. Mexicans in the United States have today the lowest employment rates among the foreign-born, a result of their strong presence in construction and manufacturing sectors and their over-representation among the low-skilled. Migrants from North Africa in Europe have also experienced enormous employment losses, reaching a record high unemployment of 26.6% in 2012.
- Long-term unemployment is becoming a serious challenge for migrants in many OECD countries. Their incidence of long-term unemployment in total unemployment has increased from 31% in 2008 to 44% in 2012 in the OECD and continued to increase in many countries over the past year. The low-skilled and young (in Europe) or old (in the United States) migrants not only face the highest risk of long-term unemployment, but that risk has also increased the most during the crisis.
- The recent labour market outcomes of migrants in many OECD countries highlight the need for policies to bring workers back to the labour market and increase their chances of finding appropriate jobs. There is also increasing understanding that labour market integration of migrants plays a major role in the overall integration outcomes. Many OECD countries are making efforts to improve the process of recognition of qualifications, promote language courses, and ensure that immigrants are included in active labour market policies, while alleviating the constraints that may limit the employment opportunities for migrant groups such as entrepreneurs, refugees and foreign students upon graduation.
- The emphasis and public funds devoted to integration policies vary substantially across countries. Some countries continued to invest substantial public resources in integration initiatives (such as the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, or Canada), while other countries cut back significantly on the public programmes due to the economic recession and fiscal constraints (e.g. Spain and Greece).


Labour market trends

Five years after the onset of the crisis, there are signs that the world economy may be weakening again. Evidence suggests an ongoing recession in the Euro area and a sluggish growth in the United States (OECD, 2012a). The labour market conditions in OECD countries, already difficult today, are likely to further deteriorate, and unemployment to remain high or increase further in some countries. Long-term unemployment is becoming a serious problem for vulnerable population groups and a daunting challenge for labour market and social policy.

Overall unemployment in the OECD has increased from 5.6% to 8%, corresponding to a 42% growth between December 2007 and November 2012 (Figure 2.1). However, there is wide dispersion in the labour market situation across OECD countries. Countries can be categorised in three groups. On the one hand, there are the Southern European countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) along with Ireland which have experienced a sharp increase in unemployment. The first two have seen their unemployment rates triple during the crisis period, reaching 26% in December 2012. At 15 and 16% respectively, the unemployment rates in Ireland and Portugal have doubled between 2007 and 2012. The rise in unemployment has also been noteworthy in Denmark, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, Iceland and the Czech Republic, although the level is still below the OECD average. In a second group of countries, there has been only a moderate increase in unemployment

Figure 2.1. **Unemployment rates in OECD countries**

Percentage of the labour force
 OECD harmonised unemployment rates,¹ December 2007 to November 2012²



Notes: Countries are shown by ascending order of the harmonised unemployment rate in November 2012.

1. For Israel, the series have been chained to take into account the break in series in 2012.

2. September 2012 for Greece, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom; October 2012 for Chile, Estonia and Hungary; December 2012 for Canada and the United States; Q2 2012 for Switzerland; and Q3 2012 for New Zealand.

Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Short-Term Indicators database (cut-off date: 31 January 2013).

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
(Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, Norway and Switzerland). Finally, Germany, Israel, Chile, Turkey and Korea, in November 2012, all have lower unemployment rates than five years earlier. Given this important degree of heterogeneity across the OECD, it is not surprising that outcomes of the foreign-born also vary considerably across different countries.

This part examines the labour market situation of foreign-born persons in comparison with their native-born counterparts over the past years in OECD countries. First, it presents evidence on the main labour market outcomes of migrants relative to natives and for different demographic groups. Next, it examines the risk of long-term unemployment. It also puts the recent labour market developments into a longer-term perspective by comparing them with the progress migrants may have made over the past decade. Finally, it looks at the share of migrants in new hires and its evolution over the recent years.

The labour market situation of migrants has worsened over the past five years in many countries


The economic downturn in Europe has had a dramatic effect on both the foreign- and the native-born who saw their employment drop by 2.5% and 2.4%, respectively between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the last quarter of 2009 (Figure 2.2). However, the decline ended in late 2009 for the foreign-born, who have seen rising employment since the first quarter of 2010. This is in contrast to the situation for the native-born who have experienced constant or slightly declining employment since then. Between the third quarter of 2011 and that of 2012, about 222 000 more migrants were employed across European OECD countries, whereas the number of native-born in employment declined by about 1.6 million persons. Foreign-born employment is now about 12% higher than in 2007 (just before the start of the

Figure 2.2. **Quarterly employment by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2007-12**
 Index 100 = Q3 2007 (Australia and the United States) or Q3 2008 (Canada and Europe)



Notes: The population refers to the working-age population (15-64). Turkey was excluded because of a break in the series in 2009, and Switzerland because quarterly data are only available since 2010.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Monthly Current Population Surveys.

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crisis) in European OECD countries on average, whereas native-born employment is 4% lower. This discrepancy can be explained by the different trends in terms of population growth of the two groups. The native-born working-age population has been declining, whereas the migrant population has been growing – albeit at a lower rate in 2009- across European OECD countries over the period examined (see OECD, 2012b).

The situation is quite similar in the United States. Both migrants and natives experienced substantial employment losses in 2008, but these were much more dramatic for the former. The recovery has also been substantially different for the two groups. Employment of foreign-born picked up in early 2011, while that of the native-born only shows small signs of recovery in 2012. Overall, declines in employment amounted to five


million for the native-born versus 350 000 for migrants between the third quarter of 2007 and that of 2012. Between 2011 and 2012, the increase in employment has been much more substantial for the foreign-born (4% increase) than for the native-born (1% increase).

In contrast to the situation in Europe and the United States, the effect of the crisis has been small and short-lived in Canada. Since the end of 2010, the country experiences a steady migrant employment growth. In Australia, there was continuous employment growth both for natives and migrants until 2010, although at much higher rate for the latter. Since the first quarter of 2011, native employment has remained fairly stable, whereas that of the foreign-born has continued to rise.

Recent trends differ substantially across OECD countries


Figure 2.3 presents the evolution of unemployment rates and employment rates between 2008 (2007 for the United States¹) and 2012 for many OECD countries, separately for natives and migrants. In the majority of OECD countries, the crisis has had a substantial negative impact on the labour force and even more so on foreign-born persons. As shown on the left panel of Figure 2.3, most OECD countries are located on the right of the identity line, indicating that migrants have experienced larger increases in unemployment than natives. The greatest differences between increases in unemployment of foreign-born and native-born persons are found in Greece and Spain, where migrants' unemployment increased by 10 and 6 percentage points more than for natives respectively. Other countries that have experienced substantial increases in unemployment are Ireland, Portugal, Estonia, Italy and Slovenia. However, the situation has not been uniform across the OECD. A second group of countries (Austria, Norway, Australia, Luxembourg, Canada and Switzerland) experienced little or no increase in unemployment between 2008 and 2012. In

Figure 2.3. **Change in unemployment and employment rates by place of birth, 2008-12**
Percentage points



Notes: The unemployment rate is measured as percentage of the labour force and the employment rate is measured as percentage of the population of working-age (15-64). Data for EU countries refer to changes between Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2012, except for Switzerland where data refer to changes between Q2 2008 and Q2 2012. Data for the United States refer to changes between 2007 and 2012 (US 07-12) and between 2008 and 2012 (US 08-12). Data for Australia and Canada refer to changes between 2008 and 2012.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

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Germany, unemployment declined for both groups, but more so for migrants. These trends suggest that the crisis has further widened the gaps in labour market outcomes of migrants across OECD countries.

The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of employment over the crisis period across OECD countries. It suggests that the situation remains difficult for many OECD countries, but indicates improvement in others. In the majority of countries in Figure 2.3 there have been employment losses, and these have been greater for the foreign-born than for the native-born. Few OECD countries are located above the zero line and to the right of the identity line, with migrants seeing a greater increase in employment than the native-born. In Sweden and Turkey, employment rates have increased but only for the native-born.

The situation is not homogeneous across demographic groups

Figure 2.4 presents evidence on labour market outcomes for different groups of migrants and natives between 2008 and 2012 in European OECD countries and Canada and between 2007 and 2012 in the United States. Over this period, all demographic groups experienced substantial employment losses, with the exception of native-born women in Europe, foreign-born women in Canada and older workers in Europe and Canada. Losses, however, have been unequally distributed across age, gender and education groups. The extent and depth of the crisis has, in addition, varied across European countries. The European average in Figure 2.4 is a weighted average of these outcomes, and hence may mask the situation in countries at the extreme of the distribution.

A comparison between European OECD countries and the United States reveals that the employment rate of the foreign-born has decreased more than for the native-born in Europe, whereas the opposite is true in the United States. Differences in net migration trends between Europe and the United States over the crisis period may also be responsible for the above trends. Net migration in Europe continued to increase – albeit at a slower pace – during the crisis, whereas the United States experienced lower net migration because of adverse labour market conditions.


The above differences between Europe and the United States are to a large extent driven by differences across education groups between the two. In the United States, the low-skilled foreign-born (and to some extent the medium-skilled) have experienced smaller employment losses relative to their native-born peers, while the situation is exactly the opposite in Europe.

In addition, stark differences exist between Europe and the United States when age groups are considered. Older workers in the former have seen their participation and employment rates increase between 2008 and 2012; this holds for both migrants and natives, but even more for the latter. The positive outcomes for older workers in Europe are to some extent driven by their positive performance in Germany. If the European weighted average is re-calculated excluding Germany, the rise in employment for older migrant workers remains but is much lower. In contrast, in the United States, employment rates of older workers dropped throughout the period, although less than for other age groups.

Youth have experienced substantial employment losses over the past five years

There are many reasons why foreign-born young persons are more affected by the recent economic crisis than other population groups. Their concentration in cyclical sectors and their over-representation in temporary jobs make them more vulnerable to

Figure 2.4. **Changes in labour market outcomes by demographic group and country of birth, in selected OECD countries (2007/08-2012)**



Notes: The reference population is the working-age population (15-64). “Low-skilled” here refers to less than upper secondary attainment, “Medium-skilled” to upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary, “High-skilled” to tertiary.

Sources: Panel A: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2012. The data include Turkey and exclude Switzerland. Panel B: Current Population Surveys, 2007 and 2012. Panel C: Labour Force Surveys, 2008 and 2012.


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shocks. In addition, their limited job tenure and overall labour market experience lowers the cost to employers of firing them, relative to older workers. As a result, young workers are among the first to become unemployed in a downturn.

The negative employment effect of the crisis has been larger for migrant youth than for prime-age and older migrants in Europe. These differences, which also apply for natives, are due to a sharper increase in unemployment for youth, but also – and to a large extent – to a downward trend in terms of participation. Labour force participation of migrant youth in Europe has decreased by 4.6 percentage points, whereas that of prime-age and old persons has increased by 0.6 and 6.1 percentage points respectively. The situation is similar in Canada for all age groups and in the United States for youth, but not for the other age groups.

The increasing unemployment and inactivity of youth is becoming a serious issue across the OECD (for a discussion on unemployment, see Annex 2.A1). About 26% of foreign-born youth (15-24) are not in employment, education or training (NEET), versus an average 20% for native youth (Figure 2.5). The share of youth not attached to the labour market has increased across the OECD between 2008 and 2012, for both migrants and natives (by 5 and 4 percentage points respectively). Nonetheless, this increase has not been uniform across OECD countries. For a number of countries, the increase has been dramatic. For instance, NEET rates of migrants increased by 18 percentage points in Greece, by 11 percentage points in Spain and by 9 percentage points in Ireland and Portugal. In contrast, in Finland, the United States and the United Kingdom, the increase has been small, while in Austria and Germany the NEET rate has gone down between 2008 and 2012.

Figure 2.5. **NEET rates by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008, 2011 and 2012**
Percentage of the 15-24 population who is neither in employment, nor in education or training



Notes: The OECD average was calculated on the countries for which data are available for the entire period (i.e. excludes Turkey and Switzerland). The results for NEET in Europe are overestimated because they are based on three quarters, including summertime, when under declaration of school enrolment of students is commonly observed.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), Q1-Q3 2008, Q1-Q3 2011, Q1-Q3 2012; United States: Monthly Current Population Surveys, 2007 and 2012.

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More worryingly, foreign-born youth remain in a disadvantaged position relative to their native-born counterparts. In the majority of OECD countries, the share of NEET among migrants is higher than among natives and the greatest differences are found in Greece, Spain, Slovenia, Italy and Austria. In Slovenia and Austria, the NEET rate among foreign-born youth is twice that for native young persons. In addition, in more than half of the countries in Figure 2.5, the increase (in percentage points) has been greater for foreign-born youth than for their native peers. Exceptions to this are Ireland, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. Further increases in the NEET rate among migrants have occurred over the last year in many countries, including in some of the countries with the highest NEET rates (Turkey, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal). These developments highlight the risk of young migrants dropping out of the labour market with little hope of easy reversal.


The effect of the crisis seems to be more muted for women relative to men

A comparison of participation rates of women between 2008 and 2012 reinforces the observation in OECD (2012b) that the crisis has brought some women back to work, through a possible added-worker effect (Figure 2.6). This is the case for the majority of OECD countries, irrespective of women's origin. Only in Slovenia, Norway, Finland, Switzerland and Ireland did female labour force participation decline (and in Denmark and the United States for native-born women only). In Greece, Denmark, Portugal, Germany, Austria and Australia, the increase in participation rates has been greater among foreign-born women than their native-born counterparts. In the first four of these countries, migrant women experienced increases of between 4 and 5 percentage points. In other countries, such as Italy, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic and Belgium, the increase has been modest and in many cases smaller for migrant than native women.

The situation for foreign-born men is different. In half of the OECD countries in Figure 2.6, participation rates fell between 2008 and 2012. In some countries, such as Ireland, Italy, Belgium and Denmark the drop has been particularly noteworthy, ranging between 3 and 6 percentage points.

The difficult labour market conditions and the limited opportunities in many countries have not allowed the increased participation of women to translate into increased employment rates. However, even in countries hard hit by the crisis, where employment dropped substantially, the impact on women was somewhat muted. For example, in Greece, Spain and Ireland the employment rates of foreign-born men decreased by 26, 20 and 16 percentage points respectively, whereas for foreign-born women the drop was two to three times smaller (7, 10 and 8 percentage points respectively). The reason behind this is possibly the different distributions of men and women across sectors. The situation is similar in Portugal, although the employment losses have been more limited for both men and women. Comparisons between foreign-born and native-born women reveal that in some countries the former have been less affected by the crisis (Portugal, Denmark, Germany, the United States and Austria) while in others it is the latter (Ireland, Spain, Slovenia, Turkey, etc.), but overall the differences are not very large. The only exception is Spain, where the employment rate of foreign-born women went down by 10 percentage points versus just 3 percentage points for their native-born counterparts. This may be linked to a lower demand for personal services (child and elderly care, domestic services, etc.), typically provided by migrant women, due to wage cuts in the context of fiscal consolidation in the country. In Italy, the effects of the downturn have been confined to foreign-born men who saw their employment rates decrease by 8 percentage points.

Figure 2.6. **Changes in participation and employment rates by place of birth and gender in selected OECD countries, 2008-12**



Notes: Data for European countries refer to changes between Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2012, except Switzerland for which they refer to changes between Q2 2008 and Q2 2012. Data for the United States refer to changes between 2007 and 2012. Countries with changes below one percentage point for all groups, are excluded from the figure.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

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Migrants from Latin and Central America and North Africa have been the most heavily hit

Table 2.1 presents basic labour market outcomes for migrants in Australia, Canada, European OECD countries and the United States in 2007/08 and 2012. It shows that the labour market outcomes of migrants from different world regions vary greatly and that these differences are fairly consistent across OECD destinations. Two groups seem to be sharply affected by the crisis that hit strongly the United States and some European countries. First, Latino migrants, experienced the greatest employment losses between 2008 and 2012 in

Table 2.1. **Employment, unemployment and participation rates by region of birth in selected OECD countries, in 2008 and 2012 (2007 and 2012 in the United States)**

Region of birth		Percentages					
		Employment rate		Unemployment rate		Participation rate	
		2008	2012	2008	2012	2008	2012
Australia	Oceania	77.4	76.0	4.7	6.0	81.2	80.8
	Europe	71.4	73.6	3.1	3.9	73.7	76.6
	North Africa and the Middle East	49.1	48.4	9.0	11.2	54.0	54.5
	Sub-Saharan Africa	75.1	74.2	5.1	5.6	79.2	78.6
	Asia	67.6	66.9	5.8	5.7	71.7	70.9
	Americas	73.9	73.9	4.6	5.9	77.5	78.5
	Foreign-born (total)	69.8	69.9	4.6	5.4	73.2	73.9
	Native-born	75.0	73.7	4.2	5.3	78.3	77.8
Canada	Africa	66.5	66.4	12.4	12.8	75.9	76.1
	Asia and the Middle East	68.6	68.0	7.6	9.0	74.2	74.8
	Europe	73.1	74.3	5.2	5.9	77.1	79.0
	Oceania	81.5	79.1	4.3	3.2	85.1	81.7
	United States	76.1	71.5	5.1	5.7	80.2	75.8
	South America	73.6	71.2	8.7	10.0	80.6	79.1
	Other North and Central America	69.0	70.6	6.9	8.8	74.1	77.4
	Foreign-born (total)	70.7	70.1	7.2	8.5	76.2	76.6
Native-born	74.4	72.8	6.0	7.0	79.1	78.3	
OECD European countries	EU27 + EFTA	69.1	66.1	7.6	13.1	74.8	76.0
	Other European countries	64.8	53.7	9.1	16.7	71.3	64.5
	North Africa	55.2	47.8	15.7	26.7	65.5	65.1
	Other African countries and Middle East	63.1	57.3	13.2	19.8	72.7	71.4
	North America	69.6	68.1	4.9	7.7	73.2	73.8
	Central and South America and Caribbean	70.7	58.7	12.1	25.7	80.4	79.0
	Asia	63.1	61.8	6.5	10.1	67.5	68.7
	Others	78.3	58.8	4.2	13.4	81.7	67.9
	Foreign-born (total)	65.2	60.0	10.2	17.3	72.6	72.6
Native-born	65.6	63.4	6.4	10.8	70.1	71.0	
United States	Mexico	70.3	65.7	4.9	9.3	74.0	72.4
	Other Central American countries	77.0	71.4	4.7	8.1	80.8	77.7
	South America and Caribbean	73.2	68.7	4.9	9.4	76.9	75.9
	Canada	74.1	72.3	3.6	5.6	76.9	76.5
	Europe	73.4	70.7	3.6	6.9	76.1	75.9
	Africa	70.4	66.4	6.0	10.8	75.0	74.4
	Asia	70.9	67.1	3.4	6.3	73.4	71.6
	Other regions	68.5	64.8	4.7	9.8	71.8	71.9
	Foreign-born (total)	71.8	67.7	4.4	8.1	75.1	73.7
Native-born	70.3	65.6	4.9	8.3	73.9	71.5	

Notes: The population refers to working-age population (15-64). OECD European countries do not include Switzerland because the data are not fully comparable with the other countries for the entire period and Germany and Turkey because no data by region of birth are available for these countries. The regions of birth could not be more comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2012; Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys 2008 and 2012; United States: Current Population Surveys 2007 and 2012.

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Europe (12 percentage points for persons from Central and South America and the Caribbean) and similarly, dramatic employment losses in the United States (between 4 and 6 percentage points for those from Central and South America and the Caribbean). In terms of unemployment performance, migrants from Central and South America and the Caribbean in Europe have seen their unemployment more than double from 12% to 26%.

The drop by 4 percentage points in the employment rates of Mexicans in the United States draws attention to this group of workers, who still represented in 2011 about 13.5% of all new legal permanent entries into the country and 35% of seasonal or other temporary worker entries. Mexicans show today the lowest employment rates among all groups of migrants in the United States. Although their employment rate at 66% is still at the same level as overall native-born employment rates in the country, and well above that of many migrant groups in Europe, it has fallen to a historic low. The high share of young men with low education, working in construction and manufacturing, and having limited English language skills may explain why Mexican migrants in the United States have been particularly hurt by the recession.

The second group which was sharply hit by the crisis are migrants from North Africa in Europe who saw their already-low employment rates drop from 55% in 2008 to 48% in 2012. This, combined with an unemployment rate of 27% suggests that the situation of migrants from North Africa in Europe is becoming critical. Although the economic and labour market developments in Spain are to a large extent responsible for this increased unemployment, North African migrants in other European countries have also been severely hit by the adverse economic conditions, with an unemployment rate of 18.6% in 2012 (from 13.6% in 2008). Their strong presence in construction, but also in manufacturing in certain European countries, may also partly explain these latest trends.


Overall, migrants from OECD countries have been less affected by the crisis and are still enjoying high employment rates across destinations. One reason behind this is that many OECD foreign-born migrated a long time ago and hence enjoy more secure employment conditions than those who arrived more recently. In addition, recent OECD migrants tend to be more highly educated than others, suggesting that the impact of the crisis, which hit low-skilled sectors and occupations in particular, may have been smaller for them. Finally, European migrants are by definition more mobile within Europe which may have allowed them to move across countries responding to changes in the labour market conditions in their countries of residence.

The distribution of migrants across sectors is a key determinant of exposure to the shock

Given the fact that the crisis mostly hit certain sectors of the economy, the distribution of migrants and native-born across sectors at the beginning of the crisis is likely to explain why some groups of migrants have been more negatively affected than natives.

The distribution of the foreign-born across sectors differs substantially from that of the native-born in all OECD countries. Overall in the OECD, about 20% of migrants would have to change sectors for the two distributions to become identical² (Figure 2.7). A first group of countries (Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) presents noteworthy distribution differences between migrants and natives. The evidence for Greece suggests that close to half (45%) of migrant women would have to change sectors in 2011 for their distribution to resemble to that of native-born women. Similarly, this “segregation index” for Luxembourg is 41% for men. In a second group of countries,

Figure 2.7. **Industry segregation by gender, 2008 and 2012**
Dissimilarity index



Notes: The dissimilarity index is defined as half the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the distribution of the foreign-born across industries (NACE Rev. 1.1) and the distribution of the native-born across industries. The OECD average excludes countries for which some observations are missing (i.e. Iceland). Data for European countries refer to Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2012, except Switzerland for which data refer to Q2 2008 and Q2 2012. Data for the United States refer to 2007 and 2012.


Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Surveys, March supplement.

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migrants and natives are distributed more equally across sectors (Sweden, Hungary and the Netherlands for both men and women, Denmark for women and Portugal for men) but at least 10% of them would have to change sectors to mirror the distribution of native workers. There is evidence that, over time, in half of the OECD countries, the distributions of migrants and natives have become somewhat more similar. This is the case in Greece, Portugal and Spain for men and in Poland, Portugal and Germany for women. This trend in the European countries in recession and in the United States may be explained by the labour market consequences of the recent crisis, which pushed many of the migrants in construction and manufacturing out of the labour market. It may also be explained by the different distribution of recent migrants across sectors (see Table 2.A4.2 in Annex 2.A4).


Figure 2.8 presents evidence that the crisis has hit harder some of the sectors where migrants are over-represented in comparison with natives. Overall, in the OECD countries included in Figure 2.8, there is a negative correlation between the over-representation of migrants and the change in value added before and after the crisis. The greatest losses in terms of value added between 2006 and 2009 have occurred in construction, manufacturing and hotels and restaurants (16%, 10% and 8% respectively), three of the sectors in which migrants are over-represented relative to native-born workers. The other three sectors where there is an over-representation of migrants (“private households with employed persons”, “agriculture, hunting, forestry and finishing” and “real estate, renting and business activities”) have experienced some growth during the crisis but to a lesser degree in comparison with native-dominated sectors such as “mining and quarrying” and “health and social work”.

Figure 2.8. **The effect of the recent crisis across sectors and the over-representation of migrants, selected OECD countries**



Notes: The population refers to foreign-born population aged 15-64. Over-representation of the foreign-born in a specific Sector I, is measured as the ratio of the percentage of the foreign-born in that sector (out of total foreign-born employment) over the percentage of native-born in the sector (out of total native-born employment). The foreign-born overrepresentation and the change in value added in volume are weighted averages based on the following countries: AUT, BEL, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, HUN, ITA, LUX, NLD, NOR, SVN, ESP, SWE and USA. Exceptions are: L, M, N, O exclude Sweden and P excludes Estonia, Hungary and Spain.

Sources: Foreign-born overrepresentation: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), 2006; United States: Current Population Surveys; Value added in volume: OECD STAN Database 2006-09.

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The main employment losses following the crisis have occurred in construction and manufacturing both for migrants and native workers (Table 2.2). In the construction sector, there were about 853 000 migrant jobs lost in the United States and another 474 000 jobs in Europe between 2008 (2007 for the United States) and 2012. Native workers have been also hard hit in this sector, where 2.5 million jobs were lost in Europe (both construction of buildings and specialised construction activities) and another 2.1 million jobs in the United States.

Table 2.2 shows that there were about 113 000 migrant jobs lost in manufacturing in Europe (versus 2.5 million for the native-born). In the United States, sectors that occupy a substantial share of high-skilled workers have also been severely hurt. For instance, 89 000 migrant jobs were lost in finance, which corresponds to about one-fifth of total employment losses in the sector. An additional 109 000 jobs of migrants were lost in wholesale and retail trade.

However, given the diverse economic conditions across the OECD and the fact that some countries have been little affected (if at all) by the crisis, and others have come out of it fairly quickly, suggests that hiring also takes place in the crisis. As shown in Table 2.2, the services sector has recorded the greatest increases in migrant employment in Europe. 218 000 migrant jobs have been created in “activities of households as employers of domestic personnel” and 175 000 jobs in “education” (28% of total employment increase in the sector). The 206 000 migrant jobs created in “residential care activities” correspond to 27% of total employment creation in the sector. Employment also increased substantially in “human health services” (+117 000 for migrants and +551 000 for natives).

Table 2.2. **Ten industries with the largest changes in foreign- and native-born employment, in selected OECD countries, 2007/08-2012**

A. European OECD countries, changes between 2008 and 2012						
	Native-born		Foreign-born			
	Change (000)	%	Change (000)	%		
Human health activities	551	5.1	218	20.2	Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel	
Residential care activities	546	16.1	206	44.5	Residential care activities	
Education	450	3.3	175	16.5	Education	
Social work activities without accommodation	356	8.7	150	17.8	Services to buildings and landscape activities	
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities	312	14.8	129	35.6	Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	
Services to buildings and landscape activities	260	10.8	123	6.9	Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles	
Civil engineering	252	21.8	117	9.6	Human health activities	
Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities	206	21.7	91	5.5	Food and beverage service activities	
Other professional, scientific and technical activities	199	25.9	82	19.3	Accommodation	
Food and beverage service activities	190	3.8	81	15.4	Land transport and transport via pipelines	
Printing and reproduction of recorded media	-247	-23.6	-23	-18.6	Manufacture of wearing apparel	
Manufacture of furniture	-258	-21.7	-23	-6.8	Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.	
Manufacture of wearing apparel	-324	-31.3	-24	-23.4	Manufacture of textiles	
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	-472	-3.4	-26	-11.0	Legal and accounting activities	
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment	-484	-13.6	-29	-13.9	Manufacture of rubber and plastic products	
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles	-523	-8.0	-42	-26.4	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	-532	-8.1	-48	-37.1	Manufacture of furniture	
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles	-571	-3.5	-72	-13.9	Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment	
Construction of buildings	-731	-17.2	-173	-13.3	Specialised construction activities	
Specialised construction activities	-1 775	-19.1	-301	-29.4	Construction of buildings	

In the United States, the largest expansion in employment occurred in “professional and technical services”, where the 235 000 new jobs occupied by immigrants correspond to half of total employment increase in the sector. The “health care services, except hospitals” sector also presents important employment gains for migrants (+232 000) and the same holds for other service sectors such as “food services and drinking places” (+139 000), “personal and laundry services” (+126 000), and “social assistance” and “educational services” (+119 000 each).

Long-term unemployment is becoming a serious challenge especially for certain groups

The crisis has not only increased the share of persons in unemployment but also the time it takes them to find a new job. Indeed, long-term unemployment (more than 12 months) has increased during the crisis in many OECD countries, for both foreign- and native-born persons. The share of long-term unemployment in total foreign-born unemployment in the OECD has increased from 33% to 45% between 2008 and 2012. In the vast majority of OECD countries, long-term unemployment accounts for more than one third of total unemployment of the foreign-born, and in countries such as Estonia, Ireland, Slovenia, Germany and Greece, above half of total unemployment.

Table 2.2. **Ten industries with the largest changes in foreign- and native-born employment, in selected OECD countries, 2007/08-2012 (cont.)**

B. United States, changes between 2007 and 2012					
	Native-born		Foreign-born		
	Change (000)	%	Change (000)	%	
Health care services, except hospitals	867	12.2	235	17.9	Professional and technical services
Food services and drinking places	467	7.6	232	18.4	Health care services, except hospitals
Professional and technical services	261	3.5	139	7.2	Food services and drinking places
Mining	178	26.9	126	23.4	Personal and laundry services
Arts, entertainment, and recreation	114	4.8	119	9.6	Educational services
Hospitals	102	2.1	119	29.7	Social assistance
Waste management and remediation services	64	18.5	80	18.3	Food manufacturing
Miscellaneous and not specified manufacturing	61	6.4	74	14.4	Public administration
Internet publishing and broadcasting	29	145.6	69	4.7	Administrative and support services
Chemical manufacturing	22	2.2	51	13.0	Agriculture
Computer and electronic product manufacturing	-206	-19.1	-39	-11.2	Private households
Publishing industries (except Internet)	-234	-31.9	-40	-35.6	Plastics and rubber products
Paper and printing	-246	-25.2	-40	-27.0	Paper and printing
Educational services	-268	-2.4	-43	-6.6	Wholesale trade
Real estate	-306	-14.8	-50	-49.8	Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing
Finance	-371	-9.4	-62	-43.7	Furniture and fixtures manufacturing
Retail trade	-381	-2.8	-66	-2.8	Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing	-473	-9.2	-83	-28.6	Textile, apparel, and leather manufacturing
Wholesale trade	-646	-18.2	-89	-12.8	Finance
Construction	-2 088	-24.1	-853	-28.9	Construction

Notes: The population refers to working-age population (15-64). Panel A: European members of the OECD, excluding Turkey and Switzerland where data are not available for the entire period; NACE Rev. 2. Panel B: Industries are derived from the 2002 Census Classification.

Sources: Panel A: European countries: Labour Force Surveys, Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2012. Panel B: Current Population Surveys.



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Figure 2.9 presents evidence on the risk of long-term unemployment, defined as the ratio of persons in long-term unemployment in the labour force and its increase between 2008 and 2012 as well as over the past year. The risk of long-term unemployment varies greatly across OECD countries, from 1.4% in Canada to 17.9% in Greece. The recent economic crisis has brought dramatic increases in the risk of long-term unemployment. In Greece and Spain, the increase has been above 15 percentage points and in Ireland 11 percentage points. Long-term unemployment in these three countries, further increased between 2011 and 2012. In the vast majority of countries in Figure 2.9, this risk has tripled between 2008 and 2012, but remains well below 10%.

Some demographic groups are facing a great risk of long-term unemployment

Different groups of workers are likely to face different risk of long-term unemployment, depending on their qualifications and professional experience, their age and the sector in which they work. For example, foreign-born youth are likely to be among the most vulnerable groups because they tend to accumulate various disadvantages such as short labour market experience, but also limited contacts and networks, which can make them more prone to become unemployed and stay unemployed for a long time.

Figure 2.9. **The risk of long-term unemployment of foreign-born workers in selected OECD countries, 2008, 2011 and 2012**



Notes: The population refers to the labour force 15-64. Data for European countries refer to Q1-Q3 2008, Q1-Q3 2011 and Q1-Q3 2012, except Switzerland for which data refer to Q2 2008, Q2 2011 and Q2 2012. Data for the United States refer to 2007, 2011 and 2012. The risk of long-term unemployment is defined as the share of unemployed for more than one year in the labour force.


Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

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Panel A in Figure 2.10 pools European OECD countries together to present the risk of long-term unemployment³ for different demographic groups. The overall increase in the long-term unemployment risk has been greater for the foreign-born than the native-born for all demographic groups (see Figure 2.A2.1 in Annex 2.A3). Among the foreign-born, the long-term unemployment risk has gone up for all, but there are important differences across demographic groups. The low-skilled and young migrants not only face the highest risk of long-term unemployment in 2011 but have also experienced the greatest increase in that risk between 2008 and 2011 (4 and 5 percentage points respectively). In contrast, the rise in the risk of long-term unemployment has been less dramatic among high-skilled migrants (1 percentage point). In 2008 in Europe, the risk of long-term unemployment was higher among native-born youth than among foreign-born youth, but this was reversed with the crisis (Figure 2.A2.1 in Annex 2.A2).


In 2007 in the United States (Figure 2.10, Panel B), there was much less variation across demographic groups and although the risk of long-term unemployment has increased for all groups since then, the change in percentage points has been smaller than in Europe. Patterns, however, are similar between the United States and Europe when gender, education and duration of stay are considered except for youth. The greatest increase in long-term unemployment risk has been occurred among older foreign workers, who thus risk losing pension rights just before their retirement. Loss of pension rights may push older migrants into marginalisation and poverty.

Figure 2.10. **The risk of long-term unemployment by demographic group in selected OECD countries, 2007/08 and 2011/12**



Notes: Overall population refers to working-age population (15-64) and the prime age to the 25-54. The risk of long-term unemployment is defined as the share of unemployed for more than one year in the labour force by demographic group. Data for European countries refer to 2008 and 2011. They exclude Belgium for which information on the length of stay of immigrants is not available. Recent migrants are foreign-born who migrated less than five years earlier.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

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In Canada (Figure 2.10, Panel C), the risk of long-term unemployment is lower than in Europe and the United States and it has also increased less between 2008 and 2012. Differences between groups are also less important in Canada.

Has the crisis reversed the progress made by migrants over the past decade?

The recent economic crisis affecting many OECD countries has put additional strain on the labour market situation of migrants and in particular on some more vulnerable groups among them, such as youth and the low-skilled, as shown above. Given this situation, there is concern that the crisis has reversed the significant progress that migrants have made over the past decade in the OECD. This section examines precisely the employment trends for migrants and natives, by gender, for the period starting in the beginning of the previous decade and ending in 2011/12, in order to shed some light on this question.

Overall, the past decade has seen improvements in the employment rates of the foreign-born relative to natives (Figure 2.11). In some countries the process of convergence of employment between foreign-born and native-born was disrupted by the crisis. In a large number of other countries, the recessions reversed the employment advantage that migrants had held relative to natives over a long time span. This is, for example, the case in Spain, where both men and women enjoyed high employment rates but where the trend relative to natives reversed dramatically with the crisis. Also, in Ireland, the clear advantage of foreign-born stopped in 2008/09 and after that native and migrant male employment rates started to converge, while the trend reversed completely for women. In other countries, such as for example Estonia, the advantage of migrants has resisted the crisis, although the gap with natives has narrowed down since 2010. In Luxembourg, the employment advantage of migrants has also persisted throughout the period both for men and women.

In some other countries, such as Austria, Germany, Hungary and Switzerland (for women) there is a clear catching-up effect for the foreign-born and in some cases, migrants outperformed the natives over the 2001-12 period. Despite a decline in their employment rates during the crisis, male migrants in the United Kingdom had higher levels of employment than native-born men from 2007 onwards. In Poland, which has been largely unaffected by the adverse economic conditions in Europe, employment rates of migrants are now similar to those of the natives. This might be due to the different age composition of the working-age migrant population in Poland, which is substantially younger in 2011 than it was in 2004. Also, native-born workers experienced some losses in 2009, which further closed the gap between migrants and their native peers. In Norway, the crisis arrested a rising employment trend for the foreign-born. In 2012, foreign-born men were about at the same employment level as in 2001, whereas women had gained 1.5 percentage point over the period, despite the substantial employment losses they experienced in 2009.

Overall, there are important gender differences in the employment trends across the OECD. In the majority of OECD countries, the employment rates of foreign-born men are today well below the maximum of the period but also, in at least half of these countries, below the pre-crisis average. In Southern European countries, but also Ireland, Estonia, Denmark, Norway and Finland, foreign-born men are in 2012 well below their peak employment level of the past ten years. However, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and the Slovak Republic, experience today higher male

Figure 2.11. **Employment rates by country of birth and gender in selected OECD countries, 2001-12**





Figure 2.11. **Employment rates by country of birth and gender in selected OECD countries, 2001-12 (cont.)**



Notes: Data refer to the working-age population (15-64). There are breaks in series in Finland (2006/07), Ireland (2008/09), Switzerland (2009/10) and the United Kingdom (2008/09). For the European countries in 2012, the data refer to Q1-Q3 2012 only.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

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employment rates for migrants than in the first half of the previous decade. In only three countries (Germany, Luxembourg and Poland) have migrants experienced substantial gains over the recent period, reaching their peak employment levels in 2012.

For foreign-born women, the situation is more mixed across the OECD and smaller employment losses have occurred in the majority of countries. In two thirds of OECD countries, the employment rates of foreign-born women are today higher than in the first half of the decade, and in some cases substantially higher (Poland, Germany, Finland). Only in Spain, Greece, Ireland, Estonia and Slovenia are migrant women in a worse situation today than prior to the recent crisis. However, in the majority of countries, they are below the peak employment level reached over the past decade. Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, are notable exceptions, as foreign-born women have seen their employment levels rise to a ten-year peak in 2012.

Figure 2.A3.1 (in Annex 2.A3) presents the difference in employment rates between native-born and foreign-born, separately for men and women, by comparing the difference in employment rates between natives and migrants in 2012 relative to the average difference in the period prior to the crisis (2002-06). In half of the OECD countries, migrant men have an employment advantage relative to native men. In the majority among them (Iceland, Ireland, Slovenia, the United States, Hungary and Luxembourg), this advantage has been further strengthened in 2012 relative to the pre-crisis levels, except in Italy, Estonia and Portugal. In countries such as the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Poland, the situation has improved for migrants. The foreign-born men have reversed the pre-crisis shortfall and are doing now better than native-born men. In the other half of OECD countries, native men are doing better than foreign-born ones but this advantage has shrunk over time in many among them. The greatest changes have occurred in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Finally, in Greece and Spain the advantage of male migrants has been completely reversed with the crisis and has turned into a clear disadvantage.

In more than half of OECD countries in 2012, there is an advantage of native-born women over foreign-born ones in terms of employment. The smallest gaps between foreign-born and native-born women are found in Greece, Ireland, Spain and Estonia, countries heavily affected by the recent economic crisis. However, in all these four countries, the recent crisis reversed the relative employment advantage that migrant women had in 2002-06, suggesting that further deterioration of the situation is likely if the economy does not recover. In Luxembourg, Portugal and Italy, foreign-born women have preserved and broadened their relative advantage in comparison with the pre-crisis period. In the majority of countries where native women have a relative advantage over migrants, they have preserved it but the gap has narrowed over the past years and in comparison to the pre-crisis situation. For example, in Finland and Norway in the 2002-06 period, there were 16 and 11 percentage points difference in employment rates between migrants and natives respectively, but these differences diminished by 6 and 5 percentage points respectively in 2012. In a set of countries (Austria, Sweden and France), the employment advantage of native women increased in 2012 relative to the pre-crisis period, but overall changes have not been large (between 1 and 3 percentage points).

What is the position of migrants in new hires across the OECD?


Migrants have for quite some time represented a substantial share of new entries into employment in the OECD area (see Chapter 2 in OECD, 2012b). Given the substantial employment losses they have experienced over the past five years, and the limited data for calculating comparative risk of layoff between migrants and natives, it is important to examine the share of foreign-born in new hires, including in countries where only limited

hiring is taking place. However, it should be noted that hiring does not necessarily imply new job creation. It may also capture renewal of temporary contracts, more prevalent in some countries than in others. As a result, differences in new hires across countries are likely to reflect differences in labour market structure, labour market rigidities and the incidence of temporary employment. For that reason, cross-country comparisons in this section should be taken with caution.

Indeed, the share of migrants in total hires varies significantly across countries (Figure 2.12), in many countries mirroring their share in the working-age population. In 2008, it ranged from 2% in Turkey to 50% in Luxembourg, but in the majority of OECD countries, the share of foreign-born persons among new hires ranged between 10% and 23%. Nonetheless, the situation has somewhat changed with the crisis. Overall in European OECD countries, the share of migrants in new hires has slightly increased from 16.1% to 16.8% between 2008 and 2012, while it declined in the United States (from 15.4% in 2006 to 14.5% in 2012). The European average masks important differences across countries. In most countries, the contribution of migrants in new hires has increased, in particular in Luxembourg, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. However, in some countries, the share of foreign-born in new hires has dropped, in some cases strikingly. For example, in Ireland the share of migrants in new hires decreased by 7 percentage points between 2008 and 2012, and in Spain, by 3 percentage points.


As already discussed above, the recent economic downturn has had varied implications for the labour market outcomes of the different demographic groups. It is hence important to analyse the distribution of new hires across these groups to better understand their

Figure 2.12. **Share of foreign-born workers in hires, 2008, 2011 and 2012**



Notes: Hires refer to persons who started in their current occupation within the previous 1-year period. The population refers to working-age population (15-64). Data for the United States refer to 2006 instead of 2008 and 2010 instead of 2011. Data for European countries refer to Q1-Q3 2008, Q1-Q3 2011 and Q1-Q3 2012, except Switzerland for which data refer to Q2 2008, Q2 2011 and Q2 2012. The OECD average excludes countries for which some observations are missing (i.e. Canada).

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys, January supplement.

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current prospects and their likelihood to return to work, even in cases where these hires are mainly renewals of existing temporary contracts. As shown in Figure 2.13 (Panel A), in European OECD countries, there was a significant drop in the total number of hires between 2008 and 2011 for all demographic groups and for both the foreign- and the native-born. The only exceptions are the older workers (both natives and migrants), the high-skilled and the less recent migrants (those who arrived more than five years ago). Overall in Europe, the drop in the representation of the low-skilled among new hires has been more limited among the foreign-born than the native-born. This may reflect, at least to some extent, the willingness of low-skilled migrants to occupy jobs that native workers with equivalent education levels refuse to take (see Chapter 2 in OECD, 2012b) or the greater likelihood that migrants hold short contracts which are tacitly renewed.

The overall small increase in Europe in the share of foreign-born in hires is mainly driven by the increase among the low- and the high-skilled as well as men (see Figure 2.A5.1 in Annex 2.A5). There is a decline in the share of the foreign-born among newly hired youth. These trends are possibly driven by the sectors (see Table 2.A5.1 in Annex 2.A5) and type of jobs that are currently being created and the skills and characteristics that they require.


Important differences exist between Europe and the United States (Figure 2.13, Panel B). First, the overall losses were substantially higher in the latter, close to 20% versus 11% in Europe. In addition, all groups of migrants experienced substantial drops in the number of new hires between 2008 and 2011 in the United States. Contrary to the situation in Europe, overall losses were greater for foreign-born persons than for native-born ones and this is mainly driven by the impact on women (they saw their share in new hires dropping from 14% in 2006 to 12% in 2012) who were spared the effect of the crisis in Europe. Among migrants, those who had been in the country for longer were more affected than other migrants. The contrary is observed in Europe, where it may be explained by free mobility.

For most OECD countries, the majority of migrants in new jobs are medium- or high-skilled persons (Figure 2.A5.2 in annex). The United Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg have the highest share of high-skilled migrants in new hires, close to 50%. In Norway, Switzerland, Denmark and the United States, high-skilled and medium-skilled foreign-born together make up for 75 to 80% of new hires among migrants. Only in Southern Europe are low-skilled the major group among the new hires. This reflects the migration inflows in these countries over the past 20 years, which have been mainly low-skilled in construction, agriculture and services. Over the crisis period, the high-skilled have seen their shares in new entries rise in Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the Czech Republic. Similarly, the low-skilled are well represented in new hires in Belgium and the medium-skilled in the Czech Republic, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In contrast, in Ireland, all migrant groups saw their share fall relative to 2008, and especially the medium and high-skilled ones. In the United Kingdom, the losses were greatest among the medium-skilled, whereas the high-skilled have seen their share rise. In the United States, the losses were greater for the low-skilled and the medium-skilled, while high-skilled migrants continue to comprise a relatively high share of new hires.

What kind of new jobs are newly hired migrants taking up?

The share of temporary hires among new hires of migrants (but also of natives) varies greatly across OECD countries (Figure 2.A5.3 in Annex 2.A5). It ranges between 19% in Turkey and a high of 78% in Spain. In half of the OECD countries in Figure 2.A5.3, more than 40% of all new hires of migrants involve temporary contracts. In Belgium, the

Figure 2.13. **Change in the number of hires by demographic group and country of birth over the crisis in selected OECD countries**



Notes: Hires refer to persons who started in their current occupation within the previous 1-year period. Data for European countries refer to Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2011. They exclude Belgium for which information on the length of stay of immigrants is not available. Data for the United States refer to 2006 and 2012. Data for Canada refer to 2008 and 2012. Recent migrants are foreign-born who migrated less than five years earlier.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys, January supplement.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822883>

Netherlands, Greece and Sweden temporary new hires are more common among the foreign-born than among natives. In other countries, the opposite is true. These differences across countries and between migrants and natives seem to suggest segmented labour markets in some countries, where workers with certain characteristics (low skilled, migrants, etc.) have access only to short-term jobs.

Overall, the share of temporary new hires in total hires of foreign-born persons has slightly increased between 2008 and 2012 across the OECD. In Ireland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Netherlands, there has been a sharp increase in the share of temporary jobs (between seven and 17 percentage points). This combined with the evidence in Figure 2.12 suggests that in these four countries, migrants are less represented in new hires than in 2008 and more of these hires are on temporary contracts, implying that there may be a further segmentation of the labour market for migrants. In Luxembourg and Greece, there are substantial differences between the foreign- and the native-born. The share of temporary jobs in new hires has dropped by 15 percentage points for natives in Luxembourg, while it has slightly increased for the foreign-born. In Greece, the share for migrants has increased by 6 percentage points while it has slightly declined for natives.

Overall, the greater incidence of temporary jobs among new hires is suggestive of the prevailing economic conditions. The economic uncertainty especially in Europe makes employers more reluctant to hire on a permanent basis, in particular in sectors mostly hurt by the crisis. As shown in Table 2.A5.1 in Annex 2.A5, new hires in manufacturing and construction have been substantially cut between 2008 and 2012 (from 12.4 to 8.8% and from 13.5 to 10.0% respectively).

Integration policy

The integration of immigrants and their children remains on national agendas of OECD countries, partly because of their growing presence and partly because their full integration into the economy and society is increasingly viewed as contributing to better performance in economic terms while mitigating social pressures. This section provides an overview of the recent changes in the field of integration policies and practices across the OECD and the non-member countries participating in the OECD expert network on international migration (the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania). The first section deals with the role of integration measures in the overall policy mix of OECD countries. Labour market integration is discussed in the second section along with the recent developments in the assessment and recognition of the foreign qualifications. The third section describes recent developments in the field of integration through education and language training. Section four provides an overview of integration measures for other groups such as family migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and returning nationals. Section five summarises the developments in terms of measures tackling discrimination and promoting diversity and social cohesion, while section six provides an overview of naturalisation measures.

The role of integration measures in the overall policy mix

In terms of general approaches towards integration pursued in the course of 2011-12, OECD countries can be divided into two broader groups. The first includes countries with longstanding immigrant presence, with an integration agenda cutting across the whole spectrum of economic and social life, including Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the Nordic countries. These countries enhanced their broad integration

efforts, while a second group of countries with small immigrant populations such as the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Mexico, Bulgaria and the Russian Federation, started to formulate, often for the first time, their national integration strategies. The topic of integration has also gained prominence in Korea and Japan.

There were considerable differences in how countries used public funds for integration programmes over the 2011-12 period. Some countries continued to invest substantial public resources in integration initiatives (such as the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, and Canada), while other countries cut back substantially on integration measures, in particular due to the economic recession and fiscal constraints. This is, for example, the case in Greece, Spain and Portugal. In Spain, for instance, cuts have been made to immigrant integration measures. The Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and Educational Support, created in 2005, was unfunded in 2012, and the free access to health services for irregular migrants in Spain has also been limited.

Finland opted for a new, more comprehensive approach to integration. This was done by including integration in the Future of Migration 2020 Strategy that aims, among other things, at making integration policies more effective, increasing immigrants' employment rates and intensifying anti-discrimination efforts. Furthermore, a specific Integration Act entered into force in Finland in September 2011 followed by the adoption, in June 2012, of the Government Integration Programme for 2012-15.

In Australia, a National Settlement Framework was developed in 2012 by the Select Council on Immigration and Settlement that operates under the auspices of the Council of Australian Governments. The Framework is a tripartite intergovernmental agreement which recognises the importance of all tiers of government to work together in the delivery of settlement support. It seeks to provide guiding principles and focus action in the areas of planning, delivery and outcomes. It also aims at providing greater clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities of government partners and the importance of engaging other key stakeholders, such as service delivery agencies and the settlement sector bodies.

Germany opted for a wide participatory approach in developing its integration strategy through 11 "dialogue forums" involving a broad range of stakeholders who together committed to a broad range of integration actions that were incorporated into the National Action Plan on Integration presented in January 2012.

In Ireland, the adoption of the Programme for Government Common Statement in 2011 was supplemented by the Department of Justice and Equality Strategy Statement 2011-14, which committed to promote equality and integration in Irish society in order to further boost economic growth, social inclusion and fairness. The main tools towards achieving these goals include stakeholder consultation, a review of approaches to migrant integration, development of anti-racism and promotion of integration measures. To this end, the Irish Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration allocates grants to local authorities, supporting bodies and other national organisations.

The Chilean Government embarked on a new national migration strategy for the period 2010-14 that led to a number of initiatives including the development of a new Immigration bill put forward by the government at the end of 2012. One of the new features of the Chilean migration policy is the establishment of integration agreements as a series of co-ordination and collaborative acts among public agencies with the aim to aid vulnerable groups of migrants (notably women, children and young people), in obtaining legal resident status and access to various facilities including healthcare, education and access to finance.

In Canada, all permanent residents are eligible for settlement and integration programmes. These are delivered by a broad range of actors, including provincial and municipal governments, educational institutions, settlement service organisations, NGOs and the private sector. In the interest of delivering a more coherent service across Canada, the Canadian Government will be resuming its responsibility for previously decentralised settlement services delivery in the provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia as of 2013 and 2014, respectively.

In Switzerland, the integration agenda is understood as a broad interdisciplinary matter with shared responsibility among the Confederation, the cantons and other stakeholders, such as public institutions, civil society and the private sector. In 2011, the Federation Council outlined the main priorities for the future development of the integration agenda that include legal action, links to professional organisations and the labour market, increased financial support, co-financing by the Confederation and the cantons, and the intensification of dialogue with both state and non-state actors in the field of integration. Although Hungary does not have a strategic document on the integration of immigrants, it established a working group on integration, involving non-governmental stakeholders such as civil society representatives, that addresses developments at the national and EU-level and discusses the priorities for the annual allocation of the European Integration Fund and other resources.

In the Netherlands, the Civic Integration Act has been amended as of 1 January 2013. Local governments no longer have a role to play in the integration process and individuals are themselves responsible for meeting the requirements, supported by a system of loans. Failure to pass the civic integration examination will result in the migrants' temporary residence permit being revoked unless there are exceptional circumstances, for example in the case of refugees.

The Russian Federation adopted a new Concept of the State Policy on Migration in August 2012 that sets the national goals in the fields of both internal and external migration to be achieved by 2025. The Concept, which includes migrant adaptation and integration among its main priorities, should be implemented according to an operational plan designed by the Federal Migration Service.

Finally, Romania adopted a new National Strategy for Immigration for 2011-14 in which the social integration of foreigners is outlined as one of the key priorities. The country implemented several initiatives with the assistance of the European Integration Fund.

Monitoring and evaluation efforts have expanded

A growing number of OECD countries are actively involved in monitoring their integration measures and evaluating their outcomes. In the OECD countries which are members of the EU, integration indicators are becoming increasingly wide-spread following an initiative at the EU level. This holds, among other countries, for Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Luxemburg. Increasingly, the indicators are presented at both national and sub-national level. In Italy, for example, the National Economics and Labour Council (CNEL) publishes regional integration indicators covering specific thematic areas such as territorial attractiveness, social inclusion, and work placement that aim at measuring both the level and quality of immigrants' inclusion in the local labour markets. Although not an EU member country, Switzerland also presented in December 2012, for the first time, a set of 67 integration indicators in seven domains.

Countries with long-established monitoring of immigrant outcomes also continue to further elaborate their indicator systems. For example, the Danish government has launched a new national integration monitoring tool known as the “integration barometer”, focusing on basic indicators in terms of employment outcomes, education, Danish language skills, social cohesion, equal treatment, public financial support, deprived urban areas and crime against immigrants.

Canada also strengthened the capacity for evidence-based policy design and evaluation through several initiatives in the field of monitoring, such as an improved design of the *Immigrant Longitudinal Database* (allowing for better linking of cases over time, higher coverage, as well as identification of family and sector-specific characteristics), or the increased capacity for gender-based analysis in policy design and evaluation.

Labour market integration

One general trend observed among OECD countries is that labour market integration plays an increasing role in the overall integration efforts. In particular, early labour market integration is increasingly central.

Labour market integration strategies involve a wide array of measures aimed at improving the chances of migrant workers to find their first job or to find a new job after becoming unemployed. Such measures include, among others, a better matching between immigrants’ skills and jobs through improvements in the assessment, recognition of foreign qualifications and active labour market policies.

Active labour market policies

Active labour market measures represent a prominent tool for achieving labour market integration. However, their general scope of action has been recently undermined by the fiscal constraints countries are facing, while their relevance to migrants has been generally weak because of the lack of targeting on this particular group. Some OECD countries experiencing deep recessions such as Spain, Greece and Portugal, recently cut their budget for active labour market measures, as well as other measures aimed at promoting the labour market integration of migrants. At the same time, in Spain new urgent measures were enacted in the course of 2011 and 2012 aimed at the professional training of unemployed. For example, the PREPARA Plan providing vocational training to the unemployed who exhausted their unemployment benefits was extended till 2013. Although these training measures do not specifically target migrants, their universal nature, combined with the weak labour market position of migrants, imply a specific relevance for the latter.

In Denmark, active labour market policies constitute an important part of integration efforts. The national integration programme involves the so-called “offers of active employment” that are based on three types of active labour market measures: guidance, job training and internship, and employment with wage subsidy. The integration programs are implemented by local authorities and cover all refugees and persons coming under the family reunification scheme. A new initiative called “We need everyone” was launched in 2012 to aid the recipients of cash benefits who do not participate in the integration programs for newly arrived migrants, and who were unable to find jobs mainly due to complex personal and social problems. Individual cases will be reviewed by specialised local teams that will also prepare co-ordinated plans to promote activation of the

beneficiaries. Sweden, in its budget bill for 2013, also took a number of initiatives to encourage employers to hire newly arrived immigrants, including by enhancing flexibility and extending eligibility in the so-called “Step-In” job.

Employer responsibility has increased

Employer involvement and responsibility are increasingly strengthened. For example, employers of non-EU/EFTA migrants in the Czech Republic are charged with the responsibility to guide and guarantee the situation of these workers upon completion of their job assignment. Similarly, in Japan the revised Employment Measures Act obliges employers to make an effort to support their foreign workers who are willing to find another job after leaving their enterprises. The choice of action is left to employers. Public employment services are assigned to assist employers in supporting re-employment of their former employees within their resident status timeframe.

In several EU member countries, the EU Employer Sanction Directive (2009/52/EC) inspired legislative changes in terms of sanctions against employers of illegal migrants from third countries. For example, in Finland changes came into force in August 2012 and stipulate sanctions in the range of EUR 5 000 and EUR 30 000. These sanctions can be imposed by the Finnish Immigration Office and should be enforced under the responsibility of the Legal Register Centre.

In Israel, the monitoring and supervision of the labour rights of migrant workers are at the centre of a newly-established inspection unit within the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour. In the course of 2012, 12 inspectors were added to the staff and an additional five openings were envisaged for officers focused on enforcement issues.

Employer involvement is also strengthened with respect to integration measures, notably in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. In Switzerland, for example, a dialogue between various stakeholders in integration resulted in pilot projects regarding language training paid by employers, partly counting as working hours.

Assessment and recognition of foreign qualifications are on the top of employment agendas

Internationalisation of labour markets and global competition for talent and skills imposes additional need for the assessment and recognition of foreign qualifications. However, the question of whether the recognition procedure should be based on comparing the educational curricula or on competences gained through the educational process remains an important issue. Although some mechanisms for comparing curricula are in place (e.g. the European Credit Transfer System), establishing the equivalence of curricula is in practice a serious challenge. Several recent policy developments therefore aim to facilitate and simplify the recognition process, for example by developing one-stop shops, streamlining procedures, increasing transparency and by lowering the costs and the processing time of the recognition procedures.

New comprehensive frameworks for the recognition of foreign qualifications were established in Austria and Germany. Germany developed an extensive information network about its new recognition procedures through a network of offices participating in the Integration through Qualification Programme (IQ Programme), a dedicated website (Recognition Finder) and a hotline. The information is available also in English in order to make the knowledge about regulations more transparent and accessible to foreigners.

Canada initiated a pilot project aimed at surmounting credit barriers: micro loans are provided to immigrants to cover expenses related to diploma recognition, in particular in the case of costly bridging courses.

In terms of occupational coverage, the recognition of foreign qualifications is of particular importance in regulated professions where formal recognition is generally a pre-requisite for being able to exercise a profession. In this regard, Germany embarked on further systematisation in the field of recognition of vocational qualifications. A new Recognition Act adopted by the federal Government that entered into force in April 2012 provides the ground for systematic recognition of foreign vocational qualifications in the occupations regulated by the federal law. The Act provides for improvement and harmonisation of procedures and of criteria guiding the recognition of qualification. This should substantially improve the chances for formal recognition of vocational qualifications gained abroad and facilitate the integration of skilled migrant workers. The state (*Länder*) governments follow the suit in the occupational areas that fall under their jurisdiction such as teachers, childcare workers, engineers, and social workers.

Canada further improved its Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications that is led federally by the Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. Action plans for the first group of eight regulated occupations were launched in 2010 with the aim to overcome the barriers in foreign credential recognition. In 2012, six target occupations were added (dentists, engineering technicians, licensed practical nurses, medical radiation technologists, physicians and teachers). Furthermore, an International Qualifications Network website was launched in Canada during 2011-12 to provide virtual space for stakeholders interested in sharing innovative practices in the field of foreign credential recognition. By the end of 2012, almost 150 initiatives were posted on its website.

Many reforms go in the direction of merging different institutions to a single one, to enhance transparency. Sweden, for example, transferred the assessment and validation functions for foreign qualifications at the upper-secondary and post-secondary level that were previously managed by several separate actors to a new agency, the Swedish University and Higher Education Council.

Lack of host-country language knowledge may also be an obstacle in the recognition process. Some countries have reacted to this for specific occupations. In Israel, for example, doctors may pass tests in languages other than Hebrew and Arabic (e.g. in Russian).

Educational and linguistic integration

The education of the children of immigrants

Integration through education gains importance in many OECD countries as the numbers of both young immigrant children and native-born children of foreign-born parents increase.

Italy experiences increasing numbers of children of immigrants in schools, with a particular concentration in the northern part of the country in both large cities and smaller industrial cities of the centre-north. Given that the Italian education policy is largely decentralised, schools introduced a wide array of measures focused mainly at improving students language skills, but also targeted at parents or teachers. A recent initiative by the Italian Government to limit the share of foreign pupils per classroom to 30% triggered debates regarding its justification as well as its practical implementation and effectiveness.

In Denmark, a special “youth package” was approved in 2012, targeting unemployed citizens below 30 who have participated in a formal youth education programme. The initiative should improve the educational background of youth of immigrant descent, notably for males who complete formal education programs at a substantially lower rate than their Danish counterparts. The Danish Ministry for Children and Education also administers the initiative “We need all youngsters” aimed at helping young immigrants to complete education bridging to gainful employment. Role play, educational guidance, homework cafés and other volunteer-driven initiatives represent core activities of the initiative, which also involves a “Retention Caravan” programme implemented by selected vocational schools to prevent ethnic minority students from dropping out.

In Sweden, a system of complementary education has been promoted by the government, which designated a number of universities and colleges to arrange supplementary courses for non-EU/EFTA nationals with a university degree. The courses are tailored for specific professions, such as teachers, lawyers, doctors, nurses, and dentists.

Linguistic integration

This section covers the issues related to: a) language requirements for integration; and b) language courses and the related responsibilities. Language proficiency is viewed as a key factor for successful integration. Close attention of authorities to language education is evident in frequent changes and new initiatives in this area. In terms of language requirements, the general development is divergent: some countries decreased the language-based eligibility requirements for the resident foreign population in order to ease access to various public schemes (for example, in Denmark) while others raised the level of language proficiency required of migrant workers (the Netherlands) or reunifying family members (the United Kingdom). Danish authorities decreased the language requirements for granting Danish nationality in order to prevent exclusion of the less educated from the naturalisation procedure. It is envisaged that requirements for passing the civic education will be modified as well.

In the United Kingdom, a new English-language requirement was introduced in November 2010 as a compulsory condition for migrants who wish to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, for example as the partner of a British citizen or a person settled in the country. The partner should demonstrate basic reading and comprehension skills in English; exemptions are granted for exceptional circumstances such as disability and old age. The language requirements for settlement are stricter than the ones for foreign spouses. Until October 2013, applicants for settlement will be required to meet the current knowledge of life and language criteria by passing the “Life in the United Kingdom” test or an “English for Speakers of Other Languages” course. From October 2013, the English language requirement will be raised to speaking and listening qualification at B1 level (independent user) or above.

In Norway, the right and obligation to participate in Norwegian language training and social integration courses for adult immigrants has been expanded from 300 to 600 hours since 1 January 2012. Tests in Norwegian language for newcomers will become mandatory from 1 September 2013 onwards. In addition, the group that can participate in the introduction programme – which includes language training – has been expanded to certain groups of family migrants who have been mistreated or cannot return to their origin country after divorce. In Sweden, an inquiry has looked into ways to enhance the scope for tailor-made language training under the “Swedish for Immigrants” programme.

In Canada, the Government undertook several initiatives in 2012 aimed at improving language training services for immigrants. These include field-testing of the so-called “Portfolio-Based Language Assessment” tool for measuring students’ progress in language training funded through immigration services, completing two versions of a national test of language achievement, launching an on-line national repository of language teaching tools and resources, and renewing the national language benchmarks and standards for rating the language proficiency of adult immigrants.

Other groups

Integration of refugees and asylum seekers

Several OECD countries have introduced or expanded special integration programmes targeted at refugees. The Australian Cultural Orientation programme (AUSCO) prepares holders of refugee and humanitarian visas for settlement in Australia by means of a five-day orientation course. The course provides an initial introduction to aspects of Australian life and culture that should enhance entrants’ settlement prospects by helping to create realistic expectations for their life in Australia. The course is delivered overseas before travel to Australia. During 2011-12, almost 300 such courses were delivered to over 4 500 participants, in their own languages, in 25 countries of Africa and Asia. AUSCO courses are complemented by the Onshore Orientation Program provided through the Humanitarian Settlement Service.

In 2012, the Danish Government achieved a political agreement to implement a new law enabling asylum seekers to take up employment and residence outside the refugee centres after a six-month period, on the condition that they co-operate with the authorities. The aim is to improve the integration prospects of persons who could be later granted asylum.

In Bulgaria, refugees and asylum seekers are the only population group that can benefit from a specific integration programme. The Programme for Integration of Refugees (2011-13), adopted in 2011, switched the focus of employment services provided to refugees from passive to active measures and introduced a new initiative for promoting entrepreneurship among refugees.

Re-integration of own nationals gains importance

Several OECD and non-OECD countries with significant emigration are concerned with re-integration of their returning nationals who have lived and worked abroad. Re-integration of return migrants becomes an increasingly important issue in countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania, but also remains of ongoing concern of more longstanding countries of emigration such as Italy. It is increasingly recognised that nationals returning because of financial or adaptation problems abroad can also face adaptation problems upon return, especially when accompanied by children.⁴ Therefore, returning nationals have become a special target group of integration policies.

Working with national diasporas abroad may also ease the re-integration of nationals. Thus, several countries with substantial emigration try to strengthen the links with their nationals living abroad by a wide array of measures, such as establishing schools teaching in national languages abroad, supporting the participation of Diasporas in the national elections, or encouraging the protection of migrant workers’ rights abroad through networking with the national trade unions.

Integration of family migrants

Family migrants are another group that is increasingly in the focus of integration measures, although these still tend to be less developed than those for humanitarian migrants.

In Ireland, a new Government Integration Programme for 2012-15 was adopted in June 2012, which focuses on employment of immigrants and on supporting immigrant children, women and families, through a series of practical measures, such as language training, early childhood and basic education, and development of integration in basic services. New models of integration training have been tested in the framework of the programme “Participative Integration in Finland” while further measures are envisaged in the fields of housing, physical exercise and cultural policies.

In Denmark, immigrant women living in isolation from the Danish society became a special focus group for integration efforts in 2012 and 2013. A targeted initiative aimed at helping them to enrol in education or gain employment will build on the experience of previous programmes, such as the “District Mothers” programme established in 21 vulnerable housing areas. Unemployed immigrant mothers in these areas are trained to become “district mothers” who visit other immigrant women in the neighbourhood and give them advice on various issues relevant to their social integration. The National Organisation for District Mothers gained a permanent status in 2012.

Integration programmes targeted on mixed marriages and ethnic descent

A number of OECD countries, in particular in Asia, provide for special integration programmes targeted at mixed marriages or ethnic descent. For example, Japan provides targeted assistance to migrants of Japanese descent whose prospects for settling in the country are complicated by the economic crisis, as well as by the lack of social contacts and networks. The measures are focused mainly on improving labour market integration through the provision of individual counselling, training and directed job-search by the public employment services. Assistance can also be provided to migrants of Japanese descent if they wish to return to their origin country.

In Korea, marriage migration has been driven in part by demographic developments in rural areas. The Korean Government embarked on gradual institutionalisation of the integration of these predominantly women migrants, by adopting a Multicultural Families Support Act. The act was followed by the first strategic Three-Year Framework Plan for Multicultural Families for 2010-12, aimed at creating a favourable environment for children and promoting social understanding and inclusion of multicultural families. Prominent measures under the plan are the provision of home care and home tutoring for children in the Korean language. The programme has been expanding at a high rate, and the number of offices increased more than ten-fold between 2006 and 2011. By 2011, the plan served more than 200 000 beneficiaries, of whom almost one-third had Korean nationality.

Programmes aimed at tackling discrimination and promoting diversity and social cohesion

Social cohesion is a necessary condition for achieving progress across all segments of society. Redistributive policies and affirmative action have been widely used in economic and political policy towards achieving this goal. However, in societies with varied ethnic and cultural background, the maintenance of social cohesion requires broader and more

innovative approaches that are embedded in all aspects of social life, beyond economic well-being. Building an inclusive society is at the heart of the Strategy Europe 2020, a task increasingly difficult to achieve without paying due attention to integrating immigrant populations with their specific backgrounds. Programmes aimed at “soft” approaches, such as promotion of multicultural values, are gaining increasing importance and popularity among OECD countries.

In Italy, national institutions have recently directed more attention towards the problem of discrimination against immigrants. The Prime Minister has appointed a Minister for International Co-operation and Integration whose portfolio so far focuses on knowledge-sharing on integration initiatives, preparation of a forum on integration, and other integration-related initiatives.

In Australia, the Diversity and Social Cohesion Program (DSCP) is undertaken through initiatives that address cultural, racial and religious intolerance by promoting respect, fairness and a sense of belonging for everyone. The aim is to provide an environment in which all Australians can develop a sense of belonging by providing opportunities to participate and contribute to Australian society. The programme also includes projects which develop capacity-building skills for specific community groups under significant pressure due to their cultural, religious or racial diversity.

Canada embarked on a policy review of its Multiculturalist Program with the view to design future action along the lines of promoting equality of opportunity and reducing the socio-economic barriers for migrants. Canadian immigration authorities also positioned themselves in the framework of the Canada Counterterrorism Strategy as partners in preventing radicalisation and mitigating the threat of violent extremism.

Similarly, in Ireland intercultural aspects are mainstreamed into a number of national strategies, such as the Intercultural Education Strategy (2010-15), the Cultural Diversity and the Arts Strategy (2010), the Diversity Strategy and Implementation Plan (2009-12) and the Intercultural Health Strategy (2007-16).

The importance placed on intercultural values and diversity is also reflected in Germany through the provision of intercultural and migrant-oriented training to advisory and management staff of the Federal Employment Agency.

In Spain, a comprehensive Strategy against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was approved in November 2011. The strategy planned for the 2011-14 period entails multiple objectives and measures that should be funded by the central state budget.

In Norway, a new toolbox was introduced by the Directorate of Integration and Diversity that intended to assist public service providers to ensure that persons with immigrant background are offered equal public services to their native counterparts. The Norwegian Government requested municipal services to include the principle of equal services in their service statements and to include the experience of immigrants in their surveys. To this end, the Directorate of Integration and Diversity developed a guide to ensure that all residents are sampled in such surveys.

Sweden decided to strengthen its support for non-governmental organisations that are working to prevent and combat discrimination. Funding for this has been increased and support has been made permanent.

Naturalisation

Changes in naturalisation law have been prominent in 2011/12, and there appears to be some convergence, with several countries with relatively restrictive policies introducing facilitations whereas others with more liberal provisions making access more difficult. In the former group are Poland and Switzerland. Poland adopted a new Act on Polish Citizenship in 2012 that facilitates the acquisition of Polish citizenship by shortening the period of required stay, broadening the category of eligible applicants, and allowing for dual citizenship. Switzerland is undergoing a revision of its citizenship legislation, reducing the duration of residence requirement for the ordinary naturalisation procedure at the federal level from its current twelve years to eight, and partially standardising procedures at the sub-national level.

Canada belongs to the group of OECD countries where citizenship access has traditionally been relatively easy. However, in November 2012, new citizenship regulations were introduced that require adult applicants to prove that they have obtained a certain level of language mastery in either English or French. Further changes are under consideration.

Belgium, another OECD country with relatively liberal access to citizenship, also decided in 2012 to tighten the conditions for access to citizenship. In particular, the duration of residence requirement for the ordinary procedure has increased from three years (two for refugees) to five to ten years, depending on the integration level. In addition, language requirements are now generally applied.

Ireland announced a series of changes to the citizenship application process in 2011 with the aim to enable more efficient and streamlined processing times. The issue of processing times has attracted considerable debate, as the average waiting time in 2011 was about 26 months. The Department of Justice and Equality noted in its *Annual Report 2011* that as from mid-2012 all non-complex cases will be completed within six months. A simplified application form was introduced in response to the high level of applications which had to be routinely returned due to errors. Other changes included accelerated checking procedures for certain categories of applicants, such as spouses of Irish citizens and recent grantees of long-term residency. In addition, the Minister for Justice and Equality highlighted the preparation of an English language and civics test for naturalisation applicants as a key priority.

Denmark is also in the process of changing the conditions for naturalisation. Whereas the requirement regarding self-support is scheduled to be tightened, other conditions such as the required level of Danish are to be relaxed. In France, a circular issued in October 2012 clarified and softened the procedures for access to French nationality.

In Greece, the citizenship law reform of 2010 that aimed at opening up the Greek citizenship to native-born children of immigrants and easing the naturalisation procedures for the foreign-born led to about 12 000 naturalisations in its first three years. Application fees and complex procedures may explain the less-than-expected uptake. The amended citizenship law has been recently withdrawn on the grounds of unconstitutionality.

The Russian Federation recently tightened its naturalisation policies by closing down in October 2011 the previous fast-track procedure for selected groups of foreigners (e.g. the nationals of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus who were born on the territory of the Russian Federation or had close relatives there).

Notes

1. Given that the global financial crisis started earlier in the United States in comparison with most OECD countries (OECD, 2012c), 2007 has been chosen as the comparison date for the United States, and 2008 for European OECD countries.
2. The industry segregation index measures the share of foreign-born that should change sectors for their distributions across industries to become identical to that of the native-born.
3. The risk of long-term unemployment is defined as the number of unemployed for more than 12 months in a specific group out of the total labour force in the group.
4. For example, the Romanian Education Ministry statistics show that nearly one out of two children of returnees has to repeat a grade after arrival.

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ANNEX 2.A1

Employment, unemployment and participation rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12

Table 2.A1.1. Quarterly employment rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12
Percentages

Men + women		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	74.8	72.6	64.1	73.1	..	66.1	71.6	78.4	64.5	68.7	69.7	65.3	72.2	60.8	56.0	67.6	-	58.5	57.8	58.6	78.0	78.0	75.8	58.1	67.7	61.3	67.0	75.4	42.4	69.3
	Q2 2008	75.1	73.5	63.2	75.1	81.0	66.6	71.9	79.4	64.5	68.9	72.6	65.7	72.2	61.7	56.3	67.3	-	59.0	58.7	58.9	78.7	78.9	76.3	59.0	68.1	61.6	68.4	76.8	46.2	69.9
	Q3 2008	75.0	74.4	64.0	75.5	..	66.7	72.9	79.6	64.2	69.9	72.4	66.1	72.2	61.6	57.1	67.6	-	58.5	58.2	60.4	78.9	79.0	76.1	60.1	67.6	63.1	70.3	77.7	46.5	69.6
	Q4 2008	74.9	73.7	63.7	74.0	..	66.8	73.0	79.3	62.7	68.8	70.6	65.4	71.9	61.1	56.5	65.1	-	58.2	57.7	59.7	79.1	77.9	76.9	60.0	67.3	62.9	68.6	75.2	44.2	68.6
	2008	75.0	73.6	63.8	74.4	..	66.6	72.4	79.2	64.0	69.1	71.3	65.6	72.1	61.3	56.5	66.9	83.8	58.5	58.1	59.4	78.7	78.5	76.3	59.3	67.7	62.2	68.6	76.3	44.8	69.4
	Q1 2009	73.9	72.4	63.2	71.4	..	65.5	72.0	77.1	60.7	64.2	68.6	64.8	71.0	60.5	54.9	62.8	-	57.8	56.8	60.2	78.8	77.4	75.0	58.9	66.6	61.0	66.9	73.8	41.2	66.5
	Q2 2009	74.0	73.1	63.2	72.9	80.3	65.4	72.3	77.2	60.3	63.0	70.0	65.4	70.3	61.0	55.4	62.1	-	57.9	57.3	63.3	78.7	77.8	74.3	59.3	66.3	60.4	67.8	74.9	44.6	66.5
	Q3 2009	73.8	73.8	63.1	73.1	..	65.2	72.5	76.8	60.1	63.3	69.5	65.3	70.4	61.0	55.3	61.9	-	57.2	56.9	62.9	78.6	76.8	73.6	59.9	65.4	60.1	68.6	74.9	45.8	66.2
	Q4 2009	74.0	73.0	63.4	71.9	..	65.3	73.2	75.2	59.5	61.2	67.5	64.5	70.4	60.2	55.3	60.5	-	57.2	56.5	61.0	78.1	76.4	74.6	59.4	65.5	59.2	67.5	73.3	44.9	65.1
	2009	73.9	73.1	63.2	72.3	..	65.4	72.5	76.6	60.1	62.9	68.9	65.0	70.5	60.7	55.2	61.8	78.4	57.5	56.9	61.9	78.6	77.1	74.4	59.4	66.0	60.2	67.7	74.2	44.1	66.1
	Q1 2010	73.4	71.9	63.6	70.6	80.3	64.1	71.8	74.0	58.7	59.0	66.7	64.6	69.7	59.5	54.3	59.7	-	57.5	56.1	60.5	77.6	75.6	74.1	58.2	65.5	58.0	66.3	73.1	43.6	64.6
	Q2 2010	73.8	72.7	63.1	73.0	79.9	64.8	72.4	75.3	59.0	59.9	69.5	65.0	69.9	59.6	55.1	60.4	-	58.7	56.6	60.3	78.0	76.5	73.5	59.3	65.3	58.6	66.4	75.4	47.3	65.3
Q3 2010	74.0	73.7	63.6	73.5	80.2	65.3	72.7	75.0	59.1	62.6	69.7	65.3	70.5	59.1	55.8	60.5	-	58.7	56.0	62.0	76.4	76.2	73.8	60.0	65.1	59.2	66.6	76.5	47.4	65.6	
Q4 2010	74.4	73.4	64.2	72.6	80.5	65.4	73.2	74.2	58.9	63.7	68.1	64.4	70.2	57.8	55.6	59.6	-	59.1	56.5	59.9	76.3	76.0	74.0	59.6	64.9	59.3	65.9	75.3	46.4	65.2	
2010	73.9	72.9	63.6	72.4	80.3	64.9	72.5	74.7	58.9	61.3	68.5	64.7	70.1	59.0	55.2	60.1	78.5	58.5	56.3	60.7	76.2	76.1	73.9	59.3	65.2	58.8	66.3	75.1	46.2	65.2	
Q1 2011	73.8	72.3	63.0	71.3	80.9	64.9	72.8	74.3	58.3	63.6	67.6	64.3	69.9	56.6	54.5	58.6	-	59.0	56.1	60.0	76.0	75.5	73.6	58.9	64.4	59.0	64.0	75.1	46.0	64.6	
Q2 2011	74.0	73.2	64.3	73.5	81.1	65.6	73.6	74.9	58.9	64.8	70.4	64.9	69.9	56.0	55.7	59.1	-	59.5	56.5	58.8	76.5	75.8	73.2	59.7	64.4	59.6	64.6	77.1	49.2	65.1	
Q3 2011	73.8	74.3	63.5	73.9	80.7	66.1	74.0	75.2	58.6	67.2	70.7	65.3	70.0	55.1	56.3	58.6	-	59.0	56.3	60.5	76.8	76.4	73.3	60.2	64.0	59.9	65.4	78.0	49.9	65.4	
Q4 2011	73.9	73.5	64.0	72.6	81.4	66.0	74.6	74.5	57.7	65.8	68.9	64.7	70.2	53.3	56.3	59.0	-	59.1	56.4	58.8	77.0	76.2	73.9	59.9	62.3	59.5	64.7	76.1	48.3	65.3	
2011	73.9	73.3	63.7	72.8	81.0	65.7	73.8	74.7	58.4	65.3	69.4	64.8	70.0	55.2	55.7	58.8	78.7	59.2	56.3	59.5	76.6	76.0	73.5	59.7	63.8	59.5	64.7	76.6	48.4	65.1	
Q1 2012	73.3	72.7	63.5	71.2	80.6	65.6	73.3	73.9	56.6	66.0	68.2	64.3	70.1	52.4	55.6	58.3	-	..	56.1	58.8	76.7	76.2	73.4	59.2	61.7	59.6	64.0	75.4	46.3	64.6	
Q2 2012	73.8	73.7	63.9	73.4	80.5	66.5	73.7	74.4	56.6	67.1	70.7	65.0	70.4	51.9	57.0	58.7	-	..	56.6	60.6	76.8	76.7	72.9	60.0	62.0	59.8	63.8	77.0	49.9	65.7	
Q3 2012	73.6	75.0	64.1	73.7	81.1	67.0	74.2	74.4	56.2	68.2	70.9	65.3	71.0	51.0	57.9	59.0	-	..	56.4	62.2	77.0	76.7	72.4	60.2	61.5	60.1	64.3	78.2	49.9	66.0	
Q4 2012	73.9	73.8	63.8	72.8	81.3	67.0	74.4	74.0	55.3	67.4	68.7	64.8	71.4	50.5	57.6	59.3	-	..	56.1	61.3	76.9	76.2	72.2	60.0	60.1	59.3	64.2	75.9	49.6	65.9	
2012	73.7	73.8	63.8	72.8	80.9	66.5	73.9	74.2	56.2	67.2	69.6	64.9	70.8	51.4	57.0	58.9	79.8	..	56.3	60.7	76.9	76.5	72.7	59.7	61.3	59.7	64.1	76.2	48.9	65.6	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	68.6	63.3	52.8	70.4	..	65.2	61.8	61.3	68.0	74.6	66.8	59.2	67.9	66.5	63.8	72.4	-	64.4	63.7	68.5	66.0	72.5	68.5	40.3	73.0	68.2	68.3	62.7	44.9	70.5
	Q2 2008	68.6	66.5	54.5	71.0	75.4	66.8	62.2	68.2	67.0	75.5	66.7	60.4	67.6	67.7	64.3	71.3	-	63.8	64.3	71.9	67.4	73.2	70.4	46.8	74.7	67.5	66.9	64.3	49.9	71.3
	Q3 2008	68.5	65.4	53.8	70.8	..	66.4	63.8	68.6	66.0	74.1	66.4	59.9	67.4	68.4	65.1	70.0	-	63.1	66.6	68.9	68.4	73.6	70.1	45.7	74.1	70.3	67.6	65.3	51.4	71.5
	Q4 2008	69.1	65.3	54.7	70.7	..	67.2	62.7	67.2	63.6	75.1	61.9	59.2	67.3	67.4	65.4	67.9	-	64.2	65.5	66.6	68.2	73.3	71.2	39.4	74.1	66.6	71.0	63.9	48.5	69.8
	2008	68.7	65.1	54.0	70.7	..	66.4	62.6	66.3	66.1	74.8	65.4	59.7	67.6	67.5	64.7	70.4	81.4	63.8	65.1	69.0	67.5	73.2	70.1	43.5	74.0	68.1	68.4	64.0	48.8	70.8
	Q1 2009	67.8	63.4	53.3	68.3	..	66.3	63.1	67.7	58.7	73.2	64.8	58.4	67.0	65.0	64.8	62.9	-	63.6	62.9	69.6	67.8	70.5	69.4	43.4	71.0	64.9	64.7	62.2	46.2	67.3
	Q2 2009	67.0	64.8	51.4	68.4	75.7	66.9	63.4	67.0	58.3	69.4	64.5	58.2	65.5	66.3	66.0	62.9	-	62.9	63.5	68.6	65.9	71.0	69.6	44.4	71.3	61.4	66.1	61.9	48.2	68.3
	Q3 2009	66.8	65.1	51.4	68.4	..	65.1	63.7	71.8	58.2	64.0	64.1	57.7	66.0	67.1	65.3	61.5	-	64.4	62.6	69.4	66.6	70.5	68.1	43.1	69.0	56.6	66.0	62.8	47.5	67.9
	Q4 2009	67.6	65.5	52.6	68.8	..	64.9	64.0	65.6	56.8	65.1	61.8	56.9	65.5	65.6	65.8	60.7	-	63.8	62.3	69.6	66.0	68.9	68.2	52.6	68.0	58.1	67.4	61.5	47.2	67.4
	2009	67.3	64.7	52.2	68.5	..	65.8	63.5	68.1	58.0	67.8	63.8	57.8	66.0	66.0	65.5	62.0	77.2	63.7	62.8	69.3	66.6	70.2	68.8	45.7	69.8	60.6	66.1	62.1	47.2	67.7
	Q1 2010	67.9	64.5	51.8	67.9	72.3	65.5	62.7	64.1	56.4	57.8	61.6	56.9	65.0	64.4	64.3	59.7	-	63.2	61.4	70.1	64.6	69.4	68.1	47.3	68.8	55.9	66.8	60.6	47.9	66.1
	Q2 2010	67.7	65.6	52.5	69.0	75.3	67.5	64.2	63.6	56.8	56.6	61.9	58.4	66.0	64.3	66.2	60.4	-	65.3	62.6	69.8	65.4	69.1	67.8	49.1	69.5	56.2	67.1	60.9	49.6	68.8
Q3 2010	68.5	67.4	53.2	69.3	75.8	69.8	65.3	63.8	57.8	58.8	59.5	58.1	67.1	64.9	67.1	59.4	-	65.3	62.5	71.1	65.0	68.6	68.0	54.7	69.3	55.9	63.1	62.5	49.7	68.2	
Q4 2010	69.9	67.6	54.5	68.8	74.9	69.8	64.2	62.2	56.3	63.4	59.0	57.8	66.6	62.4	64.2	58.5	-	64.9	61.0	71.7	65.2	68.5	69.3	53.0	68.7	57.9	64.1	61.4	50.9	67.4	
2010	68.5	66.3	53.0	68.8	74.6	68.1	64.1	63.4	56.8	59.2	60.5	57.7	66.2	64.0	65.5	59.5	74.8	64.7	61.9	70.7	64.4	68.9	68.3	50.7	69.1	56.5	65.3	61.3	49.5	67.6	
Q1 2011	69.9	65.6	52.4	67.8	74.0	68.5	65.0	59.7	54.6	61.0	57.5	57.6	66.6	59.6	61.1	57.8	-	64.9	61.5	72.3	64.1	68.2	70.1	54.2	66.8	58.7	61.7	61.3	49.4	66.7	
Q2 2011	69.6	67.1	52.9	69.0	75.7	67.9	66.9	61.6	55.7	60.7	62.6	58.4	66.7	60.5	60.9	59.4	-	66.4	63.0	69.4	62.7	70.7	70.2	55.8	69.2	59.0	63.1	62.1	49.8	67.8	
Q3 2011	69.9	67.2	52.0	69.5	76.1	67.1	67.1	63.4	54.5	67.4	61.8	57.7	6																		

Table 2.A1.1. **Quarterly employment rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12 (cont.)**
Percentages

Men		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	80.7	78.2	69.5	75.2	..	74.9	76.0	81.6	74.8	73.1	71.2	69.3	77.3	73.7	62.3	75.2	-	62.4	68.8	66.3	83.6	80.2	81.5	65.0	73.6	68.9	71.0	77.2	64.1	73.3
	Q2 2008	80.8	79.3	68.7	77.6	86.1	75.2	76.4	83.0	74.4	72.3	74.8	69.9	77.3	74.4	63.0	74.6	-	63.1	70.0	68.5	84.3	81.4	81.7	66.0	73.7	69.2	72.6	78.4	68.0	74.3
	Q3 2008	80.8	80.2	69.5	79.0	..	75.7	77.7	83.5	73.9	72.8	74.7	70.2	77.4	74.2	63.7	74.7	-	62.8	69.5	69.8	84.3	81.6	80.9	67.3	73.3	70.8	74.5	79.3	68.6	73.9
	Q4 2008	80.6	79.0	69.1	76.3	..	75.8	77.2	82.4	71.3	72.3	72.2	69.6	76.8	73.6	62.4	71.4	-	61.7	68.7	68.3	84.4	80.2	82.0	67.1	73.1	70.8	72.1	76.8	65.6	72.1
	2008	80.7	79.2	69.2	77.0	..	75.4	76.8	82.6	73.6	72.6	73.2	69.7	77.2	74.0	62.8	74.0	87.5	62.5	69.3	68.2	84.2	80.8	81.5	66.4	73.4	69.9	72.6	77.9	66.6	73.4
	Q1 2009	79.0	76.5	68.4	72.3	..	74.2	76.0	79.5	68.7	65.0	69.2	68.8	75.5	72.6	60.5	67.4	-	60.6	67.6	67.3	83.8	79.0	80.1	65.7	71.7	68.6	69.8	75.1	61.6	69.3
	Q2 2009	78.7	77.7	67.8	74.5	84.5	73.9	76.1	79.4	67.9	62.8	70.6	69.2	74.6	73.1	61.3	66.3	-	60.9	68.1	71.1	83.9	79.8	80.0	66.1	71.2	68.0	71.4	76.0	64.8	69.5
	Q3 2009	78.6	78.6	67.9	75.8	..	73.7	76.6	79.1	67.5	65.4	70.6	69.1	74.6	73.1	61.0	66.0	-	60.4	67.9	70.0	83.6	78.7	78.2	66.9	70.2	67.4	71.9	76.3	66.7	69.8
	Q4 2009	78.9	78.2	68.5	73.4	..	73.6	76.9	77.3	66.6	60.8	67.9	68.2	74.6	72.0	60.8	64.2	-	59.8	67.3	68.4	82.8	77.8	79.7	65.9	70.0	66.1	71.1	74.8	65.5	68.0
	2009	78.8	77.7	68.1	74.0	..	73.8	76.4	78.8	67.7	63.5	69.6	68.8	74.8	72.7	60.9	66.0	80.3	60.4	67.7	69.2	83.5	78.8	79.5	66.2	70.8	67.5	71.0	75.6	64.6	69.1
	Q1 2010	78.6	76.0	68.3	71.4	85.2	72.2	75.8	75.3	65.5	56.7	67.2	68.1	73.6	71.1	59.0	63.2	-	60.6	66.8	67.6	82.0	77.2	79.2	64.3	70.0	64.3	69.8	74.4	63.7	67.0
	Q2 2010	79.0	78.0	68.3	74.8	85.1	73.3	76.5	76.6	65.9	58.7	70.4	68.5	74.3	70.9	60.2	64.1	-	62.0	67.0	67.6	82.4	78.1	78.6	65.5	69.6	65.2	68.9	76.9	67.8	68.5
	Q3 2010	79.3	78.8	68.6	76.4	85.1	74.1	77.0	77.5	66.0	65.1	71.4	68.9	75.2	70.3	61.0	64.4	-	62.0	66.4	70.5	81.4	78.2	79.4	66.6	69.7	65.5	70.3	78.2	68.3	69.2
	Q4 2010	79.9	78.7	68.7	74.5	85.6	73.9	77.4	77.2	65.1	66.0	69.1	68.3	74.7	68.6	60.7	63.0	-	61.5	66.7	67.7	81.1	77.8	79.2	66.2	69.5	65.7	69.3	76.9	67.2	68.2
	2010	79.2	77.9	68.5	74.3	85.3	73.4	76.7	76.6	65.6	61.6	69.5	68.4	74.5	70.2	60.2	63.7	80.6	61.5	66.7	68.4	81.2	77.8	79.1	65.6	69.7	65.2	69.6	76.6	66.7	68.2
	Q1 2011	79.2	76.8	67.5	72.6	85.7	72.9	76.7	76.5	64.6	65.7	68.8	68.1	74.1	67.0	59.5	62.1	-	61.6	66.3	67.5	80.6	76.8	78.6	65.1	68.6	65.5	67.2	76.4	66.7	67.2
	Q2 2011	79.1	78.4	69.1	75.5	85.6	74.0	77.5	77.0	64.8	66.6	72.0	68.7	74.2	66.6	61.0	62.4	-	62.8	66.6	65.6	80.9	77.3	78.5	66.4	68.4	66.4	67.3	78.5	69.9	68.4
	Q3 2011	78.5	79.4	67.4	77.1	86.0	74.4	78.0	77.7	64.8	69.7	72.1	69.1	74.4	65.4	61.8	62.2	-	63.0	66.7	66.0	81.4	78.3	78.6	67.3	68.5	66.7	68.5	79.3	71.3	69.2
	Q4 2011	78.9	78.8	68.7	74.7	86.0	74.2	78.7	77.0	63.3	67.7	70.1	68.2	74.5	63.0	61.8	62.5	-	62.0	66.2	64.4	81.5	78.0	78.9	66.7	66.1	66.4	67.5	77.5	69.5	68.8
	2011	78.9	78.3	68.2	75.0	85.8	73.9	77.7	77.1	64.4	67.4	70.8	68.5	74.3	65.5	61.0	62.3	80.6	62.3	66.5	65.9	81.1	77.6	78.7	66.3	67.9	66.3	67.6	77.9	69.4	68.4
Q1 2012	78.3	76.9	68.1	72.5	85.2	73.5	77.1	75.8	61.8	67.6	68.9	67.7	74.1	61.9	60.7	61.8	-	..	65.5	63.9	81.0	77.8	78.8	65.4	65.1	66.4	66.1	76.4	66.1	68.0	
Q2 2012	78.6	78.6	68.8	75.7	85.3	74.5	77.7	76.3	61.6	68.3	71.8	68.4	74.7	61.4	62.1	62.0	-	..	65.9	66.9	81.2	78.2	77.9	66.7	65.3	66.6	66.5	78.0	70.0	69.4	
Q3 2012	78.1	79.6	68.4	76.9	85.9	75.1	78.3	76.5	61.5	71.6	71.9	68.8	75.4	60.5	63.3	62.8	-	..	66.2	66.8	81.1	78.4	77.0	67.1	64.6	67.2	67.8	79.4	70.7	70.2	
Q4 2012	78.8	78.4	67.5	74.9	86.2	74.8	78.4	76.6	60.3	70.9	69.9	68.0	75.5	59.7	63.1	62.6	-	..	65.4	67.6	80.8	77.5	77.4	66.6	63.3	66.4	67.6	77.2	70.0	69.7	
2012	78.4	78.4	68.2	75.0	85.6	74.5	77.9	76.3	61.3	69.6	70.6	68.3	75.0	60.9	62.3	62.3	81.4	..	65.8	66.3	81.0	78.0	77.8	66.3	64.6	66.7	67.0	77.4	69.2	69.3	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	77.6	71.0	63.1	77.1	..	77.4	70.8	70.0	76.6	84.8	71.3	67.7	78.2	84.3	73.8	80.5	-	70.0	80.2	76.9	75.1	76.2	78.6	46.9	80.2	74.5	74.6	67.9	61.5	81.3
	Q2 2008	77.0	77.2	65.3	77.9	83.6	79.6	71.5	76.6	74.6	83.3	73.1	68.9	77.8	85.7	71.9	79.5	-	69.1	79.5	78.6	76.4	78.0	79.2	54.0	81.2	74.0	72.8	70.1	70.0	82.7
	Q3 2008	76.5	75.9	62.1	78.4	..	77.3	72.9	77.5	72.3	78.6	73.1	69.4	77.1	86.1	72.6	78.3	-	68.5	82.8	76.2	77.6	77.1	78.0	54.8	81.0	77.0	73.0	71.8	69.0	83.5
	Q4 2008	76.8	75.4	67.0	77.9	..	75.9	71.5	76.0	68.9	74.4	67.4	68.5	77.7	84.0	73.1	76.1	-	69.8	80.8	71.8	76.8	75.4	79.9	47.2	79.6	75.9	75.8	69.9	65.7	80.5
	2008	77.0	74.9	64.4	77.8	..	77.5	71.7	74.9	73.1	80.5	71.2	68.6	77.7	85.0	72.9	78.6	85.3	69.4	80.9	75.9	76.5	76.7	78.9	51.2	80.5	75.4	74.0	69.9	66.6	82.0
	Q1 2009	75.5	70.0	62.1	73.8	..	73.9	71.5	73.3	62.6	75.6	68.6	66.2	76.9	80.3	75.6	69.5	-	69.2	77.8	76.4	76.1	72.6	77.2	46.2	76.1	75.7	67.9	66.8	59.8	76.7
	Q2 2009	74.7	72.4	61.3	73.6	84.1	74.2	71.1	70.0	61.8	74.9	67.9	65.4	74.6	80.9	75.7	68.8	-	69.0	77.9	79.0	74.5	75.2	77.2	52.9	75.7	71.6	71.4	66.3	63.3	78.8
	Q3 2009	74.8	74.1	61.7	74.0	..	74.8	72.3	76.8	60.7	63.3	68.5	65.9	75.2	81.3	71.2	66.7	-	69.2	77.5	78.8	74.8	74.0	74.7	53.8	73.5	67.7	71.3	67.5	62.4	77.8
	Q4 2009	75.6	73.4	60.4	74.1	..	75.4	71.9	74.0	59.4	61.0	65.7	64.6	73.7	79.3	73.0	65.8	-	67.8	76.0	78.2	73.7	74.0	75.3	66.2	73.7	73.7	72.7	66.1	62.6	76.6
	2009	75.1	72.5	61.4	73.9	..	74.6	71.7	73.5	61.1	68.8	67.7	65.5	75.1	80.5	74.0	67.7	76.5	68.8	77.3	78.1	74.8	74.0	76.1	54.2	74.8	72.4	70.9	66.7	61.9	77.5
	Q1 2010	76.7	70.7	58.7	72.6	82.7	76.1	71.1	72.1	58.5	55.3	66.3	64.9	72.9	77.6	69.4	64.8	-	67.0	74.5	78.3	71.3	73.0	76.1	60.1	73.5	74.8	71.2	65.9	61.5	75.2
	Q2 2010	76.2	73.3	61.6	74.3	79.7	78.9	72.7	66.0	60.0	57.6	68.6	67.0	74.2	76.6	67.9	66.3	-	70.4	76.4	77.4	72.2	73.4	75.0	60.8	75.0	74.3	70.5	66.8	64.3	78.8
	Q3 2010	76.7	75.0	62.1	75.7	84.0	81.3	74.2	65.3	61.5	59.7	65.0	67.3	76.1	77.4	69.0	65.1	-	70.5	78.1	79.7	72.5	72.3	75.5	55.4	74.8	74.9	69.9	68.3	66.1	78.7
	Q4 2010	78.2	75.1	63.4	75.4	83.0	80.5	73.3	67.6	60.1	70.4	65.1	66.4	76.1	75.3	70.3	63.8	-	69.4	75.3	80.1	73.2	72.3	76.5	60.1	73.7	73.8	69.4	68.0	66.3	76.8
	2010	77.0	73.5	61.4	74.5	82.8	79.1	72.9	67.6	60.0	60.8	66.2	66.4	74.8																	

Table 2.A1.1. Quarterly employment rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12 (cont.)
Percentages

Women		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	68.8	67.0	58.6	71.0	..	57.3	67.2	75.2	53.9	64.6	68.0	61.4	67.1	47.9	50.0	59.8	-	54.5	46.7	50.9	72.3	75.8	70.3	51.4	61.8	53.7	62.8	73.6	20.9	65.6
	Q2 2008	69.5	67.6	57.5	72.5	75.8	57.9	67.3	75.7	54.4	65.7	70.3	61.7	67.2	49.0	50.0	60.0	-	54.8	47.1	49.0	72.8	76.3	71.1	52.1	62.5	54.1	64.0	75.0	24.7	65.8
	Q3 2008	69.2	68.5	58.4	71.9	..	57.7	68.0	75.7	54.2	67.1	70.0	62.1	67.0	49.0	50.8	60.5	-	54.0	46.6	50.9	73.4	76.3	71.5	53.1	61.9	55.4	65.9	76.0	24.7	65.5
	Q4 2008	69.2	68.3	58.2	71.7	..	57.7	68.7	76.1	53.8	65.5	68.9	61.4	67.1	48.7	50.9	58.8	-	54.7	46.6	50.8	73.6	75.6	71.9	53.2	61.5	55.1	65.0	73.6	23.0	65.3
	2008	69.2	67.9	58.2	71.8	..	57.6	67.8	75.7	54.1	65.7	69.3	61.7	67.1	48.6	50.4	59.8	79.8	54.5	46.8	50.4	73.0	76.0	71.2	52.4	62.0	54.6	64.4	74.5	23.3	65.5
	Q1 2009	68.7	68.2	57.9	70.4	..	56.7	67.9	74.6	52.4	63.5	68.1	61.0	66.5	48.5	49.5	58.1	-	54.9	46.0	53.1	73.8	75.7	70.1	52.3	61.6	53.3	63.8	72.5	21.5	63.8
	Q2 2009	69.4	68.5	58.5	71.4	75.9	56.7	68.5	74.9	52.4	63.1	69.3	61.7	66.0	49.0	49.7	57.8	-	55.0	46.4	55.3	73.5	75.7	68.9	52.7	61.3	52.8	64.0	73.7	24.9	63.6
	Q3 2009	68.9	69.0	58.3	70.5	..	56.6	68.3	74.5	52.4	61.3	68.4	61.7	66.3	48.9	49.7	57.8	-	53.8	45.6	55.4	73.4	74.9	69.1	53.1	60.7	52.8	65.0	73.4	25.4	62.8
	Q4 2009	69.0	67.7	58.2	70.5	..	56.7	69.4	73.0	52.2	61.5	67.1	60.8	66.3	48.3	50.0	56.9	-	54.5	45.6	53.5	73.3	74.9	69.8	53.0	61.1	52.3	63.7	71.7	24.8	62.4
	2009	69.0	68.4	58.2	70.7	..	56.7	68.5	74.3	52.3	62.4	68.2	61.3	66.3	48.7	49.7	57.6	76.4	54.5	45.9	54.4	73.5	75.3	69.5	52.8	61.2	52.8	64.1	72.8	24.2	63.2
	Q1 2010	68.1	67.6	58.9	69.8	75.5	55.8	67.7	72.7	51.8	61.1	66.2	61.2	65.7	47.9	49.8	56.2	-	54.3	45.2	53.1	73.1	74.1	69.2	52.3	61.1	51.7	62.6	71.7	24.2	62.3
	Q2 2010	68.6	67.4	57.7	71.2	74.6	56.2	68.1	74.0	51.8	61.0	68.6	61.5	65.5	48.3	50.3	56.8	-	55.4	46.0	53.2	73.6	74.7	68.7	53.3	61.1	52.1	63.7	73.8	27.3	62.3
	Q3 2010	68.6	68.6	58.6	70.5	74.8	56.4	68.3	72.5	52.0	60.2	68.1	61.8	65.8	47.9	50.7	56.5	-	55.4	45.4	53.3	71.2	74.2	68.5	53.6	60.5	52.9	62.6	74.8	27.0	62.1
	Q4 2010	68.9	68.0	59.5	70.6	75.3	56.8	69.0	71.1	52.4	61.5	67.0	60.5	65.6	46.9	50.6	56.2	-	56.7	46.2	51.4	71.4	74.1	68.9	53.1	60.3	53.0	62.4	73.7	26.1	62.2
	2010	68.5	67.9	58.7	70.5	75.1	56.3	68.3	72.6	52.0	61.0	67.5	61.1	65.7	47.8	50.4	56.4	76.4	55.5	45.7	52.8	71.1	74.3	68.8	53.1	60.8	52.4	62.8	73.5	26.1	62.2
	Q1 2011	68.2	67.7	58.4	70.0	75.9	56.7	68.8	71.9	51.9	61.6	66.4	60.5	65.7	46.0	49.7	55.2	-	56.3	45.9	52.4	71.2	74.2	68.7	52.8	60.2	52.5	60.6	73.7	25.9	62.0
	Q2 2011	68.9	67.9	59.4	71.4	76.4	57.2	69.6	72.8	52.8	63.1	68.8	61.2	65.5	45.3	50.5	55.8	-	56.2	46.2	51.8	72.0	74.4	68.1	53.2	60.5	52.8	61.7	75.6	29.0	61.9
	Q3 2011	69.1	69.1	59.5	70.6	75.2	57.6	69.9	72.7	52.3	64.8	69.2	61.6	65.6	44.8	50.8	55.0	-	54.9	45.7	54.7	72.1	74.3	68.1	53.2	59.5	53.0	62.2	76.6	28.9	61.7
	Q4 2011	69.0	68.1	59.3	70.4	76.6	57.8	70.5	71.8	51.8	64.0	67.7	61.3	66.0	43.5	51.0	55.6	-	56.1	46.6	53.1	72.4	74.2	69.1	53.3	58.6	52.5	61.9	74.7	27.6	61.9
	2011	68.8	68.2	59.1	70.6	76.0	57.3	69.7	72.3	52.2	63.4	68.0	61.2	65.7	44.9	50.5	55.4	76.9	55.9	46.1	53.0	71.9	74.3	68.5	53.1	59.7	52.7	61.6	75.1	27.9	61.9
Q1 2012	68.4	68.4	58.8	69.9	75.9	57.5	69.4	71.9	51.3	64.4	67.5	61.0	66.1	42.7	50.7	54.9	-	..	46.6	53.4	72.3	74.5	68.2	53.0	58.4	52.7	61.9	74.3	26.5	61.6	
Q2 2012	69.0	68.8	58.9	71.2	75.7	58.2	69.7	72.5	51.3	65.9	69.5	61.7	66.2	42.3	52.0	55.4	-	..	47.1	54.0	72.4	75.1	68.1	53.5	58.6	52.9	60.9	76.0	29.8	62.1	
Q3 2012	68.9	70.2	59.7	70.5	76.3	58.7	70.0	72.2	50.7	65.0	69.9	61.9	66.6	41.4	52.8	55.2	-	..	46.4	57.6	72.7	74.9	68.0	53.4	58.4	52.9	60.7	77.0	29.2	62.0	
Q4 2012	69.0	69.2	60.0	70.7	76.3	59.0	70.4	71.3	50.2	64.0	67.6	61.7	67.2	41.2	52.2	56.0	-	..	46.7	54.7	73.0	74.8	67.2	53.4	57.0	52.2	60.6	74.6	29.1	62.3	
2012	68.8	69.2	59.4	70.6	76.0	58.3	69.8	72.0	50.9	64.8	68.6	61.6	66.5	41.9	51.9	55.4	78.2	..	46.7	54.9	72.6	74.8	67.9	53.1	58.1	52.7	61.0	75.0	28.7	62.0	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	59.9	56.6	43.2	63.9	..	53.2	53.0	53.6	59.5	65.7	62.3	51.5	57.8	48.4	55.9	63.9	-	59.2	48.9	59.5	57.8	68.9	59.2	32.5	66.1	60.1	61.5	57.9	28.6	59.2
	Q2 2008	60.4	57.2	44.8	64.5	67.5	54.0	53.3	60.6	59.3	68.5	60.4	52.5	57.7	49.3	58.4	62.6	-	59.0	51.1	65.1	59.2	68.4	62.4	39.6	68.5	60.5	60.8	59.1	30.9	59.2
	Q3 2008	60.6	56.2	45.9	63.7	..	55.5	54.9	60.8	59.8	70.0	59.6	51.2	58.3	50.3	59.4	61.2	-	58.4	52.3	61.0	60.0	70.1	62.9	36.5	68.0	63.4	60.9	59.5	32.4	58.8
	Q4 2008	61.3	56.2	42.4	64.0	..	58.4	54.4	59.7	58.2	75.7	56.4	50.5	57.4	50.1	59.5	59.5	-	59.3	52.0	61.3	60.3	71.1	63.2	33.2	69.2	57.6	65.4	58.4	29.9	58.5
	2008	60.6	56.6	44.1	64.0	..	55.4	53.9	58.6	59.2	70.0	59.6	51.4	57.8	49.5	58.3	61.8	77.4	59.0	51.1	61.8	59.3	69.7	61.9	35.8	68.0	60.3	62.1	58.7	30.5	58.9
	Q1 2009	60.1	57.3	44.7	63.2	..	58.5	54.9	62.5	54.9	71.2	60.5	51.2	57.6	49.2	56.9	55.8	-	58.7	49.6	62.3	60.4	68.5	62.3	41.2	66.6	54.7	61.3	58.0	26.7	57.4
	Q2 2009	59.4	57.7	42.2	63.5	67.6	59.4	56.0	64.3	54.8	64.4	60.8	51.5	56.9	51.4	58.8	57.0	-	57.5	51.0	58.2	58.2	66.8	62.2	37.1	67.4	53.4	60.9	57.9	27.3	57.4
	Q3 2009	58.8	56.8	41.4	63.3	..	55.5	55.4	67.4	55.7	64.5	59.8	50.0	57.3	52.3	60.9	56.1	-	60.2	49.9	60.1	59.2	67.0	61.8	35.7	65.2	47.7	60.2	58.7	25.8	57.4
	Q4 2009	59.7	58.3	45.2	63.8	..	53.9	56.5	58.6	54.2	68.1	58.4	49.8	57.7	51.5	60.6	55.5	-	60.3	50.2	60.6	59.2	63.8	61.2	43.8	63.1	45.1	61.5	57.2	25.5	57.6
	2009	59.5	57.5	43.4	63.4	..	56.8	55.7	63.2	54.9	67.0	59.8	50.6	57.4	51.1	59.2	56.1	77.7	59.2	50.2	60.3	59.3	66.5	61.9	39.4	65.6	50.6	61.0	58.0	26.4	57.4
	Q1 2010	59.2	58.9	45.3	63.5	65.0	54.4	54.6	57.5	54.4	59.8	57.1	49.3	57.4	50.7	60.5	54.6	-	59.9	50.0	61.9	58.8	65.7	60.4	36.9	64.8	39.5	62.0	55.8	27.4	56.6
	Q2 2010	59.4	58.6	44.1	64.0	66.9	55.0	56.1	61.5	53.9	55.7	55.5	50.5	57.9	51.9	64.8	54.7	-	60.7	50.5	61.5	59.4	64.6	60.8	39.4	64.7	39.9	63.4	55.5	28.0	58.1
	Q3 2010	60.6	60.6	44.5	63.2	67.5	57.3	56.9	62.6	54.2	58.1	54.3	49.4	58.5	52.5	65.5	53.8	-	60.6	48.9	62.6	58.2	64.7	60.9	54.2	64.4	36.5	56.2	57.3	26.7	57.4
	Q4 2010	61.8	60.9	46.3	62.7	67.1	58.3	55.6	58.2	52.6	58.1	53.7	50.0	57.9	49.8	59.1	53.2	-	61.1	48.6	63.6	57.9	64.5	62.5	46.8	64.3	39.9	58.0	55.5	29.3	57.7
	2010	60.3	5																												

Table 2.A1.2. Quarterly unemployment rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12
Percentages

Men + women		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	4.5	3.4	5.8	6.2	..	4.7	7.3	2.9	8.7	-	6.5	6.8	4.9	8.4	8.1	4.4	-	6.5	7.0	2.7	2.5	2.3	4.1	8.2	7.9	10.5	5.0	5.4	10.7	5.4
	Q2 2008	4.3	2.9	5.3	5.9	2.4	4.2	7.0	2.8	9.3	-	7.1	6.4	5.1	7.4	7.7	5.0	-	5.9	6.6	4.7	2.3	2.6	3.8	7.2	7.6	10.1	4.1	6.0	8.3	5.5
	Q3 2008	3.9	3.2	6.6	5.9	..	4.3	6.4	3.2	10.2	6.2	5.3	6.7	6.0	7.3	7.8	6.5	-	6.9	6.0	4.1	2.1	2.2	4.3	6.7	8.0	9.0	4.1	4.7	9.3	6.3
	Q4 2008	4.2	3.2	5.8	5.9	..	4.4	6.1	3.2	12.5	7.9	5.8	7.4	6.1	8.0	8.1	7.2	-	6.7	6.9	3.4	2.2	2.2	4.3	6.8	8.1	8.7	4.3	5.2	11.5	6.8
	2008	4.2	3.2	5.9	6.0	..	4.4	6.7	3.0	10.2	-	6.2	6.8	5.5	7.8	7.9	5.8	2.8	6.5	6.6	3.7	2.3	2.3	4.1	7.2	7.9	9.6	4.4	5.3	9.9	6.0
	Q1 2009	5.7	3.7	6.6	8.1	..	5.8	7.1	4.9	15.2	12.3	7.5	8.2	7.0	9.2	9.7	9.4	-	7.4	7.8	3.9	2.7	2.7	5.6	8.3	9.0	10.5	5.1	6.9	14.4	8.9
	Q2 2009	5.4	3.9	6.3	8.0	3.2	6.3	6.9	5.6	15.9	13.5	9.4	8.1	7.5	8.7	9.7	11.4	-	7.8	7.0	3.2	2.8	3.0	5.7	8.0	9.3	11.3	5.5	8.0	12.4	9.4
	Q3 2009	5.2	4.3	6.8	8.1	..	7.3	7.0	5.9	16.1	14.4	7.3	8.4	7.9	9.2	10.4	12.0	-	8.6	7.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	6.4	8.2	10.1	12.5	6.2	7.0	12.3	9.7
	Q4 2009	5.1	3.8	6.8	7.4	..	7.3	6.4	6.4	16.7	15.6	8.0	9.1	7.5	10.1	10.6	11.9	-	8.1	8.2	2.7	3.3	2.5	6.6	8.6	10.4	13.9	6.7	7.1	11.9	9.7
	2009	5.3	3.9	6.6	7.9	..	6.7	6.9	5.7	16.0	14.0	8.0	8.5	7.5	9.3	10.1	11.2	7.0	8.0	7.5	3.3	2.9	2.8	6.1	8.3	9.7	12.1	5.9	7.2	12.8	9.4
	Q1 2010	5.8	3.9	7.1	8.4	3.5	8.1	7.2	7.4	17.9	20.1	9.1	9.0	7.9	11.4	11.9	12.5	-	7.3	8.8	2.6	3.9	3.2	6.5	10.7	10.9	15.2	7.0	8.0	13.2	10.5
	Q2 2010	5.3	3.6	6.7	7.6	3.1	7.2	6.3	6.6	18.1	18.3	9.3	8.3	7.6	11.5	11.3	13.3	-	6.4	8.0	2.7	3.7	3.3	6.4	9.6	10.9	14.4	7.0	8.0	10.0	9.9
	Q3 2010	5.0	3.8	7.0	7.7	3.7	7.2	6.1	6.6	17.9	14.0	6.9	8.4	7.9	12.2	11.0	13.3	-	7.7	7.4	2.7	3.8	2.9	6.2	9.2	11.2	14.2	7.0	6.4	10.3	9.8
	Q4 2010	4.9	3.4	6.6	6.8	3.1	7.0	5.8	6.9	18.4	13.2	7.2	8.8	7.7	14.0	11.0	13.4	-	6.8	8.3	4.0	3.8	2.7	6.7	9.4	11.2	13.9	7.7	5.9	9.9	9.2
	2010	5.3	3.7	6.9	7.6	3.3	7.4	6.3	6.9	18.1	16.4	8.1	8.7	7.8	12.3	11.3	13.1	7.2	7.1	8.1	3.0	4.0	3.0	6.5	9.7	11.0	14.4	7.2	7.1	10.8	9.9
	Q1 2011	5.6	3.6	5.9	7.9	3.2	7.3	6.1	7.3	19.2	14.1	8.4	8.7	7.7	15.5	11.7	13.8	-	5.9	8.3	3.5	3.9	2.7	7.1	10.2	12.3	13.9	8.1	6.6	10.5	9.6
	Q2 2011	5.0	3.4	5.1	7.2	2.6	6.8	5.3	6.6	18.8	12.8	8.7	8.0	7.8	16.2	10.9	14.3	-	5.5	7.4	-	3.5	3.0	6.7	9.6	12.3	13.2	7.5	6.8	8.6	9.2
	Q3 2011	5.1	3.1	6.5	7.0	3.4	6.6	5.2	6.8	19.4	10.6	6.5	8.3	8.4	17.5	10.8	14.9	-	6.8	7.4	3.4	3.6	2.7	6.4	9.5	12.7	13.2	7.7	5.3	8.4	9.4
	Q4 2011	5.1	3.4	5.8	6.5	3.0	6.5	4.8	6.8	20.6	11.1	6.6	8.8	8.1	20.3	10.8	14.2	-	5.9	9.0	4.0	4.1	2.5	6.4	9.9	14.5	14.0	8.6	5.5	8.2	8.5
	2011	5.2	3.4	5.8	7.2	3.0	6.8	5.4	6.9	19.5	12.1	7.6	8.4	8.0	17.4	11.0	14.3	6.7	6.0	8.0	3.4	3.8	2.7	6.7	9.8	13.0	13.6	8.0	6.0	8.9	9.2
	Q1 2012	5.8	3.5	5.4	7.6	3.1	7.1	5.4	7.3	22.1	11.6	7.8	9.1	8.0	21.9	11.8	14.6	-	..	10.5	-	4.5	2.6	7.2	10.7	15.3	14.1	8.5	6.4	9.5	8.8
	Q2 2012	5.2	3.6	5.5	7.0	2.7	6.7	4.9	7.1	22.5	10.1	8.5	8.6	7.8	22.7	10.9	14.7	-	..	10.2	3.2	4.4	2.8	6.8	10.1	15.5	13.7	8.1	7.0	7.4	8.3
	Q3 2012	5.2	3.7	6.2	7.1	3.6	7.0	4.9	6.7	23.3	9.3	6.9	9.0	7.9	24.0	10.5	14.8	-	..	9.6	-	4.5	2.7	7.2	10.0	16.3	13.7	9.1	5.7	7.9	8.4
	Q4 2012	5.1	3.6	6.5	6.4	3.2	7.2	4.7	6.3	24.1	9.0	6.8	9.7	7.5	25.0	10.9	13.4	-	..	11.2	3.6	4.8	2.6	6.9	10.2	17.4	14.5	9.5	6.0	8.4	7.7
2012	5.3	3.6	5.9	7.0	3.1	7.0	5.0	6.8	23.0	10.0	7.5	9.1	7.8	23.4	11.0	14.4	5.7	..	10.4	3.8	4.6	2.7	7.0	10.2	16.1	14.0	8.8	6.5	8.3	8.3	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	4.6	8.5	15.6	7.1	..	8.1	13.4	9.3	14.1	5.0	12.7	12.4	7.1	8.3	5.2	5.8	-	4.8	9.0	6.2	6.9	5.0	5.1	-	9.5	-	6.5	12.1	10.4	5.8
	Q2 2008	4.6	6.6	13.8	7.1	6.2	6.8	12.3	6.2	15.7	4.6	13.2	11.1	6.7	7.2	6.0	6.8	-	5.5	8.7	5.4	6.4	4.7	4.3	-	8.6	-	5.7	12.8	7.4	5.2
	Q3 2008	4.7	7.0	15.6	7.5	..	6.7	11.5	5.6	16.7	6.7	12.4	11.6	7.1	6.8	5.6	8.4	-	5.8	7.3	7.2	4.3	5.7	4.2	-	9.8	-	4.5	11.5	6.4	5.7
	Q4 2008	4.6	8.1	13.3	7.1	..	6.4	12.1	7.3	20.3	7.6	13.3	12.1	7.4	8.8	7.4	9.2	-	5.9	8.9	7.7	5.7	5.8	5.2	-	9.9	-	4.3	12.3	11.5	6.7
	2008	4.6	7.5	14.6	7.2	..	7.0	12.3	7.1	16.7	6.0	12.9	11.8	7.1	7.8	6.1	7.5	4.7	5.5	8.5	6.6	5.8	5.3	4.7	-	9.5	-	5.3	12.2	8.8	5.9
	Q1 2009	6.6	10.0	16.2	9.7	..	8.5	13.2	9.1	27.1	8.1	14.0	13.9	7.9	12.0	9.2	14.2	-	7.0	10.6	7.7	6.3	6.9	6.3	-	12.6	-	8.6	14.3	16.8	9.8
	Q2 2009	7.1	9.2	15.3	10.6	6.9	9.5	13.0	10.1	26.9	14.2	17.2	13.8	9.0	11.4	8.9	15.2	-	7.7	10.7	7.3	7.2	7.1	6.7	-	12.4	-	7.5	16.7	13.8	9.1
	Q3 2009	6.8	9.5	17.4	10.8	..	10.3	13.0	8.8	26.5	18.6	14.9	14.0	9.7	11.4	10.1	16.6	-	6.6	10.4	5.4	6.6	5.9	6.8	-	13.9	-	8.1	15.0	16.1	10.0
	Q4 2009	6.2	9.5	16.0	9.7	..	10.0	12.2	11.5	28.3	17.8	15.6	15.2	9.0	13.2	8.2	15.8	-	6.8	12.3	8.1	7.3	7.3	8.3	-	13.6	-	5.5	15.5	14.1	10.0
	2009	6.7	9.5	16.2	10.2	..	9.6	12.8	9.9	27.2	14.8	15.4	14.3	8.9	12.0	9.1	15.4	11.8	7.0	11.0	7.1	6.8	6.8	7.0	-	13.1	-	7.4	15.4	15.1	9.7
	Q1 2010	6.2	9.2	18.0	10.2	9.8	8.3	13.0	13.4	29.6	22.6	16.8	15.5	9.1	15.7	9.5	15.5	-	6.5	12.6	7.3	8.7	8.6	7.6	-	14.4	-	9.7	16.2	15.1	11.4
	Q2 2010	5.7	8.6	16.9	10.2	7.4	7.5	11.6	14.8	29.1	25.5	18.7	14.0	9.2	15.7	7.6	16.2	-	5.2	11.5	5.6	7.7	9.1	8.2	-	13.9	-	9.6	17.4	13.3	8.7
	Q3 2010	5.2	7.7	17.9	10.5	7.4	6.6	10.7	13.9	28.3	26.0	17.8	14.3	8.9	15.4	6.9	17.3	-	6.4	9.7	5.1	7.9	8.5	6.9	-	14.6	-	8.9	15.7	10.8	9.2
	Q4 2010	5.1	7.4	15.5	8.9	7.1	6.3	11.3	12.2	29.3	17.3	15.5	15.1	8.4	17.9	6.1	18.1	-	6.4	12.2	5.1	7.8	8.0	7.1	-	16.9	-	10.1	15.7	11.8	9.9
	2010	5.6	8.2	17.1	10.0	7.9	7.2	11.6	13.6	29.1	22.8	17.2	14.8	8.9	16.2	7.5	16.8	13.4	6.1	11.5	5.8	8.5	8.5	7.4	11.6	15.0	11.8	9.6	16.3	12.8	9.8
	Q1 2011	5.5	9.4	14.6	9.3	7.7	7.3	10.4	15.7	30.9	19.1	17.1	15.7	8.7	21.2	-	17.7	-	5.5	11.8	-	9.2	8.3	7.5	-	19.2	-	13.2	16.9	13.2	10.1
	Q2 2011	5.3	7.8	15.5	8.7	6.1	8.1	9.5	14.4	30.5	19.5	14.1	14.3	8.9	19.5	10.5	17.2	-	4.8	10.8	7.6	9.3	8.4	6.2	9.6	16.7	-	10.9	17.0	11.4	8.7
	Q3 2011	5.1	6.8	1																											

Table 2.A1.2. Quarterly unemployment rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12 (cont.)
Percentages

Men		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	4.2	3.3	5.3	7.2	..	3.7	7.4	2.7	7.0	3.9	6.3	6.4	5.4	5.7	7.8	5.3	-	5.9	5.8	2.3	2.4	2.5	4.0	7.7	6.8	9.2	4.7	5.1	10.7	5.9
	Q2 2008	4.1	2.6	4.9	6.6	2.1	3.5	6.9	2.3	7.9	4.7	6.9	5.8	5.6	4.8	7.5	6.2	-	5.3	5.4	3.9	2.1	2.7	4.0	6.6	6.6	9.1	3.4	5.8	8.3	5.7
	Q3 2008	3.6	2.9	5.7	5.9	..	3.3	6.0	2.6	9.0	7.1	4.8	6.2	6.6	4.8	7.5	7.5	-	6.0	5.0	2.4	2.0	2.3	4.7	5.8	6.8	7.7	4.0	4.5	8.9	6.5
	Q4 2008	4.2	2.8	5.1	6.7	..	3.4	6.1	3.3	11.3	8.3	5.7	6.8	6.9	5.3	8.1	9.1	-	6.2	6.1	1.3	2.0	2.2	4.5	6.1	7.1	7.7	4.0	5.1	11.4	7.5
	2008	4.0	2.9	5.3	6.6	..	3.5	6.6	2.7	8.8	6.0	5.9	6.3	6.1	5.2	7.7	7.0	3.1	5.8	5.6	2.5	2.1	2.4	4.3	6.5	6.8	8.4	4.0	5.1	9.8	6.4
	Q1 2009	5.8	3.8	6.3	10.1	..	5.0	7.5	5.7	14.3	15.1	8.3	8.0	8.0	6.5	10.1	12.3	-	7.0	6.7	4.3	2.7	3.0	5.5	7.8	8.3	9.7	5.2	7.1	14.6	10.6
	Q2 2009	5.8	3.8	6.3	9.6	3.0	5.5	7.2	6.2	15.0	17.9	10.3	7.8	8.8	6.0	10.0	14.7	-	7.9	6.2	2.6	2.7	3.4	5.4	7.6	8.9	10.5	5.4	8.2	12.5	10.8
	Q3 2009	5.5	4.2	6.2	8.6	..	6.4	7.3	6.5	15.3	16.7	7.5	8.0	9.1	6.3	10.6	15.1	-	8.2	6.2	2.7	2.9	3.1	6.5	7.7	9.2	11.9	6.4	7.3	12.0	10.4
	Q4 2009	5.4	3.9	6.7	8.8	..	6.5	6.7	7.1	15.9	19.6	8.7	9.0	8.7	7.3	10.8	15.3	-	8.2	7.2	2.7	3.3	2.9	6.7	8.3	9.8	13.5	6.6	7.5	12.0	11.0
	2009	5.6	3.9	6.4	9.3	..	5.9	7.2	6.4	15.1	17.3	8.7	8.2	8.7	6.5	10.4	14.4	8.3	7.8	6.6	3.0	2.9	3.1	6.1	7.9	9.0	11.4	5.9	7.5	12.7	10.7
	Q1 2010	6.0	4.2	6.7	10.3	3.1	7.6	7.8	9.1	17.3	25.9	10.4	9.1	9.3	8.5	12.7	16.2	-	7.5	7.9	2.8	3.9	3.7	6.2	10.6	10.2	15.1	7.2	8.5	13.2	12.4
	Q2 2010	5.4	3.7	6.6	8.8	3.2	6.3	6.7	7.9	17.2	22.7	10.0	8.2	8.6	8.7	11.9	16.7	-	6.5	7.4	2.7	3.7	4.0	6.3	9.4	10.2	14.2	7.4	8.4	9.7	11.0
	Q3 2010	4.9	3.9	6.8	7.7	2.9	6.1	6.4	6.7	17.1	14.7	7.2	8.1	8.6	9.2	11.1	16.5	-	7.3	6.7	1.9	3.8	3.1	5.6	8.7	10.0	14.0	7.2	6.6	9.8	10.3
	Q4 2010	4.8	3.3	6.5	7.5	2.9	6.0	6.0	7.2	17.7	14.3	7.8	8.2	8.6	11.1	11.2	16.9	-	6.6	7.5	2.7	3.6	3.1	6.5	9.0	10.3	13.9	7.9	6.1	9.4	10.1
	2010	5.3	3.8	6.7	8.6	3.1	6.5	6.7	7.7	17.3	19.4	8.8	8.4	8.7	9.4	11.7	16.6	7.9	7.0	7.4	2.5	3.9	3.5	6.1	9.4	10.2	14.3	7.4	7.4	10.5	10.9
	Q1 2011	5.4	3.6	5.9	9.2	3.0	6.5	6.6	7.9	18.5	15.7	9.1	8.2	8.6	12.7	12.2	17.4	-	6.3	7.7	-	3.9	3.0	6.6	10.1	12.0	14.0	8.3	6.5	10.2	10.9
	Q2 2011	5.0	3.3	4.8	8.0	2.6	5.9	5.7	7.2	18.3	13.7	9.3	7.6	8.5	13.2	10.9	17.8	-	5.6	6.9	-	3.6	3.1	6.5	9.1	12.1	13.5	8.0	6.8	8.2	9.8
	Q3 2011	5.3	3.1	6.3	7.0	2.9	5.6	5.3	6.7	18.6	10.4	6.9	7.8	9.2	14.5	10.7	18.1	-	5.9	6.6	3.6	3.6	2.6	6.3	8.4	12.2	13.1	8.1	5.5	7.5	9.5
	Q4 2011	5.1	3.0	5.7	7.2	2.7	5.6	4.9	6.8	20.0	12.5	7.5	8.7	8.8	17.2	10.7	17.8	-	5.4	8.4	3.8	4.0	2.8	6.3	9.0	14.6	13.8	8.4	5.6	7.7	9.0
	2011	5.2	3.3	5.7	7.8	2.8	5.9	5.6	7.2	18.8	13.1	8.2	8.1	8.8	14.4	11.1	17.8	7.6	5.8	7.4	3.0	3.8	2.9	6.4	9.1	12.7	13.6	8.2	6.1	8.4	9.8
Q1 2012	5.9	3.3	5.2	8.9	3.0	6.3	5.8	7.7	21.5	12.9	8.7	9.1	8.9	18.7	12.2	18.0	-	..	9.8	5.1	4.6	3.2	6.8	10.3	15.2	13.9	8.5	6.7	9.3	9.5	
Q2 2012	5.1	3.6	5.4	7.6	2.5	5.8	5.1	7.4	22.2	11.5	9.3	8.5	8.7	19.5	11.4	18.4	-	..	9.7	3.4	4.3	3.4	6.4	9.4	15.6	13.4	7.9	7.2	7.1	8.7	
Q3 2012	5.6	3.6	5.9	7.0	3.7	5.9	5.0	6.8	22.5	9.3	7.1	8.8	8.6	20.4	10.7	18.1	-	..	8.8	3.6	4.6	2.8	6.9	9.1	16.8	13.0	8.5	5.8	7.1	8.4	
Q4 2012	5.2	3.5	6.9	7.1	3.2	6.2	4.8	6.4	23.4	9.4	7.4	9.6	8.1	21.7	11.0	16.8	-	..	10.4	-	5.0	3.2	6.6	9.5	17.4	14.0	9.3	6.2	7.7	8.0	
2012	5.4	3.5	5.8	7.6	3.1	6.0	5.2	7.1	22.4	10.8	8.1	9.0	8.5	20.1	11.3	17.8	6.1	..	9.7	3.7	4.6	3.1	6.7	9.6	16.2	13.6	8.6	6.7	7.8	8.6	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	4.1	8.8	15.9	6.8	..	5.7	13.7	7.8	12.5	-	13.1	12.5	6.7	5.0	4.3	6.3	-	5.0	6.1	2.6	6.2	4.7	4.3	-	6.9	-	6.3	11.7	9.8	5.9
	Q2 2008	4.1	6.1	13.7	7.1	5.0	4.0	12.0	4.5	14.8	-	14.4	11.0	6.6	4.3	7.7	7.1	-	6.2	6.0	4.7	5.9	5.6	3.7	-	7.5	-	5.0	11.9	6.0	4.8
	Q3 2008	4.4	6.5	16.8	7.0	..	3.4	11.2	5.4	17.2	-	9.5	10.6	6.8	4.3	5.6	8.9	-	5.8	5.0	8.0	3.8	6.1	3.6	-	7.7	-	3.6	10.6	7.2	5.3
	Q4 2008	4.1	7.9	11.2	6.7	..	5.0	12.2	7.9	20.8	-	12.5	11.4	7.0	6.3	7.4	10.6	-	6.0	6.6	10.4	5.5	7.4	4.6	-	8.9	-	4.1	11.9	11.5	6.9
	2008	4.2	7.3	14.3	6.9	..	4.5	12.3	6.4	16.4	-	12.4	11.4	6.8	5.0	6.3	8.2	6.0	5.8	5.9	6.4	5.3	6.0	4.1	-	7.8	-	4.7	11.5	8.6	5.7
	Q1 2009	6.3	11.6	15.9	10.4	..	7.8	13.6	8.8	29.1	-	12.1	13.7	7.8	10.3	7.4	16.2	-	7.3	8.9	6.0	6.3	9.9	6.4	-	11.6	-	10.1	14.7	16.5	10.4
	Q2 2009	7.3	10.6	15.4	11.3	6.2	9.6	14.3	10.2	29.5	13.1	19.9	14.1	8.9	9.8	8.0	18.2	-	8.0	8.9	6.2	7.5	7.3	6.7	-	12.6	-	8.9	18.0	13.8	9.3
	Q3 2009	6.6	10.1	17.0	11.1	..	8.2	13.2	9.9	29.3	23.0	15.7	13.5	10.0	9.8	10.6	19.2	-	6.8	9.4	4.9	7.1	7.8	7.2	-	14.9	-	6.3	16.2	16.0	10.2
	Q4 2009	5.9	10.5	17.0	10.0	..	8.2	13.3	11.2	31.4	26.5	16.1	15.4	8.9	11.5	8.6	19.3	-	7.9	10.4	6.4	8.0	8.8	8.1	-	13.8	-	5.1	16.0	12.7	10.6
	2009	6.5	10.7	16.3	10.7	..	8.5	13.6	10.0	29.8	17.7	16.1	14.2	8.9	10.4	8.6	18.2	14.8	7.5	9.4	5.9	7.2	8.5	7.1	-	13.2	-	7.5	16.2	14.7	10.1
	Q1 2010	5.7	10.6	18.6	10.7	7.4	7.1	14.3	14.9	32.5	26.5	17.3	14.7	9.4	14.2	9.1	19.1	-	7.7	11.2	6.5	9.4	9.5	6.9	-	12.9	-	10.6	16.3	14.6	12.1
	Q2 2010	5.2	9.2	17.1	10.5	9.8	5.4	12.1	17.8	31.4	26.2	19.7	13.2	9.4	15.2	8.2	18.5	-	5.9	10.0	5.7	8.1	10.3	8.6	-	10.9	-	9.7	16.8	14.2	8.8
	Q3 2010	5.0	8.4	16.9	10.1	6.3	4.6	11.4	15.0	29.8	26.8	19.8	13.0	8.7	14.9	6.8	20.0	-	7.2	8.0	3.8	8.0	9.7	6.6	-	12.0	-	7.5	15.3	9.5	9.0
	Q4 2010	4.5	7.1	15.0	8.7	6.4	5.0	11.7	12.4	30.7	15.5	16.7	13.7	7.8	16.6	6.4	21.0	-	6.7	11.0	4.7	8.3	9.6	6.8	-	14.9	-	9.7	15.1	11.1	10.0
	2010	5.1	8.8	16.9	10.0	7.2	5.6	12.4	15.1	31.1	23.6	18.4	13.7	8.8	15.2	7.6	19.7	16.5	6.9	10.0	5.2	8.8	9.8	7.2	12.1	12.7	8.9	9.4	15.9	12.4	10.0
	Q1 2011	4.7	10.2	16.0	9.1	7.3	-	10.9	16.3	31.9	-	17.2	14.3	8.6	19.7	-	20.8	-	6.2	10.4	-	9.8	9.2	7.4	-	20.2	-	13.0	16.9	12.6	10.4
	Q2 2011	4.6	7.9	16.0	8.2	5.9	6.5	9.8	12.9	31.8	19.0	15.7	13.8	9.0	19.4	9.7	19.8	-	5.1	8.2	5.9	10.1	9.3	6.2	8.4	17.4	-	8.8	16.8	10.1	8.4
	Q3 2011	4.5	6.0	15.0	8.3	5.4	7.4	9.3	13.1	33.1	13.6	16.4	13.6	9.3	21.3	8.5	19.3	-	5.8	8.4	3.5	9.4	6.8	6.5	11.7	18.0	-	8.2	15.0	9.0	8.2
	Q4 2011	4.6	7.9	14.9	8.0	6.2	6.2	9.0	13.2	34.6	14.3	14.7	14.7	9.5	25.9	7.1	19.3	-	5.1	11.9	4.7	9.5	7.8	7.9	11.2	16.4	-	8.2	15.4	9.2	8.4
	2011	4.6	8.0	15.5	8.4	6.2	6.1	9.7	13.8	32.9	15.6	16.0	14.1	9.1	21.5	8.9	19.8	-	5.6	9.7	4.7	9.7	8.3	7.0	9.9	18.0	-	9.7	16.0	10.3	8.9
Q1 2012	4.8	8.2	17.8	8.7	7.3	-	9.9	-	36.9	-	-	16.8	9.4	30.6	-	21.0	-	..	13.2	-	10.0	-	7.3	-	19.2	-	-	17.0	-	9.0	
Q2 2012	4.7	8.9	15.1	8.6	5.7	-	8.6	13.9	36.4	-	14.4	14.8	7.5	34.0	-	1															

Table 2.A1.2. Quarterly unemployment rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12 (cont.)
Percentages

Women		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	4.9	3.5	6.5	5.0	..	5.9	7.2	3.2	11.1	4.3	6.7	7.2	4.3	12.3	8.4	3.3	-	7.1	8.6	3.1	2.7	2.0	4.3	8.8	9.2	12.2	5.4	5.6	10.7	4.7
	Q2 2008	4.4	3.1	5.7	5.0	2.7	5.1	7.1	3.3	11.3	3.4	7.4	7.0	4.4	11.0	8.0	3.4	-	6.6	8.3	5.9	2.7	2.4	3.5	7.8	8.8	11.3	4.8	6.2	8.3	5.2
	Q3 2008	4.2	3.5	7.6	6.0	..	5.5	6.8	3.9	11.9	5.4	5.9	7.2	5.3	10.9	8.1	5.2	-	8.0	7.6	6.2	2.3	2.1	3.8	7.9	9.4	10.5	4.3	5.0	10.4	6.1
	Q4 2008	4.2	3.7	6.6	4.9	..	5.7	6.1	3.2	14.1	7.4	5.9	8.0	5.1	11.7	8.0	4.8	-	7.3	8.2	6.2	2.4	2.2	4.2	7.7	9.3	10.0	4.7	5.3	11.6	5.9
	2008	4.4	3.5	6.6	5.3	..	5.6	6.8	3.4	12.1	5.2	6.5	7.4	4.8	11.5	8.1	4.2	2.5	7.3	8.2	5.4	2.5	2.2	3.9	8.0	9.1	11.0	4.8	5.5	10.2	5.5
	Q1 2009	5.6	3.6	7.1	5.9	..	6.8	6.7	4.1	16.4	9.5	6.6	8.5	5.8	12.9	9.4	5.7	-	7.8	9.2	3.3	2.7	2.3	5.6	9.0	9.9	11.4	5.0	6.6	13.9	7.1
	Q2 2009	5.0	4.0	6.3	6.2	3.4	7.4	6.5	5.0	17.1	9.1	8.4	8.4	6.1	12.5	9.2	7.3	-	7.8	8.3	3.9	2.8	2.5	6.1	8.4	9.8	12.3	5.6	7.8	12.3	8.0
	Q3 2009	4.7	4.5	7.5	7.5	..	8.5	6.6	5.2	17.0	12.0	7.2	8.8	6.4	13.1	10.1	8.1	-	9.0	8.2	4.5	3.1	2.8	6.2	8.7	11.1	13.3	5.9	6.6	13.2	9.0
	Q4 2009	4.7	3.7	7.0	5.9	..	8.2	6.1	5.5	17.8	11.5	7.2	9.3	6.2	14.0	10.3	7.6	-	7.9	9.6	2.8	3.3	2.0	6.5	8.9	11.1	14.4	6.7	6.6	11.9	8.3
	2009	5.0	3.9	7.0	6.4	..	7.7	6.5	5.0	17.1	10.5	7.4	8.8	6.1	13.2	9.8	7.2	5.5	8.1	8.8	3.6	3.0	2.4	6.1	8.7	10.5	12.9	5.8	6.9	12.8	8.1
	Q1 2010	5.6	3.5	7.6	6.3	3.7	8.9	6.6	5.5	18.8	14.3	7.7	9.0	6.4	15.3	11.1	8.0	-	7.1	10.1	2.3	3.9	2.6	6.8	10.7	11.6	15.4	6.8	7.5	13.1	8.3
	Q2 2010	5.1	3.5	6.9	6.3	3.4	8.3	5.8	5.2	19.3	13.8	8.5	8.4	6.4	15.3	10.6	9.0	-	6.3	8.9	2.8	3.7	2.6	6.6	9.9	11.6	14.7	6.5	7.7	10.6	8.8
	Q3 2010	5.2	3.6	7.3	7.6	4.1	8.6	5.7	6.5	19.0	13.4	6.7	8.8	7.1	16.2	10.9	9.3	-	8.3	8.3	3.8	3.8	2.8	7.0	9.8	12.5	14.3	6.9	6.2	11.6	9.3
	Q4 2010	5.0	3.6	6.8	6.0	3.3	8.2	5.5	6.7	19.3	12.2	6.5	9.4	6.7	17.9	10.8	9.1	-	7.0	9.5	5.8	4.0	2.2	6.9	10.0	12.2	14.0	7.5	5.6	11.0	8.3
	2010	5.2	3.6	7.1	6.6	3.6	8.5	5.9	6.0	19.1	13.4	7.4	8.9	6.6	16.2	10.8	8.9	6.4	7.2	9.2	3.6	4.0	2.5	6.8	10.1	12.0	14.6	6.9	6.8	11.6	8.7
	Q1 2011	5.8	3.6	5.9	6.5	3.5	8.2	5.6	6.6	20.1	12.4	7.6	9.2	6.7	19.2	11.2	9.4	-	5.4	9.1	-	4.0	2.4	7.7	10.3	12.7	13.9	8.0	6.6	11.2	8.2
	Q2 2011	5.0	3.4	5.4	6.4	2.7	8.0	4.9	5.9	19.4	11.9	8.1	8.4	6.9	20.2	10.9	9.9	-	5.4	8.2	-	3.5	2.8	6.9	10.2	12.6	12.8	6.9	6.7	9.7	8.5
	Q3 2011	4.9	3.1	6.7	7.1	3.8	7.8	5.1	6.8	20.4	10.9	6.1	8.9	7.4	21.5	10.9	11.0	-	7.7	8.5	-	3.6	2.9	6.6	10.7	13.3	13.3	7.4	5.0	10.5	9.2
	Q4 2011	5.2	3.9	5.9	5.7	3.3	7.6	4.8	6.8	21.3	9.6	5.6	9.0	7.2	24.5	10.9	9.8	-	6.4	10.0	-	4.2	-	6.6	10.9	14.5	14.3	8.9	5.4	9.6	7.9
	2011	5.2	3.5	6.0	6.4	3.3	7.9	5.1	6.5	20.3	11.2	6.9	8.9	7.0	21.4	11.0	10.0	5.8	6.2	8.9	4.0	3.8	2.5	7.0	10.5	13.3	13.6	7.8	5.9	10.2	8.5
Q1 2012	5.8	3.7	5.8	6.3	3.3	8.1	4.8	6.8	22.8	10.2	6.8	9.1	7.0	26.1	11.4	10.4	-	..	11.4	3.9	4.4	1.9	7.6	11.2	15.4	14.5	8.5	6.2	10.1	8.0	
Q2 2012	5.3	3.5	5.6	6.3	2.9	7.9	4.7	6.8	23.0	8.7	7.7	8.7	6.9	27.0	10.4	10.2	-	..	10.9	-	4.4	2.2	7.2	10.9	15.4	14.1	8.4	6.7	8.2	7.9	
Q3 2012	4.8	3.8	6.6	7.3	3.4	8.3	4.8	6.5	24.3	9.3	6.7	9.3	7.2	28.7	10.3	10.6	-	..	10.7	-	4.4	2.5	7.5	11.0	15.7	14.6	9.7	5.6	9.7	8.4	
Q4 2012	5.0	3.7	5.9	5.7	3.1	8.5	4.6	6.1	25.0	8.6	6.1	9.8	6.9	29.3	10.7	9.4	-	..	12.3	4.6	4.7	2.1	7.3	11.1	17.4	15.1	9.7	5.8	10.2	7.3	
2012	5.2	3.7	5.9	6.4	3.2	8.2	4.7	6.6	23.8	9.2	6.8	9.2	7.0	27.8	10.7	10.1	5.2	..	11.3	3.9	4.5	2.2	7.4	11.0	16.0	14.6	9.1	6.3	9.5	7.9	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	5.3	8.1	15.2	7.4	..	11.4	13.1	11.0	16.0	-	12.2	12.3	7.6	13.7	6.2	5.1	-	4.5	13.1	10.7	7.8	5.3	6.1	-	12.4	-	6.8	12.5	11.6	5.6
	Q2 2008	5.2	7.3	13.9	7.2	7.7	10.6	12.7	8.1	16.7	-	11.8	11.2	6.8	11.9	4.4	6.5	-	4.7	12.2	6.3	6.9	3.7	5.1	-	9.9	-	6.7	13.7	10.3	5.8
	Q3 2008	5.2	7.5	14.1	8.1	..	11.0	12.0	5.8	16.0	-	15.8	12.9	7.6	10.9	5.5	7.7	-	5.8	10.3	6.1	5.0	5.3	5.0	-	11.9	-	5.9	12.4	4.6	6.3
	Q4 2008	5.2	8.3	16.6	7.5	..	8.1	12.0	6.6	19.7	-	14.3	13.0	7.9	12.7	7.3	7.3	-	5.7	11.9	4.1	5.9	4.0	5.9	-	10.8	-	4.6	12.8	11.3	6.5
	2008	5.2	7.8	14.9	7.6	..	10.2	12.4	7.8	17.2	-	13.5	12.4	7.5	12.3	5.9	6.6	-	5.2	11.8	6.8	6.4	4.6	5.5	-	11.2	-	6.0	12.9	9.4	6.0
	Q1 2009	6.9	8.1	16.6	8.8	..	9.3	12.6	9.4	24.8	-	16.1	14.2	8.1	14.8	10.9	11.4	-	6.8	12.8	9.8	6.3	3.5	6.2	-	13.5	-	6.8	13.9	17.5	8.9
	Q2 2009	6.8	7.4	15.3	9.9	7.8	9.3	11.2	10.1	23.8	15.4	13.6	13.5	9.2	13.7	9.6	11.2	-	7.4	12.9	8.8	6.8	6.8	-	12.2	-	5.8	15.3	13.8	9.0	
	Q3 2009	7.1	8.8	17.9	10.5	..	13.0	12.7	7.7	23.2	15.0	14.1	14.6	9.4	13.8	9.7	13.1	-	6.4	11.7	6.2	6.1	3.6	6.2	-	12.8	-	10.1	13.7	16.4	9.7
	Q4 2009	6.7	8.3	14.7	9.3	..	12.4	10.9	11.8	24.7	11.0	15.2	15.0	9.0	15.6	7.9	11.2	-	5.8	14.6	10.1	6.5	5.5	8.5	-	13.4	-	6.1	15.0	18.5	9.3
	2009	6.9	8.2	16.1	9.6	..	11.0	11.8	9.7	24.1	12.3	14.7	14.3	8.9	14.5	9.6	11.7	8.6	6.6	13.0	8.8	6.4	4.9	7.0	-	13.0	-	7.2	14.5	16.6	9.2
	Q1 2010	6.9	7.6	17.3	9.6	9.8	9.9	11.3	11.8	26.2	19.4	16.2	16.6	8.7	17.9	9.7	10.8	-	5.4	14.3	8.3	7.9	7.5	8.5	-	15.8	-	8.5	16.2	16.5	10.3
	Q2 2010	6.3	8.0	16.5	9.8	8.8	10.5	10.9	11.8	26.4	25.0	17.4	15.0	9.0	16.6	7.1	13.2	-	4.3	13.4	5.5	7.4	7.5	7.7	-	16.8	-	9.5	18.1	10.4	8.6
	Q3 2010	5.5	7.0	19.2	11.0	8.7	9.4	10.0	13.0	26.6	25.3	15.4	16.0	9.1	16.2	7.0	13.7	-	5.5	11.9	6.6	7.8	7.1	7.3	-	17.1	-	10.5	16.1	15.1	9.4
	Q4 2010	5.9	7.7	16.2	9.2	7.9	8.1	10.7	12.0	27.6	18.9	14.1	16.6	9.0	19.9	-	14.4	-	6.0	13.7	5.7	7.4	6.0	7.4	-	19.0	-	10.7	16.4	14.2	9.8
	2010	6.1	7.6	17.3	9.9	8.8	9.5	10.7	12.1	26.7	22.2	15.8	16.0	9.0	17.7	7.4	13.0	10.4	5.3	13.3	6.5	8.2	7.0	7.7	11.1	17.2	16.7	9.8	16.7	14.1	9.5
	Q1 2011	6.5	8.5	12.8	9.4	8.1	11.6	9.8	15.2	29.9	21.8	16.9	17.3	8.9	23.3	8.2	13.8	-	4.4	13.5	9.5	8.6	7.3	7.5	8.1	18.1	-	13.5	16.8	15.1	9.6
	Q2 2011	6.2	7.6	14.9	9.1	6.3	-	9.1	15.7	29.1	20.0	-	14.9	8.9	19.7	-	14.1	-	4.2	14.1	-	8.5	7.3	6.3	-	16.1	-	-	17.1	15.9	9.1
	Q3 2011	5.9	7.8	16.3	9.9	7.8	11.0	9.0	15.1	29.																					

Table 2.A1.3. Quarterly participation rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12
Percentages

Men + women		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	78.3	75.2	68.1	78.0	..	69.4	77.3	80.8	70.7	71.6	74.5	70.0	75.9	66.4	60.9	70.7	-	62.5	62.1	67.1	80.1	79.9	79.1	63.3	73.5	68.5	70.6	79.7	47.5	73.3
	Q2 2008	78.5	75.7	66.7	79.8	83.0	69.5	77.4	81.7	71.2	71.8	78.1	70.2	76.1	66.6	61.0	70.8	-	62.7	62.8	67.4	80.5	80.9	79.3	63.5	73.7	68.5	71.3	81.6	50.4	74.0
	Q3 2008	78.1	76.8	68.5	80.3	..	69.7	77.8	82.3	71.5	74.5	76.4	70.8	76.7	66.5	62.0	72.3	-	62.8	61.9	68.7	80.6	80.8	79.5	64.4	73.5	69.3	73.3	81.5	51.2	74.3
	Q4 2008	78.1	76.1	67.6	78.7	..	69.9	77.8	82.0	71.6	74.7	74.9	70.7	76.6	66.4	61.5	70.2	-	62.4	62.0	69.1	80.8	79.7	80.4	64.4	73.2	68.9	71.8	79.4	49.9	73.6
	2008	78.3	76.0	67.7	79.2	..	69.6	77.6	81.7	71.2	73.1	76.0	70.4	76.3	66.5	61.3	71.0	86.2	62.6	62.2	68.1	80.5	80.3	79.6	63.9	73.5	68.8	71.7	80.6	49.7	73.8
	Q1 2009	78.3	75.2	67.6	77.7	..	69.6	77.5	81.1	71.6	73.2	74.2	70.7	76.3	66.6	60.8	69.2	-	62.4	61.6	69.2	81.0	79.5	79.4	64.3	73.3	68.1	70.5	79.3	48.2	73.0
	Q2 2009	78.3	76.1	67.4	79.3	82.9	69.8	77.7	81.9	71.7	72.8	77.2	71.2	76.0	66.9	61.3	70.1	-	62.9	61.7	69.6	81.0	80.2	78.9	64.4	73.1	68.1	71.7	81.4	50.9	73.4
	Q3 2009	77.8	77.2	67.7	79.6	..	70.4	77.9	81.6	71.6	74.0	75.0	71.3	76.5	67.2	61.7	70.3	-	62.5	61.2	70.1	81.0	79.2	78.6	65.3	72.8	68.8	73.1	80.5	52.2	73.4
	Q4 2009	78.0	75.8	68.1	77.7	..	70.4	78.2	80.3	71.5	72.5	73.4	70.9	76.1	66.9	61.8	68.7	-	62.2	61.5	69.6	80.8	78.3	79.8	65.0	73.1	68.7	72.3	78.9	51.0	72.1
	2009	78.1	76.1	67.7	78.6	..	70.0	77.9	81.2	71.6	73.1	74.9	71.0	76.2	66.9	61.4	69.6	84.3	62.5	61.5	69.6	80.9	79.3	79.2	64.7	73.1	68.4	71.9	80.0	50.6	73.0
	Q1 2010	77.9	74.8	68.5	77.1	83.2	69.8	77.4	80.0	71.6	73.8	73.4	71.0	75.6	67.2	61.7	68.3	-	62.1	61.5	69.2	79.3	78.1	79.2	65.2	73.5	68.4	71.3	79.5	50.3	72.2
	Q2 2010	78.0	75.4	67.6	79.0	82.5	69.9	77.2	80.7	72.0	73.3	76.6	70.9	75.7	67.4	62.2	69.7	-	62.8	61.5	69.3	79.3	79.1	78.6	65.6	73.3	68.5	71.4	82.0	52.5	72.5
	Q3 2010	77.9	76.6	68.4	79.6	83.3	70.4	77.4	80.3	72.0	72.8	74.9	71.3	76.5	67.3	62.7	69.7	-	63.7	60.4	71.2	79.4	78.5	78.8	66.1	73.3	69.0	71.6	81.8	52.9	72.7
	Q4 2010	78.3	76.0	68.8	77.9	83.1	70.3	77.7	79.8	72.1	73.4	73.3	70.6	76.0	67.2	62.5	68.8	-	63.4	61.6	62.4	79.3	78.1	79.3	65.8	73.1	68.9	71.4	80.0	51.5	71.8
	2010	78.0	75.7	68.3	78.4	83.0	70.1	77.4	80.2	71.9	73.3	74.6	70.8	76.0	67.3	62.3	69.1	84.6	63.0	61.2	62.6	79.3	78.5	79.0	65.7	73.3	68.7	71.4	80.8	51.8	72.3
	Q1 2011	78.1	75.0	66.9	77.4	83.6	70.0	77.6	80.1	72.2	74.0	73.8	70.4	75.8	66.9	61.8	68.0	-	62.7	61.2	62.2	79.1	77.6	79.2	65.5	73.5	68.6	69.6	80.4	51.4	71.4
	Q2 2011	77.9	75.7	67.7	79.2	83.3	70.4	77.7	80.3	72.5	74.3	77.2	70.6	75.8	66.8	62.5	69.0	-	63.0	61.0	60.4	79.3	78.2	78.5	66.0	73.5	68.7	69.8	82.7	53.9	71.7
	Q3 2011	77.8	76.7	67.9	79.5	83.5	70.7	78.1	80.7	72.8	75.2	75.6	71.2	76.4	66.8	63.1	68.9	-	63.3	60.8	62.6	79.7	78.5	78.3	66.5	73.3	69.0	70.9	82.3	54.5	72.2
	Q4 2011	77.9	76.1	67.9	77.6	83.9	70.6	78.4	79.9	72.6	74.0	73.8	71.0	76.4	66.9	63.1	68.8	-	62.8	62.0	61.2	80.3	78.1	79.0	66.5	72.9	69.2	70.8	80.5	52.7	71.3
	2011	77.9	75.9	67.6	78.5	83.6	70.4	77.9	80.2	72.5	74.4	75.1	70.8	76.1	66.8	62.6	68.7	84.4	62.9	61.3	61.6	79.6	78.1	78.8	66.1	73.3	68.8	70.3	81.5	53.1	71.7
Q1 2012	77.9	75.3	67.1	77.1	83.2	70.6	77.5	79.7	72.7	74.6	74.0	70.8	76.2	67.0	63.1	68.3	-	..	62.7	61.6	80.4	78.2	79.1	66.3	72.8	69.4	70.0	80.6	51.2	71.0	
Q2 2012	77.8	76.5	67.6	79.0	82.8	71.2	77.5	80.1	73.0	74.6	77.3	71.2	76.4	67.2	64.0	68.8	-	..	63.0	62.6	80.4	78.9	78.2	66.7	73.3	69.3	69.4	82.8	53.9	71.6	
Q3 2012	77.6	77.8	68.3	79.4	84.1	72.1	78.0	79.7	73.2	75.2	76.2	71.8	77.1	67.2	64.8	69.3	-	..	62.4	64.7	80.6	78.8	78.0	66.9	73.5	69.6	70.7	82.9	54.2	72.0	
Q4 2012	77.9	76.6	68.2	77.8	83.9	72.2	78.1	78.9	72.9	74.0	73.7	71.8	77.2	67.3	64.6	68.5	-	..	62.2	63.6	80.8	78.3	77.6	66.8	72.8	69.4	70.9	80.8	54.1	71.4	
2012	77.8	76.5	67.8	78.3	83.5	71.5	77.8	79.6	73.0	74.6	75.3	71.4	76.8	67.2	64.1	68.7	84.6	..	62.8	63.1	80.5	78.6	78.2	66.5	73.1	69.4	70.3	81.5	53.4	71.5	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	72.0	69.1	62.6	75.7	..	71.0	71.4	67.6	79.2	78.5	76.5	67.7	73.1	72.6	67.3	76.8	-	67.6	70.0	70.9	70.9	76.3	72.2	43.9	80.7	74.1	73.0	71.3	50.2	74.8
	Q2 2008	71.9	71.3	63.3	76.5	80.4	71.6	71.0	72.8	79.4	79.1	76.9	68.0	72.4	73.0	68.4	76.5	-	67.5	70.4	75.3	72.0	76.8	73.6	48.4	81.7	72.5	71.0	73.7	53.9	75.2
	Q3 2008	71.9	70.3	63.8	76.6	..	71.2	72.1	72.6	79.2	79.4	75.8	67.8	72.6	73.4	69.0	76.4	-	67.0	71.9	81.1	71.5	78.1	73.2	47.7	82.1	74.6	70.8	73.8	54.9	75.8
	Q4 2008	72.4	71.0	63.2	76.1	..	71.7	71.4	72.5	79.8	81.4	71.5	67.4	72.7	73.8	70.6	74.8	-	68.2	71.9	75.9	72.3	77.7	75.1	41.9	82.2	71.5	74.2	72.8	54.8	74.9
	2008	72.1	70.4	63.2	76.2	..	71.4	71.5	71.3	79.4	79.6	75.1	67.7	72.7	73.2	68.9	76.2	85.5	67.5	71.1	75.9	71.7	77.3	73.5	45.8	81.7	73.1	72.2	72.9	53.5	75.2
	Q1 2009	72.6	70.4	63.7	75.6	..	72.4	72.6	74.5	80.5	79.7	75.3	67.9	72.7	73.9	71.4	73.3	-	68.4	70.3	72.2	72.4	75.7	74.1	51.3	81.3	70.9	70.8	72.6	55.5	74.6
	Q2 2009	72.1	71.3	60.8	76.5	81.4	73.9	72.9	74.6	79.8	80.9	77.9	67.6	72.0	74.8	72.4	74.2	-	68.1	71.1	79.1	71.0	76.4	74.7	51.0	81.3	71.2	71.5	74.3	55.9	75.2
	Q3 2009	71.7	72.0	62.3	76.8	..	72.6	73.2	78.8	79.2	78.6	75.3	67.1	73.1	75.7	72.6	73.7	-	69.0	69.9	74.4	71.3	74.9	73.0	48.9	80.1	68.5	71.8	73.9	56.6	75.4
	Q4 2009	72.1	72.3	62.6	76.1	..	72.0	72.9	74.1	79.2	79.3	73.2	67.1	72.0	75.6	71.7	72.0	-	68.5	71.0	73.3	71.2	74.4	74.4	55.6	78.7	67.7	71.4	72.8	54.9	74.9
	2009	72.1	71.5	62.3	76.3	..	72.7	72.9	75.5	79.7	79.6	75.4	67.4	72.4	75.0	72.0	73.3	87.4	68.5	70.6	74.7	71.5	75.3	74.0	51.6	80.4	69.7	71.3	73.4	55.7	75.0
	Q1 2010	72.4	71.0	63.2	75.6	80.1	71.4	72.1	74.0	80.2	74.7	74.0	67.3	71.5	76.3	71.1	70.6	-	67.6	70.3	76.6	69.2	75.8	73.8	54.8	80.4	64.1	74.0	72.3	56.3	74.6
	Q2 2010	71.8	71.8	63.2	76.9	81.4	73.0	72.6	74.6	80.1	76.0	76.1	67.9	72.7	76.4	71.6	72.1	-	68.8	70.7	77.0	71.0	76.0	73.8	56.7	80.8	63.4	74.2	73.7	57.2	75.4
	Q3 2010	72.3	73.1	64.9	77.4	81.9	74.7	73.2	74.2	80.6	79.5	72.3	67.8	73.7	76.8	72.1	71.9	-	69.7	69.2	78.2	70.6	75.0	73.0	59.5	81.2	61.9	69.3	74.2	55.7	75.1
	Q4 2010	73.7	73.1	64.6	75.6	80.6	74.4	72.4	70.9	79.5	76.7	69.9	68.0	72.7	76.1	68.4	71.4	-	69.3	69.4	75.6	70.7	74.5	74.6	59.4	82.8	66.8	71.3	72.8	57.7	74.8
	2010	72.6	72.																												

Table 2.A1.3. Quarterly participation rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12 (cont.)
Percentages

Men		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	84.2	80.9	73.4	81.1		77.7	81.9	83.9	80.4	76.0	76.0	73.9	81.8	78.2	67.5	79.5	-	66.3	73.1	67.9	85.6	82.3	84.9	70.4	79.0	75.9	74.5	81.3	71.9	77.9
	Q2 2008	84.2	81.4	72.3	83.1	88.0	77.9	82.0	85.0	80.8	75.8	80.3	74.1	81.9	78.1	68.1	79.5	-	66.6	74.0	71.3	86.1	83.6	85.1	70.7	78.9	76.1	75.2	83.2	74.2	78.8
	Q3 2008	83.9	82.5	73.7	83.9		78.2	82.5	85.7	81.1	78.3	78.5	74.8	82.8	78.0	68.9	80.7	-	66.8	73.2	71.5	86.0	83.5	84.9	71.4	78.6	76.7	77.6	83.0	75.3	79.1
	Q4 2008	84.1	81.3	72.9	81.8		78.4	82.1	85.2	80.4	78.9	76.6	74.6	82.5	77.7	67.9	78.5	-	65.7	73.1	69.2	86.1	82.1	85.8	71.4	78.7	76.6	75.1	81.0	74.1	78.0
	2008	84.1	81.5	73.1	82.5	88.0	78.1	82.1	84.9	80.7	77.3	77.8	74.4	82.3	78.0	68.1	79.6	90.2	66.4	73.4	70.0	86.0	82.9	85.2	71.0	78.8	76.3	75.6	82.1	73.9	78.4
	Q1 2009	83.9	79.6	72.9	80.5		78.0	82.1	84.3	80.1	76.5	75.5	74.6	82.1	77.6	67.3	76.9	-	65.2	72.5	70.3	86.1	81.5	84.8	71.3	78.2	76.0	73.6	80.8	72.1	77.5
	Q2 2009	83.5	80.8	72.3	82.4	87.1	78.2	81.9	84.7	80.0	76.5	78.7	74.9	81.8	77.7	68.1	77.8	-	66.1	72.6	73.0	86.2	82.6	84.6	71.5	78.2	76.0	75.5	82.8	74.0	77.9
	Q3 2009	83.2	82.1	72.4	82.9		78.7	82.5	84.6	79.7	78.5	76.3	75.0	82.1	78.0	68.3	77.7	-	65.8	72.4	72.0	86.0	81.2	83.7	72.5	77.3	76.6	76.9	82.3	75.8	77.9
	Q4 2009	83.5	81.3	73.4	80.4		78.7	82.3	83.2	79.2	75.6	74.4	74.8	81.6	77.6	68.2	75.8	-	65.1	72.5	70.3	85.6	80.1	85.4	71.9	77.6	76.4	76.1	80.9	74.4	76.4
	2009	83.5	80.9	72.8	81.6	87.1	78.4	82.2	84.2	79.8	76.8	76.2	74.9	81.9	77.7	67.9	77.0	87.5	65.6	72.5	71.4	86.0	81.3	84.6	71.8	77.8	76.2	75.5	81.7	74.1	77.4
	Q1 2010	83.6	79.4	73.2	79.6	87.9	78.1	82.1	82.9	79.1	76.5	75.0	74.8	81.1	77.7	67.6	75.5	-	65.5	72.5	69.5	84.5	80.1	84.4	71.9	77.9	75.7	75.2	81.3	73.4	76.5
	Q2 2010	83.5	81.0	73.1	82.0	87.6	78.3	82.1	83.2	79.7	75.9	78.2	74.5	81.3	77.6	68.3	77.0	-	66.3	72.3	69.5	84.5	81.4	83.9	72.2	77.5	76.0	74.5	84.0	75.1	77.0
	Q3 2010	83.4	82.0	73.6	82.8	88.3	78.9	82.2	83.0	79.5	76.3	76.9	74.9	82.2	77.4	68.7	77.1	-	66.9	71.2	71.9	84.7	80.7	84.1	72.9	77.5	76.2	75.7	83.7	75.7	77.1
	Q4 2010	83.9	81.4	73.5	80.6	88.1	78.6	82.3	83.1	79.1	76.9	74.9	74.4	81.7	77.2	68.4	75.8	-	65.8	72.0	69.7	84.2	80.3	84.8	72.7	77.5	76.3	75.2	81.9	74.2	75.8
	2010	83.6	80.9	73.4	81.3	88.0	78.5	82.2	83.1	79.4	76.4	76.2	74.7	81.6	77.5	68.2	76.3	87.4	66.1	72.0	70.1	84.4	80.6	84.3	72.5	77.6	76.0	75.1	82.7	74.6	76.6
	Q1 2011	83.7	79.7	71.7	80.0	88.3	78.0	82.2	83.1	79.2	77.9	75.7	74.2	81.1	76.8	67.7	75.1	-	65.7	71.9	68.6	83.9	79.1	84.2	72.3	78.0	76.2	73.3	81.8	74.3	75.4
Q2 2011	83.3	81.1	72.6	82.1	87.9	78.6	82.1	83.0	79.3	77.1	79.4	74.4	81.2	76.7	68.5	76.0	-	66.5	71.6	67.5	83.9	79.7	84.0	73.0	77.8	76.8	73.2	84.3	76.1	75.8	
Q3 2011	82.9	82.0	71.9	82.9	88.6	78.8	82.3	83.3	79.6	77.8	77.4	74.9	81.9	76.5	69.3	76.0	-	66.9	71.5	68.5	84.4	80.4	83.9	73.4	78.0	76.8	74.5	84.0	77.1	76.5	
Q4 2011	83.2	81.2	72.8	80.5	88.4	78.5	82.7	82.7	79.1	77.4	75.8	74.6	81.7	76.0	69.2	76.1	-	65.5	72.2	66.9	84.9	80.3	84.3	73.2	77.3	77.0	73.6	82.1	75.3	75.6	
2011	83.3	81.0	72.3	81.4	88.3	78.5	82.3	83.0	79.3	77.5	77.1	74.5	81.5	76.5	68.6	75.8	87.2	66.2	71.8	67.9	84.3	79.9	84.1	73.0	77.8	76.7	73.7	83.0	75.7	75.8	
Q1 2012	83.1	79.5	71.8	79.5	87.8	78.5	81.9	82.1	78.7	77.6	75.5	74.5	81.3	76.1	69.1	75.3	-	...	72.6	67.3	85.0	80.4	84.5	72.9	76.8	77.1	72.2	81.8	72.9	75.1	
Q2 2012	82.8	81.5	72.7	81.9	87.4	79.1	81.8	82.3	79.2	77.2	79.2	74.8	81.8	76.3	70.1	76.0	-	...	73.0	69.2	84.8	80.9	83.3	73.6	77.4	76.9	72.2	84.0	75.3	76.0	
Q3 2012	82.7	82.6	72.7	82.6	89.2	79.9	82.5	82.0	79.3	79.0	77.4	75.4	82.5	76.1	70.9	76.7	-	...	72.6	69.3	85.0	80.7	82.7	73.8	77.7	77.3	74.1	84.3	76.1	76.6	
Q4 2012	83.1	81.3	72.5	80.6	89.0	79.7	82.3	81.8	78.7	78.2	75.5	75.3	82.2	76.2	71.0	75.3	-	...	73.1	69.6	85.1	80.1	82.9	73.6	76.6	77.2	74.6	82.3	75.9	75.8	
2012	82.9	81.2	72.4	81.2	88.4	79.3	82.1	82.1	79.0	78.0	76.9	75.0	82.0	76.2	70.3	75.8	86.7	...	72.8	68.9	85.0	80.5	83.3	73.3	77.1	77.1	73.3	82.9	75.1	75.9	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	80.9	77.8	75.0	82.8		82.1	81.8	75.9	87.5	86.5	82.1	77.5	83.8	88.7	77.1	85.9	-	73.8	85.4	79.0	80.1	80.0	82.2	50.3	86.1	79.6	79.6	77.0	68.1	86.4
	Q2 2008	80.3	82.2	75.7	83.9	88.0	82.9	81.1	80.2	87.6	86.6	85.3	77.5	83.3	89.6	77.9	85.6	-	73.7	84.6	82.5	81.1	82.6	82.2	54.4	87.7	77.9	76.6	79.6	74.4	86.9
	Q3 2008	79.9	81.2	74.7	84.2		80.1	81.8	81.9	87.3	84.3	80.8	77.5	82.7	89.9	77.0	86.0	-	72.7	87.2	82.9	80.6	82.1	80.9	55.2	87.7	80.3	75.7	80.4	74.4	88.2
	Q4 2008	80.1	81.9	75.4	83.5		79.9	81.3	82.5	87.1	82.7	77.0	77.3	83.6	89.7	78.9	85.1	-	74.3	86.5	80.1	81.3	81.3	83.7	49.6	87.4	80.2	79.1	79.3	74.2	86.5
	2008	80.3	80.8	75.2	83.6	88.0	81.2	81.5	80.1	87.4	85.1	81.3	77.5	83.4	89.5	77.8	85.6	90.7	73.6	86.0	81.1	80.8	81.5	82.3	52.8	87.3	79.5	77.7	79.1	72.9	87.0
	Q1 2009	80.6	79.2	73.8	82.4		80.2	81.9	80.4	88.2	82.5	78.1	76.6	83.4	89.6	81.6	83.0	-	74.6	85.4	81.3	81.2	80.5	82.5	59.5	86.1	80.8	75.5	78.3	71.6	85.6
	Q2 2009	80.6	81.0	72.4	83.0	89.6	82.1	82.3	83.0	87.6	86.1	84.7	76.1	81.8	89.7	82.3	84.0	-	74.9	85.5	84.2	80.5	81.2	82.7	60.9	86.7	80.8	78.4	80.8	73.5	86.8
	Q3 2009	80.1	82.5	74.3	83.2		81.4	82.5	85.2	85.9	82.2	81.2	76.1	83.6	90.2	79.6	82.5	-	74.2	85.6	82.9	80.6	80.3	80.5	58.1	86.4	83.3	76.1	80.5	74.2	86.6
	Q4 2009	80.3	82.0	72.8	82.3		82.1	82.3	83.3	86.5	83.1	78.3	76.4	80.9	89.6	79.9	81.5	-	73.5	84.8	83.5	80.1	81.2	82.0	67.4	85.5	85.3	76.6	78.7	71.7	85.7
	2009	80.4	81.2	73.3	82.7	89.6	81.5	82.2	81.8	87.0	83.6	80.6	76.3	82.4	89.8	80.9	82.8	89.9	74.3	83.7	83.0	80.6	80.8	81.9	61.2	86.2	82.3	76.6	79.6	72.6	86.2
	Q1 2010	81.4	79.1	72.1	81.3	88.4	81.9	83.1	84.7	86.7	75.2	80.2	76.1	80.5	90.4	76.4	80.1	-	72.6	83.9	83.7	76.6	80.6	81.7	68.4	84.4	82.8	79.7	78.7	72.0	85.5
	Q2 2010	80.4	80.7	74.3	83.0	89.6	83.4	82.8	80.3	87.4	78.1	85.4	77.1	81.9	90.3	73.9	81.3	-	74.8	84.9	82.1	79.3	81.8	82.0	67.8	84.2	82.7	78.0	80.3	74.9	86.5
	Q3 2010	80.8	81.8	74.8	84.2	90.1	85.3	83.7	76.9	87.7	81.6	81.1	77.3	83.4	90.9	74.1	81.4	-	75.9	84.9	82.9	78.8	80.1	80.8	62.5	85.0	79.9	75.6	80.6	73.1	86.5
	Q4 2010	81.9	80.8	74.6	82.5	88.7	84.7	83.0	77.2	86.8	83.3	78.1	76.9	82.5	90.2	75.2	80.7	-	74.4	84.7	84.0	79.7	80.0	82.1	70.1	86.6	81.6	76.9	80.1	74.5	85.3
	2010	81.1	80.																												

Table 2.A1.3. Quarterly participation rates by gender and place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2008-12 (cont.)
Percentages


Women		AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
Native-born	Q1 2008	72.4	69.4	62.7	74.8	..	60.9	72.4	77.6	67.5	60.6	73.0	66.2	70.1	54.6	54.5	61.9	-	58.6	51.1	52.5	74.3	77.4	73.5	56.3	68.0	61.2	66.4	78.0	23.4	68.8
	Q2 2008	72.7	69.8	61.0	76.4	78.0	61.1	72.5	78.2	68.1	61.3	76.0	66.4	70.3	55.0	54.3	62.1	-	58.7	51.4	52.1	74.8	78.2	73.7	56.6	68.5	61.0	67.2	80.0	26.9	69.4
	Q3 2008	72.3	71.0	63.2	76.5	..	61.0	72.9	78.7	70.9	61.5	74.4	66.9	70.7	55.0	55.3	63.8	-	58.7	50.5	54.3	75.1	77.9	74.3	57.6	68.3	61.9	68.8	80.0	27.5	69.7
	Q4 2008	72.2	70.9	62.3	75.5	..	61.1	73.2	78.6	70.7	62.6	73.2	66.8	70.7	55.1	55.3	61.8	-	59.0	50.8	54.2	75.4	77.2	75.1	57.6	67.9	61.2	68.2	77.7	26.1	69.4
	2008	72.4	70.3	62.3	75.8	..	61.0	72.8	78.3	69.3	61.5	74.1	66.6	70.4	54.9	54.9	62.4	81.9	58.8	51.0	53.3	74.9	77.7	74.1	57.0	68.2	61.3	67.7	78.9	26.0	69.3
	Q1 2009	72.8	70.8	62.3	74.8	..	60.9	72.8	77.9	70.2	62.8	72.9	66.7	70.6	55.7	54.6	61.6	-	59.5	50.7	55.0	75.8	77.4	74.3	57.5	68.4	60.2	67.2	77.7	24.9	68.7
	Q2 2009	73.0	71.3	62.5	76.1	78.6	61.2	73.2	78.9	69.4	63.2	75.7	67.4	70.3	56.0	54.8	62.3	-	59.6	50.6	57.5	75.6	77.7	73.4	57.6	68.0	60.2	67.8	79.9	28.4	69.2
	Q3 2009	72.3	72.3	63.0	76.2	..	61.8	73.2	78.6	69.6	63.1	73.7	67.7	70.9	56.4	55.3	62.9	-	59.1	49.7	58.0	75.8	77.1	73.7	58.2	68.3	61.0	69.1	78.7	29.3	69.0
	Q4 2009	72.4	70.3	62.6	74.9	..	61.8	73.9	77.3	69.5	63.5	72.4	67.1	70.6	56.2	55.7	61.6	-	59.1	50.4	55.1	75.8	76.5	74.6	58.2	68.7	61.1	68.3	76.7	28.1	68.0
	2009	72.6	71.1	62.6	75.5	..	61.4	73.3	78.2	69.7	63.2	73.7	67.2	70.6	56.1	55.1	62.1	80.9	59.3	50.4	56.4	75.8	77.2	74.0	57.9	68.3	60.6	68.1	78.2	27.7	68.7
	Q1 2010	72.1	70.1	63.8	74.5	78.4	61.2	72.5	77.0	71.3	63.8	71.7	67.2	70.2	56.6	56.0	61.1	-	58.5	50.3	54.4	76.1	76.0	74.3	58.6	69.2	61.1	67.2	77.5	27.8	68.0
	Q2 2010	72.3	69.8	61.9	76.0	77.2	61.3	72.3	78.1	70.8	64.1	75.0	67.2	70.0	57.0	56.3	62.4	-	59.1	50.5	54.8	76.4	76.7	73.5	59.2	69.2	61.1	68.2	79.9	30.5	68.3
	Q3 2010	72.4	71.2	63.2	76.3	78.0	61.6	72.5	77.5	69.6	64.2	72.9	67.8	70.8	57.2	56.9	62.4	-	60.4	49.5	55.4	74.0	76.3	73.6	59.5	69.2	61.8	67.3	79.7	30.5	68.5
	Q4 2010	72.5	70.5	63.9	75.1	77.9	61.9	73.0	76.2	65.0	70.0	71.7	66.8	70.3	57.2	56.7	61.8	-	60.9	51.0	54.6	74.4	75.8	74.0	59.0	68.7	61.6	67.4	78.1	29.3	67.9
	2010	72.3	70.4	63.2	75.5	77.9	61.5	72.6	77.2	64.3	70.4	72.8	67.1	70.3	57.0	56.5	61.9	81.6	59.7	50.3	54.8	74.1	76.2	73.9	59.0	69.1	61.4	67.5	78.8	29.5	68.1
	Q1 2011	72.4	70.3	62.1	74.9	78.6	61.8	72.9	77.0	65.0	70.3	71.8	66.6	70.4	57.0	56.0	61.0	-	59.5	50.4	55.6	74.2	76.0	74.5	58.9	69.0	61.0	65.8	79.0	29.1	67.6
	Q2 2011	72.5	70.3	62.7	76.3	78.5	62.1	73.2	77.4	65.5	71.6	74.8	66.8	70.4	56.8	56.6	62.0	-	59.5	50.4	53.3	74.6	76.5	73.2	59.2	69.2	60.6	66.3	81.0	32.2	67.7
	Q3 2011	72.6	71.3	63.8	76.1	78.2	62.5	73.7	78.0	65.7	72.7	73.7	67.6	70.9	57.1	57.1	61.8	-	59.5	49.9	56.5	74.8	76.5	72.9	59.6	68.7	61.2	67.1	80.6	32.3	68.0
	Q4 2011	72.7	70.9	63.0	74.7	79.2	62.5	74.0	77.0	65.8	70.8	71.7	67.4	71.0	57.6	57.3	61.6	-	59.9	51.7	55.4	75.6	75.8	73.9	59.8	68.5	61.3	67.9	78.9	30.5	67.2
	2011	72.6	70.7	62.9	75.5	78.6	62.2	73.5	77.3	65.5	71.3	73.0	67.1	70.7	57.1	56.7	61.6	81.5	59.6	50.6	55.2	74.8	76.2	73.6	59.4	68.8	61.0	66.8	79.9	31.0	67.6
Q1 2012	72.6	71.0	62.4	74.5	78.4	62.5	72.9	77.1	66.4	71.8	72.4	67.1	71.1	57.8	57.3	61.3	-	..	52.6	55.5	75.6	76.0	73.9	59.7	69.0	61.6	67.7	79.2	29.5	67.0	
Q2 2012	72.8	71.3	62.4	75.9	77.9	63.2	73.1	77.8	66.6	72.1	75.3	67.6	71.1	58.0	58.0	61.7	-	..	52.9	55.6	75.7	76.8	73.4	60.0	69.3	61.6	66.5	81.5	32.5	67.4	
Q3 2012	72.4	73.0	63.9	76.0	79.0	64.0	73.5	77.2	66.9	71.6	74.9	68.2	71.8	58.2	58.9	61.8	-	..	52.0	60.1	76.0	76.9	73.5	60.1	69.3	62.0	67.3	81.6	32.3	67.7	
Q4 2012	72.7	71.9	63.8	75.0	78.7	64.5	73.8	75.9	66.9	70.1	72.0	68.4	72.1	58.3	58.5	61.8	-	..	53.2	57.3	76.5	76.4	72.5	60.1	69.0	61.5	67.1	79.2	32.4	67.2	
2012	72.6	71.8	63.1	75.4	78.5	63.6	73.3	77.0	66.7	71.4	73.7	67.8	71.5	58.0	58.2	61.6	82.5	..	52.7	57.2	76.0	76.5	73.3	59.7	69.2	61.7	67.1	80.1	31.7	67.3	
Foreign-born	Q1 2008	63.2	61.6	50.9	69.0	..	60.1	61.0	60.2	71.6	70.9	70.9	58.7	62.5	56.1	59.6	67.3	-	62.0	56.3	66.6	62.7	72.8	63.0	36.9	75.5	67.0	66.1	66.2	32.4	62.7
	Q2 2008	63.7	61.7	52.1	69.5	73.1	60.4	61.0	65.9	72.5	71.2	68.5	59.1	61.9	56.0	61.0	66.9	-	61.9	58.1	69.4	63.7	71.0	65.8	42.1	76.1	66.7	65.1	68.5	34.4	62.8
	Q3 2008	64.0	60.8	53.5	69.4	..	62.4	62.4	64.6	75.1	71.2	70.8	58.8	63.1	56.5	62.9	66.4	-	62.0	58.4	65.0	63.2	74.1	66.1	39.9	77.2	68.7	64.7	67.9	34.0	62.8
	Q4 2008	64.7	61.3	50.9	69.2	..	63.6	61.8	63.9	80.3	72.5	65.8	58.1	62.3	57.3	64.2	64.2	-	62.9	59.0	64.0	64.0	74.1	67.1	36.4	77.6	63.0	68.6	67.0	33.7	62.6
	2008	63.9	61.4	51.8	69.3	..	61.7	61.6	63.6	74.8	71.5	69.0	58.7	62.5	56.5	62.0	66.2	80.0	62.2	58.0	66.3	63.4	73.0	65.5	39.1	76.6	66.2	66.1	67.4	33.6	62.7
	Q1 2009	64.6	62.3	53.6	69.3	..	64.5	62.8	69.0	77.4	73.0	72.2	59.6	62.6	57.8	63.9	62.9	-	63.0	56.9	69.1	64.4	70.9	66.4	45.4	77.0	61.4	65.8	67.4	32.4	63.0
	Q2 2009	63.7	62.4	49.8	70.4	73.3	65.5	63.1	71.5	76.0	71.9	70.4	59.5	62.7	59.5	65.1	64.2	-	62.1	58.6	63.8	62.4	71.7	66.8	41.8	76.8	63.4	64.7	68.4	31.7	63.0
	Q3 2009	63.3	62.3	50.5	70.7	..	63.7	63.4	73.1	75.9	72.5	69.6	58.6	63.2	60.7	67.4	64.6	-	64.4	56.5	64.0	63.1	69.5	65.9	42.4	74.8	56.4	67.0	68.1	30.8	63.5
	Q4 2009	64.0	63.5	53.0	70.3	..	61.5	63.4	66.4	76.5	72.0	68.8	58.6	63.4	61.1	65.8	62.5	-	64.0	58.8	67.4	63.4	67.6	66.9	47.3	72.9	53.0	65.4	67.3	31.2	63.5
	2009	63.9	62.6	51.7	70.2	..	63.8	63.2	70.0	76.4	72.4	70.2	59.1	63.0	59.8	65.5	63.5	85.0	63.4	57.7	66.1	63.3	69.9	66.5	44.2	75.4	58.9	65.7	67.8	31.6	63.3
	Q1 2010	63.6	63.7	54.7	70.2	72.0	60.4	61.6	65.2	74.2	73.7	68.1	59.1	62.9	61.8	67.0	61.2	-	63.3	58.3	67.5	63.9	71.1	66.0	43.7	77.0	47.7	67.7	66.5	32.8	63.1
	Q2 2010	63.4	63.7	52.8	71.0	73.4	61.5	62.9	69.7	74.3	73.2	67.2	59.4	63.7	62.3	69.8	63.0	-	63.4	58.4	65.0	64.1	69.8	65.9	47.5	77.7	45.9	70.0	67.7	31.2	63.6
	Q3 2010	64.1	65.2	55.1	71.0	73.9	63.2	63.1	71.9	77.8	73.9	64.1	58.8	64.4	62.7	70.4	62.3	-	64.1	55.5	67.0	63.1	69.7	65.6	57.3	77.7	43.6	62.8	68.4	31.4	63.3
	Q4 2010	65.7	66.0	55.2	69.1	72.8	63.4	62.2	66.2	72.7	71.7	62.5	59.9	63.6	62.2	62.7	62.2	-	65.0	56.3	67.5	62.5	68.6	67.4	49.9	79.3	50.0	65.0	66.4	34.1	64.0

ANNEX 2.A2

Risk of long-term unemployment for different demographic groups and by country of birth in selected OECD countries, 2007/08 and 2011/12


Figure 2.A2.1. **The risk of long-term unemployment, by demographic group in selected OECD countries, 2007/08 and 2011/12**

Percentages of the labour force



Notes: The population of reference is the working-age population (15-64). The prime age refers to the 25-54. The risk of long-term unemployment is defined as the share of unemployed for more than one year in the labour force by demographic group.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822902>

ANNEX 2.A3

Employment and unemployment gaps between native-born and foreign-born over the past decade in selected OECD countries, 2002-12

Figure 2.A3.1. **Differences in employment rates between migrants and natives by gender over time**


Percentage points



Notes: Differences are defined as native-born employment rate minus foreign-born employment rate. The average difference is defined as the average employment difference between native-born and foreign-born over the 2002-06 period (2004-06 for the United Kingdom, 2003-06 for Iceland, France and Switzerland). A negative difference implies an employment advantage of the foreign-born. The data refer to Q2 2002-06 and Q2 2012.


Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.
StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932830369>

Figure 2.A3.2. **Differences in unemployment rates between migrants and natives by gender over time**



Notes: Differences are defined as native-born unemployment rate minus foreign-born unemployment rate. The average difference is defined as the average unemployment difference between native-born and foreign-born over the 2002-06 period (2004-06 for the United Kingdom, 2003-06 for Iceland, France and Switzerland). A negative difference implies a disadvantage of the foreign-born. The data refer to Q2 2002-06 and Q2 2012.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932830388>

ANNEX 2.A4

Foreign-born employment by sector of activity

Table 2.A4.1. Employment of foreign-born persons by sector, 2012
Percentage of total foreign-born employment

	Agriculture and fishing	Mining, manufacturing and energy	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade	Hotels and restaurants	Education	Health	Households	Admin. and ETO	Other services
Austria	0.7	17.1	12.2	13.9	12.7	4.2	9.8	0.6	7.1	21.8
Belgium	0.9	13.2	7.4	12.3	7.2	5.3	11.7	1.4	14.7	25.9
Czech Republic	1.1	29.6	9.1	16.9	3.6	4.9	6.4	0.3	7.2	20.8
Denmark	2.8	14.7	2.6	10.4	9.0	9.7	18.3	0.9	8.0	23.6
Estonia	1.4	27.3	7.7	12.5	1.7	10.2	6.8	-	6.4	26.0
Finland	2.4	16.5	6.3	12.0	6.6	7.2	13.3	0.3	8.2	27.1
France	1.4	11.1	11.9	11.7	6.8	5.2	11.5	5.2	11.1	24.1
Germany	0.6	25.4	7.0	12.7	8.9	4.5	11.0	1.2	7.0	21.9
Greece	11.1	13.8	16.5	13.9	13.0	1.9	4.0	13.2	3.7	8.9
Hungary	3.9	18.9	7.9	19.0	5.9	11.6	8.8	-	7.9	16.2
Iceland	4.3	20.0	4.4	14.5	10.8	9.4	11.1	-	8.9	16.6
Ireland	2.2	15.1	4.3	15.6	13.2	5.0	14.0	1.2	6.8	22.5
Italy	4.4	19.7	13.1	9.8	9.0	1.8	4.9	19.2	5.5	12.6
Luxembourg	0.2	6.4	9.2	8.8	5.3	4.1	8.7	3.4	16.4	37.6
Netherlands	1.4	14.9	4.3	12.9	6.8	6.0	16.2	0.0	9.9	27.6
Norway	1.3	12.5	7.6	12.6	6.2	6.6	23.3	0.3	6.0	23.7
Poland	4.2	11.2	7.0	17.3	4.0	12.0	5.6	1.6	8.2	28.9
Portugal	2.2	12.9	8.2	14.2	9.9	9.3	7.8	5.2	11.6	18.8
Slovak Republic	4.3	20.6	4.9	15.4	2.2	7.2	11.5	1.0	10.5	22.3
Slovenia	1.6	29.4	17.8	6.5	5.6	5.4	6.5	0.1	5.8	21.4
Spain	6.8	8.8	8.0	14.7	16.0	2.6	5.1	14.7	6.1	17.3
Sweden	0.6	12.6	4.6	10.3	7.3	11.8	18.4	-	8.2	26.3
Switzerland	1.4	16.6	8.1	14.4	7.6	5.2	13.8	1.6	6.1	25.2
Turkey	2.8	32.0	6.2	17.7	5.2	8.9	4.9	1.3	7.2	13.8
United Kingdom	0.7	10.4	5.6	12.9	9.0	8.4	14.6	0.4	8.1	29.9
United States	1.9	12.6	9.0	13.5	10.8	5.8	12.5	1.3	2.5	30.1

Notes: A dash indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication. ETO stands for extra-territorial organisations.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Survey (Eurostat), Q1-Q3 2012; United States: Current Population Surveys.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932843764>

Table 2.A4.2. **Industry segregation index, 2011/12**

	Comparison between recent and non-recent migrants		Comparison between migrants and natives	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Austria	0.14	0.09	0.16	0.20
Belgium	0.08	0.09	0.16	0.19
Czech Republic	0.21	0.23	0.15	0.19
Denmark	0.12	0.15	0.18	0.09
Estonia	0.73	0.74	0.20	0.15
Finland	0.17	0.26	0.15	0.19
France	0.16	0.20		
Germany	0.25	0.27	0.17	0.12
Greece	0.10	0.15	0.32	0.45
Hungary	0.35	0.22	0.13	0.10
Ireland	0.17	0.25	0.18	0.16
Italy	0.13	0.17	0.24	0.40
Luxembourg	0.21	0.21	0.41	0.39
Netherlands	0.25	0.19	0.13	0.12
Norway	0.14	0.25	0.15	0.14
Poland	0.31	0.57	0.31	0.17
Portugal	0.34	0.26	0.12	0.17
Slovak Republic	0.51	0.87	0.27	0.28
Slovenia	0.24	0.27	0.25	0.25
Spain	0.18	0.25	0.19	0.36
Sweden	0.19	0.18	0.14	0.11
Switzerland	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.14
United Kingdom	0.15	0.22	0.15	0.13
United States	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.14

Notes: Data for European countries refer to 2011. Data for the United States refer to 2012. The segregation index is based on the NACE Rev. 1.1 (1-digit) classification.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), 2011; United States: Current Population Survey 2012.


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ANNEX 2.A5

New hires

Figure 2.A5.1. **Share of foreign-born in hires by worker group in 2008 and 2012 (Europe) and 2006 and 2012 (United States)**

Evolution in percentage of the share of foreign-born among the persons who started their current employment less than one year ago



Notes: Data for European countries refer to Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2011. They exclude Belgium for which information on the length of stay of immigrants is not available. Data for the United States refer to 2006 and 2012.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Surveys, January supplement.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932830407>

Figure 2.A5.2. **Share of foreign-born in hires by education level in 2008 and 2011 (Europe) and 2007 and 2012 (United States)**

Evolution, index = 100 in 2007/08




Notes: Hires refer to persons who started in their current occupation within the previous 1-year period. The population of reference is the 15-64 who are not currently in education (except for the United States). Data for European countries refer to 2008 and 2011. Data for the United States refer to 2006 and 2012.

Sources: European Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys, January supplement.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932830426>

Figure 2.A5.3. **Share of temporary jobs in hires by country of birth, 2008 and 2012**

Percentage



Notes: Hires refer to persons who started in their current occupation within the previous 1-year period. Data for European countries refer to Q1-Q3 2008 and Q1-Q3 2012, except for Switzerland for which data refer to Q2 2008 and Q2 2012. Data for the United States refer to 2006 and 2012.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Surveys, January supplement.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932830445>


Table 2.A5.1. **Occupation and sector distribution of hires of foreign-born workers in selected OECD countries, 2008 and 2012**

Foreign-born who started their current employment less than one year ago (distribution in percentages)

	European OECD countries		United States	
	2008	2012	2006	2012
Industry (NACE Rev. 1.1)				
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry	2.6	4.2	1.5	2.7
C Mining and quarrying	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3
D Manufacturing	12.4	8.8	12.3	11.2
E Electricity, gas and water supply	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.7
F Construction	13.5	10.0	12.6	7.3
G Wholesale and retail trade: repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods	12.4	12.8	15.6	15.4
H Hotels and restaurants	12.8	13.7	12.9	13.4
I Transport, storage and communications	7.6	7.9	4.5	5.5
J Financial intermediation	2.1	1.7	3.5	2.2
K Real estate, renting and business activities	11.7	12.1	14.1	17.7
L Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	1.8	1.9	1.2	1.1
M Education	3.6	5.0	6.9	6.7
N Health and social work	7.7	8.7	9.0	9.7
O Other community, social and personal services activities	4.1	4.6	4.3	4.7
P Activities of private households as employers and undifferentiated production activities of private households	6.8	7.5	1.4	1.5
Q Extraterritorial organisations and bodies	0.1	0.3	-	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Occupation (ISCO)				
1 Managers	4.2	2.9		
2 Professionals	8.6	12.6		
3 Technicians and associate professionals	8.5	9.0		
4 Clerical support workers	7.8	5.9		
5 Service and sales workers	21.8	23.7		
6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	1.2	1.2		
7 Craft and related trades workers	16.2	12.2		
8 Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	7.9	6.4		
9 Elementary occupations	24.0	26.0		
Total	100.0	100.0		

Notes: Data for European countries refer to Q2 2008 and Q2 2012 and exclude Germany. Data for the United States refer to 2006 and 2012.

Sources: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Survey, January supplement.

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Chapter 3

The fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries¹

Whether immigrants make the fiscal challenges faced by OECD countries more difficult or whether they aid in addressing them is a topical question in many OECD countries. This chapter provides a first-time comparative analysis of the fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries, using data for all European OECD countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the United States. It also includes a comprehensive overview of the literature and the methodological issues involved in estimating the fiscal impact of migration. Depending on the assumptions made and the methodology used, estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration vary, although in most countries it tends to be small in terms of GDP and is around zero on average across OECD countries.

Immigrants tend to have a less favourable net fiscal position than the native-born, but this is almost exclusively driven by the fact that immigrant households contribute on average less in terms of taxes and social security contributions than the native-born and not by a higher dependence on benefits. Employment is the single most important determinant of migrants' net fiscal balance, particularly in countries with comprehensive social protection systems. More generally, differences in the composition of the migrant population by migration category (labour, family, humanitarian) account for a large part of the cross-country variation of migrants' fiscal position relative to that of the native-born. There is also a strong impact of the age of immigrants on their net fiscal position.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.


Introduction

Whether immigrants are net contributors to or a net drain on public finances is a topical issue in many countries for several reasons. First, immigrants, defined as the *foreign-born*, account for a significant and growing part of the population in many OECD countries. On average in the OECD in 2010, about 13% of the population was composed of immigrants, with a growth of more than 2 percentage points since 2000. At the same time, immigrants' fiscal position can be expected to differ from that of the native-born. Immigrants have different socio-demographic characteristics, and their labour market outcomes are often less favourable than those of the native-born – even after accounting for these characteristics (OECD, 2012). In addition, immigrants generally do not spend their entire life in the host country. Most arrive as adults, and some will return eventually to their origin countries or migrate elsewhere. As a result, immigrants are overrepresented among the working-age population in virtually all OECD countries. This is likely to have an impact on the fiscal balance, as per capita social expenditure is lowest among those in the working-age population.²

The second reason why the fiscal impact of immigration has gained importance in the policy debate is the often sharp deterioration in the fiscal balance of most OECD countries since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008/09. In 2011, gross financial liabilities of general government in the OECD area exceeded total GDP for the first time, and governments' net borrowing amounted to more than 6% of GDP on average. These large fiscal imbalances resulting from the Great Recession are coupled with the fiscal impact of ageing. By 2020, in the absence of migration, on average across the OECD, the number of individuals entering into the working-age population will be about 30% lower than the number of those exiting it. In parallel, life expectancy is increasing. Over the past two decades, average life expectancy at the age of 65 has increased by about three years. As a result, population ageing will be accompanied by significant increases in expenditures on pensions, health and long-term care, while the number of contributors of working-age declines. Along with ageing, labour shortages may well tend to increase. Many OECD countries are looking for migration to help fill skills and overall labour shortages. Migrants' fiscal impact is one element in public policy decisions about the scale and composition of discretionary labour migration flows. The key question is therefore: will immigrants aggravate the fiscal challenges associated with the recent crisis and population ageing, or can they play a role in addressing them?


Finally, in many countries, there is widespread public concern over immigrants' use of the welfare system. Opinion surveys show a strong association between the public's view about the desirability of further migration and their perceptions of immigrants' fiscal contribution. In European OECD countries, people who believe that the fiscal impact of immigration is positive are also more inclined to welcome additional migration (Figure 3.1). Although this association does not necessarily mean that the fiscal impact is the main determinant of views on migration, there clearly is a link between the perceptions of the fiscal impact and public acceptance of additional migration.

Figure 3.1. **The association between views on migration and the perception of migrants' fiscal impact, selected European OECD**



Notes: In the survey, respondents were asked to provide their views on the net fiscal position of migrants on a scale from 0 (“immigrants receive more than they contribute”) to 10 (“immigrants contribute more than they receive”); respondents with a score of up to 3 were categorised as having the view that immigrants are net recipients, and respondents with a score of 7 or more as having the view that immigrants are net contributors. The y-axis shows the average score (on a scale 1-4) for openness to additional immigration from poorer countries outside of the EU/EFTA.

Source: European Social Survey.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822921>

Given these challenges, and the availability of better data, there has been an increasing amount of research on the fiscal impact of immigration in recent years.³ Yet, the question of how to reliably evaluate the fiscal impact of immigrants is complex. Should one simply compare immigrants' *current* tax/benefit balance (including social security contributions), or are forward-looking projections of *future* cash flows the approach that should be taken to account for a potential demographic impact and economic assimilation over time? If so, how sure can one be about the assumptions and forecasts underlying these approaches? And what about the descendents of immigrants and the indirect effects of immigration on the public finances through the labour and capital markets?

The first section addresses these questions and discusses, on the basis of an overview of the literature, the key issues to be considered in the analysis of the fiscal impact of immigration, including measurement. The second section provides a first-time internationally-comparative overview of immigrants' fiscal impact, based on household survey data from all European OECD countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the United States. The final section draws some conclusions.

Main findings

- The fiscal impact of immigration cannot be pinned down to a single and undisputable figure, as its measurement depends on a number of key assumptions, including the degree to which the cost for the public purse of certain public services and the public capital stock (such as for infrastructure and public administration) and non-personal taxes (such as the corporate income tax) is attributed to the immigrant population. Inclusion or exclusion of these items often changes the sign of the impact.

- There are three basic sets of approaches used in the literature to measuring the fiscal impact of immigration. The first is an *accounting approach* that estimates the fiscal contributions of immigrants to the public purse minus public expenditures related to immigrants in a given year. The accounting approach thus looks at the fiscal contribution of the *resident* immigrant population, many of whom may have arrived decades ago, and should thus not be used to assess the success or fiscal impact of *current* immigration and integration policies. The second relies on *dynamic models*, which analyse the impact of immigration in the long run, generally by modelling the impact of *additional* migration on future public budget balances. For analysing the long-term fiscal impact of immigration, assumptions regarding intertemporal budget constraints and the labour market integration of immigrants' offspring are often crucial. The third, and closely related, are *macroeconomic models* which assess the overall impact of immigration on the economy and the implications which this entails, generally by simulating the impact of additional immigration flows.
- Depending on the assumptions made and the methodology used, estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration vary, although in most countries it tends to be very small in terms of GDP and is around zero on average across the OECD countries considered. The impact, whether positive or negative, rarely exceeds 0.5% of GDP in a given year. It is highest in Switzerland and Luxembourg, where immigrants provide an estimated benefit of about 2% of GDP to the public purse.
- In most countries, immigrants have a less favourable *net* fiscal position than the native-born. This is driven by immigrants' lower taxes and social security contributions and not by higher dependence on social benefits. However, because unemployed migrants tend to be less likely to obtain unemployment benefits than their unemployed native peers, they are more likely to find themselves among the recipients of social assistance than the native-born. Households with low-educated migrants have higher net fiscal contributions than comparable native-born households in almost all OECD countries. In contrast, high-educated migrant households have on average a lower net fiscal contribution than high-educated native-born.
- Cross-country differences in the fiscal position of immigrant households are shaped both by the design of the tax and benefit system and by differences in the composition of the migrant population in terms of age and migrant-entry category. In countries where recent labour migrants make up for a large part of the immigrant population, immigrants have a much more favourable fiscal position than in countries where humanitarian migration accounts for a significant part. Countries with longstanding immigrant populations and little recent labour immigration generally have a less favourable fiscal position of immigrants. Labour migrants thus tend to have a much more favourable impact than other migrant groups, although there is some convergence over time. Labour migration is also generally the only *direct* policy lever with respect to migration management, since governments have generally little influence on the size and composition of other forms of migration. Yet, few studies look explicitly at labour migration, partly because few countries have information on immigrant-entry category for the immigrant population. The limited available evidence suggests that the impact of labour migrants is positive, particularly for migrants with secondary and post-secondary education.
- Immigrants' *age* profile is a main factor in explaining cross-country differences in immigrants' net fiscal position, since countries with a favourable fiscal impact, measured in terms of current net contributions to the budget, tend to have relatively

young immigrant populations, whereas the reverse is the case for countries where a negative impact is observed. Likewise, age at arrival is an important element in determining the net present value of immigrants' discounted future net direct fiscal contributions. Immigrants who arrive as young adults provide a positive pay-off to the public purse over their life-cycle in most countries. The net present value of future payments then declines and generally turns negative somewhere between the age of 40 and 45, depending on the country. Despite this, in most migration systems, age plays a relatively minor role in the selection of labour migrants compared with other selection factors such as work experience, language and education.

- *Employment* is the single most important determinant of migrants' net fiscal contribution, particularly in countries with generous welfare states. Raising immigrants' employment rate to that of the native-born would entail substantial fiscal gains in many European OECD countries, in particular in Belgium, France and Sweden where this would have a budget impact of more than 0.5% of GDP. It is thus not surprising that the labour market integration of immigrants and their children has become a key policy issue. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that the potential fiscal gains from better labour market integration of resident immigrants – in particular of immigrant women and of highly-educated immigrants – will tend to exceed the potential fiscal gains from additional labour migration in many European OECD countries with large and longstanding immigrant populations.
- Immigrants' fiscal position also seems to vary more strongly with the business cycle than that of the native-born. This is less visible in the current crisis where on average, immigrants' net fiscal contribution declined on average just about as much as that of the native-born, because the benefit payments to immigrants increased less than those to the native-born. This seems to be due in part to the fact that immigrants do not always have full access to the social protection system, for example because of their status as foreigners or because they have not yet sufficiently paid into systems which are contributory, notably for recently-arrived immigrants.

Measuring the fiscal impact of immigration – an overview

Measuring the fiscal impact of immigration is not a straightforward exercise and can be done in several different ways which will be discussed below. This section first defines the target group for the purposes of the exercise. It then discusses the revenue and expenditure items to be considered in the measurement. The section ends with a discussion of alternative methodological approaches to measuring the fiscal impact, both in the short-term and in the long-run.

The target population

Before studying the fiscal impact of immigration, the target group needs to be defined. This relates mainly to whether to focus on the foreigners or on the foreign-born, and whether or not to include the children of immigrants and immigrants in an irregular situation.

Some empirical studies look at foreign nationals rather than the foreign-born (e.g. Boeri, 2010). However, a person's nationality can change over time, and the conditions under which nationality is granted vary widely across the OECD (see OECD, 2011a). As a result, in countries with longstanding liberal citizenship laws, such as Australia, Canada and Sweden, foreign nationals are essentially recent arrivals, whereas in countries with

more stringent citizenship laws, such as in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, many foreign nationals are native-born. For international comparisons, the OECD has taken the view that the foreign-born are the appropriate target group.

As will be discussed below, some studies also include the native-born children of immigrants. This is appropriate when one wishes to look at the long-term fiscal implications of immigration. Occasionally, however, the children of immigrants are also considered in studies that look at contributions and expenditures in a given year (see below and Wadensjö, 2000). This is also partly driven by data considerations – revenues and expenditures generally refer to the household level.⁴ Household-based data also include the native-born children of immigrants living with their parents in the same household.

Regarding immigrants in an irregular situation, these are included to the degree that the dataset used for the analysis covers them. Many surveys, such as the Current Population Survey in the United States, cover at least part of such immigrants. The fiscal position of immigrants in an irregular situation – and also their inclusion in administrative datasets on taxes and benefits – will mainly depend on whether or not they are in regular employment and thus pay taxes and social security contributions. At least in the United States where this issue has been well researched, this seems to be the case for the majority of immigrants in an irregular situation (CBO, 2007). A second major determinant of the fiscal position of such immigrants is their access to certain social benefits and services.⁵ Orrenius and Zavodny (2012) argue that *regularisation* of immigrants' status would lead to higher tax revenue as some workers would move onto the books and beneficiaries' incomes would tend to increase. But there might also be a higher take-up of certain benefits, including some to which immigrants and their children have already access but low take-up because of fears about revealing their undocumented status.

Revenue and expenditure items to be considered

The most straightforward items to include in an assessment of the budget implications of migration are the direct financial transfers involving immigrants, that is, the taxes and social security contributions paid and the financial transfers received via unemployment and social assistance benefits, disability payments, family allowances, financial housing support, and the like.⁶ Specific issues arise with the pension system, where the time-lag between contributions and benefit payments is particularly long.⁷ Given the magnitude of the sums involved, inclusion or exclusion of the pension system can considerably alter the balance, as immigrants are largely underrepresented among the elderly in most countries – especially in countries where a large share of immigrants arrived only recently. On the one hand, the pensions received generally have a direct link with previous payments into the pension system, which is an argument for exclusion of pension contributions and payments. On the other hand, few pension systems are actuarially fair, which means that pensions are, at least to some degree, transfers between generations and tax payers. In the empirical analysis below, the estimates are thus provided both with and without consideration of the pension system.

The fiscal impact may also differ between levels of government. In many cases, the contributions tend to be mainly towards the central government level, whereas the expenditures tend to occur at the local level. For example, social assistance and housing support is often paid at the local level, whereas pensions are paid out at the national level.⁸ As will be seen in the empirical analysis below, immigrant households obtain on average 70% more in social assistance and 50% more in housing allowances than the

native-born, but about 50% less in pensions. In a review of the literature for the United States, Kandel (2011) concludes that the relatively young age distribution of the foreign-born accentuates the degree to which state and local governments incur greater fiscal costs from the foreign-born than the federal government.⁹

Clearly, direct fiscal transfers are not the only component that should be considered in assessing the fiscal impact of immigration. First, one should take account of the indirect taxes and consumption of social goods such as education and health by immigrants. These are revenues and expenditures that increase with each individual immigrant, at least in principle. Second, one should also consider public goods, some of which may partly depend upon the size and composition of the population.¹⁰ Finally, there are indirect budget implications arising from migrant's broader impact on the economy.

Regarding the first category, on the revenue side, these are the indirect taxes paid by immigrants through their expenditure (namely value-added tax and excise taxes). From income and expenditure surveys, such information can often be obtained, at least on an approximate basis. On the expenditure side, this includes, in particular, public education and public health expenditure, as well as expenditure for active labour market policies. The expense attributable to migrants is generally not directly available. For those in education, estimates of public education expenditure by education level are available for a majority of OECD countries. Likewise, there is information on overall spending on active labour market policy programmes (which is generally targeted on the unemployed) and on the labour market status of the respondents, from which estimates of expenditure can be obtained. The individual public expenditure for health care is more difficult to assess. It varies widely by age, and only few OECD countries have estimates in this respect.

It is also questionable whether such age-specific public expenditures (where available) apply to the same degree to immigrants as to the native-born. For example, immigrants tend to cause some additional education expenditure, namely through language training. Yet, at the same time, in most countries children of immigrants tend to be underrepresented in the initial years of early childhood education and in post-secondary education in most countries (Liebig and Widmaier, 2010).¹¹ Likewise, whereas adult immigrants can receive targeted and publicly-subsidised language training upon arrival in many cases, unemployed migrants are often underrepresented among the beneficiaries of some of the more expensive active labour market policy programmes (see OECD, 2007, 2008, 2012).

Language training – both for children in school and for adult migrants – is generally the single most important budget item that is directly integration-related and not included in the general consumption of social services. Such expenditures for language training and introduction courses can be a major item for new arrivals in per capita terms and are included in most country-specific studies where they are sizeable, notably in the Nordic countries. However, since these expenditures essentially occur in the first few years after arrival, they are generally not large when expressed in per capita terms of the total immigrant population.¹²

Regarding health care expenditure, although little direct information is available, there are a number of indications suggesting that immigrants are on average less costly for the public purse than the native-born. As already mentioned, immigrants are underrepresented among the elderly, where health expenditures tend to be highest (see Hagist and Kotlikoff, 2009). In addition, immigrants tend to have less access to, and make lower use of, the health

care system due to formal and informal barriers such as legal restrictions, language barriers, socio-cultural factors, and migrants' lack of information about their rights and the health system of the host country (Norredam and Krasnik, 2011).¹³

The situation becomes even more complex with respect to the second category, that is, revenue and expenditure items on the government budget that do not vary on a person-by-person basis. On the revenue side, this includes, for example, the corporate income tax which is an important source of tax revenue in many countries. Although immigrants are slightly overrepresented among entrepreneurs, their companies are also more often small and there are some indications that they are less productive on average (see OECD, 2011b). They are thus either not subject to this tax at all or they may contribute only little. On the expenditure side, this concerns in particular publicly-provided goods that depend only partly upon the size and composition of the population, such as public infrastructure, public administration and police forces.¹⁴ These are often referred to as “congestible public goods” (e.g. Wadensjö, 2000). In order to do a proper accounting of such congestible goods, one needs assumptions about how the consumption and provision of these goods changes with variations in the (immigrant) population size. Most studies which account for this tend to attribute the costs of such goods equally across the whole population (i.e. an assignment *pro rata*). They thus assume that the cost of provision is proportional to the number of recipients (Rowthorn, 2008).¹⁵

There are also a number of “pure” public goods which tend to be unaffected by population size. Defence, which accounted on average for 4% of government expenditure of OECD countries in 2008, is a classic example. The marginal increase in these costs due to immigration should, within certain limits, therefore be zero and immigrants will thus lower the per capita cost for the native-born (see Loeffelholz et al., 2004). Nevertheless, defence spending tends to grow proportionally with GDP, which challenges the pure public good classification; and indeed, a number of studies assign the cost of defence proportionally.

This chapter will refer to proportional (per capita) – cost assignment as *pro rata* and to fixed-cost assignment as *zero marginal cost*. For substantial budget items such as defence, a change in this classification can change the sign of the impact, and it does so in many cases where the fiscal effect is not large either way.

Finally, as a third category, there are the indirect implications which migrants exert on the budget through their overall economic impact on the wages and employment of natives, on the capital stock and on productivity, all of which have fiscal implications as well, for example through the corporate income tax and the taxes paid by the native-born. This indirect impact is considered in general equilibrium models, which will be discussed in more detail below.¹⁶

Specific groups

Many empirical studies do not look at the overall immigrant population, but only at a part thereof. For example, in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands (e.g. Roodenburg et al., 2003), there is often a focus on so-called “non-Western” immigrants, a term that essentially refers to immigrants from lower-income countries. This distinction is motivated by the fact that immigrants from such countries tend to have poorer labour market outcomes and are more often dependent on benefits than the native-born and immigrants from high-income countries. In the European OECD countries, most migrants from high-income countries are from EU/EFTA countries, and nationals of these countries enjoy freedom of movement and access to all government services like the native-born.¹⁷

Ideally one should analyse immigrants' fiscal contribution by category of entry. This is the single key determinant in explaining cross-country differences in immigrants' labour market performance (see OECD, 2007, 2008, 2012). In all countries, labour migrants have much more favourable labour market outcomes than family and humanitarian migrants. The composition of the migrant population by entry category can thus be expected to have a strong impact on migrants' fiscal position as well.¹⁸

However, only a few countries have information on immigrants' entry category, and only Australia – where a specific fiscal impact model has been developed as a tool for migration management – provides estimates of the fiscal impact by migration category (see Box 3.1).¹⁹ This model demonstrates the key role played by migration category. The insights are used for both migration management and budgetary planning. Comparisons of the results over time show the impact of shifts in migration policy on the budget. Overall, estimations on the basis of the fiscal impact show that the net fiscal surplus during the first three years after arrival per migrant has increased by more than 50% between 2006 and 2008, along with a stronger selection for skills. The model is also used to assess the impact of different economic scenarios, e.g. in 2009 in the context of the economic downturn.

Closely related to immigrants' entry category is their access to social services. While immigrants generally have access to most contributory benefits, this is less clear for non-contributory benefits such as family support and welfare payments, which may depend on immigrant category or citizenship status.²⁰ Fiscal implications may also arise from the limited international transferability of social benefits (see Holzmann and Koettl, 2011, for a comprehensive discussion).²¹

An alternative way to looking at entry groups is to analyse specific migrant groups who share common characteristics. In the United Kingdom, there has been an assessment of the fiscal impact of immigration from the Central and Eastern European Countries that entered the European Union in 2004. Most of these arrived as migrants for employment. Not surprisingly, Dustmann et al. (2010) found that these migrants provided a net contribution to the public purse, regardless of the accounting model used.

Methodological approaches

Static accounting (cash-flow) models

The most straightforward and direct approach of measuring the fiscal impact of immigration is by directly comparing immigrants' taxes and social security contributions and government expenditures attributable to them. By means of an accounting exercise, the fiscal impact of immigration can thus be calculated as the residual between the credit side, namely the taxes and contributions paid by immigrants, and the debit side, i.e. fiscal transfers from which migrants benefit. Usually, the studies calculate this balance for a fiscal year.

A large number of this type of accounting studies exist for the OECD countries. A landmark for the early analysis of the fiscal impact of immigration on this basis was the "New Americans" study by the US National Research Council in the late 1990s. Although not providing analyses at the nation-wide level, it compared the results of two studies on the fiscal impact of immigration at the state level, for New Jersey (Garvey and Espenshade, 1998) and California (Clune, 1998). In this analysis, all publicly-provided goods, with the exception of defence, are assumed to be *pro rata*. The study found an overall negative impact in both states. Whereas in both cases there was a net contribution at the federal level, it did not suffice to compensate for the loss at the state level. In addition, the negative

Box 3.1. The Australian Fiscal Impact Model

For many years, the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship has operated, with the support of a private consulting firm, a Migrants' Fiscal Impact Model (see Access Economics, 2008, for a detailed description). The model allows for a detailed analysis of the effect of new arrivals on the Australian Government Budget. The model provides separate analyses for the eight main visa categories for permanent migration, and the main temporary labour migration visa.

The model uses estimates of income, employment and expenditure for the different categories of migrants to model income tax and revenue from indirect taxes, such as the goods and service tax. The model also assesses the indirect contribution of migration through other revenue streams such as the corporate income tax.

The model also includes comprehensive estimates of government expenditure on health, education, social security and settlement services for migrants, taking into account migrants' age profile and the propensity of different migrant groups to use government services. The data are derived from administrative data and other sources, in particular the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Australia (LSIA).


The fiscal impact is modelled over a 20-year period and accounts for return migration. The model only examines immigrants *themselves* – the impact on the Australian Government Budget from any children born after arrival in Australia is not considered.

Humanitarian migrants have a negative fiscal impact during the first 10-15 years, whereas labour migrants provide a strongly positive contribution (see Table 3.1). The model highlights the importance of *duration of residence*, as immigrants' outcomes tend to converge to those of the native-born over time. This convergence process results in a positive impact for humanitarian migrants at later stages, although these are generally not large enough to turn the net fiscal impact positive if considered from a life-time perspective. Not considering accompanying family, labour migrants tend to have a highly positive fiscal position initially which then tends to decline over time. In contrast, humanitarian migrants have a highly negative fiscal position initially which then tends to improve over time (see also Sarvimäki, 2011, who finds evidence of such convergence for Finland).

Table 3.1. **Estimated net impact of immigration on the Australian Government Budget, by visa category, 2010-11**

Entry category	Visa grants in 2010-11	Net fiscal impact (AUD million)				
		Period of settlement in Australia (years)				
		1	2	3	10	20
Family	54 543	212	60	43	201	146
Labour (including accompanying family)	113 725	747	839	915	1 033	1 154
Humanitarian	13 799	-247	-69	-62	-12	48
Total permanent	182 067	712	829	896	1 221	1 349
Temporary Labour (business long stay)	90 120	889	955	383	441	586

Source: Adapted from Cully (2011).

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net fiscal impact of a migrant-headed household in California was more than three times as large as for an average migrant-headed household in New Jersey. The authors argued that the main reason for the large differences between New Jersey and California came from differences in their respective immigrant populations. Immigrant households in California tended to be less skilled and to have lower income and more children compared with their New Jersey counterparts.

The negative impact has not primarily been driven by higher welfare dependency but by lower tax contributions of immigrant households. Likewise, most studies for European OECD countries which looked at welfare dependency found only a modest overrepresentation of immigrants, if any – in contrast to public opinion which often assumed a much stronger overrepresentation (see e.g. Fertig and Schmidt, 2001 on Germany; and Sheldon, 2007 on Switzerland).

The “New Americans” study also stressed that the results differed with respect to the region of origin, with positive contributions by European and Canadian households, and a negative impact by Latin American households. A latter study by Garvey, Espenshade and Scully (2002), based on the previous estimates and data for New Jersey, challenged these results and demonstrated that the discrepancies were due to different socio-economic characteristics rather than country-of-origin effects.

Whereas the studies for the United States tend to show a negative fiscal impact, the analyses for Australia, and New Zealand generally suggest a positive impact. For New Zealand, Slack et al. (2007) found that the resident foreign-born population provided a positive net fiscal contribution of NZD 3 288 million for the fiscal year 2005/06, based on the difference between direct fiscal revenues (income taxes, VAT, and excise duties) and direct fiscal expenditures for transfer payments (education, health, benefits, etc.). The net contribution of migrants was positive regardless of length of stay, region of residence and region of origin.

For Canada, Grubel (2005) found for the immigrant cohort that entered in 1990 a negative net fiscal contribution of CAD 6 294 in 2000 for each immigrant; a later study by Grubel and Grady (2011) arrived at similar results for the migrants who entered between 1987 and 2004 (a net burden of CAD 6 051; or about 1.5% of GDP in the fiscal year 2005/06). However, Javdani and Pendakur (2011) challenged these findings, demonstrating that with a more precise accounting and somewhat more realistic assumptions one can drastically alter the results by Grubel and Grady (2011). Their estimate is a negative net contribution of about CAD 450 per migrant.²²

In Europe, specific attention has been paid to the fiscal impact in the Nordic welfare states. For Denmark, Wadensjö (2000) estimates a total net negative fiscal impact of immigrants and their children of 0.7% of GDP, with important differences in terms of impact per capita by country of origin (immigrants from higher-income countries provide a positive contribution) and generation (the impact of the children of immigrants is slightly positive). More recent studies on Denmark (Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2006; Wadensjö, 2007) obtained similar results.

Ekberg (1999) analysed the situation in Sweden, applying a *pro rata* approach to all untargeted government expenditures and attributing also part of the costs for defence, public administration and the rural road system to immigrants. Using 1994 as reference year – a year that just followed a severe recession which hit immigrants’ labour market outcomes particularly hard – he estimates that there was a negative net fiscal impact in the order of 2% of GDP.

This relatively large impact suggests that the reference year may matter a lot. Indeed, studies in the United Kingdom have shown a strong impact of the business cycle on immigrants' net fiscal impact. Gott and Johnston (2002) found that in 1999/2000, in a favourable economic environment, immigrant households were net contributors to the public purse, adding a net of 0.3% of GDP. A latter study by Sriskandarajah et al. (2005) estimated a small negative net fiscal contribution of GBP -0.4 billion for 2003/04, when economic conditions were somewhat less favourable. More generally, they found that immigrants tend to be net contributors in upturns but net beneficiaries during downturns. It thus seems that the fiscal impact of immigrants is more sensitive to the business cycle than that of the native-born, which is undoubtedly linked with the observed higher variation of immigrants' employment with economic conditions (see also the following section and OECD, 2009). Rowthorn (2008) provided a full range of alternative estimates, including cyclical adjustments, and found that the fiscal impact varied between -0.7% and +0.7% of GDP, depending on the assumptions made and the business cycle.

There have also been a number of studies for the Southern European countries which had significant labour migration prior to the recent crisis. As part of an extensive study on the broader economic impact of immigration in Spain, the Economic Bureau of the President (Oficina Economica, 2006) estimated that in 2005, immigrants provided a net fiscal benefit of 0.5% of GDP.

Table 3.2 summarises the main findings of those accounting studies from OECD countries that cover the entire immigrant population and thus allow providing estimates in terms of GDP impact.

Accounting-type methods can, in principle, also be applied to a study of the fiscal impact of emigration on origin countries. However, in addition to a study of the impact in destination countries, counterfactual assumptions on the labour market outcomes of emigrants, had they not migrated, are also needed. Box 3.2 provides an overview of the issues involved in measuring the fiscal impact of emigration on origin countries.


A number of studies have not looked at the fiscal impact of immigration *per se*, but rather into immigrants' use of social benefits. Most studies, such as Barrett and Maître (2011) for the EU countries, find little evidence that immigrants are more dependent on social benefits, if all components (social assistance, unemployment, disability, etc.) are considered (see also Boeri, 2010). Nevertheless, there are significant differences across countries. In the Scandinavian countries, which have longstanding immigrant populations, many of whom arrived on humanitarian grounds, most studies found that immigrants are more likely to take up social benefits (e.g. Ekberg, 2006). In the Southern European countries with a more recent migration history and large-scale labour migration, such as Spain and Italy, most studies find that immigrants are less likely to take-up welfare services (e.g. Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón, 2009 for Spain and Rizza and Romanelli, 2010 on Italy) – at least prior to the crisis. A similar result was found in a recent in-depth study for Portugal (Peixoto, Marçalo and Tolentino, 2011). For Germany, Fertig and Schmidt (2001) confront actual differences in benefit take-up with public perceptions of the take-up and find that the latter largely overestimates actual take-up. Boeri (2010) reaches a similar conclusion in his comparative study for foreigners in a number of European OECD countries.

The accounting exercises summarised above provide estimates for the direct fiscal impact in a given year. This approach neither accounts for the longer-term fiscal consequences of immigration, nor for the indirect effects arising from the impact of immigration on the

Table 3.2. Comparison of selected static accounting exercises

	Reference year	Authors	Definition of "Immigrants"	Non-direct government spending and revenue	Net fiscal impact as % of GDP
Denmark	1997	Wadensjö (2000)	Foreign-born and native-born offspring with at least one immigrant parent	Partial attribution, except defence and some small items	-0.7
France	2005	Chojnicki et al. (2010)	Foreign-born	Not considered	+0.8
Germany	1997	Loeffelholz et al. (2004)	Foreign-born and native-born offspring (excluding ethnic migrants)	Not considered	+1.0
New Zealand	2005/06	Slack et al. (2007)	Foreign-born	Not considered	+2.1
Spain	2005	Oficina Economica (2006)	Foreign-born	Most expenditure attributed <i>pro rata</i>	+0.5
Sweden	1994	Ekberg (1999)	Foreign-born	Partial attribution, including defence	-2.0
United Kingdom	1999/2000	Gott and Johnson (2002)	Foreign-born households	<i>Pro rata</i> , including corporate taxes	+0.3
United Kingdom	2003/04	Sriskandarajah et al. (2005)	Foreign-born households	<i>Pro rata</i> , corporate taxes estimated	0
United Kingdom	2003/04	Rowthorn (2008), <i>unfavourable scenario</i>	Foreign-born and native-born children with two immigrant parents	All government spending <i>pro rata</i> , integration-related expenditures exclusively attributed to migrants; assumption of additional burden on health system	-0.7
United Kingdom	2003/04	Rowthorn (2008), <i>favourable scenario</i>	Foreign-born and dependent offspring	Defence not attributed; favourable economic situation	+0.7

Note: The table includes only accounting studies which are methodologically similar and which do not focus on specific sub-groups.

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economy at large. The first shortcoming is addressed by dynamic studies, which can be broadly classified into two groups, net transfer profile-based projections and Generational Accounting.²³ Indirect effects are studied through macroeconomic models. These different approaches are now discussed in turn.

Dynamic modelling

Net-transfer profiles. The general idea of so-called lifecycle *net-transfer profiles* is to expand the static accounting exercise over time by projecting the net fiscal impact of immigrants and their descendents in the coming years and decades. The studies are based on projections of the evolution of annual net fiscal balances and generally aim at calculating the *net present value* (NPV), in terms of the net fiscal contribution of an additional immigrant.

For that purpose, in a first step, the net fiscal contribution is calculated for each immigrant group under consideration, depending on age and other variables of interest, such as gender, educational attainment, and country of origin. The underlying estimations and attributions of contributions and receipts are akin to the static accounting exercises. Based on these estimates, so-called *net-transfer profiles* are constructed for the various immigrant groups over their lifecycle that provide for every age the respective net fiscal impact.

Box 3.2. The fiscal impact of emigration on origin countries

While measuring the fiscal impact of immigration on destination countries is already far from straightforward, measuring the fiscal impact of emigration on origin countries poses a number of additional challenges. First, the fiscal impact greatly depends on the size and use of remittances, part of which is through informal channels and thus not officially recorded. Second, one needs information on the size and composition of the emigrant population, which requires data from destination countries. Although basic information on the characteristics of the emigrant population is available through the OECD's database on immigrants in OECD and non-OECD countries (DIOC-E) for most destination countries for up to 2005/06, these data are not compiled at the household level. It is thus not possible to have an idea of the family composition of the emigrant population, although this will greatly influence the assessment of the fiscal impact. Third, to get an appropriate picture of the fiscal impact, one has to make a large number of counterfactual assumptions about the income and expenditure pattern, as well as social transfers, if the migrants had stayed in the origin country. Finally, information on the tax and benefit system is often only partially available for origin countries.

Given these challenges, the few available studies on origin countries either focus only on specific groups of emigrants for whom more detailed information is available or do not aim at estimating the fiscal impact through accounting-type exercises and instead base them on general-equilibrium models that model first the impact of emigration on the labour and capital markets of the origin country and use, in a second step, additional information on income, tax revenues and household expenditure. Using the latter technique, Campos-Vazquez and Sobarzo (2012) provide alternative scenarios for the fiscal impact of emigration from Mexico. The estimates have a very large range, from a decline in net tax revenues by 3 percentage points to an increase by more than 7 percentage points. The latter would imply a positive net fiscal impact in terms of GDP of about 1.3 percentage points (the difference between the impact measurement in terms of revenue and GDP tends to be larger in lower-income countries due to generally smaller tax revenue as a percentage of GDP). A crucial element in the estimates is the use of remittances, which make up about 2.5% of GDP in Mexico. The latter scenario assumes that all remittances are invested. The results thus provide an indication of the rough magnitude of the possible effect rather than answering the question of whether or not the impact is positive.

The most precise study to date is probably the one by Desai et al. (2009) who estimated the fiscal impact of Indian emigration to the United States. They used census data from the United States on the characteristics of the Indian emigrant population and linked this with survey data on earnings from India and a comprehensive model of the Indian fiscal system. The authors find that the emigration of Indians to the United States, a large part of whom are highly educated, has resulted in a net fiscal loss of up to 0.5% of India's GDP.

The only internationally comparative empirical work on the fiscal impact on origin countries is a recent study by Gibson and McKenzie (2012). The authors use survey data on a sample of top achievers in upper secondary education from five countries with significant emigration (Ghana, Micronesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga), who are followed over time and space. They estimate that, for this selective group of students, there is an annual fiscal loss for origin countries which ranges from about USD 500 in Micronesia to USD 17 000 in Papua New Guinea. These large differences are mainly driven by the different progressiveness of the tax systems and the scale and scope of government expenditure.

In a second step, based on these profiles as well as demographic and economic projections for a specific time horizon in the long term (generally 2050 or 2100), the net fiscal balances of the immigrant group under consideration is estimated. Generally, the future cash flows are discounted back to the base year using a selected discount rate so as to obtain an NPV for each immigrant.

A key element in the projections is age-expenditure profiles, which can be grouped into three broad phases. A *childhood phase* characterised by the receipt of transfers (predominately education and some social security expenses) and the absence of contributions; a *working-age phase* in which, depending on labour market performance, people generally contribute far more (personal taxes and social security contributions) than they receive in government spending and social security benefits; and a *retirement phase* during which contributions are limited (no labour income and payroll taxes, only taxes on wealth and excise duties), but benefits are significant (pensions and, especially towards the end of the life-cycle, health care costs).

Comprehensive studies of this kind require extensive data and a careful handling of assumptions and projections. Lee and Miller (1997) did pioneering work in this area within the “New Americans” study. In their estimates, the fiscal impact is highly dependent on the educational attainment of immigrants. Taking the expected fiscal profile of the new entrants of the mid-1990s, only the tertiary-educated immigrants had a positive NPV by themselves. On average, a typical immigrant caused a net fiscal loss of USD 3 000.²⁴ However, including also the descendents of immigrants, the picture changes dramatically. Based on estimates of the integration outcomes of the native-born offspring of immigrants, the authors find that regardless of the parents’ educational attainment, the descendents will tend to provide a strongly positive fiscal contribution. As a result, the average new arrival does not cause a small fiscal burden but rather a significant fiscal gain of USD 80 000 in present value terms.²⁵

The results depend not only on educational attainment but also on age of arrival. For a 21-year old with a high-school diploma, the NPV is USD 126 000. This value then gradually declines and, for those arriving after their mid-thirties, turns negative. For immigrants with low education at age 21, the NPV is only USD 9 000 and turns soon negative for elder ages of arrival. Cully (2012) contrasts the example of a 15-year old refugee and a forty year old skilled migrant worker. Under a direct accounting approach, the skilled migrant worker clearly yields the larger fiscal benefit. The answer is less clear-cut in terms of the net present value of the fiscal contribution over their expected life cycle. Refugees tend to be younger and tend to have a full working life ahead, while many skilled workers are already half way through their working life.

Ekberg (2011) uses dynamic projections and baseline scenarios for population forecasts to obtain estimates for the net impact of the predicted future immigration to Sweden. He simulates two different labour market scenarios. In the first case, newly arriving immigrants have the same age-specific employment rates as the overall Swedish population. In the second case, he assumes age-specific employment rates equal to those of the Swedish foreign-born population. He also provides estimates separately for full and partial *pro rata* attribution of general public expenditure, thus resulting in four different scenarios in total. By 2050, the fiscal impact of future immigration would vary from -1.6% to +1.3% of GDP, depending on the scenario.

Roodenburg et al. (2003) apply net-transfer profile-based inference techniques for the Netherlands. They find that an immigrant child from a lower-income country arriving just after birth has a negative lifetime fiscal impact of EUR 96 000; this value is reduced by about half if the age at arrival is 25. These unfavourable results are largely driven by the attribution of non-direct expenditures. The authors attribute all expenditures that cannot be attributed on an individual basis, including defence, *pro rata*. Assuming such expenditures to be zero, one would instead obtain for the latter group a positive NPV of about EUR 45 000. For Germany, Bonin, Raffelhüschen and Walliser (2000), who only look at the net direct fiscal impact, arrive at much more favourable figures. In their estimates, contributions are positive for all immigrants arriving between the age of 12 and 46, with a maximum reached for an age of arrival of 30.

An important factor in the analysis of the life-cycle contribution of immigrants is return migration. Not all social benefits are fully transferable, making return beneficial for the host country. However, for those benefits which are, consumption abroad will limit the fiscal impact via foregone consumption taxes, etc. for the host country. Kirdar (2010) adjusts for this and contrasts a model of selective return migration with one of a *pro rata* return. He finds, in a study for Germany, that a precise modelling of return migration leads to a more positive lifetime contribution of immigrants; the magnitude of the effect varies, however, strongly with age at entry and country-of-origin.

Generational accounting. Generational Accounting (GA) focuses on the *intertemporal distribution* of public debt, that is, to which degree different generations contribute to finance government expenditure and thus subsidise each other (Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1991, 1994). Generational Accounting is intrinsically a measurement of fiscal sustainability that assesses not only the actual level of debt but also includes implicit payment obligations, such as pensions (see Box 3.3).

A fundamental assumption of GA is that every deficit needs ultimately to be paid for by resident taxpayers. The burden imposed on future generations is the difference between the projected present value of all government expenditure and the present value of the tax payments of all living generations. Not surprisingly, most generational accounts yield an imbalance with a higher burden on future generations.²⁶

Generational Accounting rests on numerous assumptions and projections, including demographic projections, tax and transfer profiles for different demographic groups and cohorts over their life-cycle, projections for economic growth and government consumption and assumptions about the government's discount rate. In addition, assumptions have to be made on how spending on publicly provided goods such as defence grows with population. It is thus a complex endeavour to deduce the fiscal impact of additional migration using GA methods that, in addition, are very dependent on the scenario of fiscal adjustment, i.e. how the generational imbalance will be addressed.²⁷

In the context of the fiscal impact of immigration, this technique is used to study the effect of migration on the future tax payments of the native-born population and how the effect of immigration on the public budget changes with different scenarios of fiscal adjustment. The first major study in this context was by Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999).²⁸ They set up different generational accounts for native- and foreign-born populations and simulate a scenario in which no additional immigration takes place after 2000. The authors find that the impact of immigration on intergenerational accounts is not large. Both the size and the sign of the effect depends on the extent to which the fiscal imbalance will be

Box 3.3. Immigration and the pension system

Intergenerational imbalances are largely driven by the implicit debt arising from payment obligations inside the social security system; and pensions are a major source of expected future increases in expenditure in most OECD countries (see e.g. Roseveare et al., 1996; OECD, 2011b).

Sinn (1997), in a discussion about a possible transition from the current pay-as-you-go to a partially funded pension system in Germany, calculates the net present value of contributions of additional members, such as more children or more immigrants, inside the current system, departing from an overlapping generations model, considering also the impact of immigrant offspring. For every additional native-born child, he finds a positive net present value of EUR 35 000. For immigrants, there are two important differences. First, new arrivals tend to be in working age and thus could, at least in principle, contribute immediately, leading to a lower discount of their contributions. Moreover, immigrants tend to have a higher fertility rate. Sinn accounts for these factors and models convergence of immigrants' labour market outcomes. He then arrives at a net present value in terms of pension contributions of about EUR 175 000 for immigrants arriving during working age.

Munz and Werding (2003) provide simulations for the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany in a pension model. They incorporate information on immigrant characteristics and focus on the differences between the German defined-benefit and the Italian notionally-defined-contribution* model compared with the Beveridgean approach with flat-rate pensions in the United Kingdom and the United States. They assume that the initial skill composition of arrivals only matters for immigrants themselves and that immigrant offspring share the characteristics of the native-born. They find, for an additional immigrant, net present values arising from contributions to the pension system of EUR 152 000 (Germany), EUR 140 000 (Italy); EUR 139 000 (United Kingdom) and EUR 109 000 (United States). They simulate the effect of 50% higher migration on pension expenditure and find, not surprisingly, that the potential gains from immigration tend to be higher in a defined-benefit system. For Germany, for instance, this would translate into a reduction in public expenditure for pensions (net of contributions) in the vicinity of 1% of GDP by 2050 (Italy: 0.3%; United States: 0.5%).

Using the example of Spain, Grenno (2009) shows that although large-scale immigration – such as the one experienced by Spain prior to the economic crisis – does not provide a long-term solution to the pension problem, it tends to delay its emergence if immigrants are well integrated into the labour market. In his model, a combination of selective migration policy, an increase in the statutory age of retirement and slower growth of pensions will be needed to guarantee long-term sustainability of the current pension system.

* In a defined-benefit system, the pension level is determined by the employee's working history, age and years of contribution; in a notionally-defined-contribution system, the contributions are accumulated on a "fictional" interest-paying account which later determines the pension claim (see e.g. Börsch-Supan, 2005).


passed on to the future generations.²⁹ The key, albeit not surprising, finding is that the fiscal impact of immigration – be it positive or negative – is exacerbated by unsustainable fiscal regimes.

In contrast to the approach above, most GA studies for European OECD countries simulate, as a first step, a baseline case with the current demographic and economic projections and "business-as-usual" assumptions concerning the influx of new immigrants (Table 3.3). They then calculate, extrapolating the current fiscal setting, the required tax

Table 3.3. **Changes in taxes required for fiscal sustainability and the estimated impact of immigration in European countries**

	All burden on future generations	Taxes raised immediately
EU (Fehr et al., 2004)		
Base case	+27.0 percentage points	
Double immigration	+24.6 percentage points	
Italy (Moscarola, 2001)		
Zero immigration (%)	24.8	
50 000 immigrants p.a. (%)	20.2	
Germany (Bonin et al., 2000)		
Zero immigration	+ USD 203 200 lifetime tax bill	
200 000 immigrants p.a.	+ USD 135 000 lifetime tax bill	
Spain (Collado et al., 2004)		
Zero immigration (%)	47.8	8.8
60 000 immigrants p.a. (%)	34.5	7.9
Austria (Mayr, 2004)		
Base case (%)	71.2	14.5
Additional 10 000 immigrants p.a. (%)	65.6	13.8

Source: Adapted from Rowthorn (2008).

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increases for future generations or, assuming a shift towards sustainable fiscal policy, the necessary tax increases if the tax reform is conducted immediately. In order to assess potential gains from immigration, these steps are repeated for different migration inflow scenarios.

Bonin, Raffelhüschen and Walliser (2000) find for Germany that an annual net influx of 200 000 immigrants reduces the present value of lifetime taxes on the native-born by more than USD 68 000 per capita. Studies for Spain (Collado et al., 2004) and Austria (Mayr, 2005) computed Generational Accounts under the scenario of an immediate tax increase and found that the positive fiscal effect is mainly driven by distributing the previously accumulated debt among a larger future population.³⁰

Most GA studies thus find a more positive impact of migration on public finances than other techniques (see also Razin and Sadka, 2004). Chojnicki et al. (2010) apply a GA technique for France under different immigration scenarios and contrast the findings with other methods. They find that the average life-cycle contribution of the immigrant population resident in France in 2005 is negative (about EUR -8 700) and much lower than that of the native-born (which is about EUR 28 210). However, because of the age structure of immigrant population, immigrants' net contribution is positive in 2005. The global impact of immigration on public finances in the GA framework is also slightly positive in the long term due to the arrival of individuals of working age and the net contribution of the descendants of these immigrants. Nevertheless, the impact of immigration on re-balancing public finances is small.

The assumption that the entire burden can be shifted on to future generations is increasingly challenged. Rowthorn (2008), for example, considers the extreme scenario of unchanged fiscal policies and shifting the entire burden to the future generations – government debt would increase drastically and interest rates would escalate. In his model, financial markets set limits to debt accumulation and thus also limit the possibilities of shifting the burden to future generations. If the positive effect of immigration primarily comes from decreasing the average per capita debt burden for

members of future generations, then of course boundaries to debt accumulation also limit the positive fiscal impact of immigration in generational accounts.

Macroeconomic models

As mentioned before, immigration leads to many possible effects on the economy which in turn have implications for the government budget. These effects are generally studied through Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. CGE models are standard tools used in economics in order to estimate how an economy might react to policy changes or to any other shock, such as immigration flows. Estimates of the fiscal effect are often a by-product of these studies. Regarding the fiscal effect, such models are generally used to estimate the expected impact of an additional inflow of immigrants on the budget in the future.

Chojnicki et al. (2011) look at the post-war immigration to the United States (1945-2000) and use a CGE model to analyse the impact of immigration on social expenditure and the public budget. They find that immigration had a large and positive impact on public finances. Although immigrants tended to be less skilled than the native-born and had higher welfare dependence, they also had a younger age structure and higher fertility rates. These demographic effects helped to reduce transfer payments that in the no-immigration scenario were caused by higher old-age dependency ratios. The authors estimate that the actual migration compared to the no-migration scenario helped to reduce the share of transfers in GDP by 0.3 percentage points.

A comprehensive CGE model has also been used to estimate the effect of various immigration scenarios on the New Zealand economy (Nana et al., 2009). Concerning the fiscal aspect, the authors estimate, in a scenario with doubling the immigrant intake, a net improvement in the government fiscal balance equivalent to 0.2% of the GDP.

In Denmark and Norway, the impact of immigration has been studied through general equilibrium models, in the framework of extensive studies on the future of the welfare state (Box 3.4).

Storesletten (2000) employs a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations for the United States that explicitly models differences between immigrants and native-born in terms of labour productivity and fertility. He focuses on the intergenerational distribution of debt, but in contrast to the GA studies discussed above, he does not assume that future generations have to pay for the current debt. His model assumes instead that the present value of all future government spending and transfers will equal the present value of all future taxes and contributions. Under this scenario, without any changes in migration, an immediate tax increase of 4.4 percentage points would be required. The same effect would be achieved by admitting an additional 1.6 million high-educated migrants aged 40-44. These provide a NPV of USD 177 000 each.³¹ In contrast, the average high-, medium-, and low-skilled (legal) immigrants exhibit NPVs of USD +96 000, -2 000, and -36 000, respectively.

Using a similar approach for Sweden, Storesletten (2003) finds a less favourable impact for that country. The average negative NPV arising from a typical immigrant and his family is about USD -20 500. In various sensitivity analyses, he finds that the lower labour market integration and economic assimilation of immigrants' offspring explain most of the difference between the NPVs obtained for Sweden and his earlier results for the United States.

Monso (2008) adapts Storesletten's Swedish study to the case of France and finds that the current composition of *new* entrants in France results in a net fiscal loss of about EUR 7 400 (USD 9 500) per immigrant, which would place France between Sweden and the

Box 3.4. Immigrants' fiscal impact and its implications for the future of the welfare state


Table 3.4 shows the results of alternative scenarios for Norway, on the basis of estimates by Holmøy and Strøm (2012). The impact of an additional migrant intake of 0.1% of the population per year is either positive or negative, depending on the region of origin. Region of origin is a proxy for migration category. Immigrants from high-income OECD countries, who generate a positive impact, have generally arrived for employment (plus family to labour migrants). In contrast, immigrants from lower-income countries have often arrived for humanitarian reasons (plus family to humanitarian migrants). In both cases, however, the effects on the public purse are modest. Potentially more important are deviations from the assumption that children of immigrants will be well integrated into the labour market.

Table 3.4. **Estimated effect of alternative population and integration scenarios on the primary government surplus in Norway, by year, in % of GDP**

	2020	2030	2040	2050	2070	2100
Children of immigrants from lower-income countries adopt the economic behaviour of their parents (rather than that of natives)	-0.1	-0.3	-0.5	-0.8	-1.0	-0.9
Births by native-born increased by 5 000 every year 2015-2100	-0.3	-0.7	-0.8	-0.4	0.7	0.3
Immigration from lower-income countries increased by 5 000 in every year 2015-2100	-0.2	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3

Note: High-income OECD countries refer to EU15, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Source: Data provided by Statistics Norway (see Holmøy and Strøm, 2012).

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Schou (2006) and Pedersen and Riishøj (2008), which are based on virtually the same scenarios, obtain similar results for Denmark. Even what the latter call hypothetical “super migrants” (participation rate of 100%, only working-age migrants who leave Denmark again before reaching retirement age) would only lead to a positive net contribution of less than +0.4% per year. In contrast, bringing the employment rate of the resident immigrant population up to the level of the native-born would result in a net fiscal gain of about 1.3% of GDP. The studies for both Denmark and Norway thus conclude that improving the labour market integration of already resident immigrants offers potentially higher fiscal gains than increasing the influx of new immigrants, even if the latter have favourable characteristics.

Ekberg (2011), in a study on the impact of future migration on the Swedish welfare system for the Swedish Ministry of Finance, also used population forecasts from Statistics Sweden as a baseline scenario. Although he does not use a general equilibrium model, his findings are quantitatively similar to those of the studies for Denmark and Norway – that is, under most scenarios and for most years, the impact is between +1% and -1% of GDP.

United States. However, the results are not directly comparable since unlike Storesletten, Monso neither assumes a sustainable fiscal regime nor does he add the contribution of immigrants' descendents to their parents.

In contrast to the above studies which are based on CGE, Dungan, Fang and Gunderson (2012) use a macroeconomic forecasting model to simulate the impact of additional migration flows on the Canadian economy. They find a positive impact on overall government balances. 100 000 additional immigrants would generate a total net fiscal benefit of about CAD 14 billion.³²


Summary of the results from the literature

To summarise the review of the literature, there are many different ways to measure the fiscal impact of immigration and all methods and approaches rely heavily on debatable assumptions and modelling choices that can significantly change the results.

Nevertheless, some general tendencies from the literature seem to hold across most OECD countries (see Table 3.5).³³ The fiscal effect is generally rather small. Depending on the method used, the assumptions made – in particular regarding immigrants’ impact on budget items such as defence and public infrastructure – as well the economic and fiscal context and the characteristics of the immigrant population, the impact generally fluctuates around $\pm 1\%$ of GDP in most studies that look at the fiscal impact of the resident population in any given year. The labour market situation for immigrants matters a lot, and countries with significant intakes of skilled labour migrants such as New Zealand or Australia enjoy larger fiscal gains from immigration than countries where immigration has largely consisted of family and humanitarian migration.

Table 3.5. **Overview of the empirical literature**

Static accounting calculations	Dynamic models		Macroeconomic models	Use of social security
	Net Present Value	Generational Accounting		
CAN, CHE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FRA, GBR, NZL, SWE, USA, EU	AUS, DNK, FRA, SWE, USA, EU	AUT, AUS, DEU, ESP, FRA, GBR, ITA, NLD, USA	CAN, DNK, FRA, NOR, NZL, USA, EU	AUT, AUS, CHE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FRA, GBR, ISR, IRL, ITA, NLD, NZL, SWE, USA, EU
<i>Sign of immigrants' net contribution varies, but generally the net contribution is small</i>			<i>Immigrants tend to be somewhat overrepresented among recipients</i>	

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823605>

Equally important is the age at arrival; generally, the more potential working, and thus contributing, years are still to come, the higher is the net fiscal impact. Positive effects of working-age immigrants generally result from host-country savings in education expenditure. Immigrants’ higher fertility also helps to reduce the impact of population ageing, which can have an important impact in the long run, particularly in generous pay-as-you-go pension systems. The fiscal impact of the children of immigrants largely depends on assumptions regarding their labour market integration.

Assumptions about the sustainability of the current fiscal regime are also important. If the current government debt is entirely passed on to the next generation, additional taxpayers can potentially reduce the inherited burden on a per capita basis if immigrants are net contributors; or enhance it further if immigrants are a net burden. Immigrant’s offspring, in turn, will always reduce if they are akin to other native-born.

Apart from Australia, which uses a developed fiscal impact model as a support for decision-making in migration issues, there has been little study of the impact of specific categories of migrants (i.e. labour, family, humanitarian). This is particularly unfortunate in simulation studies that look at the impact of admitting a certain number of additional migrants. The scarce direct and generally indirect (through country-of-origin) evidence on the fiscal impact by migration category suggests that labour migrants tend to have a positive fiscal impact, particularly those who have post-secondary education.

Comparative analysis of the fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries

Measuring the fiscal impact of immigration in international comparison

This section aims at analysing the fiscal impact of immigration in an international comparison. This involves a number of challenges. The first is the large heterogeneity of migrant populations across countries, notably regarding the different composition in terms of migrant entry category (labour, family humanitarian) and immigrants' socio-demographic characteristics. The second is the diversity of tax and benefit systems in OECD countries, which makes an exact modelling of the direct fiscal impact for many countries a challenging task, in particular for those items not included in standard household income and expenditure surveys. Annex 3.A3 to this document provides a detailed description of the information used and the assumptions and adjustments made.

These challenges make it evident that international comparisons in this domain can only supplement in-depth country studies. Nevertheless, by highlighting cross-country differences and commonalities in a common analytical framework, some additional light can be shed on the drivers of the fiscal impact and ballpark estimates made of its likely magnitude.

Data and approach

The fiscal impact of immigration is estimated by comparing immigrants' tax and social security contributions, on the one hand, and immigrants' receipt of social transfers and use of government services, on the other, at a specific point of time, through a static accounting (cash-flow) model. Hence, the analysis below does not look at the long-term fiscal implications and also neglects the indirect implications resulting from migrants' broader impact on the economy. It is important to keep in mind that this approach – as with any accounting-type exercise on immigrants' current fiscal impact – measures the impact of the immigrant population that has emerged over the past few decades and thus not of current immigration flows.

The comparative analytical work in this section builds on household surveys in OECD countries which have data on fiscal transfers at the household level, as well as data on the surveyed persons' country of birth. Such surveys obtain information for all European OECD countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the United States. For the European OECD countries, except Switzerland, the EU Survey of Living and Income Conditions (EU-SILC) has rich information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the household members, including country of birth, as well as on income taxes, social security contributions (including from employers), and social benefits received at the household level. Comparable national datasets have been used for Australia (Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Australia Survey, HILDA), Canada (Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, SLID), Switzerland (Swiss Household Panel, SHP) and the United States (Current Population Survey, CPS). Altogether, the analysis includes 27 OECD countries which, taken together, host about 92% of all immigrants in the OECD.

Data were pooled over the years 2007–09, and generally refer to reported income and expenditure in the previous year. The results thus relate to a rather favourable economic environment, with the exception of Ireland which saw a decline in GDP of 3% already in 2008 (see Box 3.6 on the impact of the crisis). To ensure cross-country comparability of the results, all estimates are expressed into a single currency (EUR) and adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).

The household surveys cover the resident population. They thus exclude migrants who have returned to their origin countries and may, for example, have received pensions from the host country. They also do not generally include immigrants with less than a year of residence, since they cannot report on the previous year's income and taxes in the host country.³⁴ Therefore, many temporary labour migrants tend to be excluded, and this is a group who will generally have a favourable fiscal position as they are in employment.

The degree to which these surveys cover immigrants in an irregular situation varies. Most European OECD countries draw their sample from population registers; immigrants in an irregular situation will thus only be included in as far as they are included in these registers, which in turn varies across countries. In the United States, where the irregular immigrant population is large, the CPS is designed so as to include irregular migrants.³⁵


In these surveys, two household heads are identified – except of course for single-person or single-parent households. Households in which both household heads are foreign-born are referred to below as “households with only immigrant household heads”. There is also a significant number of households in which only one of the two household heads is foreign-born. On average, about one out of four immigrants in working-age live in such households, which are referred to below as “mixed” households.

Results

Net (direct) fiscal position of immigrant households

Looking at the net direct fiscal position of immigrant households – that is, their taxes and social security contributions minus the social transfers they receive – several observations can be made (Figure 3.2).³⁶ First, there is wide variation in migrants' fiscal position, but in most countries it is positive. Net contributions are only negative in a number of eastern European countries with small immigrant populations, as well as in Germany,

Figure 3.2. **Average net direct fiscal contribution of households by migration status of the household head, 2007-09 average**



Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822940>

France and Ireland. In these latter countries, with the exception of Ireland, immigrant populations are relatively old and thus overrepresented among the population receiving pensions (see below). In Ireland, the negative net contribution holds for both immigrant and native-born households and is partly driven by the early impact of the crisis.³⁷

A second observation is that in most OECD countries, the net fiscal position of immigrant households is below that of the native-born. Nevertheless, the reverse holds in a number of countries, in particular in the Southern European countries of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, as well as in Ireland. In all of these countries, a large part of the resident migrant population consists of recent labour migrants. Immigrant households also have a better fiscal position than the native-born in Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Hungary. In all of these countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, immigrants have an employment rate that is above that of the native-born.

Finally, in virtually all countries, the “mixed” households have a highly positive net fiscal position, which in most cases is also well above that of the native-born. This result is at first sight surprising but is mainly due to the fact that, by definition, these households have at least two adults in the household. In addition, most of these households are working-age couples, which is the age at which individuals contribute most to the tax system. In order to account for these “mixed households” in the analysis below, they are attributed half to immigrant and half to native-born households.³⁸

The above findings on the net fiscal position relate to the foreign-born. Much of the research to date has instead been based on foreign nationals. However, the main results also broadly hold when looking at foreign nationals – rather than foreign-born – as household heads (Box 3.5).

As already mentioned, the data essentially refer to the pre-crisis period. Some data are already available for the early crisis period. On the basis of these results, Box 3.6 discusses how the global economic crisis affected immigrants’ fiscal contributions. In its early stage, and on average across the countries for which data are available, the crisis resulted in a 20% reduction of immigrants’ net contribution, about the same as for the native-born.

Explaining the differential net direct fiscal position of immigrant and native-born households

Figure 3.5 shows, for households in which at least one member is of working age, to which degree the differences in the net direct fiscal position between immigrant and native-born households is due to key characteristics that differ between both groups; Figure 3.A1.2 shows the full results for all observable characteristics and the difference after accounting for all these characteristics taken together. The technique used decomposes the observed difference by isolating the impact of specific control variables, namely age, education, family characteristics and labour market status.


The explanatory power of differences in age and educational attainment of the household head tends to be small in most countries.³⁹ Among the exceptions are the United States and France, where a higher proportion of immigrants is low-educated, as well as some Central and Eastern European Countries with rather small immigrant populations, such as Poland and Hungary. In France, half of the unfavourable gap for immigrant households is explained by age and educational attainment of the household head. In the United States, the unfavourable differences in net contributions would virtually disappear if both groups had the same age and education. In contrast, the positive fiscal position of

Box 3.5. Comparing the fiscal impact of the foreign-born and foreign nationals

As mentioned above, given the strong cross-country differences in citizenship legislation, for international comparisons it is better to use the *country of birth* instead of *citizenship* as the basis for the analysis of the fiscal impact of migrants. Indeed, for Australia and Canada, data on foreign nationals are not available.

That notwithstanding, much of the public debate in many European OECD countries focuses on foreigners rather than the foreign-born. In addition, some rights are linked with citizenship, and this may affect the fiscal position. How does the fiscal impact of foreigners compare with that of the foreign-born in international comparison? In most countries, there are few differences between these two groups, but on average foreign households have higher net direct contributions than foreign-born households (Figure 3.3). This also holds for foreign-born households from lower-income countries versus households with foreign nationality from the same type of countries. Likewise, when comparing the outcomes of naturalised versus non-naturalised foreign-born (see Figure 3.A1.1), one observes that in virtually all countries non-naturalised immigrant households have a more favourable fiscal position. These findings are at first surprising given the fact that access to citizenship tends to be selective – that is, immigrants who have taken up host-country citizenship generally have higher education and employment rates than their counterparts who remained foreigners. However, the most disfavoured migrants are most likely to take up host-country citizenship, as this is the group that has most to gain from naturalisation (Liebig and von Haaren, 2011).

Figure 3.3. Net direct fiscal contribution of foreign and immigrant (foreign-born) households, 2007-09 average



Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822959>

Another possible explanation is that citizenship take-up takes some time. Indeed, foreign households tend to be younger and are less often in pension age than foreign-born households. This is particularly the case in the three countries in which the differences between the two groups are particularly large – Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany. In Germany, the unfavorable position of foreign-born naturalised is undoubtedly linked with the ethnic Germans [(Spät-)Aussiedler], many of whom are already in pension age. In addition, access to certain social benefits may be restricted for some groups of foreigners; indeed, the average amount of benefits paid to foreign households is about 25% lower than that paid to foreign-born households. Finally, data from the 2008 special migration module in the Labour Force Survey for the European OECD countries show that naturalised immigrants are more likely to be family migrants, and these in turn tend to have a less favourable fiscal position.


Box 3.6. The impact of the global economic crisis on immigrants' fiscal contribution

With the global economic crisis, millions of people lost their jobs and several of the hardest-hit countries had experienced large-scale migration flows prior to the crisis. Immigrants' were among the population groups that were hardest hit by the decline in employment.

How did the crisis affect immigrants' net fiscal contribution? Since the data in the surveys refer to the fiscal year preceding the survey year, the Figure 3.4 shows in effect the change between the fiscal contribution in 2006/7 and 2009. On average, the fiscal position of both immigrant and native-born households declined by about EUR 1 000, about 20% of the pre-crisis net contribution for both groups. This figure hides, however, significant cross-country differences. In Spain, Iceland and Greece – three countries which had experienced particularly large immigration flows prior to the crisis, and where immigrants were disproportionately hard hit in terms of loss of employment – immigrants' average net fiscal contribution also declined more strongly than it did among the native-born. The fiscal contribution of immigrants also declined a lot with the crisis in Belgium and Denmark, two countries with a strong social protection system. In some countries, immigrants' net contribution even increased with the crisis, and in Norway, Hungary, Austria and Sweden it increased much more than among the native-born. This somewhat surprising result depends on several factors, including an “added-worker effect” – that is, other family members of immigrants entering the labour market to compensate for the actual or potential loss of income of the main breadwinner. This effect is particularly visible in Austria, where the employment of immigrant women increased with the crisis. In addition, immigrants may not always have full access to the social protection system, for example because of their foreign nationality or because they have not (yet) paid sufficiently into the systems that are contributory. Indeed, a disaggregation into contributions and benefits shows that on average, immigrants' contributions developed unfavourably compared with the native-born over the period, whereas the reverse is the case for benefits.

Figure 3.4. Change in the net contribution for native-born and immigrant households, 2007/8 compared with 2010

EUR (PPP adjusted)




Note: For Ireland, the comparison is between 2009 and 2007-08 average.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932822978>

Figure 3.5. **Differences in the net direct fiscal contribution of immigrant and native-born households and the role of different characteristics, 2007-09**



Notes: Age and education refer to the household head; labour market status (employed versus not employed) to all household members in working age (15-64 years old). The analysis is restricted to households in which at least one member is of working age. The results have been obtained using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973); the regression also included controls for family characteristics. The full results are shown in Figure 3.A1.2. This technique decomposes the differentials in the net fiscal position into two components: i) a portion that arises because immigrant and native-born households have different characteristics on average (explained component); and ii) a portion that arises because one of the two groups has a more favourable net fiscal position than the other given the same individual characteristics and/or because differing characteristics (e.g. higher educational attainment) have a different impact on both groups (unexplained component).

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

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
immigrant households would decrease significantly in Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg, primarily because immigrants have a higher educational attainment on average than the native-born in these three countries. This is also the case in Australia and the United Kingdom. Finally, in established welfare states, such as Finland, Norway and Iceland, relatively minor differences in the educational composition between immigrant and native-born population can already have a rather significant effect in terms of net contributions.

By themselves, differences in age and education of the household head thus explain relatively little of the differences between the contributions of immigrant and native-born households in most countries, in spite of the fact that immigrants tend to have a lower educational attainment on average. In all countries except the United Kingdom, net contributions compare more favourably for the low-educated than for the high-educated immigrant households (see Figure 3.6). This is not surprising since the employment rates and wages of immigrants generally also increase less with educational attainment than among the native-born (see Figure 3.A1.3 and OECD, 2012).

Indeed, households with low-educated migrants have higher net contributions than comparable native-born households in the majority of countries. This is particularly the case in the countries which experienced significant recent inflows of low-educated labour migrants (Italy, Greece, Spain and the United States), and in Austria, Norway and Luxembourg. Indeed, the favourable position of low-educated immigrant households

Figure 3.6. **Difference in the net direct fiscal contribution between immigrant and native-born households, by education status of the household head, 2007-09 average**

EUR (PPP adjusted)



Note: "High-educated" refers to ISCED-Level 5 and above; "low-educated" to ISCED-Level 2 and below.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823016>

diminishes when restricting the analysis to the working-age population. On average, there is no difference between the fiscal position of low-educated immigrant and native-born households of working-age. In contrast, except in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Switzerland, high-educated migrant households have a lower net direct fiscal contribution than the high-educated native-born. This picture also holds broadly when restricting the analysis to the working-age population.


Note that this finding does not imply that immigrants' fiscal contribution does not increase with the education level. Indeed, as Figure 3.A1.4 shows, in all countries immigrants' net contribution increases with educational attainment. However, the increases are much smaller than those of the native-born in all countries – with the exceptions of Australia and the United Kingdom. The differences between immigrants and the native-born are particularly large in the countries which had a lot of recent labour migration for low-skilled jobs (Greece, Iceland, Italy, Spain) – many of which were filled by migrants with high formal education levels – and in countries where most highly-educated migrants come for other reasons than employment, such as humanitarian migrants in Austria, Denmark and Norway and ethnic migrants in Germany.

The most important explanatory factor in Figure 3.5 above is *employment* and indeed, this captures the effect that age would otherwise exert through the pension transfer system (see below on the age-transfer profiles and Tables 3.A1.1 and 3.A1.2). Immigrant/native differences in the likelihood to be employed explain about half of the less favourable fiscal

position of immigrant households compared with the native-born households. In France and Norway, immigrant households would even have a higher net contribution than native-born households if immigrants had the same probability to be in employment (in contrast to a lower relative position without considering this factor).⁴⁰ Employment also explains more than three quarters of the differences between immigrant and native-born households in Belgium, and up to half in Denmark and Austria.

This suggests that fiscal gains of raising immigrants' employment to that of the native-born, in countries where this is an issue, are potentially large. Figure 3.7 shows the estimated budget impact, in % of GDP, if immigrants had the same employment rate as the native-born.⁴¹ The estimated impact is particularly large in Belgium, where it reaches almost 1% of GDP, as well as in France and Sweden, where it is more than 0.5% of GDP.⁴² The budget implications are negative in countries where immigrants have higher employment rates than the native-born, such as in Luxembourg and – prior to the crisis – the Southern European countries and Ireland.

Figure 3.7. **Estimated net budget impact if immigrants had the same employment rate as the native-born, 2007-09 average**



Note: Indirect impact arises from estimated indirect tax payments.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823035>

In addition to the net direct fiscal impact of employment in terms of lower expenditure on social benefits and higher taxes and social security contributions, there is also an indirect effect arising from estimated higher indirect tax payments (that is, value-added tax). Nevertheless, this indirect impact is small in most countries.

Figure 3.A1.5A shows the simulation results if immigrant women had the same employment rates as native-born women. Differences in employment rates between immigrants and the native-born are larger for women than for men. As a result, on average, about two-thirds of the fiscal gain of bringing immigrants' employment levels to par with that of the native-born would come from immigrant women. The expected gains would be particularly large in Australia, the United States and a number of European OECD countries


with large and longstanding immigrant populations such as Belgium, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany. In all of these countries, family migration – including the accompanying family of labour migrants – is the largest component of migration flows, and this mainly concerns immigrant women.

As stressed in Figure 3.6 above, differences in net contribution levels between immigrants and the native-born are particularly large for the high-educated. This is partly attributable to the fact that immigrants have lower returns to their qualifications in terms of wages and partly because they are less likely to be employed when highly-educated than their native-born counterparts with the same education level. Figure 3.A1.5B indicates that the estimated fiscal loss associated with this latter factor may be already quite sizeable in many OECD countries. The expected gains from a convergence of the employment rates of the high-educated immigration to those of their native-born peers are large in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Sweden – all of which have hosted many humanitarian migrants who often have low employment rates despite having a tertiary degree (generally from their origin country). The gains would also be large in Australia, because a significant part of its population consists of highly-educated migrants.

Contributions and benefits compared

Looking separately at the contributions that migrants provide to the public purse and the transfers that they receive, one finds that differences in the net direct fiscal position of immigrant versus native-born households are driven by lower contributions (in form of taxes and social security contributions) rather than by higher benefit receipts (Figure 3.8).⁴³ Indeed, the differences in the benefits are negative on average – that is, immigrant households receive lower overall transfers than native-born households.⁴⁴ Note that this is

Figure 3.8. **Average differences between immigrant and native-born households regarding taxes/contributions and benefits, 2007-09 average**



Note: Pension contributions and expenditures have been excluded from the calculations.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823054>

not driven by lower pension payments to immigrant households, as pension contributions and payments have been excluded from the analysis. Including the pension system does not alter the results fundamentally.⁴⁵

Take-up of social benefits

Overall, there seem to be few differences between the benefit receipt of immigrant and native-born households. Table 3.6 shows the take-up of social transfers by immigrant households relative to their share in the population. As can be seen, with the exception of social assistance and housing allowances (which are often linked with social assistance), the receipt of social benefits generally does not vary a lot between immigrant and native-born households. However, on average, immigrant households are twice as likely to receive social assistance in the Nordic countries and more than three times in Belgium. Note though that, as Table 3.A1.5 shows, the sums involved in social assistance are relatively small overall. All of these countries have significant populations of humanitarian migrants and the incidence of unemployment among immigrants is more than twice as

Table 3.6. **Take-up of social benefits by immigrant relative to native-born households, 2007-09 average**

	Social assistance	Unemployment benefits	Pensions	Family allowances	Housing allowances
Australia	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.9	..
Austria	1.5	1.4	0.7	1.3	1.8
Belgium	8.7	1.5	0.6	1.3	1.5
Canada	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.2	..
Czech Republic	2.3	0.9	1.2	0.5	2.2
Denmark	..	1.3	0.4	1.7	1.5
Estonia	0.8	2.3	1.6	0.6	0.8
Finland	3.3	1.8	0.4	2.0	2.5
France	1.7	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.5
Germany	1.3	0.7	1.6	0.7	1.2
Greece	0.5	1.4	0.3	1.3	2.4
Hungary	-	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.4
Iceland	-	1.5	0.4	1.0	1.1
Ireland	1.5	1.2	0.3	1.3	0.7
Italy	2.2	1.3	0.2	1.1	3.1
Luxembourg	2.4	0.9	0.6	1.2	1.1
Netherlands	1.9	1.7	0.7	1.1	1.7
Norway	3.8	1.8	0.4	1.2	2.5
Poland	1.3	1.0	1.9	0.2	0.8
Portugal	-	0.9	0.3	1.1	0.6
Slovak Republic	0.9	-	1.4	0.6	-
Slovenia	1.4	1.3	0.9	1.0	2.4
Spain	1.1	1.2	0.3	1.4	1.1
Sweden	5.6	1.3	0.9	1.3	1.7
Switzerland	2.5	1.8	1.1	1.1	..
United Kingdom	1.3	1.1	0.7	1.1	1.4
United States	1.6	1.1	0.7	1.3	0.9
OECD average	2.0	1.3	0.8	1.1	1.5

Notes: The OECD average is the average of all countries in the table. Canada's social assistance includes the old-age security pension.

..: Means that the respective benefit does not exist or no data are available.

-: Means that the sample size is below the publication threshold.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823624>

high as among the native-born. Indeed, in most countries, unemployed immigrant households are less likely to receive unemployment benefits than unemployed native-born households, but more likely to receive social assistance.⁴⁶

There are a few exceptions to the overrepresentation of immigrant households among the recipients of social-assistance, namely the Southern European countries (except Italy and to a lesser degree Spain), where migration is rather recent and has mostly been for employment, and Australia.

Table 3.A1.3 shows the ratio of benefits paid to immigrant and native-born households. This can be compared with the take-up ratios in Table 3.6. As can be seen, the average sums paid out to recipient immigrant households in terms of social assistance, unemployment aid and pensions are below those paid to recipient native-born households. However, due to the higher take-up rates of immigrant households, on average over *all* households (i.e. including non-recipient households), immigrant households still tend to receive more in terms of social assistance and housing allowances (and, albeit only marginally, also in terms of unemployment benefits and family allowances) than the native-born.

The pension system

There are two social benefits among which immigrant households are underrepresented on average, namely disability and public pensions.⁴⁷ The latter are of particular relevance since they tend to be the single largest item of government expenditure, accounting for 17% of total government spending in OECD countries (OECD, 2011b).


Since in most countries immigrant households are less likely to receive pensions because they tend to be younger, excluding the pension system (that is, public pension contributions and expenditure) generally provides a less favourable picture in terms of differences between immigrant and native-born households (Figure 3.9). The positive differential impact of including the pension system on the fiscal position of immigrant versus native-born households is particularly large in the countries which had significant recent labour migration, such as the Southern European countries. It is also large in several other countries, including Luxembourg (where immigrants have a much higher employment rate than the native-born) and Austria (where pension expenditure is particularly high). In contrast, in Germany and in several Central and Eastern European OECD Countries, immigrant households are significantly overrepresented among the pension recipients. As a result, the fiscal position of immigrant versus native-born households improves in these countries when *excluding* the pension system.

Age-transfer profiles of immigrants and native-born


Although an internationally comparative analysis of the dynamic and long-term fiscal impact of immigration is beyond the scope of this chapter, the net direct fiscal impact by age of the household head can provide a rough idea of the expected net present value of future net direct fiscal contributions for given entry ages of newly arriving households.⁴⁸

Figure 3.A1.7 shows the results for a number of OECD countries. The estimated lifetime net present value of the direct fiscal impact of immigrant households varies a lot across countries, more than among the native-born. In general, the curve tends to be flatter than that of the native-born; immigrants' lower contributions during working-age are associated with lower pension payments during retirement. Note that these results do not

Figure 3.9. Differences in the average net direct contributions between immigrant and native-born households, 2007-09 average



Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823073>

take into account return migration, which tends to underestimate immigrants' life-cycle net contributions since immigrants who ultimately return to their origin countries do not necessarily pose the same burden on the public purse upon retirement as residents do.

In countries such as Australia, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, where a large proportion of migrants have come for employment, there are little differences in the estimated net present values of the age-specific transfer profiles between immigrant and native-born households. In contrast, in countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, which have large proportions of non-labour migrants, the differences between the two groups are large. Nevertheless, in all countries the estimated net present value of future net direct contributions is positive for migrants aged over 15 and stays positive until about the age of 40, in some countries even at higher ages.


Measuring the overall fiscal impact

The surveys on which this section's analysis is based provide only information on the direct monetary transfers from and to households; they do not contain any direct information on other budget components that will generally also vary on a person-by-person basis, such as expenditure on education, health and active labour market policy on the expenditure side and indirect taxes on the revenue side (see previous section). The omitted major items can be obtained, however, on an approximate basis from other sources. Differences in characteristics between immigrant and native-born households can be used to study a differential impact in these.⁴⁹

Figure 3.10 shows to which degree adjustments for indirect taxes, health and education expenditures will likely impact on the differences in the net fiscal position between immigrants and the native-born. In most countries, these adjustments make the fiscal position of immigrant households less favourable compared with native-born households but the effect is generally small. On the one hand, immigrants have on average a more favourable age-structure which results in a more favourable picture for health expenditures (on the basis of estimated age-specific public health expenditure profiles, see Annex 3.A3). This is more than offset, however, by higher estimated expenditures on education – due to the fact that they have more school-age children – and lower estimated payments of indirect tax due to lower disposable income.

Figure 3.10. Differences in the average net fiscal contribution of immigrant versus native-born households, before and after adjustments for indirect taxes and public services, 2007-09 average

EUR (PPP adjusted)



Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823092>

Considering all of these items, as well as accounting for estimated expenditure on active labour market policy, gives an overall fiscal impact in terms of GDP that is positive but small for most OECD countries (Table 3.7).⁵⁰


Table 3.7. Estimated net fiscal impact of immigrants, with and without the pension system and per capita allocation of collectively accrued revenue and expenditure items, 2007-09 average

Percentage of the GDP

	Baseline	Baseline excluding pension system	Baseline plus per capita allocation of collectively-accrued items (excluding defence and debt services)	Baseline plus per capita allocation of collectively-accrued items (excluding defence)
Australia	0.00	0.82
Austria	0.12	0.89	-0.37	-0.80
Belgium	0.76	0.96	0.06	-0.43
Canada	-0.06	-0.06
Czech Republic	-0.01	0.07	-0.28	-0.31
Denmark	0.11	0.23	-0.31	-0.39
Estonia	0.49	1.15
Finland	0.16	0.02	-0.08	-0.13
France	-0.52	0.30	-0.52	-0.84
Germany	-1.13	0.21	-1.93	-2.32
Greece	0.98	0.86
Hungary	0.08	0.12	-0.11	-0.18
Iceland	0.90	0.96
Ireland	-0.23	-0.39	-1.23	-1.41
Italy	0.98	0.91	0.97	0.61
Luxembourg	2.02	2.20	0.37	0.24
Netherlands	0.40	0.74	-0.01	-0.14
Norway	0.42	0.50	0.60	0.49
Poland	-0.32	0.01	-0.42	-0.45
Portugal	0.52	0.56	0.27	0.13
Slovak Republic	-0.06	0.04	-0.16	-0.18
Slovenia	0.76	1.00
Spain	0.54	0.21	0.07	-0.05
Sweden	0.20	0.62	-0.37	-0.57
Switzerland	1.95	2.00	1.42	1.16
United Kingdom	0.46	1.02	-0.01	-0.26
United States	0.03	-0.51	-0.64	-1.00
Average	0.35	0.57
Average (2)	0.30	0.49	-0.12	-0.31

Notes: Average (2) includes only countries for which per capita allocation of collectively-accrued items was available. See Figure 3.A1.8 for the classification of the items.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823643>

Indeed, only in ten OECD countries does the overall impact exceed + or – 0.5% of GDP in this baseline scenario. The impact is most positive in Luxemburg and Switzerland, with +2.0% and +1.9% of GDP, respectively. In both of these countries, immigrant populations are large, overrepresented among the working-age population, predominantly from high-income countries and have high employment rates. At the other end of the spectrum is Germany, where the share of immigrants receiving pensions is particularly large and the estimated net fiscal impact is -1.1% of GDP. Indeed, as Table 3.A1.1 shows, the age-distribution is much more unfavourable in Germany, France and Poland – the three countries with the largest negative estimated impacts – than on average over the OECD, and in particular compared with the countries where the impact is highly positive.

In most countries, including the pension system has a considerable negative impact on the net fiscal position of immigrants (albeit, as stressed above, to a lesser degree than on the native-born). This is due to the fact that a significant part of pensions in many countries is tax-financed.

Not considering pension contributions and payments provides a more favourable picture for most countries, in particular for Germany, France and Austria – three countries with relatively large and longstanding immigrant populations and where public expenditure on pensions is particularly high. The reverse is the case in the United States and Spain, where few immigrants receive pensions.

Excluding the pension system changes little for the top-placed countries (in terms of fiscal impact) – Luxembourg and Switzerland – but shifts the United States from a slightly below-average position to the bottom of the impact scale. This is driven by the weight of health expenditure which is the single largest expenditure item in the United States (in contrast to all other countries included in this overview, where social transfers are more important). However, it is important to note that estimates for the United States (Goldman, Smith and Sod, 2006) suggest that the average public per capita health care spending for non-elderly immigrants is only 62% of the level of the native-born population, partly because not all immigrants have the same access to the full range of health care services that citizens enjoy.

These baseline estimates miss out on a number of major items, both on the revenue and the expenditure side of the budget. Table 3.7 also provides alternative calculations to test the robustness of the findings, which are discussed in more detail in Figure 3.A1.8. Attributing, on a per capita basis, all omitted revenue and expenditure items, except defence, would result in a GDP impact that would be slightly negative (-0.3% of GDP in 2008) on average. Considering that most countries had a fiscal deficit, the overall impact of immigrants, on the basis of an accounting of current contributions and expenditures, thus seems to be on average broadly at par with the native-born.

Conclusion

Measuring the fiscal impact of immigration is a challenging task, and any estimate of the budget implications is largely dependent on the measurement approach and the assumptions made. In international comparison, an additional complexity is added through the diversity of tax and benefit systems across countries. The only approach that limits the assumptions to be made for international comparisons to manageable proportions is an accounting method, which computes immigrants' contributions and cost to the public purse in a given year. These results are based on the current immigrant population and their outcomes. These, in turn, represent the results of several decades of immigration and integration policies, with all of their successes and failures. In this context, they cannot be taken as indicative of what current immigration policies and outcomes will yield over time.

Countries that had considerable “guestworker” migration in the past, for example, and then heavily restricted migration – such as Germany and France – tend to experience negative fiscal impacts of immigration using accounting methods, as these are measured after most guestworkers have retired, at a moment when their pension receipts will more than offset the social security contributions of the smaller cohorts of immigrants currently working. On the other hand, countries which have had extensive labour migration recently tend to show a positive impact since this is measured a short time after the large migration waves have occurred. These contrasting situations are useful in showing what affects the

fiscal impact, pointing to policies that can enhance the favourable dimension of immigration, but should not be taken as absolute or definitive statements about the appropriateness or not of current migration and integration policies.

Indeed, this is a shortcoming common to all accounting-type studies, including country-specific ones. Given the large importance of assumptions and measurement approaches to country-specific estimates, international comparisons have the advantage of highlighting common drivers of immigrants' fiscal impact across countries. Notwithstanding the limits of the exercise, a number of general observations can be made which tend to be in line with previous findings from in-depth country studies.

Overall, the fiscal impact of immigration tends to be *small* in most countries. Nevertheless, immigrants tend to have a less favourable net fiscal position than the native-born. This is mainly driven by the fact that immigrant households contribute on average less in terms of taxes and social security contributions than the native-born. Although there is a higher dependency by immigrants on some benefits, notably social assistance, such differences do not seem to have large budgetary implications on the aggregate. Relative to unemployed native-born, unemployed migrants are more likely to receive social assistance, but less likely to receive generally more generous unemployment benefits. Since the latter is often linked with access to active labour market policy measures, immigrants' lack of access to such integration measures could thus be an issue in a number of countries.

Employment is the most important factor that weighs on migrants' net fiscal contribution, particularly in the European OECD countries with relatively generous welfare systems. These are also often countries which have significant numbers of humanitarian and family migrants who tend to have lower employment rates, at least initially. As a result, potential gains in these countries from better labour market integration – in particular of immigrant women and of highly-educated migrants – tend to be large. It is thus not surprising that labour market integration has become a key concern for policy in these countries – also from a fiscal perspective.

Strongly linked with labour market status, the analysis demonstrated the strong impact of the *age* of immigrants on their net fiscal position. The age-structure of migrants is also a major factor in explaining cross-country differences because of the weight of pension contributions and payments. Yet, age is generally not a major factor in labour migration management systems in the OECD, with some exceptions.⁵¹ In the Australian point system, for example, age has a strong weight – up to 38% of the pass mark – where, in addition, maximum-age thresholds for admission apply as well.⁵²

These and other findings suggest that differences in the composition of the migrant population by migration category account for a large part of the cross-country variation of migrants' fiscal position relative to that of the native-born. Unfortunately, information on migrant entry category is not available for many countries and where it is, it is rarely used in fiscal impact analyses. Where possible, this shortcoming should be addressed, since most of the interest in the subject in terms of the implications for migration policy will relate to labour migration – that is, the migrant entry category over which there is the largest policy leverage. The available evidence suggests that labour migrants will generate a larger net fiscal contribution than other migrant groups – and thus their net contribution generally tends to be positive, at least in the short run.⁵³ Nevertheless, in the long run for most countries the overall conclusion probably holds for labour migration as well: it is neither a major burden nor a major panacea for the public purse.

Notes

1. This chapter has been prepared by Thomas Liebig (OECD Secretariat) and Jeffrey Mo. It includes contributions from Laura Castell and Sebastian Schmitz. Statistical assistance was provided by Véronique Gindrey (OECD Secretariat).
2. The foreign-born are overrepresented in the working-age population in all OECD countries except Estonia, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Data from the OECD social expenditure database suggest that, compared with the working-age population, the annual per capita social expenditure is more than twice as high for children and almost six times higher for persons above the age of 65. Note, however, that a significant part of the latter concerns pensions, which are generally transferable to other countries.
3. Nevertheless, the issue is not a new one. In 1997, the OECD's *Trends in International Migration* (the predecessor of the *International Migration Outlook*) analysed the impact of migration on social transfers and discussed methods to measure it. However, it focused essentially on empirical studies for Australia, Canada and the United States. The literature discussed in this chapter will mainly build on research that has been conducted after the 1997 publication.
4. Including the data used for the empirical analysis in the second section.
5. As a complement to this report, a survey among OECD countries on migrants' access to such benefits and services has been conducted. The results will be published under www.oecd.org/migration.
6. Boeri and Monti (2007) refer to this as the "net fiscal position". This report will use this term synonymously with *net direct impact* and *net direct contribution*.
7. This holds for both defined-benefit and defined-contribution systems. The impact of the pension system is discussed in more detail in the second section. There is also the issue of *return migration* to be considered which often coincides with retirement. Often, the pension is transferred abroad but many accounting-type studies of the fiscal impact do not account for this. As a complement to this chapter, the OECD has collected data on pension transfers abroad which will be published under www.oecd.org/migration.
8. There can also be important variation in the provision of welfare services at the local level. This is, for example, the case in Italy, where welfare services tend to be more generous in the North, which is also the part of the country where most migrants have settled because of more favourable labour market conditions. Pellizzari (2011) finds that the observed higher welfare use of immigrants in Italy is largely attributable to this geographical concentration.
9. A similar conclusion was reached by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2007) regarding the impact of irregular migration on state and local budgets in the United States. The surveys summarised in the report suggest that a majority of immigrants in an irregular situation pay taxes and social security contributions. However, as most of the public expenditure to which immigrants in an irregular situation have access, namely education and emergency health services, is paid for at the local and state level, most surveys suggest a negative fiscal impact at that level, whereas the impact at the federal level tends to be positive. This may have implications with respect to the view that different government levels have on immigration issues, which is particularly relevant in federal countries where sub-national entities exert a stronger influence on policy making.
10. In addition, there is also the issue of the claims on the *public capital stock*.
11. However, there are some exceptions, e.g. Canada (see McMullen, 2011).
12. The situation would be different for countries where recent arrivals account for the bulk of the immigrant population. However, in the countries where this is the case, integration offers are less developed and most recent migration consists of labour migrants, for whom only very limited integration offers tend to be available.
13. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research in the United Kingdom (NIESR, 2011) estimated the consumption of education, health and personal social services for migrants in the United Kingdom. It found that the per capita cost of health and personal social services is lower than that of the native-born, but the reverse is the case for education. However, recent migrants have lower costs for all three types of services.
14. This group also includes spending on sector-specific policies such as agriculture, environment, regional policies, innovation and industrial policies, etc. Interest payments are generally not specifically mentioned in empirical studies, in spite of their large and growing importance – in 2008, they accounted for almost 6% of expenditure in OECD countries. The national accounts statistics include them in "general public services"; they thus tend to be treated like public administration expenditure.

15. Note that this assumption neglects the negative impact which immigrants have on natives as the former will also acquire claims on the public capital stock in the destination country, diminishing the amount available per capita for natives (see Usher, 1977).
16. For a recent discussion of the overall economic effects of immigration and their budget implications, see, for example, the Migration Advisory Council (2012).
17. Indeed, country of origin is essentially a proxy for migrant entry category, since immigrants from lower-income countries have more often come for humanitarian or family reasons – at least in most European OECD countries.
18. In addition, only labour migration (outside of free movement) is fully discretionary, whereas most other forms of migration are essentially non-discretionary, that is, whatever their fiscal impact, there is little that governments can do to limit (or increase) them. This concerns family migration (except accompanying family of labour migrants), free movements and humanitarian migration, control over which is governed largely by international obligations and/or human rights considerations. Together, these three categories account for the majority of permanent migration to OECD countries.
19. “Migration category” and “entry category” are used synonymously in this chapter.
20. In the United States, for example, in 1996 two major reforms were passed that had a strong impact on non-citizens’ access to welfare programmes. The first was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which restricted legal immigrants’ access to cash-transfer programs such as welfare and social safety-net programmes, such as food stamps and health insurance. The second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), required that sponsors’ incomes be included in benefit-eligibility calculations, allowing states to hold sponsors liable for the value of any benefits that sponsored immigrants received.
21. As a complement to this chapter, the OECD Secretariat has conducted a survey among member countries regarding fiscal transfers abroad and immigrants’ access to social benefits. The results are published under www.oecd.org/migration.
22. In European OECD countries, conflicting results are also common but often due to different target populations. In Germany, for example, Loeffelholz et al. (2004) exclude a large part of ethnic Germans (Spätaussiedler) and estimate a per capita positive net contribution of EUR 990; whereas Gerdes (2007) finds a negative fiscal contribution per immigrant household of EUR -4 422 by excluding so-called “Western” migrants.
23. As will be seen, the chosen categorisation is more a tool for orientation than a stringent division. For example, generational accounting may be based on net transfer profiles. This is also sometimes the case in macroeconomic models, in particular of the general equilibrium type, which will be discussed further below.
24. Access Economics (2003) gives an estimate for Australia of AUD +250 000. The differences between the two countries are large and can only partly be explained by differences in the immigrant intake and the tax and benefits system; a key difference is the shorter time horizon of Access Economics (2003) – most new arrivals will still be in working age at the end of the time horizon under consideration. Such discrepancies across studies underline the primarily *ordinal* character of the results of most dynamic fiscal impact studies, particular in international comparison. The estimates are only meaningful compared with other figures that are estimated with exactly the same approach, i.e. in their ordinal dimension.
25. This result is largely driven by the assumption that there will be a shift towards a sustainable fiscal policy framework. Lee and Miller (1997) also conducted a range of robustness tests (e.g. varying the discount rate between 2 and 8%) and simulated various other scenarios. The results remained rather robust and no changes of signs occurred.
26. General accounting demonstrates the amount of intergenerational redistribution by examining the impact of the current fiscal regime on a set of representative agents that differ with respect to their age in the base year and represent the different generations. Every agent has his/her generational account which sums the present value of all taxes and benefits that he/she will contribute and receive over the rest of life. Because of the *no-default* assumption, the intertemporal budget constraint needs to hold; thus, the sum of all generational accounts of current and future generations together with the government net wealth must balance each other. In other words, there will always be someone to pay for the government’s expenses. The original study by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991), for instance, found for the United States that the net fiscal burden on future generations compared with the generation born in the base year 1989 will be 17 to 24% higher.

27. One also has to disentangle the direct fiscal effect of additional immigrants from the beneficial role of additional shoulders for the distribution of the additional burden. In any case, comparisons of the direct fiscal effect and net transfer profile-based estimates remain difficult, since GA models do not provide this net fiscal impact directly, but only indirectly via the reduced tax requirements for the representative agents of future generations.
28. The authors built on the GA framework by Gokhale et al. (1999) and used the tax and transfer profiles from Lee and Miller (1997); their study is a GA application of the net present value calculations by the latter.
29. In contrast, Ablett (1999) calculates Generational Accounts for Australia and finds that immigration unambiguously reduces the fiscal burden on future generations.
30. Borgmann and Raffelhüschen (2004) look at the impact of a number of factors, including immigration, on the evolution of the Generational Accounts for Switzerland between 1995 and 2001. They suggest that the facilitations of immigration following the gradual introduction of free mobility with the EU member countries will also result in a more favourable age-structure of the immigration flows and thus improvements in the Generational Accounts. Their estimates, however, are not directly comparable with those included in Table 3.3.
31. The NPV peaks at around the age of 40 because Storesletten's model generates a trade-off between fertility (which peaks around the age of 30 but implies education costs for the children), and more working years ahead.
32. It is interesting to contrast these findings with the accounting-type studies for Canada (e.g. Grubel and Grady, 2011; Javdani and Pendakur, 2011) that have been discussed earlier and which generally find negative effects. This seems to be due to two factors. First, the accounting studies refer to earlier migrant cohorts and a time where immigration policy was less linked with the labour market. Second, the macroeconomic model by Dungan, Fang and Gunderson (2012) considers the fiscal implications arising from the overall impact of migration on the economy, which is positive in their model.
33. For other recent reviews of the literature, see for example Leibfritz, O'Brien and Dumont (2003); Rowthorn (2008) and Kerr and Kerr (2009).
34. In addition, all of these surveys have a panel design, which means that there is some underrepresentation of *recent arrivals*. The EU-SILC, the CPS and the SLID are rotating panels; in the case of SLID the panel is renewed every six years, in the EU-SILC every four years; and in the CPS every two years. The samples are cross-sectionally representative only for the first wave of a new panel; only newly arriving immigrants who join a resident household, e.g. through family reunification and formation, are captured afterwards. In addition, even in the first year, in most surveys there tends to be some undercoverage of recent arrivals. Indeed, in Spain – which had a lot of recent labour migrants – immigrants are largely underrepresented compared with Labour Force Survey estimates. In all other countries covered by EU-SILC, with the exception of the Netherlands (where immigrants are also largely underrepresented), differences are minor. Nevertheless, the sample size of EU-SILC is much smaller than that of the Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) which, however, does not contain the same richness of information. As will be seen below, the main determinant of the fiscal impact is employment. The employment rates of immigrants and native-born in the EU-LFS are broadly similar to those obtained in the Labour Force Survey, suggesting that possible biases arising from this should be limited. In both the HILDA and the SHP, however, new arrivals after 1999 are only included if they moved to previously resident households (in the SHP, however, there has been a refreshment sample in 2004). Both of these countries had significant intakes of migrants between 1999 and 2009, in particular highly-skilled labour migrants who have particularly high net fiscal contributions in early years. The estimates for these two countries thus tend to be biased downwards.
35. Indeed, the estimates of the irregular immigrant population in the United States are based on the CPS (see Passel, 2007 for details).
36. Table 3.A1.4 shows the two components of the net fiscal impact – that is, contributions and benefits – separately.
37. However, the net contribution for the native-born in Ireland was already slightly negative prior to the crisis. This seems to be attributable to the relatively large weight of taxes not included in the calculations of the net direct contribution, such as corporate income and value-added taxes.
38. The alternative would have been to exclude them; however this would have excluded a significant part of the immigrant population from the calculations and – because of the generally more favourable net contributions for this group – introduced a downward bias.

39. As can be seen in Figure 3.A1.2, in most countries, family characteristics such as marital status and number of children explain only a small part of the observed differences in net contributions, except in the Netherlands and, to a lesser degree, in Denmark.
40. This also holds for Australia and the United Kingdom, where there is virtually no difference in net contributions without considering this factor.
41. Note that this calculation considers the overall immigrant population and not just, as previously, immigrant household heads.
42. This assumes no indirect effect of the higher employment of immigrants, for example on wages – otherwise the effect may be more limited as the increase in labour supply would put downward pressure on wages.
43. Table 3.A1.4 sheds some more light on this by showing the absolute values for contributions and benefits.
44. The pattern is similar with respect to country-of-origin differences within the immigrant households (Figure 3.A1.6). Households with immigrants from lower-income countries contribute less on average than immigrant households from high-income OECD countries. At the same time, households from lower-income countries also have a lower benefit take-up in terms of the amounts involved. As a result, there are virtually no differences between the two groups in net contributions.
45. These figures are not shown but available upon request.
46. Note that this has implications for migrants' access to active labour market programmes, as this is often conditional on the receipt of unemployment benefits.
47. The results for disability are not shown but are available upon request.
48. This is of course a very rough approximation, since it assumes that, for example, migrant families currently entering with household heads aged 35 will have the same net fiscal position in 20 years as the current migrant households whose head is aged 55 now. In other words, the figures will only be "correct" if tax-benefit systems, household composition, and the socio-economic characteristics of new arrivals do not change over time, and if there is no return migration – which is clearly not the case.
49. Regarding education, all surveys have information on whether or not persons in the household are in education, and, if so, their education level. This information has been combined with data from the OECD Education database which has public expenditure on education by education level, on a country-by-country basis. Public expenditure on active labour market policies is available from the OECD Employment database. This is attributed on a per capita basis among the unemployed. Regarding immigrants' contributions in the form of indirect taxes paid, the analyses below use the net post-tax income minus housing payments and attribute the overall net savings rate for private households. Public health expenditure is one of the main expenditures items overall, and differs strongly with age. However, comparable information for all countries is only available for overall per capita spending. For some countries, however, age-specific profiles are available and these have been used to make a rough approximation of the health expenditure by age for all countries (see Annex 3.A3). The adjustment that can be made for this important expenditure item is thus for most countries a rather crude one.
50. If expenditure for public order and safety were also attributed to the immigrant population on a per capita basis in the baseline, the impact would be virtually zero on average.
51. The Netherlands have, in their immigration system with salary thresholds for highly-skilled "knowledge workers", lower thresholds for persons under 30. In 2012, the minimum annual salary requirement was EUR 51 239 for employees 30 years of age or older, and EUR 37 575 for employees younger than 30 years of age. In addition, labour migration of persons above the age of 45 is generally not possible. The maximum age for immigrants under the general skilled migration category in Australia is 50.
52. It is interesting to note that Australia is also the OECD country which has the most developed accounting of the fiscal impact of immigration.
53. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind again that the picture as presented in the empirical analysis above refers to the current fiscal position of the resident immigrant population, many of whom having arrived several decades ago.

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ANNEX 3.A1

*Supplementary tables and figures*Table 3.A1.1. **Distribution of immigrant households by age of the household head, 2007-09 average**

% of immigrant households in each age cohort

	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	64-75	75 and above	Total
Australia	4.4	16.2	18.3	21.7	18.1	12.2	9.0	100
Austria	4.9	18.8	25.5	18.9	16.5	8.7	6.7	100
Belgium	4.6	20.9	24.7	20.3	15.0	8.3	6.1	100
Czech Republic	1.5	11.3	15.2	20.2	20.3	19.2	12.3	100
Denmark	13.9	19.6	24.6	22.6	10.4	5.4	3.5	100
Estonia	0.9	4.0	10.6	22.3	20.6	25.4	16.2	100
Finland	13.4	25.5	22.9	19.0	10.2	5.8	3.2	100
France	2.3	12.3	19.8	18.8	21.2	13.1	12.5	100
Germany	3.1	12.2	11.4	9.8	17.7	33.5	12.3	100
Greece	6.7	24.6	30.0	21.6	8.8	4.0	4.4	100
Hungary	..	18.7	20.3	21.6	13.9	14.4	11.0	100
Iceland	11.8	26.4	26.2	19.5	7.5	4.7	4.0	100
Ireland	6.1	32.2	28.0	18.2	8.7	4.5	2.2	100
Italy	4.2	28.5	35.6	17.6	6.8	4.7	2.7	100
Luxembourg	2.5	21.9	27.6	22.1	14.1	8.5	3.3	100
Netherlands	6.6	20.0	23.4	19.7	14.7	9.3	6.4	100
Norway	12.9	25.1	29.9	17.6	8.5	2.7	3.3	100
Poland	..	2.7	2.4	3.8	19.0	40.0	32.2	100
Portugal	..	36.5	25.5	12.7	12.4	5.6	7.2	100
Slovak Republic	..	3.2	15.4	14.9	33.1	24.2	9.1	100
Slovenia	0.4	7.6	18.4	31.6	20.4	14.1	7.4	100
Spain	4.4	31.6	32.8	16.2	8.1	4.6	2.3	100
Sweden	7.6	17.2	19.1	19.3	16.9	10.3	9.5	100
Switzerland	2.2	14.2	26.8	22.7	14.3	13.7	6.1	100
United Kingdom	3.3	19.5	24.4	19.5	14.5	10.0	8.9	100
United States	6.7	22.2	25.0	20.0	12.7	7.6	5.9	100
OECD average	5.0	18.7	22.5	18.9	14.8	12.1	8.0	100

Note: Figures for the 25-34 year old in Hungary, Poland, Portugal and the Slovak Republic include the 15-24 year old.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.


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Table 3.A1.2. **Net contribution of immigrant households by age of the household head, 2007-09 average**

EUR (PPP adjusted)

	Net contribution by age						
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	64-75	75 and above
Australia	751	5 715	7 197	8 383	5 096	-4 302	-7 600
Austria	4 003	7 351	11 006	12 660	-2 109	-19 858	-22 409
Belgium	5 324	17 200	16 426	14 261	614	-13 625	-14 837
Czech Republic	1 283	4 684	5 486	4 515	-1 657	-5 318	-5 625
Denmark	578	12 864	16 630	11 525	8 041	-15 547	-15 359
Estonia	3 833	5 316	4 560	4 762	1 159	-2 942	-3 350
Finland	2 288	7 561	10 792	11 464	3 667	-11 741	-11 842
France	4 530	11 359	11 416	15 056	-2 681	-18 196	-18 324
Germany	940	8 314	15 508	15 407	-3 469	-19 310	-20 631
Greece	3 041	8 319	8 529	12 062	6 165	-8 950	-11 281
Hungary	..	4 844	4 525	4 875	-1 088	-5 722	-5 790
Iceland	7 722	13 093	22 290	26 954	24 625	-1 258	-11 974
Ireland	2 293	2 923	4 910	3 249	-6 200	-21 872	-22 925
Italy	9 314	11 170	11 175	13 567	7 235	-8 175	-12 859
Luxembourg	8 369	15 401	19 038	18 768	5 875	-30 314	-39 001
Netherlands	-3 832	14 361	18 983	18 847	11 505	-20 617	-20 648
Norway	2 423	11 359	16 740	19 197	14 018	-18 042	-26 194
Poland	4 782	3 793	-2 777	-4 434	-4 512
Portugal	..	4 207	4 660	8 238	2 402	-4 489	-11 175
Slovak Republic	..	2 585	3 436	5 901	-2 337	-3 972	-3 624
Slovenia	3 144	7 667	8 070	8 493	-2 910	-9 459	-9 510
Spain	8 818	9 961	8 504	8 610	2 741	-12 469	-11 222
Sweden	2 663	8 894	12 439	10 293	3 266	-14 773	-10 778
Switzerland	8 006	28 072	26 464	34 771	20 619	-9 884	-13 020
United Kingdom	6 134	14 680	12 386	10 125	2 622	-13 921	-15 167
United States	5 862	10 196	12 189	14 788	10 127	-8 113	-11 787
OECD average	3 915	9 895	11 467	12 329	4 021	-11 819	-13 902

Source: See Annex 3.A3.


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Table 3.A1.3. Amount of social benefits paid to immigrant households on average relative to the native-born, 2007-09 average

	Social assistance	Unemployment benefits	Pensions	Family allowances	Housing allowances
Australia	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.8	..
Austria	2.7	1.7	0.5	1.4	2.3
Belgium	8.3	1.1	0.4	1.3	1.9
Canada	1.2	0.8	0.9	1.3	..
Czech Republic	2.4	0.5	0.9	0.6	2.2
Denmark	..	1.3	0.3	1.4	0.9
Estonia	0.7	1.2	1.5	0.3	0.8
Finland	4.4	1.4	0.2	1.4	2.4
France	1.5	1.2	0.7	1.3	1.8
Germany	1.2	0.7	1.4	0.6	1.4
Greece	0.4	1.3	0.2	0.9	2.4
Hungary	-	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.5
Iceland	-	1.3	0.3	0.9	0.8
Ireland	3.3	0.8	0.3	1.1	1.1
Italy	1.9	1.1	0.2	1.4	3.0
Luxembourg	2.6	1.3	0.3	1.5	1.9
Netherlands	1.9	1.0	0.5	0.9	1.2
Norway	5.0	1.7	0.3	1.2	2.7
Poland	0.9	0.4	1.6	0.2	0.7
Portugal	-	0.9	0.3	1.5	0.7
Slovak Republic	0.6	-	1.0	0.4	-
Slovenia	1.1	1.1	0.7	0.6	2.0
Spain	0.9	0.9	0.3	1.0	1.1
Sweden	10.2	1.2	0.6	1.0	2.1
Switzerland	1.6	2.3	0.8	1.0	..
United Kingdom	1.2	1.8	0.6	1.2	1.8
United States	1.4	0.8	0.6	1.2	1.0
OECD average	1.7	1.1	0.5	1.1	1.5

Notes: The OECD average is the average of all countries included in the table. Canada's social assistance includes the old-age security pension.

..: Means that the respective benefit does not exist or no data available.

-: Means that the sample size is below the publication threshold.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

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Table 3.A1.4. **Contribution, benefits and net contribution by migration status, 2007-09 average**

EUR (PPP adjusted)

	Contribution			Benefits			Net contribution		
	Native	Mixed	Migrant	Native	Mixed	Migrant	Native	Mixed	Migrant
Switzerland	19 858	26 353	20 149	4 889	4 917	5 601	14 968	21 437	14 549
Iceland	18 972	23 117	12 380	6 701	5 559	3 087	12 272	17 558	9 292
Luxembourg	20 043	23 732	20 463	21 270	16 500	11 285	-1 228	7 232	9 178
Italy	15 346	19 552	12 310	11 366	7 426	3 162	3 980	12 126	9 148
United States	15 527	22 844	13 145	6 993	5 687	4 871	8 534	17 158	8 274
Greece	13 246	16 068	9 476	8 238	5 557	1 748	5 008	10 511	7 728
Spain	10 518	14 820	10 057	7 412	4 990	2 561	3 106	9 830	7 496
Belgium	18 856	25 611	13 707	9 697	8 781	8 147	9 159	16 830	5 560
Canada	12 959	21 160	11 518	5 407	5 666	6 351	7 552	15 494	5 167
Norway	17 382	31 613	12 368	12 327	11 246	7 863	5 055	20 366	4 505
Portugal	8 024	13 854	8 320	7 074	4 055	3 841	950	9 799	4 479
United Kingdom	11 503	20 990	10 803	8 899	9 036	7 774	2 604	11 954	3 029
Slovenia	13 316	14 096	10 491	8 866	11 728	7 485	4 450	2 368	3 006
Netherlands	21 175	32 576	12 415	11 236	11 273	9 871	9 940	21 303	2 544
Denmark	17 574	26 428	11 041	10 211	8 715	8 673	7 362	17 713	2 368
Austria	16 705	21 465	12 334	13 330	15 022	9 980	3 375	6 443	2 353
Australia	8 476	12 314	7 447	4 700	3 961	5 144	3 776	8 353	2 303
Hungary	6 531	8 466	6 643	5 450	6 551	4 779	1 081	1 915	1 864
Finland	15 188	19 970	8 942	9 482	7 706	7 628	5 706	12 265	1 314
Sweden	17 041	24 472	11 005	10 226	10 999	10 109	6 815	13 473	896
Estonia	7 528	9 378	3 990	3 014	3 501	3 992	4 514	5 877	-2
Czech Republic	8 465	8 095	4 914	4 990	6 965	5 100	3 474	1 116	-184
Ireland	9 527	16 574	7 309	12 014	10 063	8 583	-2 487	6 511	-1 274
France	13 359	21 324	9 961	10 952	12 193	11 412	2 407	9 131	-1 451
Slovak Republic	6 151	6 876	2 439	4 003	6 123	4 610	2 148	752	-2 171
Germany	15 373	14 176	8 094	9 498	18 629	13 727	5 875	-4 453	-5 633
Poland	5 470	5 853	2 319	5 178	10 483	8 009	291	-4 630	-5 691

Source: See Annex 3.A3.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823719>

Table 3.A1.5. **Amount of benefits paid per household on average, 2007-09 average**
EUR (PPP adjusted)

	Immigrant households					Native-born households				
	Social assistance	Unemployment benefits	Pensions	Family allowances	Housing allowances	Social assistance	Unemployment benefits	Pensions	Family allowances	Housing allowances
Australia	15	72	2 201	1 258	..	14	68	2 158	1 677	..
Austria	135	1 012	5 438	1 918	125	50	583	9 960	1 354	55
Belgium	392	1 805	2 434	1 257	22	47	1 615	5 854	1 002	11
Canada	2 471	557	1 471	712	..	2 042	729	1 607	546	..
Czech Republic	150	41	2 831	331	48	63	80	3 298	514	22
Denmark	..	2 173	1 371	751	343	..	1 677	4 759	533	375
Estonia	6	48	2 713	209	7	9	41	1 847	602	9
Finland	586	1 529	845	1 254	733	134	1 097	5 333	874	311
France	269	1 006	5 719	1 009	732	178	821	7 958	767	405
Germany	329	595	9 636	617	32	268	890	6 670	989	23
Greece	57	203	1 480	163	57	151	158	7 195	176	24
Hungary	-	86	2 902	629	15	34	188	3 500	852	30
Iceland	-	142	1 055	740	345	43	113	4 052	811	417
Ireland	87	1 308	1 439	2 928	448	26	1 609	5 278	2 581	395
Italy	71	794	1 850	383	69	37	699	9 620	265	23
Luxembourg	487	1 008	5 150	2 802	137	185	774	14 787	1 908	74
Netherlands	1 327	480	4 092	426	306	713	502	7 586	452	250
Norway	490	330	1 545	1 398	155	97	195	6 004	1 205	57
Poland	30	68	6 604	49	19	34	169	4 111	252	27
Portugal	-	380	1 777	368	31	61	407	5 611	244	43
Slovak Republic	40	-	3 078	151	-	71	64	3 019	336	-
Slovenia	208	162	3 900	554	13	183	146	5 469	948	7
Spain	17	578	1 517	104	30	19	631	5 710	103	28
Sweden	483	609	3 657	914	397	47	509	6 133	927	191
Switzerland	111	489	2 442	460	..	71	209	3 219	461	..
United Kingdom	516	156	3 459	987	872	426	89	6 193	793	475
United States	670	137	3 054	209	87	468	170	5 533	171	86
OECD average	336	585	3 098	836	186	203	527	5 647	790	124

Notes: The OECD average is the average of all countries included in the table. Canada's social assistance includes the old-age security pension.

...: Means that the respective benefit does not exist or no data available.

-: Means that the sample size is below the publication threshold.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823738>

Figure 3.A1.1. **Net contribution of immigrant households by citizenship of the head of household, 2007-09 average**

EUR (PPP adjusted)




Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823111>

Figure 3.A1.2. **Differences in the net direct fiscal contribution of immigrant and native-born households and the role of different characteristics, 2007-09**

EUR (PPP adjusted)




Notes: Age and education refer to the household head; labour market status (employed versus not employed) to all household members in working age (15-64 years old). The analysis is restricted to households in which at least one member is of working age. The results have been obtained using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). This technique decomposes the differentials in the net fiscal position into two components: i) a portion that arises because immigrant and native-born households have different characteristics on average (explained component), and ii) a portion that arises because one of the two groups has a more favourable net fiscal position than the other given the same individual characteristics and/or because differing characteristics (e.g. higher educational attainment) have a different impact on both groups (unexplained component).

Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823130>

Figure 3.A1.3. **Difference in the employment rate of foreign- and native-born populations, by educational level, 2009-10 (excluding persons still in education)**




Notes: Data for New Zealand and Canada include persons still in education.

Source: OECD (2012), *Settling In: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012*.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823149>


Figure 3.A1.4. **Differences in net contributions between households with high- and low-educated household heads, 2007-09 average**



Source: See Annex 3.A3.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823168>

Figure 3.A1.5. **Estimated budget impact if immigrants had the same employment rate as the native-born, in % of GDP, 2007-09 average**



Source: See Annex 3.A3.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823187>

Figure 3.A1.6. **Difference in contributions, benefits and the net direct fiscal impact between immigrant households from lower-income countries and high-income countries, 2007-09 average**

EUR (PPP adjusted)



Notes: The graph shows the differences in contributions, benefits, and net contributions (contributions minus benefits) of households from lower-income countries minus households from high-income OECD countries. A positive difference in terms of benefits means that immigrant households from lower-income countries take up lower benefits on average. A positive difference in terms of contributions means that immigrant households from lower-income countries contribute more (in terms of taxes and social security contributions). "Mixed" households including either immigrants and non-immigrant household heads or immigrant household heads of different origin have been excluded. See also Annex 3.A3.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823244>

Figure 3.A1.7. **Estimated net present values of the lifetime net direct fiscal contributions, by age of the household head**

EUR (PPP adjusted)



Note: Future payments have been discounted at a discount rate of 3% p.a.

Source: See Annex 3.A3.




StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823206>

Figure 3.A1.8. Structure of general government revenue and expenditure and inclusion in the fiscal impact calculations, average over OECD countries, around 2008



Sources: OECD Statistics on General Government Accounts and OECD Revenue Statistics.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823225>

ANNEX 3.A2

Sensitivity analysis

Regarding the revenue side, the most important item that is missed is corporate tax revenues, which account for almost 4% of GDP, or 10% of all tax revenues (see Figure 3.A1.8). Another major revenue item not considered is taxes on specific goods and services. This category includes customs duties, revenue from fiscal monopolies and, most importantly, excise taxes, which alone account for almost 3% of GDP, or more than 7% of the tax revenues, on average over the OECD. Overall, however, the calculations on which the GDP impact is measured include about 74% of all revenues of OECD countries.

On the expenditure side, the major items that are not considered are public administration, infrastructure and defence. Payments on interest and reimbursement of public debt are also not included in the calculations; these account for about 5% of total expenditure on average. Overall, on average about 63% of general government expenditure in OECD countries is covered. The analysis above thus covers neither all expenditures nor revenues, but the part of revenues that is covered is larger.¹ In addition, a significant part is estimated, notably of expenditure (see Figure 3.7).

How confident can one be about the reliability and validity of the results? Spending on defence and payments of interest on past debt should *a priori* not vary with a growing population due to migration; excluding these items gives a roughly similar share of total expenditures and total revenues that are included in the above estimate. Most remaining neglected items on the expenditure side should tend to grow less than proportionally with population, such as public administration and infrastructure.² Similar arguments can be made on the revenue side, namely with respect to corporate taxes. Revenues from excise taxes, in contrast, can be expected to broadly grow proportionally with population.

A rough approximation of the impact of these omitted items can be obtained by attributing all revenue and expenditure items, except defence and interest payments, on a per capita basis to migrants. This would result in a less favourable picture for all countries except Norway and France, although the estimated budget impact would still be between +0.5 and -0.5% of GDP for most countries (see Table 3.A1.2). On average over the OECD, the fiscal impact would be marginally negative (-0.12% of GDP) under this assumption; if interest payments were also included the negative impact would be -0.31% of GDP. However, in the same year, on average the countries included in this calculation had a fiscal deficit of -0.6%; excluding Norway (which had a large surplus) the average deficit was -1.5% of GDP. Considering that immigrants account for about 10% of the population on average, it seems safe to say that the overall impact is broadly neutral on average over the OECD.

However, there is a final caveat to make. The baseline analysis does not account for specific integration-related expenses outside of mainstream active labour market policy measures, such as language training. In terms of GDP, however, public spending on these items generally tends to be small. Public expenditure for language training of (adult) migrants is generally the most important directly targeted integration expenditure not otherwise accounted for.³ In spite of recent enhancements in integration efforts, the estimated expenditure on this in countries such as Austria and Germany, for example, is still below 0.2% of GDP. Yet, such items have to be weighed against the single most important item that is attributed (age-adjusted) on a per capita basis, namely health expenditures. As seen above, while there is little research on migrants' use of health services, the available evidence suggests that they tend to use health services less often than native-born of the same age. Everything considered, any remaining biases are thus not expected to alter the overall results fundamentally.

Notes

1. Clearly, this leads *a priori* to a higher per capita net contribution for the total population (including both immigrants and the native-born) than if all expenditures and revenues were fully allocated. To which degree this affects immigrants' specific net contribution is, however, *a priori* unclear – particularly relative to the native-born.
2. Note that the fiscal implications of immigration in terms of infrastructure may also vary with the settlement pattern of immigrants. In densely-populated areas, large immigration flows could put greater pressure on infrastructures, as extending certain infrastructures can be more costly where land is scarcer.
3. The baseline analysis also does not account for expenditures in the asylum system, also because asylum seekers are not migrants but candidates for migration. Again, however, in terms of GDP, the sums involved tend to be small. In France, a report on the fiscal cost of the asylum system estimated EUR 900 million for 2004/05 (a peak period for the French asylum system), or about 0.05% of GDP (Assemblée nationale, 2005).

ANNEX 3.A3

Technical annex

Five surveys covering 27 OECD countries were used for the analysis: the Household, Income, and Labour Dynamics Australia survey (HILDA) for Australia; the Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics (SLID) for Canada; the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) for Switzerland; the March income supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the United States; and the European Union Survey of Income and Labour Conditions (EU-SILC) for all remaining European countries.

Definitions

- A *native-born* or a *non-immigrant* is a person born inside the current borders of the country in which they reside.
- An *immigrant* is a person born outside the current borders of the country in which they reside:
 - ❖ A separate analysis of immigrants born in high-income OECD countries (all OECD countries except for Mexico and Turkey) and of immigrants born in all other countries was also undertaken. The EU-SILC did not provide such a distinction; EU27 countries were thus taken as a proxy for high-income OECD countries.
- The *heads of household*, if not self-defined by the household in a national survey, are the persons in the household with the greatest income (primary head of household) and his/her partner (where applicable).
- A *native-born household* is one where the household head and his/her partner (where applicable) are both native-born.
- An *immigrant household* is one where the household head and his/her partner (where applicable) are both immigrants.
- The fiscal impact of households in which there are two household heads, of which one is native-born and the other is an immigrant (“mixed households”) is attributed half to native-born households and half to immigrant households.
- A *naturalised immigrant* is an immigrant who has acquired citizenship of the host country. Data on naturalisation are not available for Australia, Estonia, Germany, and Slovenia.
- *Benefits* are all government-funded transfers received by households, including:
 - ❖ Family- and children-related allowances.
 - ❖ Social assistance payments.
 - ❖ Housing allowances.

- ❖ Unemployment benefits.
- ❖ Old-age benefits, survivors' benefits, and pensions.
- ❖ Sickness benefits.
- ❖ Disability benefits.
- ❖ Education-related allowances and scholarships.
- Contributions are all transfers from households to the government, including:
 - ❖ Taxes.
 - ❖ Applicable tax credits.
 - ❖ Social security contributions from employers and employees:
 - Both employees' and employers' social security contributions were calculated according to the OECD *Tax and Benefits* database.
 - Employers' social security contributions are provided for most countries surveyed in EU-SILC; calculated employees' and employers' social security contributions are scaled to the value provided by the survey.
 - Employees' social security contributions were calculated as the difference between gross and net salary in the SHP.
- Net contributions are equal to contributions minus benefits.
- A person is considered to have a *low* educational attainment if he/she has not completed upper secondary education (i.e. if has attained at most ISCED Level 2).
- A person is considered to have a *high* educational attainment if he/she has completed tertiary education (ISCED Level 5 and above).

Timeframe

The surveys cover the fiscal years of 2006, 2007, and 2008, except for Australia, where the fiscal year begins in July (and for which we took the fiscal years starting in July 2006 and ending in June 2009). Benefits, contributions, and net contributions were adjusted by purchasing power parity (as tabulated by the OECD) to the Eurozone standard; all numbers are reported in euros. Results – generally weighted averages of benefits, contributions, and net contributions – were averaged over the three years. Data for Portugal in 2008 were internally inconsistent and therefore not used.

Benefits, expenditure and contributions included in the analysis

A variety of budget items that comprise benefits and contributions differ in implementation, importance, and data availability from country to country.

- Pensions were considered both in terms of benefits received by households and as contributions provided by household members. Either both pension benefits and pension contributions were included or were excluded:
 - ❖ Contributions include both employees' and employers' contributions to the public pension system and were calculated according to data from the OECD *Tax and Benefit* database.
 - ❖ The following (2007) values, allocated to both employees' and employers' contributions, were taken for Switzerland: 4.2% of personal gross income, with a minimum contribution of CHF 370 and a maximum contribution of CHF 8 400.

- Public expenditure on *education* (separate from publicly-funded scholarships) was calculated on a per capita basis from OECD data on the total public expenditure at each level of education (primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and post-secondary, where available) and the number of students at each level of education in a given fiscal year. Such costs were assigned to individuals according to their level of schooling currently attended.
- Public expenditure on *health* was obtained from OECD data on the total current expenditure on health care, including services of curative and rehabilitative care; long-term nursing care; ancillary services to health care; medical goods dispensed to out-patients; prevention and public health services; and health administration and health insurance. Capital formation of health care provider institutions was excluded:
 - ❖ Hagist and Kotlikoff (2009) provide per capita public health care expenditures in 2002 in Australia, Canada, the United States, and six European OECD countries (Austria, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) in 2002, by age group (0-14, 15-19, 20-49, 50-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and 80+). These data were used as a proxy for age-specific health care expenditures in the respective country. In each of the countries listed above, the data was combined with the population in each age cohort and the total public health care expenditure in each country (from the *OECD Health Database*) in order to derive an estimate of the health care expenditure by age in those countries.
 - ❖ For European OECD countries not covered by Hagist and Kotlikoff (2009), an average European relative per capita public health care expenditure by age was created by determining the average ratio of the per capita expenditure for each cohort to the average per capita expenditure for the entire population, over the six European countries for which data was available. This average was then used for the remaining European OECD countries.
- *Value-added taxes* (VAT) were calculated from OECD data on countries' value-added tax rates applied on estimated household expenditures. Such expenditures were calculated by subtracting the costs of housing/utilities and the estimated household savings (which itself was calculated from OECD country data on the average savings rate per household applied on the disposable income) from disposable income. Disposable income was calculated by subtracting taxes and transfers to other households from net household income. For Canada, the combined rate of Federal and Ontario rates were taken and for the United States, the average combined sales tax.
- Public expenditure on *active labour market policies* is taken from the *OECD Employment database*. This is attributed on a per capita basis among the unemployed. This data was unavailable for Estonia, Greece, Iceland, and Slovenia, which leads to a slight upward bias in the estimations for these countries.

Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of native and immigrant household differences

- The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition allows differences between two groups – in this case, the difference in benefits, contributions, net fiscal contributions, and social benefits received between native households and immigrant households – to be broken down into *endowments* and *contributions*:
 - ❖ Endowments are differences in (socio-demographic/economic) characteristics between the two groups. These can be interpreted as the “explained” part of the difference between native and immigrant households, i.e. the part of the difference that is due to differences in, for example, educational attainment of the heads of household.
 - ❖ Contributions in this context are differences due to the different impact of each characteristic on the dependent fiscal variables. These are the “unexplained” part of the difference.
- Independent variables were categorised into three clusters. The decomposition calculated the endowments and contributions attributed to each of the following seven variables; the endowments and contributions attributed to each cluster were calculated from a sum of these items on the individual variables.
 - ❖ Characteristics of the head of household:
 - Age.
 - Educational attainment.
 - ❖ Household composition:
 - Number of children aged 0 to 14 as a discrete variable (0, 1, 2, or 3+).
 - Number of working-age adults aged 15 to 64 as a continuous variable.
 - Number of senior citizens aged 65 and above as a continuous variable.
 - Marital status of the head of household.
 - ❖ Employment status:
 - Employment rate of the household (number of working-age adults in employment divided by the number of working-age adults).
- Native-born household regression coefficients were taken as reference.

Calculation of the overall fiscal impact of immigration as a percentage of GDP

- The numbers of native-born, mixed, and immigrant households in each country were scaled to take into account the (often not insignificant) number of households for which an immigration status could not be determined.
- The overall fiscal impact of immigration was calculated as the sum of *half* of the overall net fiscal contribution (impact) of mixed households and *all* of the overall net fiscal impact of immigrant households. The overall net fiscal impact of each type of household is equal to the average net fiscal impact of that type multiplied by the number of households of that type:
 - ❖ This assumes that the fiscal impact of mixed households can be half attributed to immigrants and half attributed to natives.
 - ❖ This further assumes that the fiscal impact of immigrants in native-born households is balanced by the fiscal impact of the native-born in immigrant households.

- The fiscal impact as a percentage of GDP was calculated for each year; this percentage was averaged over the three years to calculate the final estimate:
 - ❖ Active labour market policy expenditure, targeted at reducing unemployment, were also attributed to immigrants on a per capita-unemployed basis and subtracted from the overall fiscal impact calculated above.

Employment rate simulation

- A regression of net fiscal household contribution over the single independent variable household employment rate (as defined above) was performed for all combinations of native-born, mixed, and immigrant households, with 1, 2, 3, etc., adults in working age (between 15 and 64).

Take-up of social benefits

- Social benefits were categorised into:
 - ❖ Social assistance:
 - Government allowances and non-income support payments in Australia.
 - Social exclusion allowance in the EU-SILC.
 - Social exclusion/assistance in Switzerland.
 - Public assistance and Medicaid in the United States.
 - ❖ Unemployment benefits.
 - ❖ Pension benefits:
 - Government pensions in Australia.
 - Canada/Quebec pension plan in Canada.
 - Old age benefits and survivors' benefits in the EU-SILC.
 - Old age, widow(er)'s, and orphan's pensions in Switzerland.
 - Social security payments, supplementary security income, and Medicare in the United States.
 - ❖ Family and child benefits:
 - Government parenting payments, estimated family payments, and child care benefits in Australia.
 - Universal child care benefit, child tax benefits/credits in Canada.
 - Family/child allowances in the EU-SILC.
 - Family/child allowances in Switzerland.
 - School lunch benefits and food stamp benefits in the United States.
 - ❖ Housing benefits:
 - Housing allowance in the EU-SILC.
 - Housing subsidy in the United States.
 - Not available for Australia, Canada and Switzerland.

- ❖ Injury benefits:
 - Workers' compensation for Canada.
 - Sickness benefits and disability benefits for the EU-SILC.
 - Disability benefits for Switzerland.
 - Workers' compensation for the United States.
- For Australia, government allowances and non-income support payments are classified as follows:
 - ❖ Social benefits:
 - Special benefit.
 - Partner allowance.
 - Telephone allowance.
 - Maternity immunisation allowance.
 - Seniors' concession allowance.
 - ❖ Unemployment benefits:
 - Newstart allowance.
 - ❖ Pension benefits:
 - Mature age allowance.
 - ❖ Family benefits:
 - Double orphan pension.
 - ❖ Injury benefits:
 - Sickness allowance.
 - Mobility allowance.
 - ❖ The following components are ignored:
 - Widow allowance.
 - Youth allowance.
 - ABstudy.
 - AUstudy.
 - CDEP.
 - Carer allowance.

Chapter 4

Discrimination against immigrants – measurement, incidence and policy instruments¹

Discrimination is a key obstacle to the full integration of immigrants and their offspring into the labour market and the society as a whole. This chapter provides an overview of discrimination against immigrants and their children in OECD countries – its measurement, incidence and policy solutions – on the basis of the empirical literature and policy practices.

The actual prevalence of discrimination is difficult to assess, since the disadvantage of immigrants and their offspring in many domains of public life may be attributable to many other factors – both observed and non-observed – than ethnic origin itself. Testing studies which try to isolate the effect of discrimination in hiring suggest that it is not uncommon for immigrants and their offspring to have to send more than twice as many applications to get invited to a job interview than persons without a migration background who have an otherwise equivalent CV.

Most OECD countries have taken measures to combat discrimination, although the scale and scope of the measures varies widely. Much of the effect of most policy measures against discrimination appears to stem rather from raising awareness about the issue than from any direct influence which they may have on preventing discrimination.

Introduction

In many integration domains, the outcomes of immigrants lag behind those of the native-born. For example, on average in OECD countries, immigrants' labour market outcomes are below those of the native-born of similar age and education levels. Immigrants also find themselves more often living in sub-standard housing conditions (OECD, 2012a).

Yet, there are many potential explanations why immigrants face particular difficulties in integrating into the labour market and the host-country society at large. Regarding labour market integration, some of these are linked with the fact that immigrants have often acquired their qualifications and work experience in a very different context and often also in a different language. These obstacles should, however, not persist for children of immigrants raised and educated in the host country. Nevertheless, recent OECD work has shown that even children of immigrants have poorer labour market performance than comparable offspring of native-born – even when the former have good qualifications (OECD, 2010). Such persisting disadvantages may still be partly attributable to other factors, such as differences in social and professional networks, soft skills, concentration in certain geographical areas or fields of study or other un-observed characteristics and personal traits such as motivation. However, this is not the whole story because of the possibility of discrimination which is often advanced as one of the main obstacles that hamper integration. This issue is of particular pertinence now in the context of large and growing immigrant populations and the global economic crisis, which left many immigrants looking for work and subject to potential discrimination in the hiring process.

This chapter provides an overview of discrimination against immigrants and their children in OECD countries – its measurement, incidence and policy solutions – on the basis of the empirical literature and policy practices. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The first section briefly outlines why discrimination is an issue for integration policy, along with some theoretical considerations. The second section provides an overview of the different approaches to measure discrimination, and analyses the findings from the literature regarding its incidence. The chapter concludes with some implications for policy.

Main findings

- Discrimination is a key obstacle to the full integration of immigrants and their offspring into the labour market and the society as a whole. It may not only negatively impact on social cohesion and immigrants' incentives to invest in education and training, but can also represent an economic loss to the host country.
- The actual prevalence of discrimination is difficult to assess, since the disadvantage of immigrants and their offspring in many domains of public life may be attributable to many other factors – both observed and non-observed – than ethnic origin itself, and these also differ across countries. One rather unambiguous measure that has been applied in a growing number of OECD countries is *testing studies in recruitment processes in*

which fictitious CVs are submitted to hiring companies in which only the name, nationality or country of birth indicates an immigrant background. These testing studies suggest that it is not uncommon for immigrants and their offspring to have to send more than twice as many applications to get invited to a job interview than persons without a migration background who have an otherwise equivalent CV.

- Although it is difficult to compare levels of discrimination across groups or countries, one rather robust finding is that on average, men tend to be more affected by discriminatory practices than women. This notably concerns native-born offspring of “visible” immigrant groups in European OECD countries for whom the evidence suggests a high incidence of discrimination compared with other groups, whatever measure is taken.
- Most of the research on discrimination, and also on measures to combat it, has concentrated on the labour market. In the labour market, discrimination both affects access to employment and subsequent career advancement and wages. One would expect discrimination to be lower after the hiring as possible employer uncertainty about immigrants’ productivity gives way to personal experiences. Indeed, discrimination during hiring is best documented, although this may in part be due to the fact that it is more difficult to firmly establish discrimination during the employment relationship and its potential termination. There is also evidence of discrimination in other markets, notably the housing market, as well as in the education system.
- Most OECD countries have taken measures to combat discrimination, although the scale and scope of the measures vary widely. Most common are legal remedies against discrimination. A number of OECD countries have also applied affirmative-action type policies on the basis of targets and other instruments such as anonymous CVs, although hard quotas are rare. The evidence to date suggests that these tools can be effective in combating discrimination, if carefully designed and monitored.
- In recent years, *diversity policy instruments* have been tested in a growing number of OECD countries. While these are promising tools, it is difficult to assess their effectiveness, since it is generally those employers who are most interested in diversity who participate. More generally, it seems that much of the effect of policy measures against discrimination – in particular regarding legal constraints – stems more from raising awareness about the issue than through any direct influence which they may have on preventing discrimination.
- Such awareness-raising seems particularly important since there is growing evidence that discriminatory behaviour does not necessarily stem from individual preferences but often from *negative stereotypes* about immigrants and their children. For example, employers seem to value certain characteristics that tend to be associated with better integration. This suggests that a balanced public discourse on immigrants and their integration outcomes would also contribute to reducing stereotypes and thus combating discrimination.

Definition and measure

Discrimination against immigrants – definition, causes and consequences

In the context of this chapter, discrimination is understood as unequal or differential treatment that disfavours an individual or a group and that is based on origin, ethnicity, race or nationality.² Becker (1957), in his seminal work on the economics of discrimination, distinguishes two types of discrimination – *taste-based* and *statistical*. The former occurs when economic agents (e.g. employers, home owners, banks, etc.) have a preference or

taste for persons of a particular origin instead of others. “Statistical” discrimination occurs, for example, when employers lack information about a candidate’s productivity or landlords or banks have doubts about the credit worthiness of a potential tenant or credit taker, respectively. Easily observable characteristics, such as ethnic origin, are seen as conveying additional information, based on the expected ability or trustworthiness of the group they belong to.³ This form of discrimination is thus – in contrast to taste-based discrimination – in principle a rational response to uncertainty.⁴ In practice, however, it is difficult to distinguish between the two types since statistical discrimination tends to be based on prejudices against persons with a migrant background.

Another distinction that is often made is that between *direct* and *indirect* discrimination against immigrants. Direct discrimination occurs if a person or a group is treated unfavourably because of their immigrant background. The second refers to a situation where formally equal treatment has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging immigrants, and that cannot be justified on other grounds. One example is a situation where a test asks for very specific knowledge about the host country that immigrants will typically not have, albeit such knowledge is not associated with the nature of the job.

Discrimination is an important issue for integration policy, for a number of reasons.⁵ It violates the fundamental human right of equal treatment, established – among others – by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. By introducing unequal treatment, discrimination is also a threat to social cohesion and may lead to alienation of immigrants and their offspring with the host-country society, with potential negative repercussions regarding their social and civic integration. Heath et al. (forthcoming), for example, find that the feeling to belong to a group that is discriminated against is associated with dissatisfaction with democracy and distrust of host-country institutions such as the police. Since discrimination tends to reduce the pay-off to formal qualifications, it may also result in lower investment by immigrants into education and training and prevent qualified potential migrants from abroad to make the move. As a result of these processes, negative stereotypes that lead to discrimination against immigrants may thus become self-fulfilling prophecies.

Such lower investments also represent an economic loss for the host country. But discrimination may also potentially represent a loss for discriminating employers in terms of lost opportunities. Here, however, one has to distinguish between taste-based and statistical discrimination. Whereas the former imposes a cost on prejudiced employers, the latter may be a rational strategy under imperfect information. As a result, competitive pressure will tend to reduce taste-based discrimination, but not statistical discrimination. Indeed, there is evidence that more competitive product markets are generally associated with lower levels of discrimination (OECD, 2008a).⁶

Finally, there is some evidence that discrimination lowers immigrants’ wellbeing and is associated with adverse psychological and physiological outcomes, for example greater stress and a higher incidence of cardio diseases (e.g. Williams and Mohammed, 2009; Krieger et al., 2005). However, findings in this area are still mixed and cannot be generalised (see, for example, the meta-analysis of Pieterse et al., 2012).

Discrimination can be present in virtually all domains involving interactions with migrants. Most attention, both on the research and the policy side, has been paid to the labour market, in particular regarding the hiring stage. Of course, labour market discrimination can also occur with respect to wages, promotions and lay-offs, but – as will be seen below – these forms of discrimination are more difficult to establish.

But the labour market is not the only market where discrimination is an issue. For example, immigrants can be discriminated against with respect to access to housing and rent payments (see Box 4.2 below). Another example is the credit market, where immigrants may have to pay higher interest rates or are less likely to get a credit in the first place.⁷ Similar arguments can be made with respect to certain consumption goods or services, in particular where supply is constrained. Anti-discrimination bodies also report frequent complaints about discrimination in access to night clubs and in legal proceedings. Another important domain where there is growing evidence of discrimination is in the education system, such as in grading and teacher's track recommendations – in countries where the latter is an issue (see Holzer and Ludwig, 2003 for a discussion).

Finally, there is the issue of so-called “institutional discrimination”, that is, when discriminatory treatment is attributable to an institution as a result of the rules and practices of that institution (for a discussion, see e.g. Sampson, 2008). Institutional discrimination is generally indirect, i.e. not overtly or intentionally discriminatory, but will have the same effect in practice.

The above list is far from complete, but highlights the breadth of discriminatory situations which immigrants and their offspring may face. To limit the discussion to manageable proportions, this chapter will mainly deal with labour market discrimination.

Measurement, incidence, and implications of labour market discrimination

The measurement of discrimination in the labour market is by no means straightforward. It is useful to begin by distinguishing methods which demonstrate whether or not discrimination occurs, and against which groups, and methods which are able to provide estimates of discrimination. These alternative methods include field experiments, self-report surveys, and statistical analyses of labour market outcomes for minorities. Each of these will be analysed in turn after briefly reviewing data from legal cases.

Legal cases

As will be discussed in further detail in the next section, there is a growing spread of anti-discrimination legislation. Such legislation typically covers discrimination in different spheres such as employment and housing and includes various mechanisms for enforcement such as the legal possibility for complainants who believe they have experienced discrimination to take their case to a court or tribunal. If the case is upheld, the complainant may receive compensation. Judgments may have further implications such as, for example, reputational damage for employers or additional obstacles when bidding for government contracts.

At the tribunal, the case is heard according to national principles of what counts as admissible evidence, which may not necessarily be the same as social scientific criteria and which may vary from country to country. Who counts as being a member of a racial or ethnic group will also be a matter for each jurisdiction to decide and may differ from country to country (see Box 4.1).⁸ The motives of the discriminating actor are not held to be relevant. Therefore, “statistical discrimination” is no defence in a legal case. It is against the law in just the same way as “taste-based discrimination” is unlawful.

While it is possible to count the number of successful complaints within a given jurisdiction and to measure trends over time (see, for example, Heath and Li, 2010), this number does not give straightforward evidence of the incidence or prevalence of unlawful

Box 4.1. Target groups and the question of “ethnic statistics”

Measuring discrimination requires first of all an identification of the target groups. “Ethnic” and “racial” are rarely defined precisely in legal texts. They generally refer to a list of characteristics linked to this type of discrimination, such as the *International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* which defines its scope as discrimination based on “race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin”. Anti-discrimination and equity laws frequently provide the list of their recipients and set methods and standards to collect data on them. Categories and terminologies vary across countries according to their history, political context and ethnic and racial composition. For example, there are the terms “visible minorities” and “Aboriginals” in Canada, “ethnic and racial” groups in the United States, “non-Western”, “*allochtonen*” in the Netherlands, “non-Western immigrants” in the Nordic countries; “Non English-Speaking Background” (NESB) or “Culturally and Linguistically Diverse” (CALD) groups in Australia, national minorities in Central and Eastern European Countries, “ethnic groups” in the United Kingdom, “people with a migration background” in Germany – the list is extensive and the perspective to adopt any international standard in this matter is probably neither feasible nor appropriate.

Collecting data on ethnicity and race is a contentious issue. It raises political controversies and methodological problems. A significant number of countries around the world have decided not to collect data on ethnicity or race in their official statistics, like censuses, population registers, or administrative files. An overview of the censuses that took place around 2000 shows that 65% of countries have collected data on ethnicity and/or race (Morning, 2008). This global level varies greatly across continents, with only 44% of European countries (i.e. 16 out of 36) implementing ethnic enumeration, to be compared with 64% in Asia, 44% in Africa and more than 80% in North and South America and Oceania.

Being overwhelmingly considered as subjective, data on ethnicity and race are mostly collected through self-identification, in an open-ended question or, in other cases, with a pre-coded list of the main categories relevant for the country. Echoing the concerns of human rights organisations and data protection provisions, the recommendations for census taking published by the United Nations before each census round (2009-13 being the most recent) insist that ethnicity or race should be collected through self-identification with multiple answers. Self-identification data may change across time and surveys for the same individual, and they may not necessarily match the perception by others (i.e. it is possible that someone identifying him/herself as “White” or “American Indian” in the United States will be perceived as “Black” or “White”, respectively).

discrimination in that jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions, a complainant who believes that he or she has been the subject of discriminatory behaviour needs to make a complaint through formal legal channels – in the case of employment, often also with the support of his or her trade union – and this process involves overcoming a number of hurdles.⁹ In effect, then, there is a major issue of selection bias in the kinds of cases that come to court. As a result, the number of successful cases are generally low and merely represent the “tip of the iceberg”.

A first barrier is whether potential complainants will be aware of their right to take the matter to court and their awareness of the formal procedures to be followed.¹⁰ There are also issues about the accessibility and effectiveness of the complaints procedure, and the availability of legal assistance, while the relatively low average level of the compensation that courts or tribunals award may also be a disincentive to proceed with a case.

Furthermore, many cases may be settled out of court before the case is formally heard and adjudicated. In addition, in the case of wage or other job-related forms of discrimination, labour migrants whose permit is linked with a specific employer may be afraid of risking their residence permit if filing a complaint or, for migrants in an irregular situation, of risking deportation.

Cross-nationally there is considerable variation in the frequency and size of sanctions and awards made in ethnic or racial discrimination cases, as shown by OECD (2008a) which provides an overview of employer incentives to comply with anti-discrimination legislation and to follow an equality policy. The power of the sanctions and in particular the likelihood and magnitude of awards for claimants will influence the incentives of the latter to pursue a complaint. The variation in the number of legal proceedings across countries thus clearly has more to do with institutional differences in procedures and bodies available to help complainants, and their incentives, rather than with differences in underlying rates of discrimination. For example, an overview by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2008) among EU member countries in 2007 showed that twelve countries applied no sanctions while among the others, sanctions ranged from one successful case in the Netherlands, where the employer was fined EUR 500 and the complainant was awarded EUR 250, to the United Kingdom, where there were 95 successful cases, with a maximum award to the complainant of GBP 128 898 and a median award of GBP 7 000.

Field experiments

Field experiments, or audit studies as they are sometimes termed, are generally regarded as the most rigorous and valid ways for identifying the existence of discrimination and they avoid some of the main problems involved with using legal cases to establish the presence of discrimination. In the case of labour market discrimination, the standard approach is to submit applications to real job offers with *otherwise identical* CVs by applicants from the majority group and a minority. The applications are made to actual employers who have advertised vacancies, and are matched in all relevant respects except the name of the applicant, one application having a recognizably minority name and the matched one a name typical of the majority group, everything else being equal. Firms' responses to these applications are then monitored and the relative number of cases where minorities and members of the majority group receive positive responses or "call-backs" can be calculated.

Two somewhat different methodologies have been used. One, which was first applied by Daniel (1968) in the United Kingdom and since has become the standard ILO methodology, uses actors who are able to follow through the whole application process, including attendance at interview (see Bovenkerk, 1992 for details). This method has been criticised because of the possibility that the actors, who necessarily know which group they are representing, may tailor their behaviour in ways that might affect the call-back rate. The second approach, termed "correspondence testing", a method pioneered by Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (1970) in the United Kingdom, avoids this problem by using matched written applications, sent by post or online. However, correspondence testing is able to look at discrimination only at the first stage of the application process. If a fictitious applicant receives an invitation to attend for interview, for example, the invitation is politely turned down.

However, the studies using the ILO methodology (e.g. Bovenkerk et al., 1994) have often found that most of the discrimination occurs at these early stages in the application process. Among candidates who have been called for interview, discrimination rates are typically

much lower than they are at the earlier stages. Another limitation of correspondence testing is that it can only be used in cases where written applications are expected from applicants. In other words, the method cannot be used for those kinds of jobs where applications are expected to be made “in person”. In essence, such testing studies thus cover only a part of the labour market, often the same as the public employment services. It may well be that it is in the other parts of the labour market – namely those where informal, in-person recruitment methods are used – that the highest levels of discrimination occur.

There are then several different ways of calculating the extent of discrimination. The approach used in this chapter is to calculate the ratio of positive call-backs received by majority applicants to those received by minority applicants. This ratio shows how many more applications the minority applicant has to make in order to receive the same number of positive responses as the majority applicant. Thus, if the majority applicants receive one positive call-back for every four made (that is, a success rate of 25%) whereas the minority applicants receive one positive call-back for every eight applications made (a success rate of 12.5%), the minority applicant has to make twice as many applications as the majority applicant in order to get a positive call-back.

Unlike legal cases, field experiments identify only direct discrimination rather than indirect discrimination. For example if an employer specifies selection criteria that ethnic minority applicants are less able to satisfy, this might constitute indirect discrimination under the terms of many countries’ legislation. However, the typical field experiment will tailor the application to the requirements specified in the job advertisement.¹¹ In addition, standard methods of correspondence testing cannot be applied to promotion, pay or layoffs, domains which will typically be covered in law. Like the legal cases, however, audit studies look at the outcome, not the motivation or rationale for the discrimination. They therefore do not adjudicate between taste-based and statistical discrimination.

Field experiments also generally do not measure possibly varying degrees of discrimination. For example, employers may take more time to respond to applications of persons with a foreign-sounding name. In the design of the Swiss field experiment by Fibbi et al. (2006), for example, candidates who were invited to a job interview declined the offer subsequently and in many cases, the immigrant candidate was only invited after the native Swiss candidate had refused the offer. If these cases are also seen as discriminatory treatment, the measured levels of discrimination would be about twice as high for all groups (see OECD, 2012b). Some more recent studies tried to explicitly include the time dimension. For example, Kaas and Manger (2012) found, in their field experiment in Germany, that invitations to job interviews were sent later to persons with an immigrant-sounding name, while the reverse was the case for rejections.¹²

In spite of its limitations, audit testing is a powerful technique that can rigorously demonstrate direct discrimination at the point of application. The use of rigorous matching techniques in real-world settings means that one can be confident (assuming that tests of significance are reported) whether discrimination occurs at this stage of the application process. Since vacancies can be sampled in a systematic way, the issues of selection bias which are involved with court cases can also be removed.

The number of field experiments has grown a lot in recent years and they have to date been implemented in 15 OECD countries. Table 4.1 shows the headline results for field experiments in a range of OECD countries conducted over the past twenty years. As can be seen, in almost every case, significant levels of discrimination were found in these studies

Table 4.1. **Field experiments investigating discrimination**

Country and authors	Ethnic group	Qualification/job level	Relative call-back rate
Australia			
Booth et al. (2010)	Italian	Entry-level jobs (i.e. not requiring post-school qualifications)	1.1
	Chinese	As above	1.7 ¹
	Middle Eastern	As above	1.6 ¹
Belgium			
Arrijn et al. (1998)	Moroccan	Medium and low-skilled	1.9 ¹
Baert et al. (2013)	Turkish (compared with Flemish)	Jobs open to school-leavers with no work experience	2.1 (Bottleneck jobs) 1.0 ¹ (Non-bottleneck)
Canada (Toronto)			
Oreopoulos (2009)	Chinese	Jobs posted that accepted applications via direct email and generally required three to seven years of experience and a short-cycle tertiary education degree	1.5 ¹
	Indian	As above	1.3 ¹
	Pakistani	Applicants with Canadian education and experience	1.4 ¹
Canada (Montreal)			
Eid (2012)	African	Marketing, HR, communications, secretarial, customer services	1.8 ¹
	Arab	As above	1.6 ¹
	Latin-American	As above	1.6 ¹
France			
Cedey and Foroni (2007)	North African and Sub-Saharan African (native-born offspring)	Medium and low-skilled	2.0 ¹
Germany			
Goldberg et al. (1990)	Second-generation with Turkish nationality	Medium-skilled	1.2 ¹
Kaas and Manger (2012)	Turkish background with German nationality and German mother tongue (native-born offspring)	Internships for students in economics and business	1.1 ¹
Greece			
Drydakís and Vlassis (2007)	Albanian	Low-skilled (office, factory, cafe and shop sales)	1.8 ¹
Ireland			
McGinnity and Lunn (2011)	African	Medium-skilled (lower administration, accountancy, sales)	2.4 ¹
	Asian	As above	1.8 ¹
	German	As above	2.1 ¹
Italy			
Allasino et al. (2006)	Moroccan (foreign-born)	Low-skilled in construction, catering, services	1.4 ¹
Netherlands			
Andriessen et al. (2012)	Moroccan	Range covering all skill levels	1.1 ¹
	Turkish	As above	1.2 ¹
	Surinamese	As above	1.2 ¹
	Antillean	As above	1.2 ¹
Bovenkerk et al. (1994)	Surinamese	Teacher, lab assistant, administrator/financial manager, personnel manager (Surinamese correspondence test)	1.3 ¹
	Moroccan (men only)	Service sector and retail (Moroccan audit study)	1.3 ¹
Norway			
Midtbøen (2012)	Pakistani (native-born offspring)	Medium and low-skilled jobs	1.3 ¹
Spain			
De Prada et al. (1995)	Moroccans (foreign-born)	Medium-skilled	1.3 ¹

Table 4.1. **Field experiments investigating discrimination** (cont.)

Country and authors	Ethnic group	Qualification/job level	Relative call-back rate
Sweden			
Attstrom (2008)	Young native Swedes of Middle-Eastern background	Hotel and restaurant, retail and trade, office and clerical, healthcare services, manufacturing, transportation and warehousing	2.5 ¹
Carlsson and Rooth (2007)	Middle Eastern (men)	Medium and low-skilled	1.5 ¹
Bursell (2007)	Arabic/African	Range of skilled and low-skilled positions, ranging from high school teachers to cleaners	1.8 ¹
Switzerland			
Fibbi et al. (2006)	Portuguese (in French-speaking areas)	Medium and low-skilled (vocational certificate)	1.1
	Turkish (in German-speaking areas)	As above	1.4 ¹
	Albanian speakers from former Yugoslavia (in French-speaking areas)	As above	1.3 ¹
	Albanian speakers from former Yugoslavia (in German-speaking areas) (foreign-born men)	As above	2.5 ¹
United Kingdom			
Wood et al. (2009)	Black African	Medium and low-skilled (e.g. care assistant)	1.7 ¹
	Black Caribbean	As above	1.9 ¹
	Chinese	As above	1.9 ¹
	Indian	As above	1.9 ¹
	Pakistani/Bangladeshi	As above	1.5 ¹
United States			
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)	African American	Sales, administrative support, clerical and customer services	1.5 ¹
Pager et al. (2009)	Latinos	Entry-level jobs requiring no more than college degree	1.2
	Blacks	As above	2.0 ¹

1. Significantly different from 1.0.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823757>

except against applicants of Italian background in Australia, Turkish applicants in Flanders applying for shortage occupations (so-called “bottleneck” jobs), Portuguese in French-speaking areas of Switzerland, and against Latino applicants in the United States. In many cases, the relative call-back rates are around two, indicating that minorities have to make around twice as many applications as members of the majority group in order to obtain a positive response.

There is also some variation in relative call-back rates between countries. However, because of differing designs, it is not possible to make comparisons of discrimination rates *between countries* on the basis of these field studies. First, the field experiments often target rather different ranges of occupations and types of firms. There is accumulating evidence that discrimination rates tend to be higher in lower-skilled jobs than in more skilled ones, with a study in Sweden, for example, showing relative call-back rates reaching 3.0 for cleaners but being close to 1.0 and not significant for high school teachers (Bursell, 2007; see also Andriessen et al., 2012). The within-country comparisons in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have all found this pattern, although it has not been replicated in some other countries.¹³ It is important therefore not to generalise from such occupationally-specific studies to the labour market as a whole.

There is also evidence from both the United Kingdom and Norway that discrimination is higher in the private sector than it is in the public sector. Indeed in the United Kingdom, the evidence for discrimination in the public sector did not reach standard levels of statistical significance (Wood et al., 2009). In addition, one Swedish study found that discrimination

was greater in smaller firms (Carlsson and Rooth, 2007). A further complicating factor is that the studies have taken place over a considerable period of time, and labour market conditions varied. In the Netherlands, there is some evidence that discrimination tends to be greater in economic downturns when more applicants are chasing each job (see OECD, 2008b) and a study by Baert et al. (2013) in Belgium shows that discrimination is lower (and not statistically significant) for occupations which are difficult to fill. This is also corroborated by evidence from the downturn of the early 1990s in Sweden, which suggests that there have been selective lay-offs of non-European immigrants during that period (le Grand, 2000; Arai and Vilhelmsson, 2004).

Finally, the studies, in particular the one from Germany regarding hiring for internships, suggest that discrimination may tend to be relatively low if the risk is also low for the employer – he/she does not make a long-term commitment in hiring, e.g. for a traineeship period. It also seems that discrimination is low if persons with a migrant background provide what appears to be interpreted by employers as some sort of positive “signal” for integration, in this case by stating that German is their “mother tongue” although their parents were supposedly born in Turkey. Likewise, a study on name-changes in Sweden (Arai and Skogman Thoursie, 2009) found large increases in salary levels for those who changed their name compared with their peers who did not. Similar longitudinal evidence exists for a number of OECD countries regarding the impact of naturalisation (OECD, 2011).

Although the testing studies summarised in Table 4.1 do not allow for cross-country comparisons of the incidence of discrimination, it is, however, probably safe to make within-country comparisons in the discrimination rates experienced by different ethnic minority groups within a particular study since many of the complicating factors will be held constant. Thus, there is some evidence from Australia and Switzerland that minorities from high-income OECD countries experience lower rates of discrimination.¹⁴ In other countries, such as the United Kingdom (Wood et al., 2009), there was not sufficient statistical power to test effectively for differences between ethnic minorities. An important complication is that names from some ethnic backgrounds, notably Black Caribbean in the United Kingdom, may be much less distinctive than those e.g. from South Asia. This introduces a source of “noise” in the measurement which might be expected to lead to underestimating the level of discrimination experienced. In other words, one can only use these methods to compare rates of discrimination between minorities if the names used to identify minority backgrounds are equally recognizable.

A further complication is that some studies – often reflecting the social profile of the ethnic minorities in the relevant country – explicitly identify the applicants as persons having being born abroad, although usually with destination-country qualifications, while other studies explicitly identify the minorities as native-born offspring of immigrants. It is possible that employers may use birth abroad as a signal e.g. of lower levels of mastery of the host-country language and thus use this as a cue for statistical discrimination in favour of the applicant from the majority group. However, the one study that explicitly compared immigrants with native-born offspring of immigrants from the same countries found no difference in the rates of discrimination they experienced (Carlsson, 2010).

Despite these problems in making comparisons between minority groups or between countries, field experiments are a powerful tool to identify whether discrimination is taking place, against which groups, and for what types of jobs. As will be seen below, they

have a validity that alternative measures simply do not have. Just as double-blind experiments are the gold-standard in medical research, albeit not without limitations and caveats, field experiments are considered to be the “gold standard” in research on discrimination in the labour market. However, just as experiments in medicine cannot be used to establish the prevalence of a condition, so current audit studies should not be used to measure the prevalence of discrimination in a particular country. A particular issue here is that minorities may well adapt their behaviour to their expectations of discrimination, avoiding firms that might discriminate and applying to employers who have a better reputation, or instead opting for self-employment. For example, in the United Kingdom, minorities are over-represented in the public sector, where the evidence suggests discrimination is much lower than in the private sector (Heath and Cheung, 2006). It is thus logically possible that employers might be highly discriminatory, as shown by the call-back rates for fictitious candidates in field studies, and yet experiences of discrimination by genuine applicants might be rare as they selectively apply to non-discriminatory employers.

Field experiments have also been used extensively to measure discrimination in other domains than discrimination in hiring, in particular in the housing market. Box 4.2 provides an overview of the research and results in this latter market.

Self-report studies

To attempt to measure discrimination experienced by actual job applicants, one possible method, which has become well-established in studies of crime, is to use a representative survey of the population at risk, often termed “victim survey”. This approach can in principle be made representative within a country and comparable across countries, although there are practical difficulties.

“Victim” studies are widely regarded as being preferable to official statistics on reported crime, which share many of the problems that apply to administrative data on discrimination derived from court cases. In addition to coverage and representativeness, the method also has the advantage that it can in principle be applied to a broader range of outcomes, such as promotion or layoffs and can cover the whole of the application process, not being restricted to a particular stage or type of application. It can also be applied in a systematic way to make comparisons between different ethnic groups or with other disadvantaged groups.

Essentially, the method asks respondents whether they have personally experienced discrimination over a specified period of time in different spheres of life, including job applications, on the grounds of race or ethnicity. However, there are a number of fundamental problems with self-report studies. The most intractable problem is that of *validity*: can one be sure that the respondents’ reports are accurate judgements about discrimination? In the case of job applications, on the one hand, respondents may not always know why they were refused a job – they might have been refused on the grounds of lack of fluency in the relevant language which might well be needed to perform the job satisfactorily. These cases would not be grounds for a successful legal complaint and do not fall under the definition of discrimination used in this chapter. On the other hand, respondents might not always be aware of cases where they were discriminated against. For example, they may attribute their failure to secure a job to their own lack of qualifications since they might not know what qualifications other applicants had. In addition, self-report studies are unlikely to pick up indirect discrimination. It is thus *a priori* unclear whether self-reports will be biased upwards or downwards.

Box 4.2. Empirical studies on ethnic discrimination in the housing market

Since the 1970s, a growing body of research has been devoted to the issue of ethnic discrimination in housing markets. Discrimination in this context can take various forms. First, it can hamper the access to housing where landlords (including professional housing agents, agents offering housing for rental as well as for sale) deny specific ethnic groups access to information or invitations to property showings. Second, it can be associated with disadvantages in *housing conditions*, including higher rental prices and segregation into less privileged neighbourhoods.

Most empirical analyses of discrimination in the housing market examine administrative or survey data for differences in rental prices, housing conditions, housing mobility, or neighbourhood composition. Discrepancies among groups of different ethnic backgrounds that remain after controlling for observable socio-economic differences are then usually ascribed to discrimination. A recent econometric examination of rental contracts in Norway, for example, suggests that immigrants and their children pay, on average, a rent premium of 8%, compared with Norwegians and their offspring, and as much as 14% if they come from an African country (Beatty and Sommervoll, 2012), even after controlling for a comprehensive set of apartment, individual and contract-specific covariates.

While such studies are helpful at shedding light on inequalities and changes in housing conditions over time, they cannot actually single out discrimination as the main driving factor, as differences might also stem from other unobservable factors. Differences in the rent paid by immigrants/ethnic minorities and the majority population, for instance, are likely to be overstated if the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood is not taken into account. In the United States, housing prices were found to be generally lower in neighbourhoods that are close to the tipping point of becoming predominantly inhabited by African Americans, whereas housing units in predominantly white neighbourhoods tended to be more expensive (Chambers, 1992; Kiel and Zabel, 1996).

As in the domain of labour market discrimination, quasi-experimental audit or correspondence testing studies have gained prominence over the past two decades. Over the 1980s and 1990s, classic audit studies sent matched pairs of trained actors who differed significantly only in their ethnicity to personal auditions with landlords. They then recorded differences in treatment such as “opportunity denying” (i.e. landlords withholding information, refusing showings or not calling back) and “opportunity diminishing” (i.e. landlords showing minority clients fewer or different units or providing less useful information) (Yinger, 1995). The vast majority of such studies were conducted in the United States and focused on the treatment of African Americans compared with white Americans. They all found significant and persistent levels of unequal treatment in both sales and rental markets (Riach and Rich, 2002). More recent studies have also found significant levels of discrimination against Hispanics, albeit at a lower level than for African Americans (e.g. Galster, 1990a; Page, 1994; Roychoudhury and Goodman, 1992; Turner and Mikelsons, 1992; Yinger, 1998).

Observed levels of discrimination against African Americans and Hispanics tended to be higher in predominantly white neighbourhoods than in so-called “transitional” neighbourhoods where the composition of the population is gradually shifting towards predominantly non-white (Yinger, 1986; Ondrich et al., 1999). One reason for this may be *customer-based discrimination*, that is, landlords may factor in presumed preferences of their white clients by steering African Americans away from predominantly white neighbourhoods (Yinger, 1986). Recent evidence for this mechanism has been provided by a correspondence-testing study, suggesting that landlords are particularly likely to discriminate if they own several apartments in a larger housing unit and thus may factor in the ethnic preferences of other renters (Hanson and Hawley, 2011). However, it is also possible that these landlords are more likely to factor in a potentially negative effect on the overall housing prices in the area arising from a shifting neighbourhood composition.

Landlords’ practice of “steering” ethnic groups into distinctive neighbourhoods has been explored further by Galster (1990b), McIntosh and Smith (1974), and Turner and Mikelsons (1992). They provide evidence that testers of different ethnicity are shown an equal number of housing units but in systematically different neighbourhoods. Ondrich et al. (2003) suggest that real estate agents display reduced marketing efforts when advertising housing units in mixed and transitional areas.

Box 4.2. Empirical studies on ethnic discrimination in the housing market (cont.)

Over the course of the 1990s, concerns about the methodological rigour of classical face-to-face audit studies grew and Heckman (1998) pointed to the risk that unobservable characteristics of the testers might influence landlords' reactions and thus bias measurement outcomes. Indeed, in contrast to labour market discrimination in hiring, such testers are necessary since the first stage of contact is often via telephone calls or direct visits. Later US studies on housing discrimination tried to overcome such shortcomings in field experiments by introducing controls for testers' actual characteristics such as education, income, or birth place. Indeed, the incidence of discrimination against African Americans measured in these latter studies was lower than in previous ones which was partly ascribed to the reduction of bias through more precise measurement (Choi, Ondrich and Yinger, 2005; Zhao, 2006).

In one of the first telephone audits conducted on discrimination in housing, Massey and Lundy (2001) show that discrimination occurs well before actual face-to-face contact is established, as landlords identify ethnic background based on accents and other distinctive speech patterns of potential clients. They find significant discrimination against clients with an African American accent (see also Purnell, Idsardi and Baugh, 1999). Likewise, Drydakis (2011) found for Greece that women with an Albanian accent receive fewer invitations for property showings, are systematically proposed higher rental prices and are asked more frequently about their employment and financial situation than women without an accent.

With the emergence of the Internet as a virtual market place, face-to-face audits have been replaced by testing studies that maintain the logic of matched pairs but replace personal audits with e-mail inquiries. Hanson, Hawley and Taylor (2011), for instance, provide evidence for subtle discrimination by showing that housing agents in the United States favour white clients by responding faster, writing longer e-mails and using more positive language (e.g. praising qualities of the unit) than when responding to African Americans.

While early studies have usually focused on discrimination against African Americans in the United States, recent testing studies from Europe and the United States have often focused on discrimination against Arab clients in the housing market. Carpusor and Loges (2006) find that applicants with Arab-sounding names are three times more likely than applicants with American sounding names to be discouraged from visiting an apartment in Los Angeles. Comparable incidences of "opportunity denying" against men with an Arab-sounding name were recorded in Sweden (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008), Spain (Bosch, Carnero and Farre, 2010), Canada (Hogan and Brent, 2011), Italy (Baldini and Federici, 2011) and Norway (Andersson et al., 2012).


To measure interaction effects between ethnicity and other socio-economic characteristics such as gender or class, several recent testing studies have included multiple sets of mixed pairs. For Norway, Andersson et al. (2012) show that men with Arab-sounding names are 16 percentage points less likely to receive a positive response from a landlord than women with Norwegian names. The gap widens when accounting for class background, with Arab blue-collar applicant men being 25 percentage points less likely to receive a positive response than Norwegian women with white-collar jobs. Likewise, native-born women are the group most favoured by landlords in Sweden, while women with Arab-sounding names enjoy only a small gender premium (Bengtsson, Iverman and Hinnerich, 2012; Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008). Advantages of women over applicant men from the same ethnic background have also been found in Italy (Baldini and Federici, 2011).

Ondrich et al. (2003) show that landlords are less likely to respond to inquiries about higher-priced units when the applicant is African. Carpusor and Loges (2006), in contrast, find that candidates with Arab-sounding names receive more positive responses when applying for higher-priced units, implying statistical discrimination as landlords seem to use the capacity to pay more as an indicator for higher social status. African Americans, however, are found to be most successful when inquiring about units in the lowest price category. It also seems that enclosing additional personal information about family status, employment or education increases the chances for an inquiry to yield a positive response but does not make discrimination disappear entirely (Ahmed, Andersson and Hammarstedt, 2010; Bosch, Carnero and Farre, 2010; Baldini and Federici, 2011).

In surveys, the self-report question is often posed in abstract terms, that is, immigrants are asked whether they consider themselves as a member of a group that is discriminated against. This question is notably asked in the European Social Survey. Similar surveys are available for Canada and New Zealand, but ask about personal experiences of discrimination. The General Social Survey in the United States asks employed persons whether they feel discriminated in their job because of their ethnic origin. Figure 4.1 summarises the results from these surveys and shows how the self-reported discrimination differs among socio-demographic characteristics and between immigrants and their native-born offspring. Because of the different concepts involved and definitions used, Figure 4.1 should not be used to compare self-reported incidence levels across countries, but rather to compare such levels within the respective country/region for groups with common characteristics.


The first and salient result from Figure 4.1 is that awareness of, or sensitivity to, discrimination varies significantly with immigrants' characteristics. In all countries, immigrants from high-income OECD countries rarely report incidences of discrimination – in

Figure 4.1. **Share of immigrants who consider themselves members of a group that is discriminated against (OECD-Europe), have been discriminated against (Canada, New Zealand), or feel discriminated against in their job (United States) by characteristics, around 2008**



Notes: The immigrant population refers to the foreign-born aged 15-64; the offspring to the native-born children of immigrants aged 15-34. The data from the European Social Survey (ESS) refer to the perception of generally belonging to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of race, ethnicity or nationality. Canadian data refer to respondents who, in the past five years, report that they have experienced discrimination or being treated unfairly by others in Canada because of their ethnicity or culture, race or colour. Data for New Zealand refer to persons who report to have been treated unfairly or to have had "something nasty" done to them within the prior 12 months because they belong to a certain ethnic/racial group or nationality. Data for the United States refer to employed respondents who feel "in any way discriminated against" in their job because of their race or ethnic origin.

Sources: European OECD countries: European Social Survey, 2002-10; Canadian General Social Survey, Cycle 23, 2009; New Zealand General Social Survey 2008; United States 2004-12 General Social Surveys.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823263>

line with the results from the field studies in Table 4.1. Likewise, men are more likely to feel discriminated against than women, and younger immigrants more often than older ones (with the exception of the United States). In European OECD countries, native-born offspring of immigrants, and again particularly men, claim much more often to be discriminated against than persons who have themselves immigrated. This finding has also been reported in country-specific surveys such as in France (Beauchemin et al., 2010).¹⁵ A possible explanation for this pattern is that persons who have themselves immigrated have frames of reference more oriented to the origin country, while the native-born offspring of immigrants have been socialised into host-country norms and standards of equal treatment and are thus more aware of and sensitive to infractions of these standards. However, the pattern is the reverse in Canada, New Zealand and the United States, where native-born offspring of immigrants claim less frequently to be discriminated against than their peers who are born abroad.¹⁶ This reflects the differences in the outcomes of the native-born children of immigrants between European OECD countries and countries such as Canada, New Zealand and the United States (see OECD, 2012a).

A further interesting result is that in Canada and New Zealand, immigrants with higher qualification levels report more often to be discriminated against than their low-educated peers, whereas the reverse is true in OECD Europe and the United States. This might at least in part be due to the fact that most high-educated immigrants in Canada and New Zealand are labour migrants that have been selected by the host country, and who thus have high expectations whereas in OECD Europe, most highly-educated immigrants are either from other high-income countries – for whom discrimination tends to be lower – or tend to have arrived as humanitarian migrants who may have lower expectations.¹⁷

There have been occasional studies that have attempted to check on the validity of individual reports. In fact, the first field experiment conducted in the United Kingdom was designed as an exercise to check the validity of respondents' reports that particular employers had discriminated against them when applying for a job. The investigators then sent actors to apply for jobs with the firms against which allegations of discrimination had been levelled. The results corroborated the respondents' claims (Daniel, 1968).

More practicable are checks at aggregate levels. Thus, one can compare rates of self-reported discrimination by particular ethnic groups (or ethnic/gender combinations) against other evidence such as the results of audit studies or against other forms of statistical evidence on ethnic penalties (see below). Other sources of aggregate-level validation are surveys of the majority group. The British Citizenship survey, for example, asks all respondents, including those from the majority group, whether they think they would be treated the same, better, or worse than other groups in various domains (such as in a hospital, school, the courts, the police, etc.). The results for the majority and minorities are often mirror images of each other.¹⁸ This suggests that minorities' and majority perceptions are reflecting the same reality.

Because of the problems of validity and of selective reporting, self-report studies of discrimination have not as yet attained the authority of victim studies of crime. Nevertheless, subjective reports of discrimination may be of some interest in their own right in the same way that surveys of consumer satisfaction are valuable. They may not tell what the actual quality of the service was, but they nonetheless indicate areas where citizens are unhappy with their experience and where their concerns need to be addressed.

Indeed, some countries, such as Denmark, use the percentage of immigrants who feel discriminated against as one indicator of the success of their integration policy and conduct annual surveys to measure variations in this percentage.

More generally, contrasting evolutions of the self-reported incidence may convey important information about the underlying processes. An interesting example that also contrasts the two main concepts of self-report – i.e. feeling to be personally discriminated against versus feeling to be part of a group that is discriminated against – is provided by Entzinger and Dourleijn (2008). The authors interviewed a representative sample of young people (18-30 years old) of Turkish, Moroccan and native-Dutch background in Rotterdam, replicating a virtually identical survey in 1999. In 1999, 27% of the Turkish respondents and 36% of the Moroccans said that they never had a feeling that they were discriminated against. In 2006, these percentages had gone up to 39% and 52%, respectively. However, when asked whether people of their ethnic group in general experience discrimination in the Dutch society, the trend was reversed. In 1999, just over 20% of the Turks and 26% of the Moroccans felt (very) strongly that their community was being discriminated against. In 2006, these percentages had increased to around 36% for the Turks and 38% for the Moroccans. This finding reflects a view that could be described as “discrimination is something that happens to others in my community, but not to me”. According to the authors, one possible explanation for this intriguing finding may be that, for obvious reasons, people do not like being discriminated against. The youngsters therefore either deny that discrimination occurs or avoid situations in which they are likely to experience discrimination. Such forms of adaptive behaviour may imply, for example, that they no longer apply to employers who are known not to recruit immigrants, or they avoid discos where they know that they will be refused entry.

The most ambitious cross-national self-report study attempted so far is the EU-MIDIS programme, which has been conducted across the member countries of the European Union using a standardised questionnaire. However, there were considerable variations between the surveys in the different countries with respect to sample selection procedures, coverage, and choice of ethnic minority group to be sampled. Given this, one should not attempt to make comparisons between countries. Restricting the sample to Denmark, Finland and Germany – the three countries where register-based sampling was used – one observes a pattern for respondents of Somali background to be more likely to report discrimination than the other groups tested, while in Germany those of Turkish background were more likely to report discrimination than respondents from the former Yugoslavia.

In other countries which used non-opportunistic methods of sampling (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), one also sees a tendency for respondents of North African background to be somewhat more likely than other groups in the same country to report discrimination. This finding is also corroborated by other country-specific surveys such as in France (e.g. Beauchemin et al., 2010).

Statistical measures of prevalence

The fourth major approach is to employ statistical analysis of nationally representative surveys to determine the extent to which minorities have higher unemployment rates or lower wages than do comparable members of the majority group who have the same levels of human capital (usually indexed by qualifications and experience in the labour market) and their observable characteristics such as age and gender. These methods provide an estimate of the size of the disadvantage experienced by ethnic minorities which is

unexplained by the standard human capital measures. One can thus obtain estimates of the size and prevalence of the residual disadvantage experienced by ethnic minorities, for example with respect to unemployment and wages. As with audit and self-report studies, the method can also be used to compare different ethnic minorities and men and women. Residual wage differences can also be compared for large and small firms, for different industrial sectors, and for the public and private sectors as a whole.

The major issue with this approach is that residual (or unexplained) disadvantage cannot properly be assigned solely to discrimination. Indeed, while the residual disadvantage is often termed “discrimination”, it is more appropriate to call it “ethnic penalty”, of which discrimination may be a component but not the sole contributor. Indeed, as already mentioned, there are many processes other than discrimination that may account for residual ethnic disadvantage. For example, immigrants and their children may lack knowledge about potential openings in the labour market, or they may lack networks and personal contacts through which many vacancies are filled, or lack of knowledge about the process, or they may simply have different preferences that lead them to apply for different types of jobs. All of these may be sources of disadvantage but they cannot properly be attributed to discrimination, hence the use of the term “ethnic penalty”. On the other hand, working in the opposite direction, the standard measure of unemployment used in this method may miss some disadvantage that might properly be attributed to discrimination. The standard approach is to restrict the sample to those who are in the labour market, i.e. either employed or available for and actively looking for work. This means that “discouraged workers” who have given up looking for work because of their repeated experiences of refusals, perhaps as a result of discrimination, will be missed.¹⁹

A further issue is that the “ethnic residual” may be overestimated because of omitted or poorly-measured variables. In particular, and of special importance for many migrants, is the omission of variables measuring language fluency in most available datasets. Language fluency has a strong association with employment chances and earnings, and is likely to be particularly important among recent migrants. Since fluency is a relevant criterion for employment in many occupations, it would clearly be wrong to apply the term discrimination to that part of the residual disadvantage which is due to lack of fluency. Furthermore, some aspects of human capital such as education may be poorly measured, or be only a crude proxy for the relevant skills. Many of these obstacles could in principle be overcome with adequate measures of skills. The data from the OECD’s Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competences (PIAAC), which will be available in the second half of 2013, should enable a much finer measurement of the “ethnic residual”. In addition, there is also a potential issue over social class background and soft skills which are not or only partly measured by surveys that provide otherwise good measures of skills. Minorities typically come from more disadvantaged backgrounds, and if this is not fully considered in the statistical analysis, disadvantage may be attributed to ethnicity that should be attributed to social class origins.

Some of the statistical problems can also be reduced by focussing on the penalties experienced by the native-born children of immigrants. Naturally, recent migrants are the most likely to lack fluency in the majority-group language, whereas this should in principle not be an issue for the native-born offspring of immigrants, particularly for those who are highly-educated. Native-born children of immigrants will also have domestic rather than foreign qualifications, and they are more likely to have bridging social capital of the destination country. Measures of social class origins will also be more meaningful for the second generation.


One comparative study which has attempted to use a standardised methodology to identify ethnic penalties for native-born offspring of immigrants in a range of OECD countries is that of Heath and Cheung (2007). Table 4.2 shows, on the basis of this study and other data, the estimated ethnic penalties for different minorities in a range of OECD countries. These penalties, or occasionally premia, show the predicted differences in unemployment rates for ethnic-minority men and women compared with those of men and women of the same age, education and marital status belonging to the majority group. To facilitate the international comparison, the unemployment rate has been standardised at 5% for the majority-group comparators. For example, the predicted unemployment rate for men of Italian background in Australia was actually 2.4 points lower than that of the Australian majority group, whereas the rate for native-born immigrant male offspring of

Table 4.2. **Estimated “ethnic penalties” in unemployment rates for native-born offspring of immigrants compared with offspring of native-born**
Percentage point differences

Ethnic group		Ethnic penalty	
		Men	Women
Australia	Italian	-2.4 ¹	-0.8
	Chinese	-1.4	-0.1
	Lebanese	+4.0 ¹	+4.3 ¹
Austria	Turkish	+1.6	-
	Ex-Yugoslavian	+0.5	+6.3 ¹
Belgium	Moroccan	+13.9 ¹	+8.6 ¹
	Turkish	+21.6 ¹	+20.0 ¹
Canada	Italian	+2.6 ¹	+4.0 ¹
	Italian	+0.3	+0.7
	Irish	-0.2	0
	Chinese	-0.6	+0.4
	Indian	+0.1	+0.1
France	Caribbean	+2.9 ¹	+2.8 ¹
	African	+0.3	+1.1
	Sub-Saharan African	+1.8 ¹	+12.9 ¹
	North African	+16.9 ¹	+9.8 ¹
	Turkish	+4.5 ¹	+3.8 ¹
Germany	Ex-Yugoslavian	+1.3	+2.1
	Moroccan	+8.8 ¹	+6.5 ¹
Netherlands	Turkish	+5.6 ¹	+3.5 ¹
	Surinamese	+9.1 ¹	+1.2
	Pakistani	+3.1 ¹	+8.3 ¹
Norway	Turkish	+3.6 ¹	+5.2 ¹
	Indian	+9.1 ¹	+1.3 ¹
	African	+9.0 ¹	+6.5 ¹
Sweden	Asian	+3.9 ¹	+1.6 ¹
	Irish	+1.6	-0.5
United Kingdom	Indian	+2.5 ¹	+6.1 ¹
	Caribbean	+5.5 ¹	+4.9 ¹
	Pakistani	+8.8 ¹	+9.0 ¹
	Mexican	+2.2 ¹	+4.1 ¹
United States	Black	+5.9 ¹	+8.8 ¹

1. Significantly different from zero. The predicted probabilities have been derived from logistic regression models controlling for age, educational level and marital status. Results have been normalised based on an unemployment rate for the majority-group of 5%.

Sources: Calculations on the basis of data by Heath and Cheung (2007) and Hermansen (2009).

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823776>

Lebanese background was predicted to be 4.0 percentage points higher, almost twice the majority-group rate. Interestingly, the median ethnic penalty was 3.0 percentage points, indicating that the predicted median male minority unemployment rate was 1.6 times as high as that of the majority group ($8/5 = 1.6$). This is close to the typical ratio of minority to majority call-back rates in the field experiments shown in Table 4.1.

In general, penalties seem to be largest for minorities from Sub-Saharan Africa and for minorities from North Africa and the Middle East, paralleling results from EU-MIDIS. In contrast, groups of white European heritage generally did not experience a significant ethnic penalty. Some groups, such as the Chinese in Australia and Canada, actually experienced ethnic premia rather than penalties.

Cross-nationally, ethnic penalties were largest in European countries such as Austria, Belgium and Germany and smallest in the OECD countries that were settled by migration, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, although they were also relatively low in the United Kingdom and Sweden. In some countries, ethnic penalties were cumulative, penalties occurring with respect to occupational attainment or earnings in addition to those with respect to unemployment (see Heath and Cheung, 2007). In other countries, penalties were only significant with respect to unemployment.

Just as with the EU-MIDIS, there are important problems when comparing across countries. This is partly because different minorities are present in different countries – for example, there are few Sub-Saharan Africans in Australia or Canada, so the smaller ethnic penalties in those countries might simply reflect the fact that the composition of their ethnic minority population is rather different from that found in European countries.

Another important issue when considering cross-national differences in ethnic penalties is the likelihood of varying degrees of positive selection among migrants, with likely implications for their children as well. Immigration rules differed between countries historically and these may leave legacies for the descendants.

Finally, Table 4.2 reveals a gender dimension, with men generally facing on average larger ethnic penalties than women, particularly in European OECD countries, although there are some exceptions. This pattern is also mirrored by the observed higher self-reported discrimination by native-born male offspring of immigrants in these countries and some of the testing studies that also found a higher incidence of discrimination against men. The reasons for this pattern are not entirely clear. Arai, Bursell and Nekby (2011), using the example of discrimination against persons with Arab-sounding names in Sweden, suggest that negative employer stereotypes tend to be mostly against men.²⁰

There are many other variants of these statistical methods for estimating ethnic penalties (e.g. the “Blinder-Oaxaca” residual, see OECD, 2008a). There are also some informative additional kinds of statistical analysis that can be carried out, such as analyses of the duration of unemployment spells or the length of transitions from school to the labour market. But the same general problems apply to all these techniques. The key difficulty with all of them is that there will always be a range of possible mechanisms, including but not restricted to discrimination, that can plausibly be suggested as explanations for the estimated ethnic penalties.

Policy responses: What works to counter discrimination?

The focus of this section is on policies, actions and schemes that have been developed to combat discrimination. Although this chapter deals only with ethnic and racial discrimination, most of the strategies and instruments discussed below have been conceived and applied as well to discrimination based on gender, disability, sexual orientation and sexual identity, religion, age and other categories that are protected under anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, as will be seen below, there are few anti-discrimination policies that are exclusively targeted on immigrants and their children.

The focus will again be on employment and the labour market, although anti-discrimination policies cover the whole spectrum of access to rights, goods and services. Besides employment and the labour market, policies and strategies are generally mainly targeting access to higher education, housing and political representation.

There is a large variety of policies and actions that can be defined as contributing to tackle discrimination against immigrants in the labour market. They vary along a gradient of formal and soft prohibition in legal standards to coercive and direct intervention of public authorities, often in co-operation with non-governmental actors. The various policies tackle discrimination in different ways. Three main groups of measures – anti-discrimination legislation, affirmative action and equal employment policies, and tools for promoting diversity – will be discussed below.

Some policies targeting immigrants and ethnic minorities may also appear under the general heading of “integration policies”, and the distinguishing lines cannot always be clearly drawn. There are obvious connections between integration and non-discrimination, since discrimination can be understood broadly as hampering integration. However, whereas anti-discrimination policies try to adapt and transform the structures of the society (institutions, laws, policies, procedures, practices and representations) to make them fair to immigrants, integration policies mainly aim at empowering immigrants and their children by enhancing their human and social capital.

Anti-discrimination legislation

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the basis for the International Human Rights Charter, along with the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provides the most fundamental framework for anti-discrimination. Its principles have further been detailed in thematic conventions, some of which specifically focus on racial discrimination. The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination adopted in 1965 and the Convention 111 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on discrimination (employment and occupation) are the main references in this area. These international treaties are seconded by regional treaties, such as the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and their respective protocols.

Most OECD countries have implemented specific legislation to deal with the issue of discrimination against immigrants (see the overview in OECD, 2008a). An important impetus for the OECD countries that are members of the EU has come from the EU’s Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC, which implements the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of *racial* or *ethnic origin*. This complements other directives on gender and age, disability, religion and sexual orientation. Similar legislation is present in the OECD countries that have been settled by migration where it has generally been implemented at much

earlier dates – such as Australia’s Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1977, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the United States which was enacted in 1964. Few OECD countries have not enacted specific legislation covering ethnic or racial discrimination, although basic protection against discrimination is generally granted through criminal norms and civil or administrative laws.²¹

Each anti-discrimination or equal opportunity law provides for the creation of agencies responsible for monitoring its application and for implementing its programmes. At the inception of the process, agencies tend to be specialised on a specific ground (gender, race and ethnicity, disability), but the recent trend is to merge these together into a single body. For example, the British *Commission for Racial Equality*, the *Equal Opportunity Commission* and the *Disability Rights Commission* were grouped together in the *Equality and Human Right Commission*, established by the Equality Act of 2006. The same occurred in Sweden with the new Discrimination Act enacted on the 1st January 2009, which merged together seven previous acts and created jointly an “Equality Ombudsman” and a “Board against discrimination”. This partly results from the transposition of the EU Race equality directive in the 27 EU member countries, all which have more or less adopted the same structure for action (see Ammer et al., 2010). However, even in the common framework provided by the EU directives, anti-discrimination schemes and actions vary greatly among EU countries.

In addition to the national equality bodies, the European Commission has established a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2007. Conversely to its national counterparts, the FRA does not have legal powers and has received the mission to provide independent and evidence-based advice on fundamental rights (see previous section). Similar equality bodies can be found in Canada and Australia, both at federal and provincial or state levels. The prerogatives of these agencies in combating discrimination can be far-reaching, ranging from the awareness-raising of public authorities and civil society to the co-ordination of equality policies (see below). They are responsible for all complaint-handling activities and may conduct legal actions and investigations.

Equality bodies are generally entitled to receive complaints, to assist victims in litigations and sometimes have legal power to take sanctions and make legal decisions. Mediation or conciliation are often preferred to litigation since discrimination cases often proved to be difficult to prosecute in the courts. The legal context itself produces large disparities in the outcome of the legal actions, and differences in organisational structures have an impact on the efficiency of the legal anti-discrimination framework. For example, the Swedish Equality Ombudsman has received a little more than 900 complaints on the grounds of ethnic origin or religion since its creation in 2009 and only 10 resulted in lawsuits (ECRI, 2012). A similar gap between complaints and lawsuits can be observed in France where the former equality body (HALDE) had treated 5 658 files of complaints in 2010, for which 127 legal cases were completed (in various categories), and in less than a handful of cases, condemnations actually took place, although a large number of files had been treated through mediation. The legal framework is thus generally complemented by other, more pro-active strategies, to control practices and processes without waiting for a complaint to be filed in. This is what affirmative action and equal employment policies, are aiming at.

Affirmative action and equal employment policies

Affirmative action is generally defined as a set of policies that take specific efforts to advance the economic status of minorities and women (Holzer, 2010). Affirmative action

and positive action are essentially the same kind of policies, the first concept having been originated in the United States and the second one, inspired by the experience in the United Kingdom, has been adopted by the European action plan against discrimination (see McCrudden, 1986; Sabbagh, 2011).

Equal Employment Policies (EEP) are generally understood as the application of such policies in the domain of employment. They clearly go beyond the sanctions for discriminatory acts. The rationale behind EEP is to “level the playing field” by removing barriers that hamper the access to the labour market and the professional upward mobility of members of the designated groups. Examples are the *Equal Employment Opportunity Act* passed in the United States in 1972 in the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the *Equal Opportunities Policies* developed in the United Kingdom (1984), the Canadian *Employment Equity Act* (1986 and 1996), the Dutch SAMEN Act (1998-2003) on equal labour market participation, and the *Equal Employment Opportunities* programmes in Australia.²² Similar provisions exist in other OECD countries.²³ The Flemish region of Belgium, for example, proposes since 1999 so-called *diversity plans* to employers, in co-operation with the social partners (see OECD, 2008b, for a discussion). The functioning of the plans is similar to that of EEP in other countries, but an innovative and important part of the diversity plans in Belgium is that they mainly target small- and medium-sized enterprises, in contrast to policies in most other countries which generally aim at larger employers.²⁴ There are of course country-specific variations among the different EEP policies, but they share the same background and have many provisions in common.

Objectives and implementation

The main objective of EEP is to move from formal equality of treatment, as defined in non-discrimination principles, to effective equality. The decisive turning point is when legislation and policies go beyond the prohibition and the prosecution of intentional discrimination to take non-intentional, systemic and indirect discrimination into account. The concepts of *disparate* or *adverse impacts* and systemic discrimination account for this watershed policy strategy.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the United States defines an adverse impact in employment as “a substantially different rate of selection in hiring, promotion or other employment decision which works to the disadvantage of members of a race, sex or ethnic group”. It occurs when a decision, practice, or policy has a disproportionately negative effect on a protected group even if it is unintentional.

The logic behind equal opportunities is that the apparent neutrality of hiring procedures and human resources processes should be monitored by checking the statistical representation of designated groups, both in hiring and across occupational levels. The notion of fair representation is attached to those of statistical under-representation and under-utilisation of available competencies of the active population in the job area. The equality programmes first need to identify members of the designated groups in firms and in their job area; then to collect data on their proportion at the beginning of the process (i.e. applicant pools, distribution in different occupations in the firm according to the level of qualification of the employees and experiences, wages, terminations, access to on-the-job training, etc.); and finally, to compare the statistics to a benchmark computed to identify the potential gaps which should then be addressed. The long-term objective is to relate the distribution in such a way that the protected groups fill positions in line with their skills and

qualifications. These policies thus combine the goals of improving the representation of protected groups with meritocratic criteria, since the level of qualifications and skills is still the determining factor in the appraisal representation of the target group.

The programmes developed under the EEP generally apply to firms with a minimum number of employees, typically above 50 or 100.²⁵ The EEP may cover companies in the private sector, but most programmes are primarily addressing institutions in the public sector or private contractors with public (federal) institutions. The ability to exert pressure on or impose sanctions against firms that fail to comply is conditional on their dependence on state funds or oversight. Most programmes involve a range of actions to raise employers and employees awareness, to organise the firm to facilitate implementation of equality plans, to ensure employment accessibility for protected groups, to review procedures and practices when barriers are identified, and to set targets for increased representation of designated groups in the firm. Most such actions require recourse to statistical data relating both to firm personnel and to comparable labour in the firm's environment.

The toolkit of effective equality policies generally comprises setting legally-binding agreements or an equality plan, emitting standards and codes of practice which define what kind of human resources process should be developed to respect non-discrimination principles and to promote diversity, monitoring practices and realisation of the plans, benchmarking the situation of each firm, and an impact assessment of the policies implemented.²⁶

A second line of policies which affect directly employment and the workplace are "equal pay" laws which prohibit discrimination in wages, defined as unjustifiable wage differential between groups. Most of the equal pay acts focus only on gender, as has been the case in the United States since 1963, in Australia since 1969 and in the United Kingdom since 1970.²⁷

Monitoring and reporting

The efficiency of EEP depends mostly on the monitoring and reporting systems. Because the main concern of EEP is not only that processes should be fair in their conception, but – more importantly – in their outcomes, statistical information is used at every stage of the implementation of the policies. Monitoring recruitments, promotions, access to training, wage differentials, occupational segregation and terminations helps companies to assess their commitment to non-discrimination and to identify which processes have to be revised to achieve more equality.

The notion of equality or equity under EEP is to ensure the proportional representation of the designated groups when the relevant criteria to obtain the occupation, the goods or the services have been fulfilled. The hypothesis underlying EEP is that in the absence of discrimination, and relative to their skills, qualifications and merits, the members of the protected groups would be present in employment to the same level as their potential allows.

For example, the assessment of adverse impact referred to the legislation in the United States is based on several statistical indexes. The agencies have adopted a rule of thumb under which they will generally consider a selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than 80% of the selection rate for the group with the highest selection rate as a substantially different rate of selection. For example, the selection rates for the race and ethnic groups are compared with the selection rate of the race or ethnic group with the highest selection rate.²⁸ As a consequence of the 80%-rule, if the proportion of Blacks

recruited following a test is lower than 20% of Whites, the test will be declared biased and will have to be modified. Other indicators are specified, such as the compensation analysis, which compares salary levels according to professional occupations and labour sectors. Here, statistically significant disparities are not considered to be proof of discrimination, but as an indication requiring a more in-depth examination.

The relevance of monitoring not only consists in its technical support of data essential for operating equality programmes. The involvement of the managers and agents in monitoring may help to develop consciousness of discrimination and making them accountable and responsible for eventual progress. Because of this, equality programmes generally feature precise guidelines for monitoring. The methods of data collection, their format, and the instructions for completing the statistical reports are published within voluminous guides for the use of administrations and managers. Compliance with these instructions is mandatory in the Canadian and the United States' programmes, while the mandatory provisions apply only to the public authorities in the British case and monitoring remains voluntary for the private sector.²⁹

Targets, goals and quotas

Within EEP, it is important to distinguish between a *target* or *goal*, which is indicative, and a *quota*, which is compulsory. Within an *equity scheme* imposing a quota, the employer must endeavour to relate the composition of its workforce to an ideal representation, defined on the basis of the available labour force within the reference area. If this objective is not reached over the period of the scheme, sanctions are applied, except where the employer can demonstrate the lack of a satisfactory candidate to occupy the available positions. Discrimination is generally presumed if the quota is not attained.

Whereas a fixed quota generally implies a preferential treatment of the group concerned – at least as long as it is underrepresented – the *target* concept does not necessarily imply preferential treatment. The fact that a candidate belongs to one of the target groups where it is necessary to increase the representation does not confer them with any additional advantage to compensate, for example, for lower qualifications or a CV of lower quality than another candidate. The latter advantage is precisely what is defined by affirmative action programmes which consist of allocating a premium to a candidate of a minority group, by way of “unequal merit”, where he/she would be recruited according to their affiliation to a protected group. While targets are generally placed within an equal opportunity scheme and thus positioned within a meritocratic framework, quota-based affirmative action intentionally deviates from this.

The legitimacy and efficiency of quotas have been extensively discussed in the United States, especially during the 1980s with the disengagement of affirmative action by the Reagan administration. Although the available research suggests that affirmative action can be an effective tool (see Box 4.3), this instrument has often been poorly implemented and remains a contentious instrument that is often criticised (see e.g. Stryker, 2001). As a policy tool, hard affirmative action and quotas by race have generally been discontinued in the United States, but remain in some non-OECD countries such as Brazil and Malaysia.³⁰

Box 4.3. Affirmative action policies for ethnic minorities and their impact

In the *United States*, much research has been conducted to estimate the effect of affirmative action on employment and education for minorities (for summaries, see e.g. Holzer and Neumark, 2000a, 2006 and Holzer, 2010). In a study on the impact of affirmative action until the late 1980s, Leonard (1990) concluded that it successfully promoted the employment of racial minorities, including in the early phase of the policy, when regulatory pressures have been inconsistent, and weak enforcement and a reluctance to apply sanctions were observed. Compliance reviews seem to be both the main and most efficient enforcement mechanism. He also finds that affirmative action has been more successful in establishments with a growing workforce, and that litigations had a positive impact on the occupational status of blacks, with a spill-over effect to firms which were not exposed to litigation for discrimination but may react preventively to reduce the legal threat. A later study, by Holzer and Neumark (2000b), also found that the organisations that have adopted affirmative action programmes have seen a clear improvement in the representation of minorities in relation to other establishments. Among the firms that used affirmative action policies, the effect was greatest for federal contractors – these are also the firms where incentives to comply tend to be particularly strong. Although the magnitude of the impact in terms of employment has not been large, the firms and positions affected by affirmative action were generally the better-paying ones, thus opening a rather attractive part of the labour market to the minorities concerned.

Affirmative action has also been used in the education sector in the *United States*, to promote minorities' access to colleges and universities. Kane (1998) and Long (2004) found that the effect was most pronounced in the most prestigious institutions. The effects were key from the perspective of the minorities – who often saw a doubling of their share in the most elite institutions (Bowen and Bok, 2000), but the overall minority share in enrolment remained modest.

In an assessment of the employment practices and workforce reviews of 708 private sector companies in the US from 1971 to 2002, Kalev et al. (2006) concluded that programmes pertaining to the transformation of the organisational structures by strengthening managerial responsibility and accountability with respect to equality tended to be particularly effective. In contrast, diversity training and evaluation showed no effect. Another evaluation conducted on federal agencies found mixed results of the diversity programmes regarding their effectiveness in creating a more equitable work environment for women or racial minorities (Naff and Kellough, 2003).

In the *United Kingdom*, a 1998 survey on the working conditions within companies, showed that Equality programmes were applied by 97% of public companies and 57% of companies in the private sector (CRE, 2003). Among the various actions provided for by the equality programmes, the monitoring of employees' ethnic and racial origin was only carried out by 30% of companies. This rather low level of monitoring also applied to companies from the public sector, where only 48% of companies had implemented it.

In the *Netherlands*, affirmative action was in place from 1994 until 2003 (for a discussion, see OECD, 2008b). The core of the policy was that individual companies should register the number of employed minorities and publish this information; the underlying acts specified the aim of proportional representation on the basis of the size and composition of the regional population. This policy was rather unpopular with employers who complained about the heavy administrative burden of compliance. There were no sanctions for non-compliance, a growing number of companies nevertheless responded to the obligations. In 1998, about half of all Dutch companies with more than 35 employees gave information about the number of minorities among their employees; in the following years the percentage rose to 70% (SCP, 2003). Fewer companies formulated quantitative objectives or published plans to promote employment of minorities in higher-skilled occupations (Zandvliet et al., 2003). By 2003, there had been a significant improvement of the labour market position of immigrants and their children in the previous years, although it was unclear whether or not this was attributable to the policy or to the overall favourable evolution of the economic situation in the *Netherlands* that occurred in parallel. According to employers, the policy boosted their awareness of the more difficult labour market position of minorities in the *Netherlands*, but they nevertheless perceived it as merely an “obligatory registration”. Despite a marked improvement in the employment of immigrants over the period (OECD, 2008b), employers denied that the act actually contributed to increased hiring of minorities or better career prospects for them within the company, a view that was also shared by part of the labour unions (Essafi et al., 2003). As a result, the policy was abolished in 2003.

Box 4.3. Affirmative action policies for ethnic minorities and their impact (cont.)

In Norway, moderate affirmative action policies were implemented with a 2009 amendment of the anti-discrimination act which obliged all public employers and private employers with more than 50 employees to make active and targeted efforts to promote equality and to publish these efforts, although there are no fines for not meeting the obligation (see OECD, 2012a). Already since 2002, there has been an obligation for employers in the large public sector to interview at least one candidate with a non-western immigrant background, if they are qualified. Since 2007, public agencies have been obliged to set concrete targets for the recruitment of people with an immigrant background, and to provide plans on how this goal is to be attained. Although there has been no thorough study on the effectiveness of the various measures, OECD (2012b) found that the implementation of the measures coincided with a strong growth – of more than 11% between 2002 and 2007 – in the public sector employment of immigrants from non-OECD countries who had already been in Norway prior to their implementation. These and other measures have been supplemented since 2008 by a pilot project for moderate affirmative action for immigrants applying for positions in the state public administration. If candidates have equal or approximately equal qualifications, a candidate with an immigrant background is to be preferred. The use of the measure thus far has been limited. However, managers of the enterprises that took part in the project stated that they had become more aware of the matter of diversity.

Non-regulatory tools for promoting diversity**Diversity management**

Grouped under the general heading of “diversity management”, there is a range of initiatives undertaken by the business community rather than through public policy. Although at its inception, diversity management was a by-product of equal employment policies (Dobbin, 2009), it has often been implemented by companies in countries where such policies have never been developed, especially in Europe (Wrench, 2007). Indeed, the spread of diversity management seems to reflect the extension of multinational companies and the standardisation of human resources processes. Diversity management tools include so-called “cultural audits” to identify biases in the organisational processes, mentoring programmes, career guidance, diversity training, outreach activities towards underrepresented groups to diversify recruitment channels, etc.

The main idea behind these initiatives is that creating a diversity-friendly workplace by facilitating the recruitment, inclusion, promotion and retention of “diverse employees” and managing properly this diverse workforce will help to increase productivity and give a market advantage to companies both in the home market – by reaching out to immigrants and their offspring as customers – and in markets abroad. Likewise, in a context of labour shortages, developing diversity management tools has become an important means for attracting and retaining staff.³¹ This becomes evident when looking at the contribution of immigration flows in terms of labour market dynamics. On average over the OECD, new immigrants already account for almost 30% of new entries into the working-age population (OECD, 2012c), and in many countries this share is expected to grow further with population ageing.

In addition to this, there may also be a value-added stemming from diversity itself because bringing together people with different backgrounds, experiences and perspectives may increase the potential and the expertise of the working unit. There has been little solid empirical research to assess to which degree this is actually the case. However, Herring (2009) found that, using data from the National Organisations Survey in the United States, greater racial diversity in businesses is associated with increased sales revenue and profits as well as more customers and greater market share. Regarding innovation activity, Ozgen, Nijkamp

and Poot (2013) find, using longitudinal firm-level data from the Netherlands, that firms which employ *fewer* foreign workers are generally more innovative, but that diversity *within* the foreign workforce is positively associated with innovation activity, corroborating similar results regarding innovation activity among European regions by the same authors (Ozgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 2011).

Developing diversity management tools and targeting a fair (i.e. proportional) representation of minority members in the workforce also helps to reduce the risks of litigations and to comply with equal employment policies where they exist. Likewise, employees may favour working environments that promote inclusion, respect, openness, collaboration and equity. Diversity management may also involve benefits in terms of better publicity, and thus be used as a reputational tool by the firm.

Although the promotion of diversity management in the corporate world stems generally out of economic interest, the tools and strategies developed under this heading often resemble employment equality policies. It offers also an alternative to the non-discrimination paradigm by insisting on the positive dimension of diversity (promoting) rather than the coercive and critical perspective on management associated with the fight against discrimination.

Diversity management has its roots in the United States during the 1980s, when Equal Employment Policies were reaching their peak and a new class of “diversity managers” was created to fulfil the obligations created by the revision in 1972 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the new strategy of the EEOC towards systemic discrimination rather than intentional discrimination. In 1980, diversity management was applied by less than 5% of a sample of 389 employers, but almost 50% of them had implemented it by 1997 (Kelly and Dobbin, 1998).

A survey conducted with the European Business Test Panel found in 2005 that 52% of companies in the European Union did not develop any diversity initiatives, and only 21% had well-embedded policies and practices (European Commission, 2005). The main motivations of these latter companies were: i) “commitment to equality and diversity as company values”; ii) “access to new labour pools and high quality employees”; and iii) “economic effectiveness, competitiveness, profitability. In contrast to the United States, compliance with the law was not a major driver for these companies, which reflects that the anti-discrimination framework in Europe tends to be less binding”. The survey also showed that only 31% of the companies implementing diversity initiatives were monitoring and reporting the results and impacts of their actions.

Diversity charters and labels

Whereas equal employment policies comprise legally binding compliance to standards and codes of practices, diversity charters and labels fall under voluntary initiatives and participation is generally part of the broader diversity management of the company. In contrast to the latter, however, these tools involve public or semi-public bodies which are at least proposing the tool and – in the case of labels – certify participation and compliance.

A *diversity charter* is a document by which a company or a public institution commits itself to respect and promote diversity and equal opportunities at the workplace. More or less detailed provisions or targets can be stated in these charters. One of the first of its kind in Europe, the French diversity charter was launched in October 2004 and has been signed by more than 3 450 companies since then. By signing the Charter, the companies are endorsing the six articles by which they commit to create awareness and train their

managers in the values of non-discrimination and diversity, to reflect the diversity of the French society in their workforce, to involve employees in this endeavour and to report annually on the progress made. This example has been replicated in ten other European OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Poland, Spain and Sweden). The country-specific charters differ by their coverage and their scope, but the commitments tend to be similar. Clearly, there is also an element of marketing involved for the signatory companies and indeed, it is often mainly the large enterprises which participated in these efforts – i.e. the companies where recruitment strategies already tend to be less discriminatory.³²

Being voluntary, these charters do not entail specific monitoring to check if companies respect their commitments. As such, the charters testify that the companies are concerned with promoting diversity, even if this may not necessarily translate into concrete actions. Reviews of the actions implemented according to the charter are suggested, but in most cases the audits focus on the design of the programmes and not on their outcomes.

Diversity labels go one step beyond the charters by delivering a certification based on an assessment of the measures taken and their implementation. An independent body is responsible for delivering the label, which is based on an audit of the companies. A diversity label was established in France in 2008 and is delivered by a commission made up of representatives of the national administration, the social partners, the National Organisation of Human Resources Managers and experts. An audit is performed by the French national organisation for standardisation, which may grant a certification. The label is delivered for three years; more than 260 companies have received it thus far. A similar diversity label is granted by the Brussels-Capital Region in Belgium. Some countries, such as Belgium, have also established specific *diversity awards*, rewarding good practices in this domain by employers.

Standardising job applications and anonymous CVs

Among the elements that can produce discrimination, notably with respect to the crucial first stage of the recruitment process, the format and contents of the CV of job applicants have been a major concern among equal opportunity policy makers and diversity managers. The idea behind *anonymous CVs* is that the reduction of signals that are linked with categories of population exposed to discrimination, such as age, gender and ethnicity/race or nationality, will contribute to limit discrimination.

Avoiding collecting information on age and gender is straightforward, even though age can be easily deduced from details about the education history and work experience of applicants. The use of photos should also be avoided since they deliver information that clearly influences selections. Race/ethnicity, gender and age can be deduced using a photo.

Pushed to its logical conclusion, the idea to reduce the negative signals attached to stereotypes and prejudices leads to the full anonymity of the CV. Indeed, first and last names convey information on gender, ethnicity/race, and possibly also social class. The social meaning of names and their relation to discriminatory selections are highlighted in audit testing where they embody the signal used to characterise gender or race/ethnicity. Considering the compelling evidence regarding the impact of names on the chances to access to jobs, it is tempting to adopt a radical strategy to erase the signal. In the United Kingdom, a government initiative to remove the name and school details from CV

was backed by 100 major firms in January 2012. This initiative would be included in the employment equal opportunity scheme, and is deemed to reduce discrimination and increase the fairness of recruitment.

Experiments with anonymous job applications have been developed in several countries. The French law on “Equal opportunities”, enacted in March 2006 in response to the riots that took place at the end of 2005, introduced an obligation in the labour law to all firms of 50 employees or more to collect anonymous CVs in their hiring procedures. However, this article of the law has never been enforced by a relevant decree. To make a decision, the French government initiated an experiment in 2009-10, involving 1 005 job offers which were used to compare the chances of call back for different categories of applicants. An evaluation found that ethnic minorities and residents from deprived neighbourhoods appeared to be penalised by the measure, in contrast to women (Behagel, Crepon and Le Barbanchon, 2011). However, participation in the experiment was voluntary, and it appears that mainly companies that were interested in diversifying their staff participated. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the study, the government took the decision to withdraw the proposal for the use of anonymous CVs.

Similar experiments have been undertaken in Germany (Krause et al., 2012), the Netherlands (Gemeente Nijmegen, 2007) and in Sweden (Aslund and Nordstrom Skans, 2012). All of these studies found that ethnic minorities benefit from anonymity since they receive higher call-backs rates when their ethnic background cannot be detected in the CV. However, they still seem to be meeting a harder selection at the stage of the job talk and the rate of job offers received by ethnic minorities remained significantly lower and could be interpreted as a proof of discriminatory selection. Krause et al. (2012) stress that although applicants with a migration background globally benefit from anonymity, there are cases where they may lose from this strategy if employers favour diversity.

The value of anonymous CVs to reduce hiring discrimination is still debated. Although some of the studies mentioned above provide evidence that standardised and anonymous applications increase significantly the likelihood for ethnic minorities to receive call backs, it is possible that minorities that pass the first stage only because of the merits of such a CV may still encounter unfair treatment at the second stage of the hiring process.³³ Anonymous CVs also raised negative reactions from stakeholders such as employer organisations, human resources managers and immigrant associations. The former claim that – in addition to practical implementation problems – reducing the information in job applications may contradict the objectives of the selection process, while the latter express concerns that the artificial removal of gender or racial/ethnic markers in the job application contributes to the stigmatisation of these markers and may also reinforce the unfair treatments at the second stage of the hiring processes.

Conclusion

Although it is not possible to fully capture the actual incidence of discrimination across OECD countries, let alone to compare levels across countries, a consistent picture emerges of ethnic disadvantage in employment showing compelling evidence of discrimination against immigrants and their children in the labour market and other domains, notably housing. The results of the field experiments are consistent with those emerging from the self-report studies and statistical analysis of ethnic penalties. Regarding employment, there is little doubt that discrimination against “visible” minorities occurs in all countries, especially at the recruitment process.

Even though there has been no study yet of the impact of the current global economic crisis on the incidence of discrimination, the available evidence suggests that discrimination tends to be more pronounced in situations of a slack labour market, and the few studies on past crises suggest that there is a risk of selective lay-off as well. Thus, the issue of discrimination is a pertinent one to-day, particularly in a context where the crisis coincides with the presence of large and growing numbers of immigrants and, increasingly, their offspring, in the labour markets of OECD countries.

Already well prior to the crisis, policy has reacted to the existence of discrimination and a broad range of measures has been applied to tackle it, many of which have existed for several decades. The most common and basic of these actions is anti-discrimination legislation, which is now found in virtually all OECD countries. It demonstrates that policy is aware of the issue and paying attention to it. For employers, such legislation essentially increases the cost of discrimination. Sanctions, however, are rare, and the incentives to comply with the rules are generally limited. The same goes for the incentives of victims of discrimination to file a complaint. Strengthening such sanctions and, more generally, the incentives to be vigilant could be an important element in a broader strategy of tackling the issue. Immigrants' awareness about the existing legal support mechanisms against discrimination should also be raised.

Other anti-discrimination measures, such as affirmative action policies and anonymous CVs, aim rather at “technically” preventing discrimination. While these policies seem to have had some effect, rigid goals and quotas may have the negative by-effect of increasing stereotypes if such measures are associated with lower standards for the groups concerned. Such tools should thus be rather seen and designed as a means of ensuring truly equal opportunities, and success in this respect needs to be monitored.

A third group of instruments is non-regulatory and aims at enhancing the benefits from non-discrimination for employers, through diversity management and more specific diversity policy tools such as diversity charters and labels. Like many regulatory tools, however, they apply mainly to larger employers. Yet, the evidence suggests that discrimination tends to be most pronounced in small- and medium-sized companies (SMEs). Two possible explanations for this, both of which are related, are that there are higher stakes for such companies involved in hiring one staff member whose productivity level is uncertain, or that SMEs have less experience with immigrants and may thus be more prone to negative stereotypes.

Indeed, combating stereotypes and diminishing uncertainty for employers seems to be an important axis for policy action. At the level of the individual candidate, any tool that helps to overcome the information deficit will tend to lower the risk of discrimination. Therefore, many broader integration measures that bring immigrants in contact with employers, such as mentoring and traineeships, will potentially also help to tackle discrimination. Employers also seem to value “signals” of integration potential on the part of immigrants applying for jobs, and immigrants should be aware of this and should be encouraged to send such signals, for example by taking up host-country citizenship where eligible. At the level of the society, combating stereotypes seems to be particularly important. Role models can help here; this is a domain where the public sector can play a leading role. An essential step in this direction would also be an attempt to measure the economic loss from discrimination, which is currently lacking. Most important, however, is a need for a balanced and fact-based public discourse, to avoid that negative stereotypes about immigrants become self-fulfilling prophecies.

Notes

1. This chapter has been written by Anthony Heath (University of Oxford, United Kingdom), Thomas Liebig (OECD Secretariat) and Patrick Simon (Institut national d'études démographiques, France). It includes a contribution from Karolin Krause.
2. Human rights treaties and anti-discrimination laws prohibit discrimination on several grounds including race and ethnic origin. Reference to "race" does not entail a belief in the existence of biological races, but is referred to as a "social construct", which is the definition used, for example, by the census and the Office of Management and Budget in the United States. In Canada, the Employment Equity Act defines visible minorities as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour". In other countries, the terminology avoids the reference to "race", but the content of the category is very close to it. The European Equality Directives retain race as a ground while specifying that "The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. The use of the term 'racial origin' in this Directive does not imply an acceptance of such theories". Taking sides with the EU directives and in contrast to the countries which have an explicit account of race, Sweden and Germany have decided to remove the reference to race in their anti-discrimination legislation which mentions only ethnic origin among the grounds covered. In France, there is an ongoing debate to remove "race" from the Article 1 of the constitution which states the "equality before the law of all citizens without distinction of origin, race or origin".
3. To distinguish the target group, each country has a specific denomination – such as persons with a different "ethnic origin", "immigrants and their children", "immigrant background", "visible minority" and "minority group". In spite of some differences, these terms are used synonymously in this chapter. See also Box 4.1 for an overview of the different concepts.
4. If the underlying stereotypes are true, such "statistical" discrimination will only be observed at the individual level. For example, "true" stereotypes about the average productivity of immigrants with certain characteristics would result in wage differentials that reflect the average differential of productivity. However, even in the absence of stereotypes, immigrant and non-immigrant workers with the same productivity may be treated differently if employers are better judges of the productivity of the latter (see OECD, 2008 for a discussion). In any case, as will be seen below, it should be stressed that statistical discrimination is unlawful.
5. For a recent overview of the impact of discrimination on integration outcomes, see Uslucan and Yalcin (2012).
6. In particular, Røed and Schøne (2006) find that the segregation between plants hiring natives and "non-western" migrants in Norway is stronger in the domestic sectors than in the internationally open sectors. In addition, there seems to be a positive causal relationship between the employment of non-OECD migrants and profits in the domestic market.
7. For example, Albaretto and Mistrulli (2011) show for Italy that persons with an immigrant background pay, on average, almost 70 basis points more for a credit for setting up a business than the native-born. However, it is not clear to which degree this represents discrimination since the default risk of immigrants – in particular those with a foreign nationality – could also be higher either because their businesses' survival rates are lower (see OECD, 2009) or because they may be more likely to "disappear" (e.g. if they return to origin countries), with difficult enforcement. Indeed, Albaretto and Mistrulli (2011) find not only that the differential is lower for native-born offspring of immigrants, but also that a longer credit history reduces the interest-rate differential between the two types of entrepreneurs. They also find that increases in the size of the migrant community are associated with a narrowing of the interest-rate differential between migrant and Italian entrepreneurs.
8. For example, there was a long legal battle in the United Kingdom, ending up in the House of Lords, over the issue of whether Sikhs counted as a racial group for the purposes of the 1976 Race Discrimination Act.
9. Trade unions also frequently provide advice on the legal framework for anti-discrimination.
10. Indeed, survey data for the European OECD countries suggests that many immigrants are not aware of the complaints mechanisms available to them (see FRA, 2010b; and European Commission, 2012).
11. For example, in the Swiss experiment (Fibbi et al., 2006), job offers were not considered which explicitly demanded "Swiss nationality" or "Swiss German". Indeed, in contrast to most other OECD countries, such practices are not unlawful in Switzerland as it has no specific legislation covering discrimination against immigrants.

12. With respect to the housing market, Hanson, Hawley and Taylor (2011) found that landlords take longer to respond to persons with an African-American sounding name, compared with persons with a “white”-sounding name. They also tend to write emails to this group that are shorter and less polite.
13. Two British studies of applications by candidates studying for an MBA applying for managerial jobs in the top 100 companies also found no evidence of discrimination against those with an Asian name (Noon, 1993; Hoque and Noon, 1999).
14. However, this was not replicated in Ireland.
15. The French study also found a strong difference between native-born children with two and one foreign-born parent, with the former being almost twice as likely to report having been discriminated against as those with only one foreign-born parent.
16. However, Reitz and Banerjee (2007), using a different survey, found that native-born offspring from visible minorities in Canada are more likely to perceive to be discriminated against than immigrants from the origin countries of their parents.
17. Nevertheless, in some European OECD countries it seems that high-educated immigrants and their offspring report more often to be discriminated against than their low-educated peers (for France, see Beauchemin et al., 2010).
18. For example, in the case of treatment by a local council, the net rate (percentage expecting better minus percentage expecting worse treatment) was +14 for the majority group and -14 for minorities. Similar patterns were found in other domains (Heath and Cheung, 2006). Wrench (2011) gives further examples of surveys of the majority population which tend to corroborate the victim studies.
19. This also raises a bias among those in the labour force, as those who participate in the labour market may be those who have a lower tendency or fear less to be discriminated against.
20. The authors argue that although traditional gender stereotypes place women in domestic and nurturing roles, women who actively seek employment may be perceived as deviating from the stereotypical norms.
21. Mexico, for example, does not have specific legislation covering ethnic discrimination, but its Constitution provides for protection against discrimination, with a specific article (Article 123) prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in employment. The overall framework against discrimination was significantly strengthened by a human rights reform implemented in 2011.
22. Under the new Australian multicultural policy launched in 2011, a national anti-racism strategy is implemented since 2012 and an *Agenda for Racial Equality* has set different commitments for achieving equality at the workplace.
23. In addition, EEP has also been implemented in a number of non-OECD countries.
24. This is important since, as seen above, hiring practices tend to be more discriminatory in smaller companies.
25. Indeed, in small firms such policies are often impractical, since there are only few positions available and, say, if the relevant minority population only accounts for 10% of the pool, then in many cases there will be no hirings of immigrants even under perfectly equal opportunities.
26. The genealogy of Equal Employment Policies in their pro-active framework can be traced back to a landmark ruling by the United States’ Supreme Court in 1971, *Griggs versus Duke*. In this judgment, the Court established that the Civil Rights Act not only prohibits intentional discrimination, but also the practices which, although “impartial within their intent are discriminatory within their operation”. Immediately following the validation of this interpretation of anti-discriminatory legislation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act was updated to screen out access to employment, career advancement and termination of the employment relationship to make sure that these different processes are not biased against members of the target groups (women, racial and ethnic minorities, persons with disability, etc.). It was according to the same interpretation of equity defined as effective equality, not evaluated prior to the selection trials (neutrality of access) but following the trials (effective equality in the outcome), that Canada launched its employment equity programme in 1986.
27. Indeed, the more advanced and efficient anti-discrimination schemes are focusing on gender equality (see also the overview in OECD, 2008a).
28. The *Federal Contract Compliance Manual* (www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/fccm/fccmanul.htm) explains how to assess *adverse impact* and *disparate impact*: “The disparate impact analysis consists of two steps: 1) calculating the adverse impact of the criterion and the statistical significance of that

impact; and 2) determining whether the contractor can justify use of the criterion based on job relatedness or business necessity. “Adverse impact is used to refer to the results of the statistical analysis and disparate impact is used to refer to adverse impact that the contractor has not been able to justify on the basis of business necessity or job relatedness.” The complete manual covers 700 pages. It is an obligation of large companies to designate a member of staff that is responsible for the *Affirmative Action* programme. The specialisation required by such compliance with legal schemes can also be observed in the *equal opportunity* programmes in the United Kingdom and *employment equality* programmes in Canada.

29. For example, monitoring within the Canadian Equal Employment Opportunities Act is mandatory for federally regulated private sector employers with 100 employees or more, federal public sector companies and federal contractors (contracts of over CAD 200 000). Every year, companies under the EEP must provide a report consisting of a quantitative section, on recruitment, dismissals, promotions, salary ranges and professional occupations for each designated group, and a qualitative section illustrating the measures taken to improve the situation of the designated groups within the company and the results of these initiatives.
30. In Malaysia, they apply to the ethnic majority. Some hard quotas, however, still exist in some OECD countries to combat gender discrimination.
31. Indeed, the UEAPME – the employers’ umbrella organisation representing the interests of European crafts, trades and SMEs at EU level – described the motivation for diversity action plans as related to the “shortage of specific skills and competences, the demographic developments which will even increase these shortages, the activities in the framework of Corporate Social Responsibility policy and an increasing number of immigrant population, which are potential employees but also potential customers and clients” (UEAPME, 2007).
32. As part of its programme for enhancing diversity at the workplace, the European Commission is funding a platform for exchange between organisations in promoting and implementing diversity charters.
33. Indeed, as already mentioned, this seems to have been one of the drivers of the negative impact of the anonymous CV in the French experiment. Ignoring the characteristics of applicants with a migration background would then serve to reduce their chances to be called for a job interview (and later to be recruited). Some of the findings of this study support this hypothesis for women, but not for ethnic minorities who do not seem to receive specific attention by German employers.

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Chapter 5

Country notes: Recent changes in migration movements and policies

Australia

Australia's migration and humanitarian programs combined comprised 199 000 individual entries in 2011-12, an increase of 8.9% with respect with the 2010-11 figure. The migration programme was used by around 185 000 individuals, the majority of whom were granted visas under the skill stream (126 000, half of whom were already in Australia) and most of the rest (59 000) under the family stream (28% already onshore). The top two source countries for permanent migrants through the migration programme were India (29 000) and China (25 500), and seven of the top 10 source countries in 2011-12 are located in Asia. The United Kingdom (25 000) fell to third place as an origin country of permanent migrants to Australia.

The number of temporary migrants also increased sharply in 2011-12. Almost 680 000 temporary migrants entered Australia, mostly international students (37%) and working holiday makers (33%). Inflows of international students increased by 1% to 253 000 visa grants in 2011-12, the first rise since the peak in 2008-09. In 2011, there were more than 550 000 international students enrolled in Australian education institutions (more than three-quarters from within Asia).

In addition, inflows of New Zealanders under the Trans-Tasman agreement reached over 44 000 in 2011-12, an increase of 28% with respect to the previous year and equivalent to almost 1% of the New Zealand population.

After experiencing a mild downturn during the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the Australian economy continued its recovery into 2011-12. Rising global demand for commodities has led to regional skilled labour shortages. A temporary migration initiative to help address the skill needs of the resources sector was agreed in May 2012 ("Enterprise Migration Agreement"). So far, this particular agreement will result in the sponsorship of over 1 700 workers in an iron ore project in western Australia's Pilbara region.

In 2011-12, there were almost 7 400 refugee status determination requests for asylum seekers who arrived in Australia by boat, a rise of 43% over the previous year. Their number has grown substantially since 2006-07, from only 23 requests to a yearly average of over 5 700 requests in the last three years. An expert panel produced a report in August 2012 with advice and recommendations to prevent asylum seekers from risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia; the report's recommendations are being implemented by the government. The changes provide incentives for asylum seekers to look

for protection through a managed regional system. Unauthorised maritime arrivals will now have the same legal status independently from where they enter Australian territory, removing incentives to take greater risks by seeking to reach the Australian mainland to avoid being subject to regional processing arrangements. At the same time, the number of places for resettlement will rise, to 20 000 in Australia's 2012-13 humanitarian programme, 45% more than the previous year.

A 2011 review of Australia's Student visa programme produced 41 recommendations. Implementation of these recommendations started in November 2011, and more than half have since been implemented, including streamlined visa processing for university enrolment, more flexible work conditions and a Genuine Temporary Entry requirement.

In December 2011, the Australian Government announced that it would reform the current employer-sanctions regime for businesses that allow, or refer for work, non-citizens without the required lawful entitlement. The new laws are one component of a broader reformed employer sanctions framework, focused on preventing and deterring illegal work and hiring practices.

In July 2012, Australia implemented a two-step process for their skilled migration programme (named "SkillSelect"), designed to give the Australian Government greater control over the composition and quality of skilled migration. Migrants are required to submit an Expression of Interest, and only afterwards are some invited to apply for a visa. Within the SkillSelect scheme, a Significant Investor visa has been introduced for investors with more than AUD 5 million to invest in the Australian economy. The Significant Investor visa was launched in November 2012. In addition, the number of different Skilled Migration visa categories was reduced from 27 to 11.

Furthermore, the Seasonal Worker Program established in July 2012 will make 12 000 visa places available over the next four years for seasonal workers in certain Pacific Island countries to work in low-skilled jobs for up to seven months in a 12-month period. Australia also announced it will begin talks on establishing working holiday agreements with an additional six countries.

For further information

www.immi.gov.au.

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

AUSTRALIA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Inflows	5.6	7.9	9.3	9.3	6.8	9.3	210.7	
Outflows	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.7	17.9	
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Australia 2001-10 annual average 2011 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011				
Work	46.5	56.2	22.3	25.6				
Family (incl. accompanying family)	120.8	112.3	58.0	51.1				
Humanitarian	14.6	14.0	7.0	6.4				
Free movements	24.4	34.6	11.7	15.7				
Others	2.2	2.5	1.0	1.1				
Total	208.5	219.5	100.0	100.0				
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10				
<i>Thousands</i>								
International students	116.7	158.2	126.2	176.2				
Trainees	7.0	3.7	3.5	5.4				
Working holiday makers	104.4	175.7	185.5	153.2				
Seasonal workers	..	0.1	0.4	0.1				
Intra-company transfers	..	4.3	5.4	4.7				
Other temporary workers	71.6	91.1	114.5	114.8				
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.2	11 505	
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Total	12.3	14.3	11.5	13.6	12.8	15.3	302	
Natural increase	6.3	6.5	6.6	6.7	6.0	6.8	150	
Net migration	5.8	6.7	7.7	8.2	6.0	10.8	184	
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>								
Foreign-born population	23.0	24.2	26.5	26.7	23.6	25.6	6 029	
Foreign population	
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>								
	83 698	
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>								
Native-born men	..	79.9	79.2	78.9	78.8	80.0		
Foreign-born men	..	74.6	77.0	78.1	73.2	76.3		
Native-born women	..	67.0	68.5	68.8	65.6	68.9		
Foreign-born women	..	58.0	60.3	61.6	55.5	59.7		
<i>Unemployment rate</i>								
Native-born men	..	4.9	5.3	5.2	6.0	4.7		
Foreign-born men	..	5.2	5.1	4.6	6.1	5.0		
Native-born women	..	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.8	4.8		
Foreign-born women	..	5.5	6.1	6.0	6.4	5.8		
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Real GDP	2.1	3.0	2.1	2.3	3.3	2.7		
GDP/capita (level in USD)	0.8	1.6	0.6	0.8	2.0	0.9	42 060	
Employment (level in thousands)	2.6	3.5	2.3	2.0	2.1	2.3	11 488	
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
Unemployment	6.3	5.0	5.2	5.1	5.9	4.9		

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823795>

Austria

In 2011 the total inflow of foreign nationals to Austria increased to 114 900 (17% more than in 2010). Outflows also increased to 73 400, 11% more than in 2010. Net immigration of foreign nationals, was 30% higher than in 2010. This increase in the net inflow of migrants was due to relatively strong GDP growth (+2.7%) in 2011 and to the expiration of employment restrictions for citizens of the EU8 countries. 59% of foreign nationals entering Austria in 2011 came from EU/EFTA countries; the largest share (one-fourth) came from the EU15, led by Germany, from which inflows have been stable in recent years. Increasing inflows were seen from the EU8, which comprised one-fifth of all inflows and from the EU2 (13%). Inflows from Bosnia-Herzegovina increased, as did those of citizens of the United States and countries in Africa and Asia, while net inflows of Turkish citizens decreased considerably.

The employment of foreign workers increased by 8% in 2011. 45% of all foreign employees were EU/EFTA citizens. In 2011, employment of non-EU/EFTA citizens rose by 4%, compared with 2% in 2010, due in part to the “Red-White-Red” (RWR) Card introduced midyear. The share of foreigners in total employment (of wage and salary earners) stood at 15% in 2011.

Family migration accounted for the bulk of permanent migration from outside the EU. Of the 20 500 permanent immigrants from non-EU/EFTA countries arriving in 2011, about one-fifth (4 400) were quota-subject, i.e. family members of a non-EU/EFTA citizen. The rest were largely either family members of Austrians or EU/EFTA citizens, exempt from the quota, or holders of the RWR Card, status changes by university graduates or humanitarian-grounds immigrants. The RWR Card (for work in the first year of settlement) and the RWR Card plus (for family members and work beyond the first year) were introduced in July 2011 as a points-based system of immigration. In addition to settlement permits, the competent residence authorities issue temporary residence permits for study, for certain temporary kinds of work, for business purposes, and for humanitarian grounds. In 2011, 7 500 first temporary residence permits were issued, 21% more than the previous year. Most of the increase was due to a rise in the inflow of higher education students, who accounted for about half of inflows. In addition, 8 150 seasonal workers entered, a 22% decline from 2010, as nationals of new EU-member countries increasingly perform these jobs.

After a decline of asylum applications in 2010, the numbers rose again by 31% in 2011 to 14 400, and by a

further 21% in 2012, to around 17 400. The largest single country of origin of asylum seekers is Afghanistan, followed by the Russian Federation, Pakistan, Syria and Iran. The acceptance rate in 2012 was about 22%.

From July 2011, asylum applicants in the centre of first reception must remain available for the first 120 hours of the admission procedure. From October 2011, asylum applicants whose claim has been rejected by the Federal Asylum Office are automatically provided with legal counselling and support free of charge.

Comprehensive reform of Austrian migration policy in July 2011 led to the introduction of the RWR Card, which grants settlement and work with a specific employer for the first year. An RWR Card plus grants free labour market access for card holders and their family members. From September 2011, an official website (www.migration.gv.at) provides information on the immigration system (including a points calculator) as well as living and working conditions in Austria. To improve uptake of the RWR Card by skilled migrants from abroad, a return to pre-2011 procedures, under which employers in Austria can conduct the application process for a potential foreign worker, is expected in the first semester of 2013.

In early 2011 a Secretary of State for Integration, in charge of the co-ordination of integration policies in various ministries, was created. Together with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, it launched a website in early 2012 to provide information and guidance for the accreditation of foreign degrees. Information-points offering counselling services for the recognition and validation of foreign qualifications were established country-wide in early 2013. Youth and apprenticeship coaching initiatives came into effect in 2012, providing free counselling and education to prevent drop-out and to raise the skill level of early school leavers (natives as well as migrants). Home Instruction for Parents of Preschool Youngsters (HIPPPY) was further promoted by the Secretary of State for Integration in 2011.

For further information

www.bmi.gv.at
www.bmask.gv.at
www.migration.gv.at/en/
www.statistik.at/web_en/statistics/population/index.html

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

AUSTRIA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	8.1	11.9	11.7	13.6	11.2	11.0	114.9
Outflows	5.5	6.1	7.9	8.7	6.0	7.1	73.6
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011	Austria		
Work	0.6	1.0	1.4	1.7			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	11.1	12.5	24.1	21.3			
Humanitarian	4.7	6.4	10.3	11.0			
Free movements	29.3	38.2	63.7	65.5			
Others	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.4			
Total	45.9	58.4	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	3.2	3.5	4.6	3.0			
Trainees	0.4			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers	11.4	10.5	8.2	11.3			
Intra-company transfers	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1			
Other temporary workers	6.3	2.6	2.9	2.9			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	2.3	2.7	1.3	1.7	3.7	1.6	14 416
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	2.5	6.4	3.5	4.6	5.7	3.6	39
Natural increase	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	2
Net migration	2.2	5.4	3.3	4.2	4.9	3.4	36
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	10.4	14.5	15.7	16.0	14.1	15.2	1 349
Foreign population	8.7	9.7	11.1	11.5	9.4	10.4	971
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	3.5	4.5	0.7	0.7	5.0	1.5	6 690
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	76.2	76.2	77.9	73.3	75.3	78.3	
Foreign-born men	76.1	71.1	73.5	66.7	73.4	73.7	
Native-born women	59.9	63.5	67.9	73.3	61.5	67.1	
Foreign-born women	58.3	54.2	59.8	66.7	56.8	57.0	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	4.3	3.9	3.8	3.3	4.1	3.4	
Foreign-born men	8.7	10.8	8.8	8.0	9.8	9.0	
Native-born women	4.2	4.6	3.6	3.5	4.1	3.9	
Foreign-born women	7.2	10.5	7.6	8.3	8.5	8.6	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	3.7	2.4	2.1	2.7	1.7	1.4	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.4	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.1	1.0	42 186
Employment (level in thousands)	0.5	2.2	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.3	4 103
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	3.6	5.2	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.4	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823814>

Belgium

In 2011, the foreign population of Belgium amounted to 1 170 000 persons, or 10.6% of the country's total population. The share of foreigners in the population was up by 0.4% compared with 2010. Non-European nationals now account for 3.6% of the total population. 132 000 immigrants (Belgians and foreigners) entered Belgium in 2011, up by 2% compared with 2010 (not including asylum seekers). By country of birth, the foreign-born comprise 15% of the total population of Belgium, with 745 700 born in European Union member countries. Since 2008, Morocco has been the main country of origin of immigrants, followed by France, the Netherlands and Italy.

The number of first-time work permits issued to migrant workers rose by nearly 20% between 2010 and 2011. From 25 000 first-time permits granted in 2008, the number fell to 13 000 in 2009 and 2010, before climbing to 15 000 in 2011. This is due to the fact that since 1 May 2009, citizens of new EU member countries no longer need to apply for a work permit to come and work in Belgium. Only Bulgarian and Romanian EU nationals are still required to apply for a work permit, until 31 December 2013 at the latest. Half of all first-time work permits issued in 2010 went to Bulgarians and Romanians, mainly in shortage-list occupations.

The proportion of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in the labour force (comprising salaried workers, self-employed and unemployed persons) rose by 16% and 24% respectively compared with 2010. The number of Polish citizens, who make up the largest single contingent of immigrants from the new EU countries, increased by 13% in 2011. Overall, the number of foreign-born nationals in the total labour force grew by 6% over the same period.

The proportion of highly skilled workers (and managers) among migrants entering with first-time work permits stood at 25% in 2011. Over half of these permits were once again issued mostly to Indian citizens, followed by highly skilled workers from the United States and Japan.

There were 29 800 naturalisations in 2011, a drop of 14% compared with 2010. The main countries of origin of naturalised Belgians are Morocco, followed by Italy, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Russian Federation. Immigrants from these five countries accounted for 51% of naturalisations in 2011.

Just over 25 000 applications for asylum – covering around 33 000 persons – were received in Belgium in 2011. This figure is up 28% from 2010 and above the twenty-year average. In 2011, nearly a fifth of all applications were from nationals of Afghanistan or Guinea. The number of favourable decisions granting refugee status topped 2 800 in 2011, of which 570 were for Guinean citizens.

In December 2011, Belgium decided to extend the transitional arrangement applicable to Bulgarian and Romanian workers until the deadline of 31 December 2013. This decision was motivated by

the unfavourable economic outlook for 2012 and 2013 and, particularly, the gloomy employment forecasts and the decisions taken by neighbouring countries to extend their own transitional arrangements.

While Bulgarian and Romanian workers still do not enjoy free access to the Belgian labour market, the conditions for obtaining a work permit have been eased. Indeed, nationals from these countries may be exempt from a labour market test if hired for a job considered a shortage occupation by the regional authorities.

In adopting the European Blue Card for highly skilled workers, Belgium has replaced its old dual system with a single document which serves as both a residence permit and work permit. This new measure is a result of the transposition into Belgian law of EU Directive 2009/50/EC which facilitates the admission of third-country nationals and their families for the purposes of highly qualified employment.

A bill amending the Nationality Code was adopted by the House of Representatives on 25 October 2012 and entered into force on 1 January 2013. It imposes stricter conditions for the acquisition of Belgian nationality and applicants must now pay a fee. The naturalisation procedure through the House of Representatives, which required three years' residence in Belgium (two years for recognised refugees), is now an exceptional procedure open only to persons who have demonstrated "exceptional merit".

Applicants wishing to acquire Belgian nationality must now show five years' legal residence in the country and provide proof that they are socially and economically integrated. A favourable decision will be given after ten years' legal residence if applicants can show that they play an active role in the host community. Applicants must also demonstrate knowledge of one of the three national languages (level A2 in the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages). A forthcoming Royal Order will set out what elements will prove linguistic proficiency.

The bill which transposes Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 provides for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals. In addition to the existing duty for employers to obtain employment authorisation before hiring a foreign worker, they must also check that the foreign worker has a valid residence permit.

For further information


www.emploi.belgique.be
www.ibz.be
<https://dofi.ibz.be/>
www.statbel.fgov.be
www.cgra.be
www.fedasil.be

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

BELGIUM

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	5.6	7.4	10.4	10.7	6.8	9.3	117.9
Outflows	3.5	3.7	4.7	5.1	3.3	4.2	56.6
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011	Belgium		
Work	6.6	9.0	10.2	11.7			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	28.7	25.5	44.7	33.4			
Humanitarian	2.1	2.9	3.3	3.7			
Free movements	26.8	39.1	41.8	51.2			
Others			
Total	64.1	76.5	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees	..	0.2	0.2	0.3			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers	2.7	6.2	6.3	11.1			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers	2.8	6.2	6.3	8.5			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	4.2	1.5	2.0	2.4	1.8	1.4	26 003
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	2.4	6.3	10.2	8.5	4.8	8.2	94
Natural increase	1.1	1.6	2.3	2.1	1.1	2.1	23
Net migration	1.3	4.7	7.9	6.5	3.6	6.0	72
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	10.3	12.1	14.9	14.9	11.4	13.6	1 644
Foreign population	8.4	8.6	10.3	10.6	8.3	9.5	1 169
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	6.9	3.6	3.3	2.7	4.9	3.4	29 786
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	70.8	69.3	68.5	63.7	69.1	68.9	
Foreign-born men	62.2	61.2	61.4	52.6	59.9	61.8	
Native-born women	53.8	56.0	58.7	63.7	54.1	57.7	
Foreign-born women	37.3	39.7	45.0	52.6	38.0	42.8	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	4.2	6.5	6.7	5.7	5.5	6.0	
Foreign-born men	14.7	15.7	16.9	15.5	15.8	15.8	
Native-born women	7.4	8.4	7.1	6.0	7.1	7.3	
Foreign-born women	17.5	18.9	17.3	14.6	16.8	17.0	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	3.7	1.8	2.4	1.8	1.6	1.2	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.4	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.2	0.5	38 874
Employment (level in thousands)	1.9	1.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.9	4 562
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	6.9	8.4	8.3	7.2	7.8	7.7	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823833>

Bulgaria

Bulgaria's economic growth has fallen from its pre-crisis pace and its shrinking demand discourages foreign labour migration and other migration inflows. The number of permanent residence permits issued to foreign citizens has been falling from its peak of 4 600 in 2008, to 3 200 in 2011. Acquisition of long-term residence permits, at 19 300, also remains below pre-crisis levels. Turkey (1 140 and 5 450) and the Russian Federation (220 and 3 780) led in new granted permits in both cases in 2011. Only 600 work permits were issued in 2011, a decrease from 770 in 2010.

The economic situation has not affected applications for Bulgarian citizenship by foreign citizens of Bulgarian origin. The number of newly naturalised Bulgarian citizens hit a record of 18 470 in 2011, up 4 000 from 2010.

The number of foreign students, rising over the last decade, reached a new high of 11 080 in the 2011-12 academic year, with most from Turkey (5 000) or Greece (1 900). Foreign students represent only 4.1% of all students.

Asylum is a limited phenomenon in Bulgaria, with 900 applicants in 2011.

According to the 2011 national census, 36 700 foreigners live permanently in Bulgaria, representing 0.5% of the population, more than in 2001. Most foreigners are citizens of non-EU European countries.

The census indicated a rapid decline in Bulgaria's population, one-third of which is attributed to international emigration (175 200 persons over the 2001-11 census period). Data from destination countries indicate a sizeable short-term and seasonal outflow, estimated at between 300 000 and 400 000. According to a 2011 National Public Opinion Institute survey of 1 000 respondents, 12% stated they would emigrate once restrictions on free movement to the EU were lifted, a 3% increase from 2009. A further 28% intend to work or study abroad for a defined period of time. Skilled migration from Bulgaria over the last decade was led by information technology specialists, while now doctors and highly skilled medical staff rank high.

Return migration has accelerated in recent years driven by crisis-related factors since Bulgarian emigration was largely towards crisis-hit countries such as Greece, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The number of Bulgarians returning has been increasing, from 9 500 in 2006 to 15 300 in 2008 and 23 800 in 2010. According to the 2011 census, 191 400 Bulgarians returned to Bulgaria after more than one year abroad over the 1980-2011 period. Most emigration therefore appears temporary.

As Bulgaria prepares to enter the Schengen area, a National Migration, Asylum and Integration Strategy covering the 2011-20 period was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2011. The new strategy gives priority to the protection of Bulgarian migrants abroad and encourages the migration of Bulgarian minorities abroad. Specific measures are designed to integrate the foreign population. In February 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted a plan of action for its implementation.

The Law on Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria was amended in 2012 to incorporate the EU Directive requirements and allow refugees and asylum seekers to become long-term residents after five years of residence. The amendment also deals with matters of expulsion.

A 2011 change in the Employment Law introduced the EU Blue Card for residence and work of qualifying foreigners, valid only for the region, term and position stated in the sponsor's job offer.

In 2012 a draft amendment to the current Law on Bulgarian Citizenship was proposed by the Council of Ministers to the National Assembly and passed a first reading. The amendment allows dual nationality for EU/EEA citizens and streamlines procedures, and would impose a test of Bulgarian language skills for foreign citizens of Bulgarian origin, as already required of all other applicants.

The 2006 law on Entry and Residence of EU Citizens and their Family Members was amended in March 2012 to fully comply with the EU directive but also to make certain provisions more efficient. A clearer definition is provided, for instance, regarding sanctions in cases related to national security.

Fewer bilateral employment treaties were operative in 2011 and 2012 as many EU countries dropped transitional measures restricting the entry of Bulgarian workers. Such treaties continue to operate with France, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Following a treaty signed in 2011, 3 500 new jobs were opened for construction workers in Israel in January 2012. As part of the European Partnership for Mobility initiative, Bulgaria also concluded bilateral agreements with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova.

For further information

www.nsi.bg/Index_e.htm

www.aref.government.bg


www.government.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vi-s-/vis.pl?s=001&p=0136&g

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

BULGARIA

Migration flows (foreigners) <i>National definition</i>	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Inflows	0.5	2.0	..	3.1	1.5	..	22.5	
Outflows	
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution				
<i>Permit based statistics (standardised)</i>	2010	2011	2010	2011				
Work				
Family (incl. accompanying family)				
Humanitarian				
Free movements				
Others				
Total				
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average				
<i>Thousands</i>								
International students	2.1				
Trainees				
Working holiday makers				
Seasonal workers				
Intra-company transfers				
Other temporary workers	0.6	0.3	..	0.9				
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	893	
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Total	-5.1	-5.5	-7.8	-5.7	-10.9	-5.6	-42	
Natural increase	-5.1	-5.5	-4.6	-5.1	-5.6	-4.5	-37	
Net migration	0.0	0.0	-3.2	-0.7	-5.3	-1.1	-5	
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>								
Foreign-born population	
Foreign population	0.5	
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>								
	18 473	
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>								
Native-born men	63.1	61.0	56.1	65.4		
Foreign-born men	-	-	-	-		
Native-born women	56.5	56.3	49.8	57.3		
Foreign-born women	-	-	-	-		
<i>Unemployment rate</i>								
Native-born men	11.0	12.5	15.5	7.8		
Foreign-born men	-	-	-	-		
Native-born women	9.5	10.0	14.3	7.7		
Foreign-born women	-	-	-	-		
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Real GDP	5.7	6.4	0.4	1.8	5.5	2.8		
GDP/capita (level in USD)	12 934	
Employment (level in thousands)	..	2.0	-6.2	-3.4	1.3	0.6	2 950	
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
Unemployment	16.4	10.1	10.2	11.2	14.7	7.7		

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823852>

Canada

Canada's annual immigration flow is proportionately one of the highest among OECD members, at roughly 0.7% of its population of 35 million. Canada admitted 249 000 permanent residents in 2011, an 11% decrease over the previous year, when overall admissions reached a historical peak, 281 000, due to a combination of unique factors.

The proportions of admissions by stream were broadly similar in 2011 to preceding years. The economic category (including spouses and dependants) comprised 62.8% of admissions, slightly less than in 2010. The family stream comprised 22.7%.

Canada sets annual targets for total admission and by single categories; its planned admission range for 2011 was 240 000-265 000. Entries were thus within the range, although family category entries were slightly below target. Targets for 2012 were 150 000-161 000 for the economic category, 59 800-69 000 for the family category, 22 500-26 000 for the humanitarian category and 7 700-8 000 for other motives. In 2013, the overall planned immigration admission range will remain the same as in 2012, with a slight shift from the humanitarian to the family stream.

The leading origin countries in 2011 were the Philippines (14% of the total), China (12%) and India (10%); the same three countries led in 2010. The main nationalities of humanitarian migrants were Iraq (15%), Haiti (7%), and Bhutan and Colombia (6% each).

Canada admitted nearly 290 000 temporary foreign workers and international students in 2011, with increases in both categories. Canada admitted 190 800 temporary foreign workers in 2011, an increase of 6.4% from 2010. 98 400 foreign students entered Canada in 2011, 3.3% more than the previous year.

181 300 foreigners were naturalised as Canadian citizens in 2011, a 26% increase from 2010.

The Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, introduced in Parliament in February 2012 and passed in June, aims to improve the speed, flexibility and responsiveness of the existing asylum system. The bill addresses human smuggling and security measures, to prevent criminals, traffickers and those with unfounded refugee claims from abusing Canada's immigration system. Several security initiatives were also launched in 2012, including the Canada-US Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness and a plan to record biometric data of temporary residents by mid-2013.

The Federal Skilled Worker (FSW) Class, Canada's largest economic programme, continues to undergo changes. From May 2013, selection criteria assign

more importance of official language proficiency and Canadian work experience, and require educational credentials to be assessed by a designated 3rd party. In July 2012, Ministerial Instructions paused the acceptance of most new FSW applications. The pause, allowing faster processing of prior applications, was lifted in May 2013. Finally, amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, passed in June 2012, closed around 98 000 FSW applications submitted before early 2008. Including dependants, around 280 000 people were affected.

A new Federal Skilled Trades programme began accepting applications on 2 January 2013. In the programme's first year, applications will be accepted from up to 3 000 individuals in 43 specific trades, of which 17 will be subject to sub-limits of 100 applications each.

Live-in caregivers must work for two years, or 3 900 hours over a minimum of 22 months, before being eligible to apply for permanent residence. Caregivers may now receive open permits almost immediately after they apply for permanent residence, instead of waiting for "approval in principle", shortening the process by up to 18 months.

Canada's Federal Entrepreneur Program ceased accepting applications in 2011. A new "Start-Up Visa" programme launched in April 2013 links immigrant entrepreneurs with private sector organisations in Canada that have experience working with start-ups and that can provide essential resources.

Changes also were made to the family migration stream. From March 2012, new permanent residents sponsored as a spouse may not sponsor a subsequent spouse for five years following the date for which they were granted permanent residence. Sponsored spouses with no children will also receive a two-year conditional permanent resident permit.

In late 2012, proposed regulatory changes were announced that would allow foreigners studying in Canada to work part-time off-campus without requiring a work permit.

New citizenship regulations, in effect since November 2012, require adult citizenship applicants to provide objective evidence of language ability with their citizenship applications. In addition, federal, provincial and territorial partners agreed in 2011 to establish a minimum language threshold and mandatory language testing for low-skilled provincial nominees.

For further information

www.cic.gc.ca.

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

CANADA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	7.4	8.1	8.2	7.2	7.6	7.6	248.8			
Outflows			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Canada 2001-10 annual average 2011 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work	76.6	64.4	27.3	25.9						
Family (incl. accompanying family)	170.6	148.2	60.8	59.6						
Humanitarian	33.4	36.1	11.9	14.5						
Free movements	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0						
Others	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0						
Total	280.7	248.7	100.0	100.0						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students	56.7	76.7	77.2	65.9						
Trainees						
Working holiday makers	28.0	50.0	54.9	40.0						
Seasonal workers	20.3	23.9	24.1	23.8						
Intra-company transfers	6.8	13.6	13.5	10.3						
Other temporary workers	62.4	85.5	87.5	88.7						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	1.1	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.9	24 985			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total	9.7	9.9	11.1	..	9.9	11.4	..			
Natural increase	3.6	3.5	4.0	..	3.5	4.1	..			
Net migration	6.5	7.0	7.2	..	7.1	7.4	..			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	17.4	18.7	19.9	20.1	18.1	19.4	6 933			
Foreign population			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	181 127			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>										
Native-born men	77.4	..	74.3	75.0			
Foreign-born men	77.0	..	74.5	75.1			
Native-born women	66.0	..	70.5	70.6			
Foreign-born women	59.6	..	63.3	63.0			
<i>Unemployment rate</i>										
Native-born men	5.7	..	8.6	7.8			
Foreign-born men	6.1	..	10.0	8.4			
Native-born women	6.2	..	6.6	6.4			
Foreign-born women	8.7	..	9.9	9.5			
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	5.2	3.0	3.2	2.4	2.5	1.2	..			
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.3	2.0	2.0	1.3	1.5	0.1	40 418			
Employment (level in thousands)	2.5	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.2	17 406			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	6.8	6.8	8.0	7.5	7.3	7.0	..			

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823871>

Chile

Inflows of migrants in Chile continued increasing in 2011, surpassing 76 000, 19.4% more than in 2010 and more than double the number in 2002. This reflects Chile's thriving economy with a GDP growth of 6.1% in 2011. The overall unemployment rate fell to 7.1% in 2011 and continued decreasing in 2012.

41 000 foreign workers entered Chile in 2011, an increase of 28% compared to 2010 (32 000) and more than double the number in 2004 (under 18 000). Most foreign workers in 2011 came from Peru (54%) and Colombia (21%), followed by migrants from the Dominican Republic (4%), Ecuador (4%), China (2%) and the United States (2%). The number of foreign workers from Spain remains small, although fast increasing (590 in 2011 and 950 between January to October 2012, compared with 390 in 2010).

Almost 32 000 temporary visas were granted, an 11% increase with respect to the previous year. Among those, almost one third were nationals from Mercosur countries with Mercosur Agreement Visas, a type of visa granted without having to justify means for self-support. Around 15% of temporary visas were granted to foreigners with ties with Chilean citizens, and 13% to foreigners with ties to permanent residents.

The increasing number of immigrants in the last decade has been accompanied with a growing number of residency permits and naturalisations. In 2011, almost 100 000 permits were granted (including temporary residency, permanent residency and naturalisations), 18% more permits than in 2010. Naturalisation figures nevertheless remain contained: 870 in 2011, compared to 630 in 2010.

While there is a large Chilean-born population abroad – almost a half million in 2000 – migration dynamics have changed in the past two decades. The total number of non-nationals living in Chile has increased gradually since the mid-1990s. The 2010 Census figures show that over 369 000 migrants lived in Chile in 2010, equivalent to 2.2% of the total population, compared with just 0.6% in 1992. This figure is still one of the lowest in the OECD (the average share of foreign-born population in the OECD was 13.5% in 2010). Most immigrants come from neighbouring countries, in particular Peru (37%), Argentina (17%), Bolivia (6%), Ecuador (5%) and Colombia (4%), although there is an increasing presence of immigrants from Colombia, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

While accurate figures on irregular migration are difficult to obtain, the Department of Migration estimates that around 5% of non-nationals are irregular migrants, in particular from Peru.

Chile receives few asylum seekers in comparison with other OECD countries. Asylum seeker applications in 2011 were 300, compared to 260 in 2010. The number of international student visas granted was just over 2 000, a figure which has remained stable in the last five years.

A draft migration bill aimed at modernising Chile's migration law was approved by the Chilean president in July 2012 and submitted to Congress for discussion. Existing legislation, established in 1975 under the military regime, is restrictive. The new bill would expand the number of different migration categories, simplify migration procedures, allow more flexibility and facilitate the obtention of a regular migration status. The current limit of a maximum of 15% foreign labour force in each company would be maintained but exceptions will be made for certain groups: highly-skilled professionals; relatives of Chileans; foreigners with more than five years residence in Chile; and companies with fewer than 25 employees. The bill also aims to clearly establish the rights and obligations of non-nationals living in Chile and ensure compliance with international human rights standards.

As part of the Bill, a new institutional body responsible for migration policy will be created under the Subsecretary of the Interior Ministry (*División de Inmigraciones*), replacing the existing *Departamento de Extranjería*. Procedures to recognise foreign diplomas in Chile will be eased as well, extending the right to validate foreign university degrees to all accredited institutions (until now, only the *Universidad de Chile* has been able to validate degrees for which a fast-track validation procedure is not available).


A draft bill on seasonal workers is also under study after increasing demand from the agriculture industry. The industry-supported bill would create a special visa for seasonal workers to alleviate labour shortages in agriculture, similar to the visas existing in New Zealand and Australia that allow for circular migration. Employers would be responsible for the wellbeing of the migrants while employing them and would ensure that they leave the country when their contract finishes.

For further information

www.extranjeria.gov.cl/
www.minrel.gov.cl
www.interior.gov.cl

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

CHILE

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	1.2	2.3	3.7	4.4	2.0	3.8	76.3
Outflows
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Chile 2001-10 annual average 2011 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	305
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	12.2	10.4	9.3	9.0	10.9	9.8	155
Natural increase	11.6	9.7	8.9	8.7	10.4	9.5	150
Net migration	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	4
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	..	1.5	2.2	1.9	..
Foreign population
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	874
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	70.7	
Foreign-born men	79.3	
Native-born women	44.1	
Foreign-born women	59.7	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	6.7	
Foreign-born men	3.9	
Native-born women	10.0	
Foreign-born women	7.7	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	4.5	6.2	6.1	6.0	5.1	3.8	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.1	5.0	5.1	4.9	3.9	2.8	17 312
Employment (level in thousands)
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	9.7	9.2	8.2	7.1	9.7	8.1	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823890>

Czech Republic

Immigration into the Czech Republic has been declining since 2008. National statistics registered about 22 600 immigrants in 2011, 26% fewer than the previous year (30 500). Similarly, the numbers of emigrants decreased to 5 700 persons. The value of net migration thus reached the level of 16 200, which is about 2 000 more than in 2010. Net migration maintained this level in the first half of 2012.

The main nationality of immigrants who entered the Czech Republic in 2011 continued to be Slovak, with 4 400 persons registered. Nationals of the Russian Federation followed (with 2 150 persons registered). Other immigrant groups included Ukrainians (1 980), returning Czech nationals (1 920), Germans (1 340), nationals of the United States (1 320) and Vietnamese (710).

As of 31 December 2011, a total of 434 000 foreigners having a residence permit were registered on the territory of the Czech Republic, a comparable level to 2009. The proportion of foreign population in the total population of the Czech Republic thus reached 4.1%. In comparison with 2010, the total number of foreigners slightly increased by 2.1%. The increase concerned both the categories of the temporary (1%) and permanent residence holders (3.4%). This change, however, may also reflect a 2011 change in the methodology of the data recorded in the Foreign Information System which affects the data for stocks of foreigners.

Foreigners represented 1% of the total labour force in 1993 and nearly 7% in 2008. With the economic crisis, the proportion of foreigners in the Czech labour market decreased to 5.4% in 2010, before rising to 6% in 2011, as the economy recovered. Nationals of EU member countries predominate (56% of foreigners). Since 2008, there has been a sharp decline among economically active foreigners from non-EU member countries, concerning primarily salaried employees.

The “Green Card” scheme, introduced in 2009 to facilitate labour market access to qualified workers from selected countries, has continued in the Czech Republic, although weak labour market conditions have hampered take-up. In 2011, 244 applicants were registered, of which 80% were Ukrainian. The EU Blue Card for highly skilled non-EU foreigners, introduced in 2011, saw 70 applicants in its first year, primarily nationals of Uzbekistan, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

The number of applications for asylum in the Czech Republic touched its lowest historical level, with 760 applicants in 2011. The main origin country for asylum seekers in the Czech Republic continues to be Ukraine, followed by Belarus, the Russian Federation and Vietnam. In 2011, a total of 110 persons, principally

from Myanmar, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan, were granted asylum.

1 940 foreigners received Czech citizenship in 2011, up from 1 500 in 2010. The largest group was Ukrainian (500), followed by Slovaks and Poles.

In January 2011, the Czech government adopted a resolution on “the management of economic migration, protection of immigrant’s rights and return”. A new Aliens Law is being drafted based on this resolution, which favours wage employment over self-employment, and proposes progressive rights of immigrants to access social security system. The Law will also protect labour market rights and reinforce integration policy.

Two amendments to the Act on Employment came into effect in January 2012 regulating the assignment to employers of non-EU/EFTA nationals by private employment agencies. Implementation of Directive 2009/52/EC led to new employer penalties for illegal employment of unauthorised foreigners. Inspectorate competences are now under the State Labour Inspection Offices.

Measures concerning employment were also implemented in 2012 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), to favour domestic job-seekers. The changes primarily regarded job vacancies for low-skill workers (lower than secondary educational qualifications). In early 2012, MoLSA ceased issuing work permits for these positions, and required all non-EU applicants for a job in the Czech Republic to provide proof of qualifications. Work permit renewal was limited to six months. These regulations were modified in Spring 2012, to allow six-month maximum work permits for unqualified jobs, 12-month permits for jobs requiring secondary-level certificates, and 24-month permits for those requiring university degrees. The same duration applies to renewal. Exemptions to the requirement of official recognition of qualifications are granted to intra-corporate transfers under an accelerated procedure for foreign investors, and to managers.

In October 2012 a proposal for the new law on the Acquisition of the Czech state citizenship was approved by the government resolution. The draft law contains some changes, including allowing dual citizenship and making naturalisation contingent on social, work and family integration, among other elements.

For further information

www.mvcr.cz

www.czso.cz

http://portal.mpsv.cz/sz/zahr_zam.

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

CZECH REPUBLIC

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	0.4	5.7	2.9	2.2	4.3	6.1	22.6
Outflows	0.0	2.1	1.4	0.5	2.7	1.5	5.7
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Czech Republic — 2001-10 annual average ■ 2011 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total	30.5	22.6			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	4.4			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.9	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.2	756
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	-1.1	3.0	2.5	1.8	-0.3	5.4	19
Natural increase	-1.8	-0.6	1.0	0.2	-1.3	0.9	2
Net migration	0.6	3.5	1.5	1.6	1.0	4.5	17
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	4.2	5.1	6.3	6.4	4.7	6.2	669
Foreign population	2.0	2.7	4.0	4.1	2.4	3.9	434
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	3.6	1.0	0.3	0.5	1.9	0.5	1 936
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	..	73.3	73.4	65.7	..	74.2	
Foreign-born men	..	71.0	79.1	67.8	..	75.7	
Native-born women	..	56.4	56.3	65.7	..	57.0	
Foreign-born women	..	51.3	56.2	67.8	..	55.4	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	..	6.4	6.5	5.9	..	5.2	
Foreign-born men	..	9.7	5.6	6.1	..	6.9	
Native-born women	..	9.7	8.5	7.9	..	7.5	
Foreign-born women	..	15.8	9.5	10.9	..	11.4	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	4.2	6.8	2.5	1.9	4.1	2.8	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.3	6.5	2.2	2.1	4.2	2.2	26 331
Employment (level in thousands)	-0.7	1.4	-1.6	0.6	0.3	0.4	4 872
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	8.7	7.9	7.3	6.7	7.9	6.3	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823909>

Denmark

In 2012, 61 300 residence permits were granted, up from the 2011 total of 57 800. Almost half of the permits were granted to EU/EEA nationals and their dependents. Study accounted for 26% of the total, work permits for 15%, and family reunification for 6%. Work permits were at the same level as 2011. Family migration has been falling since 2007, despite an increase in applications. The largest groups within family reunification were citizens of Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines.

In 2012, 2 600 asylum seekers were issued permits. The number has steadily increased since 2007. The two leading origin countries for applications in 2012 were Syria (37%) and Somalia (35%).

Over the first nine months of 2012, 36 foreigners also benefited from Danish repatriation grants to their country of residence or former country of residence, far fewer than the annual totals of 355 in 2010 and 613 in 2011.

The new Danish government formed in October 2011 implemented a number of policy changes. New rules regarding permanent residence permits entered into force in July 2012. The former points system, which required applicants to reach a 100-point threshold based on diverse eligibility criteria, was dropped. The new criteria include a minimum legal residence requirement of at least five years, up from four, and passing of a basic Danish language test. Changes will also be made to naturalisation criteria, particularly with respect to testing Danish language skills and knowledge of Danish society.

For family reunification, the application fee was reduced and the points system was replaced by a new set of rules in May 2012. Foreign nationals can now obtain a residence permit if their spouse, cohabitant or registered partner is already legally residing in Denmark. The new rules require that both the applicant and the spouse be at least 24 years old and that the applicant pass a Danish language test within six months of receiving a residence permit. The government also announced its intention to make it easier for reunified spouses who are victims of domestic violence to keep their residence permit.

The short-lived regulation extending the right to host au-pairs to retired couples was withdrawn on 1st February 2012. At present, only families with at least one child under the age of 18 are eligible as hosts.

A new rule enacted in September 2012 allows asylum seekers and refugees to take up employment and residence outside of refugee centres after six

months, on condition that they co-operate with authorities. The agreement also seeks to improve the conditions of asylum seeker families with children by improving integration measures. In January 2013, the three-member Refugee Appeals Board was expanded to five members, with one representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one recommended by the Danish Refugee Council.

In the area of integration, the Integration Act of 1999 was amended in July 2011 removing the right of local authorities to assign housing in deprived neighbourhoods, in order to combat residential segregation and thereby strengthen integration. Another amendment, effective January 2012, eliminated the cash allowances for newly arrived refugees and immigrants, as well as the starter allowances for persons having resided in Denmark for less than seven of the preceding eight years. New immigrants will instead be entitled to social assistance from the moment they arrive in Denmark.

The government created a new committee in February 2012 to propose eventual reform on integration policy. The Ministry of Refugee, Immigrant and Integration Affairs was merged with the Ministry of Social Affairs into a new Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. In November 2012, the government presented its objectives on integration, which include better reception, improved access to education and a more active role for migrants in society and the labour market.

The Ministry of Employment also rolled out an initiative in 2012 called “We Need Everyone”. This initiative focuses on individuals receiving cash assistance – not including newly arrived immigrants already in an integration programme – who are considered to have most difficulty in finding a job due to personal or social problems. About a quarter of the 29 550 targeted individuals are non-Western immigrants. In each municipality a dedicated team makes plans for their job placement. In addition, since 2011 another programme called “We Need All Youngsters” has focused on implementation of activation programmes for youth, including young migrants, in selected geographical areas.

For further information

www.sm.dk/Sider/Start.aspx
www.justitsministeriet.dk/
www.newtodenmark.dk
www.workindenmark.dk

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

DENMARK

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	4.3	3.7	6.0	6.2	3.8	5.7	34.6			
Outflows	2.6	3.0	4.9	4.8	2.9	4.1	26.6			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Denmark ▬ 2000-09 annual average ▬ 2010 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work	8.1	6.4	19.0	15.6						
Family (incl. accompanying family)	7.5	5.8	17.7	13.9						
Humanitarian	2.1	2.2	5.0	5.4						
Free movements	22.2	23.5	52.3	56.9						
Others	2.5	3.3	6.0	8.1						
Total	42.4	41.3	100.0	100.0						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students	6.9	5.8	5.8	6.1						
Trainees	1.9	1.6	1.5	2.6						
Working holiday makers						
Seasonal workers						
Intra-company transfers						
Other temporary workers	2.6	3.8	3.4	3.5						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	2.4	0.4	0.9	0.7	1.0	0.5	3 811			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total	3.6	3.0	5.6	5.1	2.9	5.5	28			
Natural increase	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.6	6			
Net migration	1.7	1.2	4.0	4.1	1.4	3.9	23			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	5.8	6.5	7.7	7.9	6.3	7.2	442			
Foreign population	4.8	5.0	6.2	6.4	5.0	5.7	359			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	7.3	3.8	0.9	1.1	4.6	1.7	3 911			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10				
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>										
Native-born men	81.5	80.4	76.6	74.7	80.9	80.5				
Foreign-born men	67.0	71.0	67.6	61.7	67.0	71.2				
Native-born women	73.3	73.2	72.6	74.7	73.0	74.5				
Foreign-born women	53.3	55.7	60.0	61.7	54.4	59.4				
<i>Unemployment rate</i>										
Native-born men	3.7	4.2	7.7	7.2	4.1	4.6				
Foreign-born men	10.7	9.0	15.1	13.8	11.3	9.5				
Native-born women	4.9	4.9	6.0	6.5	4.9	4.5				
Foreign-born women	6.6	10.4	12.1	15.1	9.7	9.1				
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	3.5	2.4	1.6	1.1	1.3	0.0				
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.2	2.1	1.1	0.7	1.0	-0.4	40 945			
Employment (level in thousands)	0.5	1.0	-1.7	0.6	0.1	0.4	2 834			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	4.3	4.8	7.5	7.6	5.0	5.4				

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823928>

Estonia

The Estonian population on 1st January 2013 was estimated at 1.29 million, a decline of 5.5% since 2000. About 16% of the resident population were foreigners, the vast majority of whom are long-standing internal migrants who came from other parts of the Soviet Union prior to 1991.

After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, Estonian citizens were defined as those who were Estonian citizens prior to the 1940 occupation by the Soviet Union, and their descendants. Others had the opportunity to become naturalised Estonian citizens or apply for a citizenship of their country of origin. Estonia does not allow dual citizenship. Many did not determine their citizenship status, although this number has been declining. In 2011, Estonian citizenship was conferred on 1 510 people, of which 89% were those with undetermined citizenship and 10% were previously Russian citizens. In the beginning of 2012 the number of residents with undetermined citizenship was 98 000; a similar number of residents held Russian citizenship.

The severe economic crisis hit Estonia particularly hard in 2008-09, although GDP has since resumed positive growth. Net migration has been negative, and increasingly so, since 2008, albeit less than in the two Baltic countries to the south, Latvia and Lithuania. About 3 700 persons migrated to Estonia in 2011, 40% more than in 2010, with a further rise to 4 400 in 2012. This was more than counter-balanced by emigration of 6 200 in 2011 and 10 900 in 2012, leading to record negative net migration of 6 500 in 2012.

Since Estonia's accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004, returning Estonian citizens have accounted for a large proportion of inflows to Estonia. In 2010, this percentage reached 57% of all immigrants, but fell to 55% in 2011. Certain returning Estonians may receive financial support.

According to the Estonian population census, in early 2012, there were 24 900 Estonians working abroad. This was about 17% higher than previous estimates based on the Labour Force Survey. 61% of Estonians working abroad were working in Finland.

In 2011, there were 4 300 residence permits granted to foreigners, excluding renewals but including status changes. 37% of residence permits were granted to Russians, 31% to foreigners with no determined citizenship and 13% to Ukrainians. Family migration continues to be the most important category of migration in Estonia, comprising about a third

of all residence permits issued annually. In 2011, 1 370 residence permits were issued on the grounds of family reunification. Based on figures for the first ten months of 2012, permit issuance appears to have declined, with most of the decline in entries under international agreements or for employment, while family and study permits were stable.

In 2011, 18% of residence permits were issued for employment. Estonia applies annual quotas for labour migration, up to a ceiling of 0.1% of the population. While the 2010 quota was only 82% utilised, the 2011 quota (1 008 persons, or 0.075% of the population), was utilised by the end of August 2011. A sharp rise in applications for employment as board members of Estonian companies was later revealed to reflect abuse of the permit. Entries under this category were suspended in August 2011, and the quota for board members was set at zero for the first semester of 2012.

Estonia receives few asylum seekers (30 in 2010 and 70 in 2011). An apparent uptick in 2012 was related to applications, largely from Georgians, from individuals who had already requested asylum in Latvia or Lithuania.

In July 2012, amendments to the Aliens Act came into force, changing the regulation governing the residence permit for employment as a board member of a company, and making minor changes to residence permit for business, which had also been subject to fraudulent misuse. The temporary residence permit based on legal income was abolished. In light of these new conditions, the immigration quota for the latter half of 2012 was no longer divided between different types of, and grounds for residence permit.

An Estonian government action plan stipulates that by 2015 residence permit regulations should be modified to create a favourable environment for foreign students and specialists. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is to propose amendments by late 2013, and is conducting consultations. The action plan also aims to reduce the number of people with undetermined citizenship by about 10% by 2015, and this is part of the proposed 2013-20 integration strategy.

For further information

www.politsei.ee/en/
www.stat.ee/en
www.meis.ee/tagasiranne-eng
www.ti.ee/

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

ESTONIA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	..	0.7	0.9	1.3	..	1.3	1.7
Outflows	..	0.5	0.5	0.5	..	0.4	0.6
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Estonia 2004-08 annual average 2009 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	67
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total
Natural increase	-3.9	-2.2	0.0	-0.4	-3.4	-0.7	-1
Net migration
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	18.5	17.5	16.3	15.9	17.9	16.7	213
Foreign population	21.0	19.0	16.3	16.3	19.6	17.0	218
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	..	2.7	0.5	0.7	1.9	1.2	1 518
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	62.2	66.1	61.6	65.3	65.4	68.1	
Foreign-born men	70.5	73.4	60.8	63.9	70.8	72.6	
Native-born women	57.1	61.4	61.0	65.3	58.7	63.7	
Foreign-born women	57.7	65.6	58.0	63.9	60.7	67.3	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	15.3	8.9	19.4	13.1	10.6	10.8	
Foreign-born men	13.4	9.4	23.6	15.6	12.2	12.5	
Native-born women	11.8	6.3	13.4	11.2	9.0	7.7	
Foreign-born women	11.1	11.4	22.2	18.1	13.2	10.5	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	10.0	8.9	3.3	8.3	7.2	0.5	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	10.5	9.1	3.4	8.3	7.5	0.7	21 992
Employment (level in thousands)	-1.4	2.0	-5.7	1.0	1.2	-1.4	567
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	13.6	7.9	16.9	12.6	10.1	9.9	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823947>

Finland

According to national statistics, the number of foreigners living in Finland at the end of September 2012 was 192 200, or about 3.5% of the population, with the largest group represented by Estonians (38 000), Russians (29 800) and Swedes (8 500).

In 2011, 29 500 persons moved to Finland, which is 15% more than in 2010. 2011 was a peak year for total migration. Of entries to Finland, foreign nationals accounted for 20 400 (12% more than in 2010). Main countries of origin of immigrants continued to be Estonia (4 700), the Russian Federation (2 800), China (750), Somalia (750) and Iraq (700). Preliminary statistics show that 22 500 people moved to Finland during January-September 2012, a slight increase compared to the same period of the previous year (21 000).

The number of residence permit applications decreased by 4% in 2011. The number of applications based on family ties remained roughly at the same level as in 2010 (10 000). The number of applications for employment purposes increased by 41% over 2010, to 6 500. Of the 17 700 permits issued in 2011, 32% were granted on the grounds of family ties, 31% for study and 30% for employment. Between January and October 2012 a total of 19 000 people applied for a residence permit, suggesting a similar trend as in 2011, and the breakdown in permits issued was largely similar.

In 2011 a total of 3 100 persons, including 150 unaccompanied minors, sought asylum in Finland, a decline of about one-quarter compared with 2010. Asylum flows were similar in 2012: in the first 11 months of 2012, 2 900 asylum seekers were recorded, with the largest group from Iraq (760).

The Future of Migration 2020 Strategy is a key project of the present Government. The Strategy aims to create an immigration policy which supports an unprejudiced, safe and pluralistic Finland and enhances Finland's international competitiveness. The comprehensive strategy aims to anticipate the volume and quality of immigration to Finland and its impact on Finnish society. Under the co-ordination of the Ministry of the Interior, the strategy has a number of key objectives: managing the labour market, ensuring equal rights for all employees, improving employment opportunities for people from an immigrant background, pursuing a more successful integration policy, accelerating asylum application processing, and fighting discrimination. A proposal, under discussion, is expected to be approved by the government in May 2013.

According to the Act on the Promotion of Integration, a Government Integration Programme for 2012-15 was adopted in June 2012. The extensive and concrete action plan takes the needs of the immigrant population into account through mainstreaming in all policy sectors, especially within employment, education, housing and social and health care services. The programme focuses on promoting the immigrant employment and supporting immigrant children, youth, families and women. Practical measures include the development of language training, early childhood and basic education, and the development of integration in basic services.

In the 2010 Act on Integration, one chapter includes the project Participative Integration in Finland. The project aims to develop effective models to bring immigrants to the labour market faster and support the integration of those who are already in the labour market. The EUR 10 million project runs from 2010 to 2013.

The Government programme included a review of the income and accommodation requirements for family reunification in Nordic countries, to determine whether new restrictions are justified in Finland. The Minister of the Interior has set up a project with the aim of adopting a co-operative model between the Finnish Immigration Service, the Police and the Border Guard in the administration of immigration affairs. The objective is to create a permanent co-operation structure between the authorities concerned. The operating model is scheduled for the implementation at the end of 2013.

The legislative changes on implementation of the EU Employer Sanction Directive came into force on 1 August 2012. A special sanction was incorporated in the Finnish Employment Contracts Act against employers who have employed an illegally staying third-country national. In order to combat illegal employment practices on construction sites, from September 2012 all employees must request a tax number and display it while on the job. More than 36 000 foreigners signed up for the tax registry in the first five months of the new rule.

For further information

www.migri.fi/netcomm/?language=EN

www.intermin.fi

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

FINLAND

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	1.8	2.4	3.4	3.8	2.1	3.3	20.4
Outflows	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	3.3
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Finland 2001-10 annual average (dashed blue line), 2011 (solid grey bar) 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work	1.1	1.2	5.8	5.6			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	6.2	7.8	34.3	38.4			
Humanitarian	3.2	2.2	17.4	11.0			
Free movements	7.1	8.4	39.0	41.3			
Others	0.7	0.8	3.6	3.7			
Total	18.2	20.4	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	..	4.5	5.5	4.2			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers	12.2	12.0	12.0	12.7			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers	6.5	9.0	9.0	10.2			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	3 086
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	1.9	3.6	4.7	5.0	2.9	4.4	26
Natural increase	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.6	2.0	10
Net migration	0.4	1.7	2.6	3.0	1.3	2.4	16
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	2.6	3.4	4.6	4.9	3.1	4.1	266
Foreign population	1.8	2.2	3.1	3.4	2.0	2.7	183
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	3.4	5.2	2.8	2.7	4.3	3.3	4 558
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	71.2	71.2	69.5	69.4	71.0	71.3	
Foreign-born men	49.9	61.7	66.2	61.1	64.9	68.2	
Native-born women	65.3	68.0	67.5	69.4	67.4	68.5	
Foreign-born women	39.0	49.7	55.1	61.1	50.8	57.2	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	10.3	9.3	8.8	8.2	10.0	7.7	
Foreign-born men	36.6	22.4	18.4	16.0	20.8	15.2	
Native-born women	12.0	9.4	7.4	6.9	10.0	7.4	
Foreign-born women	21.3	22.7	15.8	14.2	22.6	16.0	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	5.3	2.9	3.3	2.8	2.6	1.0	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	5.1	2.6	2.9	2.3	2.4	0.5	37 485
Employment (level in thousands)	1.7	1.5	-0.3	0.7	0.6	0.4	2 458
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	9.8	8.4	8.4	7.8	8.9	7.6	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823966>

France

Permanent immigration (excluding European Union nationals) increased for the second consecutive year to reach 142 000 entries in 2011 (up by 4% compared with 2010), close to the 2004 level. The rise in inflows in 2011 stemmed largely from labour migration, which increased by 5% (to 24 000) while the number of refugees and family migrants remained stable. This upward trend is due in part to better capture of the “long-stay visa constituting a residence permit” (*Visa de long séjour valant titre de Séjour, VLS-TS*), instituted in 2009 for a number of categories of temporary or permanent entries.

Most non-EU citizens admitted for permanent residence were from Africa (60%), and especially Algeria (20 500), Morocco (17 400), Tunisia (9 700) and Mali (5 100). Asia was the second-ranking region of origin (20%), the main countries being China and Turkey (5 300 each).

In 2011, 17 000 temporary labour permits were issued in France, including 8 800 new seasonal work permits. One third of the new temporary work permits (excluding seasonal permits) were granted to immigrants already living in the country.

In 2011, 70 000 permits (89% of which were VLS-TS) were granted to foreign students, an increase of 7% over the previous year. The main countries of origin were China (10 800), Morocco (7 300), the United States (5 800), Algeria (4 400) and Tunisia (2 800). Also, the number of former students changing their status remained stable in 2011 with fewer than 15 000 permanent-stay visas being granted, two out of three on economic grounds.

The number of asylum seekers has been rising constantly for four years. In 2011, 40 000 adults made an application (with 12 000 accompanying minors), roughly 10% more than the previous year. One third of the applications are from just five countries (Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo, Armenia, Sri Lanka and the Russian Federation). In 2011 – as in 2010 – approximately 10 500 persons were granted the protection of France, including 2 500 persons qualifying for subsidiary protection.

The number of persons receiving assistance for voluntary departures reached a record of 4 700 in 2011 (up 18% from 2010). Moreover, 10 600 persons qualified for humanitarian repatriation (9% more than in 2010), including 7 300 Romanians. 17 000 expulsions were carried out in 2011 (86 000 had been ordered).

In 2011, nearly 115 000 acquisitions of citizenship were recorded. The majority of these were obtained by decree (66 000). However, this method of acquiring citizenship saw a 30% decline in 2011, probably as a result of the anticipated stricter French

language test introduced on 1 January 2012. Over the same period, there were 23 000 early acquisitions for minors and 22 000 by marriage.

Several changes have come into effect since 1 January 2012 following the adoption on 16 June 2011 of the Act on Immigration, Integration and Nationality (“LIIN”, in French). In particular, this legislation provides for stricter measures with regard to the expulsion of undocumented immigrants. Also, the procedure for naturalisation and acquisition of citizenship after four years of marriage has been clarified, and stricter language requirements imposed. A new circular issued 18 October 2012, however, eases job-related criteria. A fixed-term or temporary employment contract may now be considered proof of stable and sufficient resources. Also, a presumption of assimilation into society is allowed for persons under the age of 25 who have lived in France for more than ten years and who have at least five years of continuous formal schooling.

The circulars of 31 May 2011 on controlling immigration and of 12 January 2012 on access to the labour market for foreign students have been repealed. The circular of 31 May 2012 encourages prefects to consider more flexibly and on a case-by-case basis applications from foreign students for a change of status. Students who have obtained a degree in France that is at least equivalent to the Master 2 (M2) diploma can now apply for temporary leave to stay (*Autorisation provisoire de séjour – APS*) which is valid for six months and which allows applicants to look for work related to their training. Under certain conditions, a change of status may later be granted, with the issuance of a permanent residence permit.

The Ministry of the Interior sent a circular to all prefectures on 28 November 2012 clarifying the conditions of the regularisation procedure for undocumented immigrants. Persons requesting a temporary residence permit must have lived in France for at least five years, hold a contract of employment or strong family ties, and have a sufficient command of French.

The Decision of the *Conseil d’État* of 26 December 2012 re-established the list of 30 shortage occupations which had initially been drawn up in 2008, and which, in the interim, had been reduced to 14.

For further information


www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr
www.ofii.fr/
www.ofpra.gouv.fr

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

FRANCE

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	1.6	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	142.0
Outflows
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011	France		
Work	22.9	24.1	11.7	11.4			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	82.8	84.2	42.2	39.9			
Humanitarian	10.3	10.7	5.3	5.1			
Free movements	61.8	71.1	31.5	33.7			
Others	18.5	21.1	9.4	10.0			
Total	196.3	211.3	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	46.2	65.2	69.9	51.2			
Trainees	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.6			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers	16.2	7.8	8.8	12.7			
Intra-company transfers	1.0	1.0	2.9	1.0			
Other temporary workers	6.5	4.7	6.2	5.0			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.6	52 147
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	6.9	7.1	5.3	5.3	7.1	5.6	333
Natural increase	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.9	4.3	253
Net migration	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.3	80
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	10.3	11.3	11.6	11.6	10.9	11.5	7 358
Foreign population	6.0	5.9	..
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	4.6	..	3.8	3.0	..	3.8	114 584
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	69.8	69.6	68.4	64.8	70.2	69.0	
Foreign-born men	66.7	67.1	66.4	57.5	66.7	66.7	
Native-born women	56.6	59.9	61.1	64.8	58.8	61.0	
Foreign-born women	45.6	48.2	49.7	57.5	48.0	50.0	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	7.7	7.5	8.4	8.1	7.0	7.6	
Foreign-born men	14.5	12.5	13.7	14.1	13.2	13.3	
Native-born women	11.3	9.0	8.9	8.9	9.3	8.4	
Foreign-born women	19.7	16.8	16.0	16.2	16.1	14.9	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	3.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	0.6	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.1	35 387
Employment (level in thousands)	3.5	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.6	25 956
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	9.0	9.3	9.7	9.6	8.8	9.0	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932823985>

Germany

The inflow of foreigners to Germany in 2011 was 841 700, a 23% increase over 2010. In the same period, outflows of foreigners increased by 2% to 538 800; net migration of foreigners in Germany was 302 900, almost twice the 2010 figure. Net migration of Germans was -23 500, 10% smaller than in 2010. As a result, total population slightly increased for the first time since 2002. The increase in inflows of foreign nationals was driven by a 34% increase in inflows from within the European Union, due to the end in May 2011 of transitional labour market restrictions on EU8 nationals. Increasing inflows of Bulgarians and Romanians were also observed (up 29% over 2010). Immigration of citizens of European countries with high unemployment increased considerably, with a 90% increase in flows from Greece and a 52% increase in flows from Spain. Comparing the first three quarters of 2012 with the same period of 2011, inflows of non-nationals from EU10 countries were about 31% higher, from Italy 38% higher, from Spain 48% and from Portugal 49% higher, and from Greece 64% higher.

Germany receives about 60% of its permanent migration flows from within the European Union; about half of the EU residents in Germany in 2008 had entered for employment-related reasons, and free movement for employment has been increasing since 2009, with new EU member countries providing a large share. Among the EU migrants who arrived in Germany in 2010 and stayed for more than a year, about two-thirds came from the new EU member countries. Of these, 40% came from Poland and 25% from Romania.

The Federal Employment Agency approved a total of almost 66 000 work authorisations for non-EU/EFTA nationals in 2011, an 8% increase over 2010. Two-fifths of the authorisations were issued to skilled migrants with a foreign university degree (twice the 2010 figure), and almost half were given to graduates of German universities (a 30% increase from 2010). 700 permanent residence permits were issued to highly-skilled workers from non-EU/EFTA countries in 2011, three-quarters to applicants already in Germany.

In 2011/12, more than 192 800 *Bildungsausländer* (foreign students whose higher-education entrance qualification was obtained abroad) were enrolled in German higher education institutions. The main countries of origin for these students were China (12%), the Russian Federation (5%), and Austria, Bulgaria and Poland (with 4% each). 4 000 job search permits for foreign graduates of German universities were issued in 2011.

While many EU migrants come to Germany for seasonal work, exemptions have meant fewer permits issued: 167 600 work permits issued in 2011, largely to

Romanians and Bulgarians. All EU citizens are largely exempt from seasonal work permit requirements since January 2012, and 3 500 seasonal work permits were issued in 2012, exclusively to Croatian citizens. 19 400 temporary contract workers were also employed under bilateral agreements in 2011, mainly in the construction sector.

In August 2012, labour migration channels were broadened. The EU Blue Card was introduced, granting a renewable permit to tertiary-educated workers earning at least EUR 46 400 gross per year (or above 36 200 for certain shortage occupations), and extending labour market access to their family members, with no language requirements. The previous salary-based permanent permit for the high skilled was eliminated. A job-search visa for up to six months was introduced for tertiary-educated job-seekers. The post-graduation job-search period for German university graduates was extended from 12 to 18 months. International students may now also work the equivalent of 120 days full-time annually, up from 90. The new regulations also opened up employment for foreigners holding a German vocational degree.

The labour market test was accelerated by expanding the grounds for exemption and granting default approval if the Employment Agency fails to respond within two weeks.

A German government programme to “promote occupational mobility” targets young people (18-35) interested in training for a career, and unemployed young skilled workers from EU countries, to fill vacant training places and skilled jobs in Germany. The programme budget is EUR 139 Mio through 2016.

The National Action Plan for Integration, with concrete, binding and verifiable objectives, was presented in January 2012 on the basis of the 2007 National Integration Plan.

The Federal “Law to improve the assessment and recognition of foreign professional qualifications” came into force in April 2012, along with an information web-portal. *Länders* are adapting their recognition systems for professions within their jurisdiction. An interministerial initiative, “Integration through Qualification – IQ”, will create contact and orientation points.

For further information


www.bmas.bund.de
www.bmi.bund.de
www.bamf.de
www.integrationsbeauftragte.de
www.destatis.de
www.anerkennung-in-deutschland.de
www.make-it-in-germany.com

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

GERMANY

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	7.9	7.0	8.4	10.3	7.6	7.3	841.7			
Outflows	6.8	5.9	6.5	6.6	6.1	6.4	538.8			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Germany 2001-10 annual average (dashed blue line), 2011 (solid grey bar) 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work	20.1	26.1	9.0	9.0						
Family (incl. accompanying family)	54.9	54.0	24.7	18.6						
Humanitarian	11.8	11.0	5.3	3.8						
Free movements	133.3	197.5	59.9	67.9						
Others	2.4	2.1	1.1	0.7						
Total	222.5	290.8	100.0	100.0						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students	55.8	66.4	72.9	58.6						
Trainees	2.6	4.9	4.9	4.9						
Working holiday makers						
Seasonal workers	329.8	296.5	167.6	295.9						
Intra-company transfers	3.6	5.9	7.1	5.2						
Other temporary workers	63.6	33.9	33.5	37.5						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	1.0	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.3	45 741			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total	1.2	-0.8	-0.6	1.1	0.4	-1.7	92			
Natural increase	-0.9	-1.8	-2.2	-2.3	-1.5	-2.0	-190			
Net migration	2.0	1.0	1.6	3.4	1.9	0.3	282			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	12.5	12.6	13.0	13.1	..	12.9	10 689			
Foreign population	8.9	8.2	8.3	8.5	8.6	8.2	6 931			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	2.5	1.7	1.5	1.6	2.0	1.6	106 897			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10				
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>										
Native-born men	73.8	72.6	76.7	73.8	72.3	75.9				
Foreign-born men	66.3	64.9	72.9	66.5	65.3	70.4				
Native-born women	59.6	63.2	68.3	73.8	61.1	66.5				
Foreign-born women	46.6	49.1	55.7	66.5	47.9	53.3				
<i>Unemployment rate</i>										
Native-born men	6.9	10.2	6.7	5.6	9.0	7.5				
Foreign-born men	12.9	18.4	12.4	9.7	15.8	14.0				
Native-born women	8.0	9.8	5.9	5.1	8.7	7.3				
Foreign-born women	12.1	16.8	10.7	9.2	13.8	13.0				
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	3.1	0.7	4.2	3.0	0.6	1.4				
GDP/capita (level in USD)	2.9	0.7	4.3	3.0	0.5	1.6	39 465			
Employment (level in thousands)	1.1	-0.1	0.2	0.4	-0.2	0.8	40 545			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	8.0	11.3	7.1	6.0	9.6	7.9				

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824004>

Greece

Greece saw its legally resident migrant population fall, as well as declines in irregular migration and asylum seeking. The number of registered foreigners, 610 800 in 2009, fell to 596 200 in 2010, 582 100 in 2011, and dropped by around 24% in 2012 to 440 100, equivalent to about 4% of the total resident population. In addition, there were an estimated 391 000 irregular migrants, based on illegal entries into Greece, apprehensions, rejected asylum seekers, visa overstayers and informal seasonal workers – the latter particularly from Albania.

Official data from the Secretariat General of Population and Social Cohesion (Ministry of Interior) show that, while residence permit renewal continues, few new permits have been issued in recent years and their number is declining: 46 500 in 2009, 33 400 in 2010, 23 200 in 2011 and 10 400 in 2012. Only a few hundred of these permits are reacquisition of status by immigrants who had been unable to meet conditions to renew a prior permit. The low issuance is an effect of the ongoing crisis on employment of immigrants. The unemployment rate for non-EU citizens climbed from 7% in 2008-09 to 28% in 2011. More than 150 000 non-EU citizens were unable to renew their permits in 2010 and 2011 due to unemployment. In 2012, permit figures also fell due to a new rule exempting non-EU temporary and seasonal workers from the obligation to request a permit to enter and stay in Greece, as a national visa is now sufficient. The employment crisis appears to have led to out-migration by foreigners, particularly Albanians.

Irregular migration through the Turkish land border continued in 2011 according to reports by the European Union border agency Frontex, although in 2012 a new border fence and increased enforcement led to a decline in interceptions, as well as a shift to the maritime border. Irregular migrants intending to transit to other European countries are often unable to travel on from Greece, despite limited reception facilities and scarce employment.

Despite the poor employment situation in Greece – in 2012, average unemployment stood at 55% for youth under 25 and 21% for nationals in general – there is no empirical evidence of large-scale emigration of Greeks. Inflows of Greeks in some destination countries show a moderate but accelerating increase, often from a low base. Recorded 2011 flows were about 23 000 to Germany, 6 000 to the United Kingdom, 2 400 to the Netherlands, and 1 000 to Sweden. Flows to these destinations increased sharply in 2012, by

almost 70% for Germany and 40% for Sweden, for example. Greek nationals who emigrate are generally more educated and younger than those staying in Greece.

In light of the poor employment situation, in 2011 the government lowered the number of welfare stamps (proof of work days) required for permit renewal from 200 to 120 per year. A 2011 law transferred permit processing to one-stop shops to be established by September 2013; half are already operational, although some remain understaffed. A January 2011 law for managing asylum and irregular migration has yet to be fully implemented, although a migrant reception centre was created near Athens in 2012, and more are under construction.

The 2010 reform of nationality law facilitated naturalisation for first-generation immigrants and granted the right to Greek nationality for second-generation immigrants born in Greece or having studied in a Greek school for at least 6 years. On this basis, 12 400 second generation immigrants were naturalised from March 2010 till the end of 2012. Moreover, between 2010 and 2012, 36 300 foreigners of Greek origin and 2 500 of foreign origin were naturalised. Application fees (from EUR 100-700 depending on the category of the applicant) and complex procedures and requirements may have discouraged filing for naturalisation. A bill to change naturalisation regulations – to increase legal residence requirements, make the process more contingent on social and cultural integration, and increase the eligibility criteria based on residence and children's school history – is expected to be introduced in 2013.

Greece extended voting rights to migrants in local elections of 2010, but of the 203 700 immigrants (of which 118 000 of Greek origin) eligible to vote in the November 2010 local elections, only 12 000 registered.

In April 2012, the Greek government transposed the EU Blue Card Directive, creating a residence permit for highly qualified foreigners from outside the European Union earning at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in Greece.

For further information

www.statistics.gr
www.ypes.gr
www.ypakp.gr
www.yptp.gr
www.astynomia.gr

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

GREECE

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	..	5.9	3.0	2.1	..	4.1	23.2
Outflows	4.2
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Greece 2005-10 annual average 2011 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.3	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.6	1.5	9 311
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	2.5	3.8	0.4	-1.8	3.5	3.3	-20
Natural increase	-0.2	0.2	0.5	-0.4	0.0	0.6	-5
Net migration	2.7	3.6	-0.1	-1.3	3.5	2.7	-15
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	7.3	6.6	751
Foreign population	2.8	5.0	7.2	6.7	4.3	6.4	757
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							

Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	71.3	73.5	70.2	55.2	72.5	73.0	
Foreign-born men	78.1	82.6	76.7	58.4	81.8	82.1	
Native-born women	41.6	45.7	47.8	55.2	43.9	48.0	
Foreign-born women	45.0	50.2	51.2	58.4	47.8	50.4	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	7.5	6.2	9.4	14.4	6.4	6.4	
Foreign-born men	9.5	6.7	15.2	21.5	7.4	8.2	
Native-born women	17.0	15.4	16.2	21.4	15.3	13.4	
Foreign-born women	21.4	15.6	17.7	23.2	18.3	14.7	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	4.5	2.3	-4.9	-7.1	4.0	0.1	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.1	1.9	-5.2	-7.1	3.7	-0.2	25 836
Employment (level in thousands)	1.4	1.3	-2.4	-2.4	1.3	0.2	4 298
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	11.2	9.9	12.6	17.7	10.2	10.8	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824023>

Hungary

Hungary is not a major destination for international migrants. At the end of 2011 there were 207 600 foreigners in Hungary, a slight decline compared to 2010 and representing 2% of the overall population. 80% of the immigrants are Europeans, predominantly from neighbouring countries, and most are ethnic Hungarians.

Long-term migration to Hungary (as defined by residence of at least one year) continued to decline in 2011, to 22 500, 6% less than 2010 and 37% less than the record level observed in 2008. This trend reflects the economic crisis, which hit Hungary hard from 2009-10. Outflows of foreign nationals dropped to 2 700 in 2011, a significant decrease compared to 2010. Romania has been the leading country of origin of immigrants over the past decade, although its share in long-term inflow declined from 50% in 2001-02 to 26% in 2011. The other main countries of origin were Germany (11%), Ukraine (6%) and the Slovak Republic (5%). Immigration from China is more limited but has been growing.

The total number of foreign workers was 22 400 in 2011 (10 500 work permits issued by the National Employment Office for non-EEA migrants, and 11 800 registrations by EEA migrants). This was 8% fewer than in 2010, reflecting the poor employment situation. The main countries of origin of migrant workers were Romania (28%), China (14%), Ukraine (12%), and the Slovak Republic (7%).

The number of residence permits issued by the Office of Immigration and Nationality for the purpose of gainful employment decreased by 18%, to 13 200. Family migrants obtained 4 500 permits, 5% fewer than in the previous year. The number of permits for students also decreased, to about 10 200, 8% less than in 2010.

While official emigration statistics are unavailable, an estimated 200 000 Hungarians were working abroad in 2011, with a significant increase in 2012. Labour emigration especially involves health sector employees and youth. In 2011, 2 000 physicians requested professional certificates required for their employment abroad. The main destination countries are Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom.

In 2011 there were 1 700 asylum seekers in Hungary, a decrease of 21% compared to 2010. The main countries of origin of asylum seekers were Afghanistan (38%), Kosovo (13%) and Maghreb countries (10%). The asylum recognition rate was very low.

The European Integration Fund supported a wide range of integration projects in 2011, including Hungarian language courses, development of public services for immigrants, and campaigns on intercultural dialogue.

After the introduction of simplified naturalisation in 2010, 202 000 people submitted applications to become Hungarian citizens in 2011. About 103 000 people acquired the Hungarian citizenship as the result of the simplified procedure. 1 200 persons applied for Hungarian citizenship on other grounds, of which almost two-thirds were non-European citizens.

Hungary implemented the EU Blue Card Directive from August 2011. Tertiary-educated non-EEA nationals who enter Hungary for the purposes of highly qualified employment receive this special permit, if their salary exceeds 1.5 times the average wage, or 1.2 times the average wage in case of shortage professions. The threshold wage is about HUF 300 000 (EUR 1040) monthly.

A plan to simplify and shorten the work-permit issuing process was developed in the framework of State-Reform Operational Programme supported by the European Social Fund. Modifications planned in the first quarter of 2013 include a one-step process for the work-permit and fewer documents to be submitted. These changes may apply to seasonal work permits as well.

In 2011, the Higher Education law and the National Public Education law were amended, to grant immigrants the right to undertake studies in programmes fully or partially financed through scholarships granted by the Hungarian state, and to entitle non-Hungarian minors to pre-school services and make them subject to compulsory education in Hungary.

In 2011, legislative changes were made to asylum procedures. The changes included introducing the definition of manifest unfoundedness to reject applications in the early stage; restricting the right to remain in Hungary to the time needed to examine first asylum requests; ending the possibility to request continuation of the process when the applicant absconds; and placing unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in Hungarian child protection institutions.

In 2012 a new Working Holiday Scheme (WHS) agreement for young people was announced with New Zealand, and negotiations on WHS agreements are ongoing with Canada and Korea. During 2011-12, Hungary signed bilateral readmission protocols with Kosovo, Serbia, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia.

For further information

www.bmbah.hu.

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

HUNGARY

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	2.0	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.6	22.5
Outflows	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.5	2.7
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Hungary 2001-10 annual average 2011 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	1 693
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	-2.2	-2.2	-2.8	-2.4	-2.4	-1.8	-24
Natural increase	-3.7	-3.9	-4.0	-4.1	-3.7	-3.4	-41
Net migration	1.7	1.7	1.2	1.8	1.3	1.6	18
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	2.9	3.3	4.5	4.7	3.1	3.9	473
Foreign population	1.1	1.5	2.1	2.1	1.3	1.9	208
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	4.9	6.9	3.1	9.8	4.9	3.8	20 554
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	62.6	63.0	60.2	55.7	63.0	62.3	
Foreign-born men	69.4	72.3	69.2	62.1	72.0	72.4	
Native-born women	49.4	50.9	50.4	55.7	50.3	50.5	
Foreign-born women	49.8	54.3	62.4	62.1	49.8	57.5	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	7.3	7.1	11.7	11.1	6.4	8.9	
Foreign-born men	3.5	3.0	7.6	8.9	2.4	5.8	
Native-born women	5.8	7.4	10.8	11.0	5.7	8.9	
Foreign-born women	4.8	6.4	7.4	10.1	6.5	7.9	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	4.2	4.0	1.3	1.6	4.2	-0.1	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.5	4.2	1.5	1.9	4.4	0.1	21 455
Employment (level in thousands)	1.6	0.0	-0.1	-0.3	0.2	-0.5	3 741
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	6.3	7.2	11.2	11.0	6.0	9.1	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824042>

Ireland

In the year prior to April 2012 (FY 2012), an inflow of 53 000 was offset by an estimated outflow of over 87 000, resulting in net emigration of 34 000, the highest level for over two decades. Returning Irish nationals were the single largest constituent of immigration. Immigration from the EU New Member States (NMS) fell to about 10 000 in 2011 and 2012. Emigration of Irish nationals increased sharply to over 46 000 in FY 2012, over half of total emigration. Citizens of the NMS accounted for about 17% of all outflows, a substantial reduction from recent years.

While the overall number of new employment permits fell by 15.8% (to 3 200) in 2011, certain categories (green cards, intra-corporate transfers and training permits) increased. 2012 saw a further decrease (of 8.7%) in new work permits issued. Ireland continued to apply transitional restrictions on access to the labour market for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals during 2011, although these restrictions ceased in January 2012.

The number of asylum applications in Ireland fell by one-third from 2010 to 2011, to 1 290 and continued to decrease in 2012. Nigeria continued to be the largest country of stated nationality (14% of all applications), followed by Pakistan and China.

During 2011, 2 440 applications for “leave to remain” were submitted and 1 970 persons granted permission to remain. These figures include cases claiming a link to the *Zambrano* judgment. Following on from a European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling on the *Zambrano* case, the Irish government changed its policy regarding the deportation of parents of Irish citizen children. During 2011 the number of deportation orders from Ireland (280) remained broadly stable. A total of 475 persons were assisted to return home voluntarily during 2011.

At the end of 2012, there were 31 400 non-EEA national students registered to study in Ireland. 38% of students were in degree programmes, 26% in non-degree further education, and 28% in language courses.

The long-discussed framework Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010 was delayed by the dissolution of parliament in February 2011 and restored the following month. The Bill is expected to be republished in 2013. The Female Genital Mutilation Bill 2011 was passed in 2012 and included an extra-territorial aspect. The Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 provides for amendments including citizenship ceremonies.

Ireland’s first formal visa-waiver programme was announced in May 2011 as a pilot and extended for four years in March 2012. It aims at providing visa-free

travel to Ireland for certain categories of persons in possession of a valid UK visa and who are nationals of one of the countries covered by the Scheme (Belarus, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Kazakhstan, China and Uzbekistan) who have entered the United Kingdom on a UK “C” General visa, or been granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom for up to 180 days. In March 2012, Bosnia and Herzegovina was added to the list of countries already covered, with fees to be waived for long-term Schengen-area residents from the same countries.

In April 2012, an Immigrant Investor Programme and a Start-Up Entrepreneur Programme became operational. Both admit approved participants and immediate family members to Ireland for an initial period of five years (renewable). The Immigrant Investor Programme requires a financial commitment of from EUR 500 000, for endowment-related investments, to one million EUR for business entities where jobs are being created or saved, and two million EUR in the new Immigrant Investor low-interest bearing Government Bond. The Start-Up Entrepreneur Programme is for approved migrants with an innovative “High Potential Start Up” business idea, and funding of EUR 75 000.

In December 2011, Ireland and the United Kingdom signed a joint agreement reinforcing the Common Travel Area (CTA) and a memorandum regarding the exchange of information such as fingerprint biometrics and biographical details, particularly from “high risk” countries, as part of the visa issuing process.

A new immigration regime for international students took effect from January 2011 whereby non-EEA students will have their time capped according to type of course followed, generally limited to seven years. Current students affected by the change benefit from interim arrangements. The Third Level Graduate Work Scheme, for access to the labour market for international students after graduation, was extended to six and twelve months for those at levels seven and eight of the National Framework of Qualifications respectively. The government also commissioned a review on access to the labour market by non-EEA students.

For further information

www.inis.gov.ie
www.entemp.ie/labour/workpermits
www.ria.gov.ie.


Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

IRELAND

Migration flows (foreigners) <i>National definition</i>	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	7.3	16.0	5.3	7.5	11.1	17.1	33.7
Outflows	9.0	8.6	..	8.3	38.6
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type <i>Permit based statistics (standardised)</i>	Thousands		% distribution				
	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work	2.8	2.6	11.9	7.7			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	8.4	16.5	35.2	48.9			
Humanitarian	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.4			
Free movements	12.5	14.5	52.3	43.0			
Others			
Total	23.9	33.7	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average			
				2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	4.7	..			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	2.9	1.0	0.8	0.5	2.0	0.8	2 310
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	14.5	23.2	2.9	2.6	18.7	12.6	12
Natural increase	6.1	8.2	10.4	10.0	7.9	10.1	46
Net migration	8.4	15.0	-7.5	-7.3	10.7	2.5	-34
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	8.7	12.6	17.3	16.8	10.8	16.2	752
Foreign population	12.0	537
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							

Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		
					2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	75.8	75.8	63.7	58.8	75.4	71.4	
Foreign-born men	75.2	78.8	65.0	59.0	75.6	74.8	
Native-born women	53.1	58.0	56.4	58.8	55.7	58.5	
Foreign-born women	54.9	57.7	54.1	59.0	55.6	59.1	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	4.4	4.5	16.6	17.8	4.5	9.4	
Foreign-born men	5.4	6.0	19.7	19.8	5.9	11.7	
Native-born women	4.1	3.5	8.9	10.0	3.6	5.6	
Foreign-born women	6.1	6.0	13.0	14.3	5.4	8.6	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	9.3	5.9	-0.8	1.4	4.9	0.5	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	7.9	3.5	-0.9	1.1	3.0	-1.0	42 329
Employment (level in thousands)	4.8	4.7	-3.1	-0.4	2.9	-0.9	1 851
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	4.2	4.4	13.9	14.7	4.4	9.4	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824061>

Israel

The foreign-born population accounts for one-quarter of residents in Israel, although migration flows have been relatively low in the past decade and this proportion is declining. In 2011, there were 16 900 new permanent immigrants to Israel, an increase of 2% over 2010 and a rate of two immigrants per thousand residents. Preliminary figures for 2012 indicate that permanent immigration to Israel rose to 18 000 entries. The main countries from which immigrants arrived in 2011 were the former Soviet Union (43%, primarily from the Russian Federation and Ukraine), the United States and Ethiopia, with a share of about 17% each, and France (10%).

While permanent immigration is generally limited to entries under the Law of Return (Jews and their family members) and family reunification with an Israeli citizen, Israel has a large temporary labour migration programme for employment in specific low-skill sectors or in specialist jobs. In 2011, there were 13 400 new entries of employees holding permits under this programme, including 1 500 specialists. In 2012, there were 10 000 entries, including 1 700 specialists. The main origin countries in 2012 were Thailand (23%), India (13%), and Moldova, the Philippines and Turkey (10% each).

At the end of 2011, the stock of legal foreign workers was about 75 000, although an additional 15 000 workers had lost their legal status and remained in Israel. The number fell slightly by mid-2012. Most of the temporary foreign workers are employed in the caregiving sector (52 000), in agriculture (24 000 in 2011) and construction (7 300). There were also an estimated 95 000 individuals who had entered with a tourist visa and illegally overstayed, many of whom are assumed to have entered the labour force.

Israel also admits Palestinian workers for employment, on a temporary renewable basis and subject to sector quotas. The quotas have been increased in recent years, to about 35 000 excluding seasonal workers; the quota for construction, the largest sector, was 27 500 in 2012. In mid-2012, there were about 31 000 Palestinian workers holding regular work permits.

2011 saw a continuous increase in the number of migrants illegally crossing the border from Egypt into Israel. 17 200 entered in 2011, compared with 14 200 in 2010. From 1 000 in 2006, the total number present rose to 41 000 in November 2011. Most are Eritreans (63%) or Sudanese (26%), who are not generally granted access to the asylum process in Israel, but who receive a tolerated temporary status (residence permit without permission to work). Inflows across the border largely ceased with the completion of a fence in mid-2012, and the total entries for 2012 amounted to 10 300. In the absence of an asylum policy and reception services, Israel is not enforcing the prohibition on employment of asylum seekers and those with tolerated status.

The government continues with a policy to reduce the number of foreign workers in agriculture and construction, by requiring new recruits to come through bilateral agreements and by reducing the quotas. While no quota is applied to the home care sector, that for foreign agricultural workers is to be lowered from 24 000 to 20 200 in 2015, and for construction workers (8 000), the quota is to end in 2016. 30% of the quota for agricultural workers is reserved for border, remote and priority areas. An additional quota of 1 000 seasonal workers is allowed.

The government has signed bilateral agreements with Thailand and Sri Lanka for the recruitment of agricultural workers. In agreement with the builders' association, bilateral agreements for the employment of foreign workers in the construction sector have been negotiated with Bulgaria and are under discussion with other countries. Implementation delays in both sectors led to inflows of workers below the number expected, contributing to a slight decline in the number of foreign workers.

For further information

www.cbs.gov.il
www.moit.gov.il
www.piba.gov.il
www.moia.gov.il/

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.


Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

ISRAEL

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	9.6	3.1	2.2	2.2	4.3	2.3	16.9
Outflows
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Israel 2001-10 annual average (dashed line) 2011 (solid bar) 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers	13.4	..			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.7	..	0.5	5 745
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	37.4	28.8	18.2	18.4	30.1	..	143
Natural increase	27.7	26.4	16.2	16.3	27.0	..	127
Net migration	9.8	2.4	2.1	2.1	3.1	..	16
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	31.1	28.1	24.5	23.9	29.5	25.9	1 855
Foreign population
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							

Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	61.5	62.3
Foreign-born men	69.3	70.8	
Native-born women	55.5	55.9
Foreign-born women	60.5	61.4	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	7.0	5.8
Foreign-born men	6.9	5.6	
Native-born women	7.2	6.2
Foreign-born women	5.3	4.5	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	9.3	4.9	5.0	4.6	2.1	4.4	..
GDP/capita (level in USD)	6.4	3.0	3.1	2.8	0.1	2.5	27 958
Employment (level in thousands)	3.7	3.8	3.6	2.5	2.3	2.9	2 953
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	8.8	9.0	6.6	5.6	9.9	6.9	..

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824080>

Italy

Permanent immigration to Italy remains at high levels. Foreign residents accounted for 8% of the entire registered Italian population in 2011. According to the 2011 Census, there were about 4 million foreign residents in Italy, equivalent to 6.8% of the Italian population. New enrolments of foreigners arriving from abroad were at their lowest levels since 2007, with 354 000 new enrolments in the population register in 2011, 16% fewer than in 2010.

The number of new residence permits granted to non-EU citizens decreased by 44% in 2011 compared with the previous year, to 331 000. The decrease was mainly due to a 67% reduction in the number of residence permits granted for work purposes. 43% of permits were granted for the purpose of family reunification (141 400) and 36% were work permits (119 300). The number of student permits increased by 18% in 2011 compared with the previous year and reached 30 200. Residence permits granted for other reasons increased to 40 000, as a consequence of coastal landings related to the “Arab Spring” and the arrival of African citizens who received temporary permits.

The three main nationalities of recipients of work permits were Morocco (12 400), India (11 200) and China (10 300). There were 15 200 work permits granted for seasonal work in 2011, led by workers from India and Morocco. Highly skilled workers or researchers were granted about 2 000 work permits; citizens of the United States were the leading recipients.

In 2012, a conditional regularisation was held through which employers of unauthorised non-EU workers for at least three months could pay a fine and back taxes to regularise their employees. 134 600 applications were filed. 86% of the applications were for domestic work (79 000 family assistants, 33 000 assistants for non self-sufficient people and 3 000 assistants for self-sufficient people). The majority of applications were for workers from Bangladesh (15 800), Morocco (15 500) and India (13 300).

In 2011, the number of asylum seekers rose to more than 34 000, from 10 000 in 2010. The main countries of origin of asylum seekers were Tunisia and Libya. Out of 24 100 requests examined by the Ministry of the Interior in 2011, 70% had a negative outcome, and the status of refugee, subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection was recognised in 7 200 cases.

Italy governs labour migration through quotas. For 2012, a ceiling of 35 000 seasonal workers was fixed, lower than in previous years but higher than actual uptake of the visa. The quota is allocated geographically according to the instructions from the

Ministry of Employment and Social Policies. Only certain nationalities – particularly from countries with bilateral agreements – may be recruited for seasonal work.

Changes to the seasonal work programme were contained in the so-called simplification decree (2012): the introduction of default acceptance of employer requests for seasonal workers who meet certain conditions and who had returned home at the expiration of their permit the previous year, and the possibility for workers to seek new seasonal employment after their initial contract ends. In addition, the decree allowed entry for non-seasonal work of up to 4 000 non-EU nationals residing overseas who have completed recognised training and educational programmes in the country of origin.

In November 2012, the government approved a quota decree for non-seasonal work, making 13 850 places available for certain worker types, or for the conversion of residence permits for certain other reasons into permits for salaried or non-salaried employment.

In August 2012, the government transposed the EU Blue Card directive. The EU Blue Card, a residence permit for highly skilled workers, is available to those earning salaries above the threshold of EUR 24 800.

With the coming into force of the recent labour market reform in July 2012, the government extended the period during which unemployed work-permit holders may seek new jobs from six months to one year.

The decree implementing the EU Employer Sanction Directive introducing minimum standards on sanctions and measures against the employers of illegally staying non-EU nationals came into force in July 2012. The decree introduced a number of tougher employer sanctions.

One of the main strategies to foster the inclusion of immigrants conceived in 2012 was the adoption of measures to finance actions for the integration of unaccompanied minors in society and at work. Under this scheme, an individual grant is allocated to each beneficiary when they reach the age of 18, to be used for active employment and integration policy services.

For further information

www.interno.it

www.istat.it


www.lavoro.gov.it/lavoro.

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

ITALY

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Inflows	3.4	4.6	7.0	5.9	4.8	6.8	354.3	
Outflows	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.3	32.4	
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Italy 2001-10 annual average (dashed line), 2010 (solid grey bar) 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011				
Work	134.2	104.1	38.4	33.4				
Family (incl. accompanying family)	94.8	87.0	27.1	27.9				
Humanitarian	4.3	7.2	1.2	2.3				
Free movements	111.7	109.1	31.9	34.9				
Others	4.9	4.8	1.4	1.6				
Total	349.9	312.2	100.0	100.0				
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10				
<i>Thousands</i>								
International students	31.7	36.8	39.9	35.3				
Trainees				
Working holiday makers	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4				
Seasonal workers	84.2	27.7	15.2	53.3				
Intra-company transfers				
Other temporary workers				
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.3	34 117	
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Total	0.7	4.9	4.7	3.2	6.2	6.3	194	
Natural increase	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	-0.8	-0.3	-0.2	-47	
Net migration	0.9	5.2	5.1	4.0	6.5	6.4	241	
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>								
Foreign-born population	8.9	9.0	5 458	
Foreign population	2.4	4.6	7.6	8.0	3.5	6.4	4 826	
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>								
	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.7	1.0	21 206	
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>								
Native-born men	67.4	69.2	66.7	56.3	69.0	68.6		
Foreign-born men	82.4	79.9	76.1	61.5	82.8	79.7		
Native-born women	39.3	45.1	45.7	56.3	43.1	46.1		
Foreign-born women	40.5	47.6	49.5	61.5	46.8	50.4		
<i>Unemployment rate</i>								
Native-born men	8.4	6.2	7.4	7.4	6.9	6.0		
Foreign-born men	6.5	6.8	10.0	9.7	5.7	7.3		
Native-born women	14.9	9.7	9.2	8.9	11.5	8.5		
Foreign-born women	21.2	14.5	13.3	14.1	15.5	12.4		
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Real GDP	3.7	0.9	1.8	0.4	1.0	-0.2		
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.6	0.2	1.3	0.0	0.4	-0.8	32 659	
Employment (level in thousands)	1.8	0.7	-0.6	0.6	1.3	0.3	23 042	
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
Unemployment	10.1	7.7	8.4	8.4	8.3	7.4		

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824099>

Japan

Inflows of foreign nationals reached 267 000 in 2011 (excluding temporary visitors), a decrease of almost 20 000 compared with 2010. The number of new entrants with the status of residence for the purpose of work, declining since 2005, fell a further 1.5% in 2011 from the previous year, to 51 700. The most important category of entry for employment remained “entertainers” (26 100). Entries of intra-company transferees remained at the same level as in 2010 (5 000), while the inflow of engineers increased by 46.5%, to more than 4 000.

International students account for a large share of temporary migrants. The 50 000 who arrived in 2011 represented a decline of 21% compared with 2010. About 84% come from Asia, especially China and Korea. According to the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), the total number of foreign students in May 2012 was 138 000, a slight decline from 2011.

The number of incoming trainees supported by the Japanese International Training Cooperation Organisation peaked at more than 100 000 in 2007 and 2008, and has since been falling due to the economic downturn. 82 000 (“trainee” and “technical intern training”) entered in 2011. The Technical Intern Training Programme was changed in 2010 in order to improve compliance with employment laws and protect trainees.

Since October 2007, business owners must provide notification of the employment situation of foreign workers. According to the result of notification, there were 682 000 foreign workers in Japan at the end of October 2012, a decrease of 0.6% since October 2011. The number of foreign workers in professional or technical fields is 124 000, while those of Japanese descent and other permanent residents, comprise 309 000, foreign students and others permitted to work part-time 108 000, and technical interns 134 000.

The number of resident foreigners declined by 2.6% in 2011 compared with the previous year, to 2 079 000, about 1.6% of the population. The largest nationalities are Chinese (33%), Koreans (26%) and Brazilians (10%). The number of Brazilians in Japan fell by more than 14% in 2010 and a further 9% in 2011, as reduced employment opportunities led some to return to Brazil.

The number of overstayers has been falling for almost two decades, and in the course of 2011 fell by 15%, to 67 100. The government attributes part of this decline to greater enforcement and border control including fingerprinting since 2007. Although Japan does not offer regularisation, the Ministry of Justice issued more than 6 900 case-by-case special permis-

sions to stay in 2011, an 8% increase compared with 2010.

An Action Plan published in March 2011 defined measures included the “Basic Policy on Measures for Foreign Residents of Japanese Descent”, issued in August 2010. Actions include Japanese language education programs, implementation of “work preparation training” for facilitating employment of foreign residents of Japanese descent, specific measures and projects for improving the integration of foreign children in the Japanese school system and translation of Japanese national programs in multiple languages.

A preferential immigration channel for highly – skilled foreigners through a points-based system, part of the 2010 New Growth Strategy, was implemented in May 2012. Under the new point-system, preferential treatment is given to university professors, academics and researchers, doctors and other professionals with highly specified knowledge or skills. It also favours corporate executives and upper managers. Education, working experience, Japanese language proficiency, annual salaries, and other qualifications of the applicants, are evaluated by points. Those who achieve a certain total qualify for special privileges and accelerated access to permanent residence.

Foreign nurses with Japanese professional licenses have been able to work indefinitely in Japan since 2010. Through Economic Partnership Agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines, Japan introduced programs for foreign nurses and certified care worker candidates trained in the home country and selected jointly by public Japanese and origin-country bodies. Annual inflow is capped (in 2011, 200 nurses and 300 certified careworker candidates from each country). Participants receive training in Japan and have three to four years to pass the national licensing exam; if they pass the national exam and find employment in their sector, they may remain. Few participants have passed.

The “New Residency Management System” enacted in July 2009 was fully executed in July 2012. Medium and long-term residents with resident status under the Immigration Control Act receive a residence card, and the maximum length of residence status has been extended from three to five years.

For further information

www.immi-moj.go.jp/english
www.mhlw.go.jp/english/index.html
www8.cao.go.jp/teiju-portal/eng/index.html

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

JAPAN

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	2.7	2.9	2.3	2.1	2.8	2.5	266.9
Outflows	1.7	2.3	1.9	1.8	2.1	1.8	230.9
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Japan 2001-10 annual average (dashed line) 2011 (solid line) 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work	19.3	22.4	34.6	38.0			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	21.9	22.0	39.3	37.2			
Humanitarian	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.5			
Free movements			
Others	14.1	14.4	25.4	24.4			
Total	55.7	59.1	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	41.5	63.5	49.9	56.3			
Trainees	83.3	75.4	82.3	90.5			
Working holiday makers	4.7	7.5	8.5	6.6			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers	4.2	5.8	5.3	6.2			
Other temporary workers	110.2	38.4	35.2	46.9			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1 867
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	0.5	0.4	-2.0	..	0.8	-1.0	..
Natural increase	1.8	0.0	-1.4	..	0.7	-0.6	..
Net migration	0.3	0.0	-0.6	..	-0.1	-0.4	..
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	1.0
Foreign population	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.7	2 079
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.6	10 359
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	
Foreign-born men	
Native-born women	
Foreign-born women	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	
Foreign-born men	
Native-born women	
Foreign-born women	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	2.9	1.3	4.7	-0.6	1.4	0.4	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	2.7	1.3	4.6	-0.4	1.3	0.3	34 483
Employment (level in thousands)	-0.2	0.4	-0.4	0.1	-0.3	-0.3	62 626
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	4.7	4.4	5.1	4.6	5.0	4.4	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824118>

Korea

Korea, historically a country of net emigration, has since 2005 become a net immigration country. The net immigration of foreigners in 2011 was 90 000, 8% below the previous year's figure. Net immigration of Korean nationals was positive – albeit just 1 400 – in 2011, compared with net negative migration of 14 700 in 2010.

In December 2011, the population of foreign long-term stayers in Korea stood at around 1.12 million, 11.4% more than the previous year. Foreign long-term residents represented 2.2% of the total population. In addition, there were about 280 000 short-term stayers, mostly tourists. Citizens of China account for almost half of the total foreign population (69% are ethnic Koreans), followed by citizens of the United States (10%) and Vietnamese (8%).

Almost 50% of the stock of foreign residents consists of workers in low-skilled jobs (547 300 in 2011, a 6.6% increase over 2010). Most are recruited through the Employment Permit System (EPS), under which temporary low-skilled workers (E-9), and ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries (H-2) acquire visas.

The E-9 visa is subject to an admission quota, of 57 000 in 2012 and 62 000 in 2013. Since 2012, subquotas are set for qualifying repeat participants returning to the same employer: 11 000 in 2012 and 10 000 in 2013. Around 49 000 E-9 foreign workers entered Korea in both 2011 and 2012. Most (82%) of the 234 300 E-9 workers are in the manufacturing sector, followed by agriculture. The ceiling on H-2 permits remained 303 000.

The total number of highly-skilled workers and professionals increased by 8% from 2010 to 2011, to 47 100.

The stock of foreign students, which had been steadily increasing through 2010, levelled off at 88 500 in 2011; a decline in the number of degree students, to 68 000, was compensated by a rise in the number of language students.

The total stock of marriage migrants exceeded 149 000 in 2011, a 2.1% increase over 2010. 30% were naturalised citizens, and 86% were women. Marriage migrants were mainly from China (44%), Viet Nam (26%), Japan (8%), and the Philippines (6%).

Since December 2009, overseas Koreans who meet the requirements for acquiring Korean nationality can be granted permanent residence status (F-5). This measure was implemented to reduce the demand for naturalisation among overseas Koreans, the number of whom hold F-5 visas jumped

from 1 000 in 2009 to 32 000 in 2011. The number holding an F-4 visa – a renewable visa for overseas Koreans which grants unrestricted labour market access – increased from 51 000 in 2009 to 137 000 in 2011; almost all the increase comprised H-2 visa-holders who changed status under a provision for those who have worked at the same workplace, in a remote area, for two years.

The number of naturalisations increased by 6% in 2011 compared with 2010, to 18 400. 12% of naturalisations were cases of recovering Korean nationality.

The number of overstaying foreign nationals stood at around 167 800 in 2011, comparable to 2010. Preliminary figures for 2012 suggest an increase of 9%, largely due to high rates of overstay (about one-third) among EPS workers whose permits have run out.

The EPS system was changed in 2011, to grant employers permits for recruitment from abroad based on need and on past compliance, measured through a points scale. Optional skills tests for candidates are now offered for all sectors but services; the test increases the likelihood of selection. 27 new local centres to support foreign workers opened in 2011, in addition to seven already in place.

The Korean government seeks to attract highly-skilled and talented foreigners. Graduating international students may receive a job-seeker permit for a period of six to 24 months, depending on degree level. Since 2010, professionals legally resident in Korea for at least one year and able to meet the requirements set in a points based system (PBS) are eligible for residence status (F-2) and accelerated access to permanent residence. Points are awarded mainly for academic qualifications, Korean language proficiency, income and age. F-2 status residents are allowed a wide range of employment activities, and permits are extended to family members.

A Refugee Act passed at the end of 2011 will take effect in July 2013, replacing the refugee provisions in the Immigration Control Act. The new act increases access to status determination and appeal, opens the way for accepting resettled refugees, and improves the status of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection.

For further information

www.immigration.go.kr
www.eps.go.kr
www.kostat.go.kr
www.moj.go.kr

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

KOREA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	3.7	5.3	5.9	6.2	3.9	5.9	307.2			
Outflows	1.9	5.5	4.0	4.4	3.3	4.1	217.7			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Korea 2001-10 annual average (dashed line), 2011 (solid line) 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work	1.1	1.4	2.1	2.5						
Family (incl. accompanying family)	34.4	34.4	67.4	60.5						
Humanitarian	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1						
Free movements						
Others	15.5	21.0	30.4	36.9						
Total	51.1	56.9	100.0	100.0						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students	9.0	16.8	15.6	15.2						
Trainees	4.4	11.8	13.3	11.9						
Working holiday makers	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.3						
Seasonal workers						
Intra-company transfers	8.4	8.4						
Other temporary workers	135.0	133.4	128.0	159.7						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1 011			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total			
Natural increase			
Net migration	91			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	0.3			
Foreign population	0.4	1.1	2.0	2.2	0.8	1.7	982			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	..	3.5	1.9	..	1.8	1.8	..			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10				
Employment/population ratio										
Native-born men				
Foreign-born men				
Native-born women				
Foreign-born women				
Unemployment rate										
Native-born men				
Foreign-born men				
Native-born women				
Foreign-born women				
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	8.8	4.0	6.3	3.6	4.5	3.8				
GDP/capita (level in USD)	7.9	3.7	5.8	2.9	4.0	3.3	30 286			
Employment (level in thousands)	4.3	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.6	0.8	24 035			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	4.4	3.7	3.7	3.4	3.7	3.4				

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824137>

Latvia

At the beginning of 2012, Latvia's population was 2.04 million. Between the 2000 and the 2011 Census, Latvia's population had fallen by almost 13%, to 2.07 million. 63% of this decline was due to net migration, which has been negative throughout the past decade. According to Statistics Latvia, outmigration flows in 2011 were 30 400, while immigration flows were 7 300.

At the beginning of 2012, 281 000, or 14% of the resident population, comprised non-citizens of Latvia, longstanding residents who migrated from other parts of the Soviet Union prior to Latvia regaining independence in 1991. This number has been slowly decreasing, and is less than half the 2000 figure, when it comprised 28% of the population. The remaining foreign population amounted to 52 300 residents, of which most were citizens of the Russian Federation.

There were 60 300 foreigners holding residence permits in Latvia on 1 January 2012, of which most (44 300) held permanent residence permits (80% were Russian citizens). While the number of persons holding permanent permits has been gradually increasing over the decade, the number of persons holding temporary permits declined from 14 700 in 2009 to 13 600 in 2010, before rebounding in 2011, to 16 000. 28% of temporary permit holders were from the Russian Federation, 10% from Ukraine, and 7% from Germany.

The number of initial temporary permits issued in 2011 amounted to 4 800, almost twice the figure for 2010. Most of the increase was due to the introduction of a new permit for investors – in real estate, banking institutions, and corporations – which attracted more than 1 700 investors in 2011. Investors must place LVL 200 000 in a five year bond, purchase real estate worth LVL 100 000 (50 000 in rural areas), or invest a smaller amount in an approved enterprise. Most such permits are issued for real estate investment. Investors from outside the EU are attracted by the residence visa, which grants access and mobility within the Schengen area. Employment-related permits accounted for about 1 300 permits, more than in 2010 but below the 3 000 permits annually issued for employment during the boom years of 2007-08.

The number of asylum seekers increased sharply in 2011, to 340, from an average of 60 in the preceding three years. 84% of applications reviewed resulted in refusal.

Acquisition of Latvian citizenship has been declining since 2004-06, when it approached 20 000 annually. The figure for 2011 was 2 500, of which 96% were cases of non-citizens of Latvia, rather than foreign nationals.

Recent emigration from Latvia has been closely related to economic conditions and particularly the poor employment situation. By mid-2009, the real GDP of Latvia had fallen to less than 80% of its early-2008 peak level, and had only returned to about 88% of its peak by mid 2012. Full time employment fell to less than 70% of its peak level, and has not yet returned to 80%. Unemployment climbed from 5% to more than 20%, and remains about 15%. In these conditions, emigration for employment increased, with 35 000 – or more, by some estimates – leaving annually in 2009 and 2010, and 2011 showing only a slight decline in outmigration by most estimates.

The main destinations of Latvian nationals are the United Kingdom and Norway. Ireland was a major destination in the 2005-08 period but poor employment prospects have led to changes in migration flows. Migration has also picked up to Germany.

Recent emigrants have been disproportionately young – 70% between the ages of 18 and 34 – and more educated than those who have remained.

In light of the demographic impact of emigration, which is expected to be felt especially as the economy returns to growth, the Latvian government has developed a strategy to try to meet labour needs with Latvians returning from abroad. The strategy also aims to benefit from business networks with Latvians abroad, even if they do not return. Among the remigration support activities planned are the creation of a one-stop agency for returnees; improved information for Latvians abroad; support such as educational loan payment for shortage occupation workers; Latvian language support abroad; resettlement orientation for returning families; public sector employment access; and legislative changes to the repatriation law to broaden the definition.

For further information

www.pmlp.lv
www.csb.gov.lv
www.emn.lv

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

LATVIA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	0.7	0.8	1.3	1.5	..	1.4	3.0			
Outflows			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Latvia 2001-09 annual average 2010 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work						
Family (incl. accompanying family)						
Humanitarian						
Free movements						
Others						
Total						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students						
Trainees						
Working holiday makers						
Seasonal workers						
Intra-company transfers						
Other temporary workers						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	0.2	335			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total	-7.4	-5.1	-8.4	-16.0	-6.0	-5.7	-33			
Natural increase	-5.0	-4.9	-4.8	-4.7	-5.2	-4.1	-10			
Net migration	-2.3	-0.2	-3.5	-11.2	-0.8	-1.6	-23			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	18.8	..	13.6	14.4	298			
Foreign population	24.6	..	13.3	13.6	281			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	2 467			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10				
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>										
Native-born men	..	66.9	59.1	62.4	64.8	66.5				
Foreign-born men	..	72.7	60.4	66.3	69.5	71.3				
Native-born women	..	58.8	59.4	61.0	57.8	62.3				
Foreign-born women	..	62.5	59.9	59.8	57.7	64.3				
<i>Unemployment rate</i>										
Native-born men	..	9.3	21.6	17.8	11.6	13.0				
Foreign-born men	..	8.2	24.1	18.5	12.2	15.5				
Native-born women	..	8.6	16.3	13.0	10.5	9.7				
Foreign-born women	..	10.0	13.8	15.2	12.1	10.8				
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	5.7	10.1	-0.9	5.5	8.2	-0.2				
GDP/capita (level in USD)	18 951			
Employment (level in thousands)	-2.8	1.6	-4.3	-8.4	1.8	-1.7	862			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	13.7	9.6	19.8	16.2	11.6	12.0				

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824156>

Lithuania

From 2010 to 2011 Lithuania saw a significant increase in reported immigration, including Lithuanians returning from abroad, from 5 200 to 15 700 entries. This increase may however only reflect delayed reporting by returning Lithuanians who must report their return in order to benefit from health care services.

Return migration accounted for nearly 90% of entries in 2011, mainly from traditional destinations, the United Kingdom (41%), Ireland (12%), Norway (8%), Spain (5%) and Germany (5%). Labour emigration to those countries was substantial during their economic boom, and return has occurred with decreased labour demand. Immigration of non-Lithuanians also increased, from 1 060 in 2010 to 1 670 in 2011, of which 1 170 were non-EU/EFTA nationals: Russians (22%), Belarussians (15%), and Ukrainians (11%).

Declared emigration peaked in 2010, when 83 500 Lithuanian residents declared their departure. This peak reflected the requirement that all permanent residents pay compulsory health insurance; emigrants who had previously not declared their departure hastened to do so in 2010. Still, the emigration figure for 2011 (53 900) and preliminary data for 2012 suggest continuous high emigration outflows. The main destination countries in 2011 remained the United Kingdom and Ireland (although they drew a smaller share than before the crisis), while Scandinavian countries grew in importance. The Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine were less important destination countries in 2011, as was the United States. The full opening of the labour markets in Germany and Austria had no noticeable impact on emigration patterns.

Official statistics reflect only those emigrants who depart for a period longer than one year and declare their departure. Previous census data showed that approximately 60% of all emigration flows during 1990-2000 were undeclared; data from the 2011 census shows that non-declared emigration also remained high during the 2001-09 period. Due to continuously high emigration and limited immigration/return migration, the resident population decreased by nearly one-sixth over two decades.

Lithuania's GDP declined by -15% in 2009 but is slowly recovering, with GDP growth of 1.4% in 2010 and 5.9% in 2011. The unemployment rate peaked at 17.8% in 2010, when the emigration rate was 25.3 per 1 000. Unemployment decreased to 15.4% in 2011, and the emigration rate decreased to 16.7 per 1 000. Net migration in 2011 was -11.8 per 1 000 inhabitants compared with -23.7 per 1 000 inhabitants in 2010, when it was the lowest in the EU.

Most outflows from Lithuania are related to employment. Unemployment, especially among

youth (35.1% in 2010 and 32.9% in 2011) can partly explain the growing share of emigrants between 20 and 34 years old, from pre-crisis levels of 47% in 2008 to 56% in 2011. With migration disproportionately involving young people, demographic imbalances and labour shortages are expected in the future, especially when the economy returns to its pre-crisis level. A decreasing number of youth entering the labour force and increased youth emigration will further affect a labour force which has been shrinking since 2010.

An improving labour market situation led to a rebound in the number of work permits issued, from 1 800 in 2010 to 3 300 in 2011. Labour migrants are concentrated in the transportation and construction sector. The main origin countries were Belarus, Ukraine and China.

Remittances are becoming more relevant. In 2011 remittances increased by 17% over 2010 and constituted an equivalent of 4.6% of total GDP and approximately 25% of all salaries paid in Lithuania.

In October 2011, the Lithuanian national visa information system was launched, to support new visa rules which entered into force in April. From January 2012, electronic residence permits have been issued.

The Law on the Legal Status for Aliens saw further amendments in 2011 to implement the EU Blue Card Directive for highly qualified employment, the Return Directive on common standards and procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. In December 2011 the amendments concerning the Return Directive were adopted, without making substantial changes in existing return procedures and institutional competences. Provisions transposing the Employer Sanction Directive were adopted into the Code of Administrative Offences and Criminal Code in January 2012.

In 2011, the Government approved the "Global Lithuania" programme for 2011-19, which aims to develop a stronger strategic relationship with the Lithuanian diaspora, estimated at 1.3 million persons. The interagency programme, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has five main goals among the Lithuania diaspora: encourage the maintenance of Lithuanian identity; promote engagement with Lithuania; support public diplomacy efforts; support "brain circulation"; and strengthen communication through technology.

For further information

www.migracija.lt
www.stat.gov.lt/en

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

LITHUANIA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Inflows	..	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.7	
Outflows	..	0.7	1.2	0.7	..	1.0	2.4	
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Lithuania 2001-10 annual average (dashed blue line), 2011 (solid grey bar) 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011				
Work				
Family (incl. accompanying family)				
Humanitarian				
Free movements				
Others				
Total				
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10				
<i>Thousands</i>								
International students				
Trainees				
Working holiday makers				
Seasonal workers				
Intra-company transfers				
Other temporary workers				
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	406	
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Total	-7.2	-6.5	-25.7	-14.8	-4.9	-9.5	-45	
Natural increase	-1.4	-3.9	-2.0	-2.2	-3.2	-2.8	-7	
Net migration	-5.8	-2.6	-23.7	-12.6	-1.7	-6.7	-38	
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>								
Foreign-born population	7.1	..	6.4	6.4	..	6.5	207	
Foreign population	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	..	1.2	30	
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>								
	0.7	311	
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>								
Native-born men	61.1	65.7	56.6	60.7	63.6	63.2		
Foreign-born men	60.6	76.6	64.5	68.5	69.4	71.6		
Native-born women	58.6	59.4	58.7	60.6	58.2	60.7		
Foreign-born women	52.5	59.7	60.5	58.9	58.0	64.0		
<i>Unemployment rate</i>								
Native-born men	18.5	8.2	21.6	18.1	13.1	11.0		
Foreign-born men	17.8	10.8	20.2	17.0	16.9	-		
Native-born women	13.5	8.1	14.5	12.9	11.8	8.0		
Foreign-born women	21.4	16.6	18.3	21.0	18.5	-		
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Real GDP	6.7	7.8	5.9	3.6	8.0	1.0		
GDP/capita (level in USD)		17 235
Employment (level in thousands)	-4.2	2.9	-5.1	-6.5	1.0	-1.8	1 257	
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
Unemployment	16.4	8.0	18.0	15.3	12.6	9.2		

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824175>

Luxembourg

Luxembourg is experiencing one of the fastest rates of population growth in Europe. As of 1 January 2012, the population of Luxembourg was 525 000, up 2% compared with 2011. Foreign nationals accounted for 44% of the total population.

In 2011, slightly fewer than 20 300 migrants entered Luxembourg. This represents a 20% increase on the previous year. Portugal remained the leading country of origin with more than a quarter of the entries, followed by neighbouring countries: France (16%), Belgium (6%) and Germany (6%). As for outflows, 9 300 foreign nationals left Luxembourg in 2011, resulting in a net migration inflow of 11 000 persons.

In 2011, employment in Luxembourg rose at a faster pace than in 2010 (total employment growth of 2.7% in 2011 compared with 1.5% in 2010). The number of cross-border workers at the end of December 2011 was close to 155 000, up 3% from December 2010.

In the realm of international protection, the Grand Duchy has faced an unprecedented explosion in the number of asylum-seekers. In 2011, Luxembourg received 2 160 new asylum seekers. This figure represents a 175% increase compared with 2010 (790 applicants). In 2011, around 44% of asylum seekers were from Serbia, 21% from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 7% from Kosovo and 5% from Montenegro. In the first ten months of 2012, Luxembourg registered 1 870 applications for asylum.

Since the entry into force of the 2008 Act on Luxembourg citizenship and its provision allowing dual nationality, there has been a significant increase in the number of people acquiring Luxembourg

nationality. Since 2008, over 11 700 persons have acquired Luxembourg nationality through naturalisation or by descent. In 2011, there were 3 400 acquisitions of nationality compared with 4 300 in 2010. Portuguese-born nationals account for 31% of these naturalisations, and immigrants from the countries of former Yugoslavia, 15%.

Two European Directives were transposed into Luxembourg law in the second half of 2011: the "Return" Directive and the "European Blue Card" Directive. The salary requirement for access to the EU Blue Card was set at EUR 67 800 in 2012, i.e. 2% up from the 2011 threshold of EUR 66 560.

For intra-company transfers and local hires of foreign workers, the minimum monthly wage requirement increased by 1.5% since 2011, to EUR 2 250.

On 18 December 2012, the Chamber of Deputies passed Bill No. 6404 transposing into national law EU Directive 2009/52/EC, which provides for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals. Sanctions against the employment of illegal immigrants in Luxembourg were already provided for under Luxembourg law but the proposed law introduces more targeted sanctions.

For further information

www.mae.lu
www.statistiques.public.lu
www.olai.public.lu
www.men.public.lu

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

LUXEMBOURG

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)		
					2001-05	2006-10	2011		
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>									
Inflows	24.7	29.8	31.5	37.3	26.9	31.7	19.1		
Outflows	16.1	15.5	15.2	14.6	16.6	16.2	7.5		
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Luxembourg ■ 2001-10 annual average ■ 2011 			
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011					
Work					
Family (incl. accompanying family)					
Humanitarian					
Free movements					
Others					
Total					
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10					
<i>Thousands</i>									
International students					
Trainees					
Working holiday makers					
Seasonal workers					
Intra-company transfers					
Other temporary workers					
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011		
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>									
	1.4	1.7	1.5	4.1	2.5	1.1	2 076		
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011		
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>									
Total	12.8	17.0	19.3	24.7	12.2	17.4	13		
Natural increase	4.3	3.9	4.1	3.5	3.6	3.8	2		
Net migration	8.2	13.1	15.2	21.2	8.6	13.6	11		
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011		
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>									
Foreign-born population	33.2	36.5	40.9	42.1	34.0	37.6	215		
Foreign population	37.7	41.5	43.9	44.9	39.5	43.6	230		
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011		
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>									
	0.4	0.5	2.0	1.5	0.4	1.1	3 405		
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average				
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>									
Native-born men	73.2	68.8	68.4	59.5	69.9	68.2			
Foreign-born men	78.1	80.1	78.9	70.3	80.2	78.3			
Native-born women	46.5	50.5	52.8	59.5	48.5	52.1			
Foreign-born women	55.3	58.3	62.4	70.3	56.8	61.2			
<i>Unemployment rate</i>									
Native-born men	1.4	3.0	2.5	3.0	2.2	2.7			
Foreign-born men	2.5	4.2	5.2	4.7	3.5	5.3			
Native-born women	3.0	4.5	3.6	4.0	3.3	4.2			
Foreign-born women	3.3	7.5	6.5	8.4	6.4	7.2			
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011		
<i>Annual growth in %</i>									
Real GDP	8.4	5.3	2.9	1.7	3.6	1.9			
GDP/capita (level in USD)	7.0	3.6	1.0	-0.7	2.2	0.2	88 601		
Employment (level in thousands)	4.2	1.7	1.7	1.2	1.7	2.1	227		
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>									
Unemployment	2.2	4.7	4.6	4.8	3.6	4.7			

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824194>

Mexico

Permanent inflows of foreigners to Mexico in 2011 decreased to 21 500, down from 26 200 in 2010. Most migrants came from the United States (20%), Cuba (8%), Colombia (8%), Venezuela (6%) and Guatemala (6%).

Inflows of labour migrants reached almost 10 300 in 2011, an increase of 18% compared to 2010. On the other hand, the number of inflows of family migrants went down to 7 700 in 2011, a decrease of 13% compared to 2010. The number of international students in 2011 increased 4.5% in 2011 and reached 4 800 individuals.

Despite those inflows, Mexico is still one of the OECD countries with the lowest share of immigrants in the population. In 2010, there were 961 000 foreign-born residents in Mexico, around 0.9% of the population (compared with the OECD average of 13.5%).

Mexico is mostly a country of emigration and transit migration. Many Mexicans have emigrated to the United States in the past 25 years. In 2010, around 11.7 million Mexican-born were living in the United States. Annual outflows, though, have been declining since 2006, due to the recession and increased border controls.

Unauthorised transit migration through Mexico to the United States was estimated to be around 140 000 in 2010, mostly from Central America. Both economic reasons but also increased vulnerability due to violence by organised crime, including kidnappings and assassinations during transit, has led to a decrease of unauthorised transit migration since 2005.

Remittance flows to Mexico remained stable in 2012. The World Bank estimates that remittance flows were USD 24 billion in 2012, a similar level than in 2011, although much higher than in 2008 and 2009.

Many Guatemalan workers work in the agriculture sector in Mexico, particularly in border regions, while retaining their residency in Guatemala. In 2011, the National Institute of Migration documented almost 30 000 Guatemalan border workers in Mexico, and noted that there was about the same amount of unauthorised border workers.

The regulations to implement the Migration Law approved in 2011 came into force in November 2012. This new regulatory framework simplifies the migration regime, establishing the conditions for entry and stay of foreigners in Mexico. In addition, two new institutions were created: the Migration Policy Advisory Council and the Migration Policy Unit. The Migration Policy Unit co-ordinates the Migration Policy Advisory Council and is responsible for the advance of migration policy proposals within the government in co-ordination with governmental and non-governmental actors.

The Migration Law and its regulations also institutionalised the condition of frontier worker. This permit allows the entry into Mexico of Guatemalan and Belizean nationals to work in any economic sector of bordering states (Chiapas, Campeche, Tabasco and Quintana Roo), including multiple entries, with a validity of up to one year.

The number of deportations of Mexicans by US authorities to the Mexican border continued to decrease in 2011 to 405 000, down from 469 000 in 2010. Some of them were victims of crime, lacked resources to return to their homeland or engaged with smugglers of persons (“coyotes”) to re-cross the border to the United States without documents. A pilot programme under the memoranda of understanding with the United States allowed the repatriation in 2012 of around 2 400 Mexican nationals by air to Mexico DF and later to their communities of origin in Mexico. This scheme could relieve pressure from municipalities near the Mexican northern border and ensure that those Mexicans deported can arrive at their homes.

For further information


www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/page/Estadisticas_Migratorias
www.inegi.org.mx/Sistemas/temasV2/Default.aspx?s=est&c=17484.

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

MEXICO

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	21.5			
Outflows			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Mexico 2007-09 annual average 2010 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work	14.4	10.3	54.4	47.3						
Family (incl. accompanying family)	8.9	7.7	33.9	35.7						
Humanitarian	0.2	0.3	0.8	1.2						
Free movements						
Others	2.9	3.4	10.9	15.8						
Total	26.4	21.7	100.0	100.0						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students	5.1	4.6	4.8	5.8						
Trainees						
Working holiday makers						
Seasonal workers	45.5	28.6	27.6	30.1						
Intra-company transfers						
Other temporary workers	41.3	38.8	41.1	39.0						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	753			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total	813			
Natural increase	19.6	14.5	12.8	12.5	16.0	13.5	1 366			
Net migration	-6.4	-5.6	-5.1	-5.1	-5.6	-5.2	-553			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	0.5	0.6	0.9	0.7	..			
Foreign population			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	2 633			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10				
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>										
Native-born men	..	80.7	77.8	78.0	..	79.6				
Foreign-born men	..	70.9	67.4	67.1	..	70.3				
Native-born women	..	41.8	43.5	43.7	..	43.5				
Foreign-born women	..	38.5	31.8	38.2	..	33.6				
<i>Unemployment rate</i>										
Native-born men	..	3.5	5.6	5.4	..	4.5				
Foreign-born men	..	3.3	6.8	5.2	..	5.2				
Native-born women	..	4.0	5.5	5.3	..	4.7				
Foreign-born women	..	2.8	6.7	8.2	..	6.7				
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	6.6	3.3	5.3	3.9	1.9	1.8				
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.7	2.3	4.5	3.0	0.8	0.9	16 055			
Employment (level in thousands)	2.3	0.6	1.7	2.3	1.5	1.6	45 165			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	2.5	3.6	5.4	5.2	3.3	4.6				

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824213>

Netherlands

Inflows to the Netherlands rose by 5.5% in 2011 to 163 000, the highest figures in three decades. 27% of these entries were of Dutch nationals. Outflows also increased, to 133 000 (including net administrative corrections). Out of the emigrants, 47% were Dutch nationals. Overall net migration decreased by 10% compared to 2010, with a surplus of 30 000 after correction for unreported emigration. Figures for 2012 indicate a 4% decrease in immigration, to 155 700, and a 7% increase in emigration, leading to a lower migration surplus for 2012.

At the beginning of 2012, there were 3.5 million non-native residents in the Netherlands, accounting for 21% of the Dutch population. The largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands were from Turkey (393 000), Indonesia (378 000) and Germany (377 000).

Immigration to the Netherlands has increased steadily since 2005. The main reason for this trend is the growth in immigration from the new EU countries which joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. Inflows from these countries increased by 21% in 2011, to almost 33 600, representing 22% of the total inflow of foreigners. For non-Dutch nationals, the main countries of origin remained Poland (18 700), Germany (9 600) and China (5 400). Altogether, almost 60% of the total inflows of foreign nationals came from one of the EU26 countries (69 200).

In 2011 immigration for all categories of migration motives increased except for asylum seekers. Labour (40%) and family (32%) motives are the two main reasons for migrating. 15% of the migrants came for reasons of study. Only 5% of all migrants coming to the Netherlands in 2011 were asylum seekers.

The Netherlands received 11 600 new asylum applications in 2011, a decrease of 13% compared with 2010. The main origin countries of asylum seekers were Afghanistan (1 900), Iraq (1 400) and Somalia (1 400). In 2011 the number of asylum seekers from Somalia decreased by 58%.

In the first eight months of 2011, 8 200 temporary work permits (TWVs) were issued to migrants outside the EU25, roughly the same level as in the same period of 2010. TWVs issued to Bulgarians and Romanians decreased to 1 400 in the first eight months of 2011.

The Netherlands restricts recruitment from outside the EU/EFTA for low-salary and low-skill

employment. In 2011 the Netherlands transposed the EU Blue Card directive, adding a new residence permit for highly skilled workers. The EU Blue Card is offered to those earning salaries above the threshold of EUR 60 000, and Blue Card holders may bring family members under more favourable conditions than those applied in the existing Highly Skilled Migrant Scheme. Family members of EU Blue Card holders are allowed to take up any work in the Netherlands.

In 2011 the Improved Asylum Procedure was evaluated for the first time and not all measures were found to be successful. Further measures were announced within the framework of the Streamlining Entry Procedure, to reduce repeat applications.

In June 2011, the government sent a memorandum "Integration, Cohesion and Citizenship" to the Lower House of Parliament. Under this policy, migrants and asylum seekers are responsible for their own integration in Dutch society. For those who do not have sufficient resources of their own, the government introduced a system of loans. In principle, failing the civic integration exam leads to revocation of the temporary regular residence permit.

In 2011, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations announced new requirements for persons who wish to make use of the "option regulation", one of two modalities to acquire Dutch citizenship. A language test will become compulsory and the other nationality must be relinquished.

In October 2012, family reunification with partners and extended family was abolished. The new governing coalition announced that it will amend the Aliens decree to reinstate this policy in 2013.

The government continued to implement the plans of past governments about policies on return. Its intentions focused on reducing and combating the amount of illegally residing immigrants. From 2011, immigrants who return can either get financial support or in kind (e.g. schooling) or a combination of the two.

For further information

<http://english.ind.nl>
www.cbs.nl

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

NETHERLANDS

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Inflows	5.7	3.9	6.6	7.1	4.7	5.7	118.5	
Outflows	1.3	1.5	2.4	2.9	1.4	2.0	47.6	
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Netherlands 2001-10 annual average (dashed blue line), 2011 (solid grey bar) 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011				
Work	10.4	11.0	10.9	10.4				
Family (incl. accompanying family)	20.8	22.4	21.7	21.2				
Humanitarian	10.0	10.7	10.5	10.1				
Free movements	54.4	61.5	56.9	58.3				
Others				
Total	95.6	105.6	100.0	100.0				
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10				
<i>Thousands</i>								
International students	10.9	10.4	11.7	10.1				
Trainees	9.9	3.2	3.4	10.6				
Working holiday makers				
Seasonal workers				
Intra-company transfers				
Other temporary workers	46.1	13.6	12.2	33.4				
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
	2.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.1	0.8	11 590	
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Total	7.7	1.8	4.9	4.5	4.3	3.9	75	
Natural increase	4.2	3.2	2.9	2.7	3.6	3.0	44	
Net migration	3.6	-1.4	2.0	1.8	0.7	0.9	30	
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>								
Foreign-born population	10.1	10.6	11.2	11.4	10.6	10.9	1 906	
Foreign population	4.2	4.2	4.6	4.7	4.3	4.4	786	
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>								
	7.7	4.1	3.6	3.8	5.0	4.0	28 598	
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>								
Native-born men	84.0	81.5	81.2	76.6	83.1	82.9		
Foreign-born men	69.9	69.5	71.7	63.6	70.1	73.0		
Native-born women	65.6	68.6	71.1	76.6	67.9	71.7		
Foreign-born women	48.8	52.4	57.8	63.6	52.2	56.7		
<i>Unemployment rate</i>								
Native-born men	1.8	3.6	3.9	3.8	2.7	2.9		
Foreign-born men	5.4	10.8	8.8	9.7	7.9	7.6		
Native-born women	3.0	4.4	4.0	3.8	3.3	3.4		
Foreign-born women	7.6	10.0	8.2	8.5	7.9	7.9		
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Real GDP	3.9	2.0	1.6	1.0	1.3	1.4		
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.2	1.8	1.1	0.5	0.8	1.1	42 781	
Employment (level in thousands)	2.4	0.5	-0.7	-0.1	0.3	0.8	8 550	
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
Unemployment	3.1	5.3	4.5	4.5	4.0	3.9		

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824232>

New Zealand

In 2011/12, inflows of foreigners reached almost 62 000 and outflows just over 25 000, resulting in a net inflow of over 36 000 foreigners in New Zealand, up from 33 800 in the previous year. Net outflows of New Zealanders surpassed 39 000, up from 30 000 the previous year, as more New Zealanders left and fewer came back, in particular to and from Australia. The movement of New Zealanders to and from Australia is closely related to economic conditions in both countries, with the recent relative strength of the Australian labour market likely encouraging trans-Tasman migration away from New Zealand. Overall, in 2011/12 there was a net outflow of 3 200 people, down from a net inflow of 3 900 in the previous year.

Permanent residence approvals were similar to the previous year with 40 400 persons approved. A decrease in the number of skilled migrants was offset by increases in the family streams. The target level for skilled migrants remains unchanged at 45 000 to 50 000 per year over the three-year period from 2011/12 to 2013/14.

The top three source countries of permanent residents were the United Kingdom (15% of all residence approvals), and China and India (13% each). While approvals for immigrants from the United Kingdom decreased (by 8%), approvals for Chinese increased slightly (by 3%) and those for Indians increased sharply (by 24%). Other important origin countries were the Philippines (8%) and Fiji and South Africa (6% each).

The inflow of temporary workers rose 2% in 2010/11 compared with the previous period and reached 138 200, continuing a decade-long trend of continuous annual growth in temporary labour migration, with the only slowdown in 2008-09. Despite the overall increase, the number of people admitted under the Essential Skills Policy – which facilitates the entry of temporary workers to fill shortages where suitable New Zealand citizens or residents are not available for the work offered – decreased to 22 100 in 2010, 11.1% less compared with the previous period.

Admissions for seasonal work, which are subject to a labour market test, increased 7% in 2011/12. Of the non-labour market tested work visa categories,

the number of participants in the Working Holiday Schemes fell 1%, while the Study to Work Policy increased 20%. The latter programme allows applicants to obtain a work visa for 12 or 24 months, where they have completed a course or qualification in New Zealand that would qualify for points under the Skilled Migrant Category. The growth in the Study to Work Policy reflects the increase in Indian international students, a group of students who typically have a high rate of transition to post-study work.

Few additional changes took place in the migration policy domain, after the new Immigration Act came into force in 2010. A new policy was established for parents of citizens or permanent residents in July 2012. This new parent policy establishes a two-stage process, where applicants first submit an expression of interest after which only candidates that meet selected criteria are invited to apply. Candidates can apply for one of the two existing tiers, a priority tier with higher income and financial requirements and a lower priority tier with lower requirements.

In addition, special labour migration measures have been taken in order to help Canterbury rebuild after the earthquakes that took place in 2010 and 2011. A special occupational shortage list has been established, the Canterbury Skill Shortage List (CSSL), that enables migrants who hold a job offer in Canterbury and meet the requirements for the listed occupation to be offered a temporary work visa without a labour market check. In addition, a special programme (“Canterbury Skills and Employment Hub”) has been set up to help employers fill vacancies for lower and medium skilled occupations to support the Canterbury reconstruction; while New Zealander workers are given priority, unfilled vacancies may be filled by migrants from abroad.

For further information


www.immigration.govt.nz/
www.dol.govt.nz/research/
www.investmentnow.govt.nz/index.html
www.legislation.govt.nz (for the Immigration Act 2009 and associated regulations).

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

NEW ZEALAND

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)		
					2001-05	2006-10	2011		
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>									
Inflows	9.7	13.1	10.2	9.3	11.8	10.8	40.8		
Outflows	4.1	5.5	6.0	6.0	4.7	5.4	26.4		
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners New Zealand ■ 2001-10 annual average ■ 2011 			
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011					
Work	12.1	10.2	25.0	22.9					
Family (incl. accompanying family)	29.4	27.9	60.7	62.6					
Humanitarian	2.8	2.7	5.8	6.2					
Free movements	4.1	3.7	8.5	8.3					
Others					
Total	48.5	44.5	100.0	100.0					
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10					
<i>Thousands</i>									
International students	70.0	74.1	69.0	71.6					
Trainees	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.2					
Working holiday makers	29.0	44.8	45.1	39.0					
Seasonal workers	2.9	7.7	7.8	7.6					
Intra-company transfers					
Other temporary workers	44.2	30.9	26.8	44.1					
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011		
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>									
	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	305		
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011		
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>									
Total	5.6	11.4	10.5	6.8	14.3	10.8	30		
Natural increase	7.7	7.5	8.2	7.0	7.1	8.0	31		
Net migration	-2.9	1.7	2.3	-0.5	5.2	2.6	-2		
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011		
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>									
Foreign-born population	17.2	20.3	23.2	23.6	19.1	22.2	1 041		
Foreign population		
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011		
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>									
	19 287		
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10			
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>									
Native-born men	79.1	80.7			
Foreign-born men	75.8	77.5			
Native-born women	68.8	70.1			
Foreign-born women	61.1	61.6			
<i>Unemployment rate</i>									
Native-born men	6.2	5.0			
Foreign-born men	7.2	5.6			
Native-born women	6.8	5.1			
Foreign-born women	7.7	6.4			
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011		
<i>Annual growth in %</i>									
Real GDP	2.5	3.2	0.2	1.1	3.8	0.9			
GDP/capita (level in USD)	1.8	2.1	-0.9	0.3	2.4	-0.2	30 208		
Employment (level in thousands)	1.9	3.0	0.5	1.6	3.0	0.9	2 211		
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>									
Unemployment	6.2	3.8	6.5	6.5	4.7	5.1			

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824251>

Norway

During 2011, the total population of Norway increased by 65 600 persons due to a birth surplus of 18 800 as well as net immigration of 47 000. This represents a growth rate of 1.3%. In 2011, the total inflow of persons to Norway increased by 7.5% from 2010, to reach the record level of 79 500, representing a migration rate of 16 per thousand inhabitants. 89% of entries were foreigners and 11% Norwegians. The increase in 2011 was due to more inflows from several countries, among them Lithuania (+18%), the Philippines (+24%) and Poland (+13%). Poland continues to lead the list, with 12 850 new immigrants, followed by Sweden (8 200) and Lithuania (7 550). Overall, 64% of immigrants came from EU member countries and 39% from the new members in Central and Eastern Europe. Emigration of foreigners also reached a record level in 2011, at 22 900. Net migration of foreigners reached a record level of 47 900, 12% higher than in 2010.

In 2011-12, labour migration rose with economic recovery. Almost 27 000 non-Nordic immigrants came to Norway for employment reasons in 2011, a 13% increase over the previous year, and the highest ever recorded. 24 000 were from Europe, and more than half came from Poland (9 100) or Lithuania (5 600). In 2011, 36 900 nationals from EEA countries (excluding the Nordic countries) entered Norway for reasons of employment. In 2012, this inflow rose to 39 800. The number of new permits issued to labour migrants from countries outside the EEA increased from 6 500 in 2010 to 7 700 in 2011 and 8 200 in 2012. The main countries of origin outside the EEA were India, the Philippines, the United States, Viet Nam, and the Russian Federation.

From 2010 to 2011, family immigration from countries outside the Nordic area increased by 9%. The major groups of family immigrants were from Poland, Lithuania, Thailand, the Philippines and Latvia. Of 16 200 persons, who arrived in Norway as family immigrants, 12 100 or 75% came through family reunification. 4 100 immigrants came to establish a new family, mostly through marriage, and the largest groups in this category were from Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Iraq. 2 100 persons, or 52% of the 4 100, came to live with a person in Norway without immigrant background.

During 2011, the number of refugees arriving through the quota for resettlement increased from 1 100 to almost 1 300. The number of asylum seekers

increased from just above 9 000 in 2011 to 9 800 in 2012. The main countries of origin of asylum seekers in 2011 and 2012 were Somalia, Eritrea and Afghanistan. The decline in applications since the peak in 2009 of 17 200 may reflect restrictive measures implemented since 2008, especially increased return of persons whose asylum request was rejected. In 2011, the number of forced returns increased only slightly reaching 4 750, while the number of voluntary assisted returns increased from almost 1 500 to 1 800. During 2012, the total number of returns was approximately the same.

At the beginning of 2012, 547 000 immigrants and 108 000 persons born in Norway to immigrant parents together comprised 13% of the resident population. Poland was the leading country of origin, with 67 300 resident immigrants. The largest number of Norwegian-born residents with immigrant parents, 14 800, had parents from Pakistan.

Several changes were made to labour migration categories in January 2013. The salary-based “specialist” category for non-EEA migrants was abolished. The six-month job-search permit for skilled foreigners was also abolished. Finally, from April 2013, the maximum duration of permits for service providers will be six instead of four years.

The government presented a new White Paper, *A Comprehensive Integration Policy: Diversity and Community*. The principles of the Norwegian welfare state – equal rights, obligations, and opportunities – underpin the integration policy. In addition to stating general policy aims and principles, the White Paper presents a range of initiatives, including an Action Plan to ensure better use of the competence of immigrants; a new Job Chance programme, targeting women outside the labour market; an upgrade of the multicultural competence throughout the education sector; a national strategy to improve the health of immigrants; an Action Plan to combat forced marriages, female genital mutilation, etc.; swifter settlement of refugees in municipalities through co-operation and increased housing grants; and active promotion of equal public services for a diverse population.

For further information


www.ssb.no
www.udi.no/

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

NORWAY

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	6.2	6.8	13.3	14.3	6.2	11.4	70.8
Outflows	3.3	2.7	4.6	4.6	3.0	3.4	22.9
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011	Norway		
Work	2.8	3.5	5.1	5.8	2001-10 annual average 2011		
Family (incl. accompanying family)	10.1	12.9	18.0	21.4	Poland		
Humanitarian	5.3	5.4	9.5	8.9	Sweden		
Free movements	37.7	38.5	67.4	63.8	Lithuania		
Others	Philippines		
Total	55.9	60.3	100.0	100.0	Germany		
					Latvia		
					Eritrea		
					Iceland		
					Somalia		
					Denmark		
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average			
				2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	4.3	7.7	7.6	5.9			
Trainees	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3			
Working holiday makers	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1			
Seasonal workers	1.8	2.3	2.5	2.2			
Intra-company transfers	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4			
Other temporary workers	2.1	1.3	1.7	1.9			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	2.4	1.2	2.1	1.8	2.7	2.2	9 053
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	5.6	7.4	12.7	13.3	5.9	11.7	66
Natural increase	3.3	3.5	4.1	3.8	3.0	3.9	19
Net migration	2.0	3.9	8.6	9.5	2.9	7.9	47
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	6.8	8.2	11.6	12.4	7.6	10.2	616
Foreign population	4.1	4.8	7.6	8.2	4.5	6.3	407
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	5.3	5.9	3.6	4.0	4.8	4.1	14 637
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		
					2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	82.3	78.8	77.8	76.0	79.7	79.3	
Foreign-born men	74.6	67.0	72.7	70.2	71.9	73.9	
Native-born women	74.6	72.9	74.3	76.0	73.8	74.7	
Foreign-born women	63.5	59.8	64.8	70.2	62.7	65.8	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	3.4	4.0	3.5	2.9	3.9	2.9	
Foreign-born men	6.8	12.5	9.8	8.3	9.7	7.9	
Native-born women	3.2	3.9	2.5	2.5	3.7	2.5	
Foreign-born women	5.3	8.5	7.0	7.0	7.4	5.8	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	3.3	2.6	0.5	1.2	2.2	0.8	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	2.6	1.9	-0.8	-0.1	1.6	-0.4	61 047
Employment (level in thousands)	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.8	0.2	1.9	2 529
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	3.2	4.5	3.6	3.3	4.0	3.1	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824270>

Poland

Registered migration inflows in Poland increased slightly in 2011, by 2%, to around 15 500. Unemployment has risen, reaching more than 10% by the end of 2012 (youth unemployment approached 30%), causing emigration to increase again. Contrary to the previous four years, Poland saw an increase in 2011 of 14% for officially registered emigrants, to almost 20 000. While net outflow rose for the first time since 2008, increasing immigration meant that net outflows were much smaller than in the early post-enlargement period.

According to estimates by the Central Statistical Office (CSO), around 2.06 million Polish citizens (5.2% of the total population) were staying abroad in 2011, an increase of 3% compared with 2010. Around 1.5 million Polish citizens were staying abroad for 12 months or longer. CSO data suggest that almost three-fourths of recent emigrants can be described as labour migrants.

The Population Census identified a stock of 56 300 temporary immigrants in 2011, of which 29 000 were in Poland for at least one year. 78% were foreign citizens, mainly from Ukraine, Belarus, Germany, the Russian Federation, China, Bulgaria and Viet Nam. In general, foreign citizens stay in Poland mostly for labour reasons, while Polish citizens from abroad are in Poland for family reasons. Labour force survey estimations put the stock of foreigners aged 14 and over at 41 000 in the 2nd quarter of 2011.

34 100 permits were issued to non-EU nationals and 8 400 EU citizens and their family members registered their residence in 2011; in total, 2% fewer than in 2010. As of 31st December 2011, 100 380 foreign citizens held valid residence cards for all kinds of stay in Poland. The main countries of origin were Ukraine (29%), the Russian Federation (11.6%), Viet Nam and Belarus (each 9.2%).

40 800 work permits, 11% more than in 2010, were issued in 2011. About 89% were work permits for foreigners working for employers based in Poland. The main sectors of foreign employment were construction, retail and wholesale trade, households and manufacturing.

Since 2006, a simplified procedure for employment without issuance of a work permit has led to increased inflow of foreign labour. Citizens of Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation now only need a declaration of a Polish employer in order to work up to six months during twelve consecutive months. 2011 saw a 44% increase of such declarations, to almost 260 000. 92% of the declarations registered by Polish employers were for Ukrainians. Agriculture and construction were the main sectors of

employment; however, the simplified procedure is increasingly used for other sectors such as transportation or highly skilled services.

Poland saw a slight increase in the number of applications for asylum from 6 500 in 2010 to 6 900 in 2011. The Russian Federation remained the main country of origin for applicants (63%).

Poland has signed Local Border Traffic Agreements (LBTA) with non-EU neighboring countries. Since 2009, an agreement with Ukraine grants Ukrainian and Polish citizens a non-visa stay up to 90 days. Since July 2012, an agreement with the Russian Federation concerning the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad region allows reciprocal visa-free entry for up to 30 days. A 2010 agreement with Belarus has not yet been ratified.

Poland's third and largest regularisation scheme was held in the first half of 2012; 9 500 people applied for the legalisation of their stay.

In July 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted a document "Migration Policy of Poland – the current state of play and further actions". The document, the result of several years of consultation, provides indications for a framework migration policy and specific proposals for administration, procedural and legislative changes.

In April 2012, the Foreigners Act and the Act on Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions were amended, transposing the EU Return and Highly Qualified Directives; the latter created an EU Blue Card permit. The EU Directive providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals was also implemented separately.

A first draft of a new Act on Aliens was presented in October 2012 with the goal of entering into force in the first half of 2013. The law does not propose fundamental changes in the status of foreigners, although a rigid legislative approach would require subsequent changes to be made through amendments.

In May 2012, the Polish and Ukrainian governments signed an agreement on social security, which co-ordinates the social security systems of both countries in order to eliminate negative consequences for Ukrainians working in Poland and vice versa.

For further information

www.udsc.gov.pl/
www.stat.gov.pl
www.mpips.gov.pl

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

POLAND

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Inflows	0.4	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.8	1.0	41.3	
Outflows	
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Poland 2001-10 annual average 2011 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011				
Work				
Family (incl. accompanying family)				
Humanitarian				
Free movements				
Others				
Total				
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10				
<i>Thousands</i>								
International students				
Trainees				
Working holiday makers				
Seasonal workers				
Intra-company transfers				
Other temporary workers				
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	5 086	
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Total	-0.2	-0.4	0.9	0.2	-0.5	0.2	9	
Natural increase	0.3	-0.1	0.9	0.3	-0.1	0.6	13	
Net migration	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.4	-4	
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>								
Foreign-born population	1.8	675	
Foreign population	0.1	55	
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>								
	5.9	4.4	2 325	
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>								
Native-born men	..	59.0	65.6	59.7	..	64.6		
Foreign-born men	..	35.9	59.3	55.3	..	50.9		
Native-born women	..	47.0	53.1	59.7	..	51.5		
Foreign-born women	..	24.0	43.7	55.3	..	35.0		
<i>Unemployment rate</i>								
Native-born men	..	16.9	9.4	9.1	..	9.2		
Foreign-born men	..	10.2	12.1	9.9	..	8.8		
Native-born women	..	19.4	10.1	10.5	..	10.5		
Foreign-born women	..	15.3	11.1	14.5	..	9.2		
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Real GDP	4.3	3.6	3.9	4.3	3.1	4.7		
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.3	3.7	2.9	4.3	3.1	4.5	21 070	
Employment (level in thousands)	-1.5	2.3	0.9	1.4	-0.6	2.6	16 237	
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
Unemployment	16.1	17.9	9.7	9.7	19.0	9.7		

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824289>

Portugal

Exact data on migration flows for Portugal continue to be difficult to obtain, because available sources combine different categories (e.g. new entries and status changes) and do not capture some inflows, especially those of EU nationals. However, estimates based on new long-term visas and residence permits suggest that in spite of the difficult economic situation in Portugal, overall migration inflows increased by 30% in 2011 to 39 400.

The number of long-term visas issued to citizens from non-EEA countries has been falling, and declined in 2010, the most recent year for which figures are available, to less than 15 000. Study visas were the most significant category, accounting for almost half of total long-term visas, followed by family visas (about 25%), and work visas (16%). Most visas were issued in 2010 to citizens from the lusophone countries of Africa (PALOP) (42%), Brazil (23%) and China (7%). The number of long-term visas issued to non-EU eastern European immigrants has been falling since 2007, reflecting poor employment opportunities in the persistent economic crisis.

Between 2010 and 2011, the number of new residence permits issued in Portugal declined, from 50 700 to 45 000. The figure for 2009 was 61 400. These permit figures comprise EU and non-EU foreigners, and include status changes and regularisations under the case-by-case procedure.

The total stock of foreign population with a valid residence permit declined 2% in 2011, to 439 000. Brazilians accounted for 25% of the total, followed by Ukrainians (11%) and Cape Verdeans (10%). The latter two groups represent a shrinking share of the total foreign population due to both naturalisations (particularly important among Cape Verdean and other PALOP citizens), and growing re-emigration/return migration of Ukrainians and other eastern Europeans.

The number of asylum applications jumped by 75% in 2011 to 280, although Portugal remains one of the countries which receives the lowest number of asylum applications in the OECD.

Data from the World Bank show that net migration over the period 2008-12, at +150 000, was 17% less than the level of the 2003-07 period.

Portuguese emigration has been rising since the mid-2000s. Estimates by Statistics Portugal indicate that about 44 000 people left Portugal in 2011, compared with 23 000 in 2010. The sharpest increase was in emigrants going to non-EU destinations, who increased from 4 300 to 15 500 between 2010 and 2011. Estimates of emigration by other bodies are much higher.

Following the reform of the Nationality Law, the number of naturalisations kept a high level with

26 900 naturalisations in 2011, a 10% increase compared with 2010. Naturalised people are predominantly citizens of Brazil and the PALOP countries, in particular Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Angola, but also from Ukraine and Moldova.

The XIX Constitutional Government, which came into office in June 2011, has continued to implement the second National Integration Plan (2010-13). The Plan is aimed at consolidating networks to welcome immigrants, promoting access to social rights and fostering employment and professional training. The Plan also emphasises entrepreneurial activities by immigrants as a solution to the ongoing weak labour market. Continuity has also been ensured regarding the implementation of the fourth generation of the "Choices Programme" (2010-12), defining priority areas of action such as educational inclusion and non-formal education, professional training and employable skills, dynamising communities and citizenship, digital inclusion as well as entrepreneurial skills and capacity building.

Portugal has also implemented various campaigns and initiatives through the Aliens and Border Service (SEF), especially with regards to the regularisation of minors, the prevention of the trafficking of human beings and the fight against illegal immigration. Border control technology has been modernised, and technical training and international co-operation improved. The second National Plan against Trafficking in Human Beings (2011-13) was adopted in 2010 and sets four strategic areas of intervention: knowledge, awareness and prevention; education and training; protection and assistance; and criminal investigation and co-operation.

Finally, Portugal has adopted amendments to the Portuguese Immigration Law, which took effect on 9th October 2012. These amendments implemented the European Directives 2009/50/EC ("Highly Qualified" Directive) and 2009/52/EC ("Sanctions" Directive) by introducing the EU Blue Card, extending validity periods for temporary stay visas, imposing more stringent eligibility requirements on foreign local hires performing highly skilled activities, creating a new residence programme for foreign investors, and introducing criminal penalties for businesses that employ unauthorised foreign workers.

For further information

www.imigrante.pt
www.sef.pt
www.acidi.gov.pt

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

PORTUGAL

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	1.6	2.7	2.8	3.1	6.1	2.8	33.0
Outflows
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011	Portugal		
Work	10.9	7.3	24.8	19.7			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	14.5	14.3	33.0	38.8			
Humanitarian	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2			
Free movements	15.2	12.1	34.6	32.7			
Others	3.2	3.2	7.4	8.6			
Total	43.8	36.9	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	4.1	5.4	6.5	5.0			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers	7.7	3.4	..	4.5			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	275
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	6.0	3.8	-0.1	-2.9	6.0	1.3	-30
Natural increase	1.4	0.2	-0.4	-0.6	0.6	-0.1	-6
Net migration	4.6	3.6	0.4	-2.3	5.5	1.4	-24
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	5.1	7.0	8.0	8.3	7.0	7.5	872
Foreign population	2.0	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.2	439
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	0.4	0.2	4.8	..	0.3	3.5	..
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	76.2	73.1	69.7	63.8	75.1	72.2	
Foreign-born men	75.5	78.1	74.3	68.7	78.7	77.2	
Native-born women	60.2	61.2	60.8	63.8	61.2	61.4	
Foreign-born women	65.1	67.3	64.5	68.7	66.3	66.5	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	3.1	7.0	10.2	12.7	5.0	8.0	
Foreign-born men	6.0	8.3	12.7	18.0	7.3	9.8	
Native-born women	4.9	9.1	12.0	13.3	6.9	10.2	
Foreign-born women	6.9	10.4	17.2	15.9	8.9	13.0	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	3.9	0.8	1.9	-1.6	0.8	0.6	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.4	0.3	1.9	-1.7	0.2	0.4	25 359
Employment (level in thousands)	2.3	0.1	-1.1	-1.0	0.4	-0.5	4 919
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	4.0	7.7	11.0	12.9	6.0	9.5	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824308>

Romania

Romania's migration pattern is mainly characterised by emigration, especially following accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007. However, data on emigration of Romanian citizens or persons born in Romania is limited. The number of Romanians working abroad in 2011 is estimated to be around 3.5 million persons.

Officially registered emigration captures only a small fraction of actual outflows. The number of newly registered emigrants in 2011 increased by 17%, to 10 000. The main official destination countries were Canada (20%), Germany (19%) and the United States (18%). A more accurate approximation of emigration can be drawn from statistics in the main destination countries. In Italy and Spain, for example, 90 000 and 61 000 Romanians enrolled in the respective population registers in 2011.

The National Agency for Employment mediates temporary labour emigration through bilateral agreements. No new bilateral agreement has been signed since 2010. In 2011, the National Agency for Employment mediated 72 900 work contracts, 30% fewer than in 2010. Almost all of these contracts related to Germany. The National Agency for Employment also provided information and mediation services to 17 300 workers seeking a job in the EU member states.

According to the Ministry of Administration and Interior, in the first semester of 2012 the number of approved visa requests decreased by 11% to 76 900. However, approval rates increased. The main origin countries were Moldova (36%), Ukraine (15%) and Turkey (14%).

In 2011, 59 600 new stay permits were issued. The main origin countries were Moldova (28%), Turkey (15%) and China (12%). Temporary stay permits constitute 83% of all stay permits issued.

At the end of November 2011, the immigrant population stood at 98 000, a 4% increase from December 2012. Around 60% of those immigrants were non-EU citizens, mainly from Moldova (27%), Turkey (15%) and China (12%). The main reasons for stay were family ties (41%), study (12%), business and employment activities (12%) and family reunification (7%).

The maximum number of work authorisations is fixed by a governmental decree. In light of the economic downturn, the Romanian government has reduced the quota for work authorisations every year since 2009. The 2011 quota for work authorisations was set at 5 500, a decrease of 30% compared to 2009

and 2010. However, only 2 700 work authorisations were issued in 2011, only half the quota. The work permits were mainly granted for permanent workers (71%) and posted workers (22%). Most immigrant workers came from Turkey (21%), China (18%) and the Philippines (12%). The quota was set at 5 500 for 2012 and again in 2013. The quota is subdivided by category; for 2013, it includes 3 000 for permanent employment, 900 intra-company transfers and 800 highly-skilled workers.

In the first five months of 2012, the number of asylum seekers increased by 166% compared to the same period in 2011, but the absolute number remained low (1 200). The main origin countries of asylum seekers were Algeria, Morocco and Afghanistan. The increase in the number of asylum seekers was mainly due to new rules in 2011 which regard asylum seekers' rights. First, Romania now provides accommodation to those having no access to material/financial resources. Furthermore, the General Inspectorate for Immigration took measures in order to increase the capacity of receiving and processing asylum seekers, by strengthening the co-operation with the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations and the Romanian Red Cross.

Since accession to the European Union, one of the main challenges Romania had to face has been irregular migration. In 2011, new measures were introduced to ensure the legal stay of immigrants. Information campaigns on the risk of illegal employment were organised both for immigrant workers and for employers. A free hotline was opened to report cases of illegal/undeclared work. A joint action plan was issued with Serbia in order to address migration flows.

In 2011, new social integration measures were introduced. A special training project prepared 20 Romanian language teachers to teach Romanian to asylum seekers. Romanian language and culture handbooks were published. From February to June 2011, 300 foreign citizens benefited from Romanian language and culture courses. The Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports, together with UNHCR, organised a training programme for teachers of Romanian language and literature in order to provide courses to immigrants.

For further information

www.insse.ro
www.mai.gov.ro
[www.ori.mai.gov.ro/.](http://www.ori.mai.gov.ro/)


Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

ROMANIA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.4	15.5
Outflows
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Romania ▬ 2005-09 annual average ■ 2010 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	2 061
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	-1.1	-2.2	-2.3	-2.7	-7.4	-1.8	-58
Natural increase	-0.9	-1.9	-2.2	-2.6	-2.2	-1.8	-55
Net migration	-0.2	-0.3	0.0	-0.1	-5.3	-0.1	-3
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population
Foreign population	0.3	0.3	..	0.3	57
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							

Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	..	63.7	65.7	64.9	64.6	65.2	
Foreign-born men	..	-	-	-	-	-	
Native-born women	..	51.5	52.0	52.0	53.8	52.4	
Foreign-born women	..	-	-	-	-	-	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	..	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.4	7.8	
Foreign-born men	..	-	-	-	-	-	
Native-born women	..	6.8	6.9	7.1	7.0	6.0	
Foreign-born women	..	-	-	-	-	-	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	5.7	7.9	2.2	0.3	6.2	1.6	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	11 895
Employment (level in thousands)	0.0	0.1	0.0	-1.1	-3.0	0.3	9 138
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	6.8	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.2	6.7	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824327>

Russian Federation

Migration inflows to the Russian Federation in 2011 almost doubled over 2010, to 356 000 people, while the outflow of migrants remained comparatively small (33 500 persons). The dramatic increase is partially due to a change in methodology which Rosstat implemented in 2011. Rosstat now includes migrants registered in a certain locality for nine months or more, in addition to the traditional method of counting migrants registered at their place of residence. Temporarily-registered residents are considered emigrants when their registered residence expires. While the methodology has changed, the general trend remains: decreasing flows from Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and increasing flows from other countries in Central Asia. Most international migration in the Russian Federation is temporary. Temporary labour migration flows are normally at least three times higher than permanent-type flows.

The census, conducted in October 2010, counted 11.2 million foreign-born persons, nearly 800 000 (or 7%) fewer than in the 2002 census. Most of the foreign-born population comes from the former Soviet Union (FSU), led by Ukraine (26%) and Kazakhstan (22%). The census showed that migrants who moved from other Soviet Republics before the breakup of the USSR are ceding share to post-breakup migrants. Between 2002 and 2010, the number of migrants born in countries in Central Asia rose, while the number of those born in Ukraine and Belarus fell. The 2010 census also counted 865 000 foreigners permanently residing in the Russian Federation. Nationals from the Central Asian countries made up 42% of the foreign population, led by Uzbekistan (19%). Among nationalities from outside the FSU, China (4%) was the main origin country.

Despite the ongoing economic crisis, 2011 saw labour migration to the Russian Federation increase. The total stock of work-permit holders at the end of 2011 was over 1.2 million, up from 863 000 in 2010, as well as 900 000 people holding “patents” (license cards for work in private households, substituting a work permit). Work permit numbers have thus returned close to their 2008 level. Most labour migrants are nationals of CIS countries that have a visa-free travel regime with the Russian Federation. Following liberalisation of labour market access for CIS nationals, the share of the inflow from CIS countries rose from 77% in 2010 to 83% in 2011. One third of migrant-workers with regular work permits were low-skilled, about 44% were higher skilled and 4% were top managers. Work permits are subject to an overall quota, set at 1.75 million per year since 2011, and a

sub-quota for visa-countries, set at 460 000 for 2012 and 410 000 for 2013. Certain skilled and high-level occupations are exempt from the quota.

The number of foreign university students in the Russian Federation is growing. In the 2011-12 academic year the total number was 158 000, triple the number in 2000/01. Most (over 75%) were nationals of other FSU countries (20% from Belarus, and 18% from Kazakhstan). China led among the non-FSU countries, with 10 000 students.

About 135 000 persons were naturalised in 2011, a 21% increase over 2010, despite stricter rules. Individuals who could formerly obtain Russian nationality through a quick and simple procedure now must apply for a temporary, and then permanent, residence permit, and wait for a decision on naturalisation.

A mandatory Russian language proficiency test administered by a Russian government-certified language centre for certain categories of migrant workers was also introduced for workers in retail trade and domestic work. As of December 2012, workers from visa-exempt countries seeking employment in the housing, utility, retail business and consumer service industries must demonstrate basic Russian language skills. Foreign nationals applying for the Highly Qualified Specialist Program are exempt from this requirement. Citizens of countries where Russian is an official language, and those holding at least a secondary-level degree issued in a country of the FSU, are also exempt.

The Assistance in the Voluntary Return of Compatriots Living Abroad programme is still operative and expected to be modernised to attract more participants. In June 2012 the President signed a document entitled Concept for the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Migration to 2025, a result of public discussion and co-operation between experts and officials. The document contains a set of new approaches which are expected to help authorities work out a more efficient and pragmatic policy aimed at both permanent-type and temporary migration to meet demographic challenges and the need for additional labour force in the Russian Federation.

For further information


www.fms.gov.ru
www.fms.gov.ru/documents/formvisa/index_eng.php
www.mid.ru/
www.gks.ru/

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	2.5	1.2	1.3	2.5	1.1	1.7	356.5
Outflows	1.0	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.3	36.8
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Russian Federation ■ 2001-10 annual average ■ 2011 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work	70.4	273.0	30.7	66.2			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	111.9	93.9	48.8	22.7			
Humanitarian	2.1	1.8	0.9	0.4			
Free movements			
Others	45.0	44.0	19.6	10.7			
Total	229.4	412.6	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	..	37.3	35.1	35.5			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers	..	795.7	2 014.0	1 077.9			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2 292
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	-4.0	-5.0	-4.9
Natural increase	-6.5	-5.9	-6.1
Net migration	1.6	0.8	0.5
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	7.9
Foreign population	0.5
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	19.6	134 980
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	
Foreign-born men	
Native-born women	
Foreign-born women	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	
Foreign-born men	
Native-born women	
Foreign-born women	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	10.0	6.4	4.3	4.3	6.1	3.7	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	10.5	6.8	4.3	4.3	6.6	3.8	21 093
Employment (level in thousands)	3.4	1.3	0.7	1.3	0.9	0.5	70 732
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	10.5	7.6	7.5	6.5	8.3	7.1	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824346>

Slovak Republic

In 2011, the Slovak Republic saw a substantial drop in both immigration (-25% compared to 2010) and emigration (-26% compared to 2010), according to national statistics. Inflows decreased to about 4 800 foreign nationals compared with 6 400 the previous year. Inflows are traditionally dominated by arrivals from nearby European countries such as the Czech Republic, Romania, Germany, Austria and Hungary. Outflows decreased to about 1 800 persons in 2011 compared with 2 500 in 2010. The gender composition of migration inflows is dominated by males, while outflows are dominated by females. This trend is more pronounced for migration flows from and to countries other than the Czech Republic, the main migration country. Although net migration figures have been positive over the past decade, they declined during the past few years, reaching up to 7 000 in 2008, almost 4 400 in 2009 and over 3 900 in 2010 and 2 900 in 2011.

The Slovak Republic rebounded from the economic crisis in 2010 with GDP growth of 4%, which fell to 3.3% in 2011. The unemployment rate in 2011 decreased for the first time post-crisis (13.5% compared to 14.4% in 2010), but rising inflation led to a fall in real wages.

Data from the Labour Force Survey show a decreasing trend for the number of Slovaks working abroad, from about 130 000 in 2010, to 116 000 in 2011. The main destination countries were the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, the United Kingdom and Ireland.

The total number of registered immigrants increased from 62 500 in 2010 to more than 66 000 in 2011. EEA nationals account for 80% of the population with permanent permits, while non-EEA nationals account for almost all residents with a temporary permit. The main origin countries for residents with a temporary permit are Ukraine, Serbia, Korea, China and the Russian Federation.

The number of foreign workers in the Slovak Republic continues to increase, to 22 000 in 2011 compared with 16 600 in 2010. The majority of foreign workers are from EEA countries (mainly from Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Germany), although the share of non-EEA nationals increased from 17% in 2010 to 23% in 2011. Foreign labour migration is predominately male. Even though the number of foreign workers increased in relative terms in 2011,

they still only account for a small fraction of the labour force in the Slovak Republic (1.1% compared to 0.8% in 2010).

Irregular migration to the Slovak Republic continues to decline from about 500 illegal migrants intercepted in 2010 to less than 400 in 2011. The decline in irregular migration is also partly due to the Slovak Republic's entry into the Schengen area in 2008, which led to fewer external borders and to a change of definition in 2011, when intra-Schengen movements were excluded from the statistics.

The number of applications for asylum declined in 2011 from 540 to 500, while more than 90% of applications continue to be rejected on procedural grounds. The largest group of applicants came from Somalia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Moldova, the Russian Federation and India.

Following the adoption of the first national migration policy document entitled "Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic with Horizon 2020" in 2011, and substantial amendments to the Alien Residency Act adopted in 2011, the new Act on Residence of Aliens came into effect in January 2012. The new act is aimed at providing the foundation for a more systematic approach to integration in line with the EU framework and international best practises and standards. The new act replaced the earlier Act on Residence of Aliens adopted in the year 2000. The new act improves procedures related to the management of migration and integration of immigrants, guarantees rights and freedoms of EU nationals, their family members and non-EU nationals, and harmonises issues related to border protection and residence permits. The new act also incorporates the transposition of two EC Directives (the "EU Blue Card" directive on highly qualified employment, and the "Sanctions" directive on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying non-EU nationals).

The planned Immigration and Naturalisation Office (INO), which will be in charge of residence permits, integration issues, citizenship and regular evaluation of migration policies, has not yet been created.

For further information

www.minv.sk

www.employment.gov.sk

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)	
					2001-05	2006-10	2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Inflows	0.9	1.4	2.3	1.5	1.1	2.6	8.2	
Outflows	..	0.2	0.5	0.4	..	0.5	1.9	
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Slovak Republic ▬ 2003-10 annual average ▬ 2011 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011				
Work				
Family (incl. accompanying family)				
Humanitarian				
Free movements				
Others				
Total				
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10				
<i>Thousands</i>								
International students				
Trainees				
Working holiday makers				
Seasonal workers				
Intra-company transfers				
Other temporary workers				
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.1	1.6	0.3	491	
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>								
Total	-3.7	0.8	1.9	2.2	0.4	1.7	12	
Natural increase	0.5	0.2	1.3	1.7	0.0	0.8	9	
Net migration	-4.1	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.9	3	
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>								
Foreign-born population	..	4.6	3.3	
Foreign population	0.5	0.5	1.3	1.3	0.5	0.9	71	
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>								
	..	6.3	0.4	0.4	..	1.8	272	
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Employment/population ratio	..	64.6	65.2	59.5	..	67.6		
Native-born men	..	67.1	74.5	59.7	..	73.2		
Foreign-born men	..	51.0	52.4	59.5	..	53.0		
Native-born women	..	37.7	38.9	59.7	..	49.9		
Foreign-born women	..	15.5	14.3	13.6	..	11.3		
Unemployment rate	..	17.4	8.9	-	..	8.7		
Native-born men	..	17.2	14.6	13.6	..	13.2		
Native-born women	..	28.6	16.7	20.8	..	13.1		
Foreign-born men	..	28.6	16.7	20.8	..	13.1		
Foreign-born women	..	28.6	16.7	20.8	..	13.1		
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>								
Real GDP	1.4	6.7	4.4	3.2	4.9	4.8		
GDP/capita (level in USD)	1.3	6.6	4.1	3.0	5.0	4.6	23 924	
Employment (level in thousands)	-1.4	2.2	-2.0	0.6	1.1	1.0	2 335	
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>								
Unemployment	18.9	16.4	14.5	13.6	18.1	12.4		

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824365>

Slovenia

From January to November 2012, 54 200 residence permits were issued, a 5% decline compared with the previous year. Out of these, 86% were issued to non-EEA nationals and the rest to EU nationals. The majority were temporary permits issued to non-EEA nationals (37 500), which means a decrease of 14% compared with the previous year. Residence permits were mostly granted for the purpose of employment or work, followed by family reunification and study. By the end of November 2012, the total population with a valid residence permit reached 106 600 persons, an increase of 6% compared with the previous year.

The number of applications for international protection in 2012 decreased by 25% compared with 2011. The main countries of origin of applicants were Afghanistan, Somalia, the Western Balkan countries and Syria. The percentage of applications which resulted in a positive decision almost doubled, from 6.7% in 2011 to 12.6%.

A new Employment and Work of Aliens Act was adopted in April 2011. It partially transposed two EU directives – one concerning minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying immigrants (the “Sanctions” directive), and one concerning the conditions of entry and residence of non-EEA nationals for highly skilled work (the “EU Blue Card” directive). The law also eliminated some administrative barriers and introduced measures aimed at protecting the rights of immigrant workers.

The International Protection Act was slightly amended and revised in 2012, with the introduction of

new procedures for the determination of the age of unaccompanied minors.

The amendments of the Regulation on the Integration of Foreigners in 2011 enabled non-EEA nationals to participate in integration courses. In 2012, the government passed an implementing regulation setting out the methods and scope of programs for the integration of non-EEA nationals. The decree entered into force in January 2013. It specifies the eligibility criteria for free participation in Slovenian language courses and courses on Slovenian society.

In 2012, the act regulating the recognition procedure for qualifications of EU citizens to access regulated professions and professionals activities was amended. Persons with international protection, family members of EU nationals, long-term residents in another EU member state and applicants for the EU Blue Card were granted equal treatment in relation to the recognition procedure for qualifications.

The Ministry of the Interior began the implementation of a single plan, called “Initial Integration of Immigrants”, which brings together Slovenian language courses and knowledge of the history, cultural and constitutional arrangements.

For further information

www.mnz.gov.si/en/
www.stat.si/eng/index.asp
www.infotujci.si/

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

SLOVENIA

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	5.5	8.7	18.0
Outflows	1.0	3.3	5.9	..	2.5	5.6	..
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011	Slovenia		
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	4.6	0.8	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.2	373
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	1.2	2.9	1.6	2.6	1.3	6.2	5
Natural increase	-0.2	-0.3	1.8	1.6	-0.6	1.2	3
Net migration	1.4	3.2	-0.3	1.0	1.9	4.9	2
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)	
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	11.2	13.2	272
Foreign population	4.7	4.9	102
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	1.8	1.9	1 798
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	66.7	70.2	69.6	64.7	68.8	71.4	
Foreign-born men	66.7	72.7	70.3	61.9	70.1	72.1	
Native-born women	58.2	61.3	62.8	64.7	59.6	63.2	
Foreign-born women	61.3	61.6	59.8	61.9	61.9	61.3	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	6.6	6.2	7.4	8.2	5.8	5.3	
Foreign-born men	10.0	6.2	9.4	9.7	6.7	6.3	
Native-born women	7.1	7.1	6.9	7.8	6.5	6.1	
Foreign-born women	7.9	7.8	9.8	14.0	8.8	8.0	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level	
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	4.3	4.0	1.2	0.6	3.6	1.9	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.0	3.8	0.9	0.4	3.5	1.4	27 346
Employment (level in thousands)	2.0	0.6	-1.5	-3.1	1.1	0.4	936
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	6.7	6.5	7.3	8.2	6.4	6.1	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824384>

Spain

Inflows of foreigners in Spain continued decreasing in 2011 and totalled 416 000, 3.5% fewer than in 2010 and 55% below the peak of 920 000 attained in 2007. Outflows of foreigners in 2011 was 318 000, around 6% less than in 2010, but much higher than the preceding years. Net migration in 2011 was 94 000, similar to the year before but almost half the 2009 figure.

The stock of foreign residents in Spain with a valid permit reached 5.4 million in September 2012, a 3.1% increase compared to the equivalent figure a year before. Around 2.7 million are nationals of other EU/EEA countries (*Régimen Comunitario*), mostly Romania (35%), and 2.7 million are nationals from non-EU/EEA countries (*Régimen General*), in particular Morocco (30%), Ecuador (13%) and Colombia (8%). The number under the *Régimen Comunitario* increased 3.9% in December 2012 compared with the previous year while the number of foreigners from third countries increased 2.2%.

The number of naturalisations in Spain in 2011 continues the increasing trend of recent years. Around 115 000 immigrants obtained Spanish citizenship in 2011, bringing the total naturalised since 1999 to over 710 000 foreigners, equivalent to 12.4% of the stock of foreigners in Spain in 2012. The number of asylum seekers in Spain in 2011 reached 3 420 applications, a 25% increase with respect to the previous year.

Spain has seen the largest increases in unemployment in the OECD area since the start of the economic crisis, affecting both natives and immigrants. The unemployment rate of foreigners reached 34.8% at the end of 2011 and increased to 36.5% at the end of 2012. For natives, the unemployment rate was 20.7% at the end of 2011 and 24.2% at the end of 2012. The accumulated growth in unemployment for foreigners was over 24 points since the start of the crisis, compared with 17 points for Spanish nationals. The duration of unemployment for immigrants in Spain also increased between 2008 and 2011: 40% of unemployed immigrants in Spain in 2011 had been looking for a job for at least twelve months.

Migration flows estimated by INE from the municipality register (*Padrón*) show an increasing number of departures from, and a decreasing number of entries to Spain in 2012. Over 420 000 individuals (both foreigners and Spaniards) are estimated to have left Spain from January to September 2012 only (while 282 000 entered). Most of the flows were foreigners (around 88% of the outflows and 91% of the inflows). Although there was an increase in the number of

Spanish nationals leaving (from 37 000 in 2010 to 57 000 in 2011 and 55 000 from January 2012 to September 2012), the absolute numbers remain small, and comprise many recently naturalised Spanish citizens.

These estimates indicate that net migration (including nationals and foreigners) was around -50 000 in 2011, the first negative figure in many years. Net migration is projected to be -180 000 in 2012 (INE), with much of the decrease due to greater emigration, mostly of foreign nationals.

Although no major changes in immigration legislation were undertaken in 2012, the economic crisis and the difficult employment situation in Spain make permit renewal, family reunifications, and ad hoc regularisation more difficult (for example, the “*arraigo*” process requires an employment offer of at least one year). In addition, transitional measures regulating the access of Romanians to the Spanish labour market, due to end in 2012, were extended until 31st December 2013.

Some measures were adopted in the 2011 New Aliens Act and Regulation to prevent legal migrants who lost their jobs from losing their legal status, mostly for those receiving unemployment benefits or whose partner can support them. Some additional legal initiatives have been taken to boost active employment policies for all, including additional vocational training for unemployed individuals who have exhausted their unemployment benefit.

General budget cuts affected the fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and Educational Support, one of the main sources of funding for Regional Government activities for the integration of immigrants. Its budget of EUR 200 million in 2009 fell to EUR 66 million in 2011, and the Central Government temporarily suspended its financial support for the fund in 2012.

In addition, a health reform imposed some limits on irregular migrants’ access to certain free basic health services since September 2012, although regions may continue to provide free health access as before to irregular migrants, and some do so.

For further information

<http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/index.html>
www.empleo.gob.es/es/estadisticas/index.htm
www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_migrac.htm

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

SPAIN

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	8.2	15.7	9.4	9.0	12.3	14.7	416.3
Outflows	..	1.1	7.3	6.9	..	5.2	317.7
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Spain 2001-10 annual average 2011 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work	89.8	135.9	29.9	38.9			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	56.0	57.1	18.7	16.4			
Humanitarian	0.6	1.0	0.2	0.3			
Free movements	149.8	148.9	49.9	42.6			
Others	3.7	6.5	1.2	1.9			
Total	300.0	349.3	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	29.9	46.9	51.8	41.1			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers	7.0	1.8	2.2	14.1			
Intra-company transfers	1.2	0.7	0.8	1.1			
Other temporary workers	33.8	12.0	14.6	40.6			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	3 414
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	10.6	16.6	3.6	0.9	15.6	10.7	43
Natural increase	0.9	1.8	2.3	1.8	1.5	2.5	85
Net migration	9.7	14.8	1.3	-0.9	14.1	8.1	-41
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	4.9	11.1	14.5	14.6	8.9	13.7	6 738
Foreign population	3.4	9.5	12.5	12.4	7.4	11.9	5 711
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	1.3	1.1	2.2	2.0	0.9	1.6	114 599
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	70.8	74.6	65.6	58.4	73.0	71.6	
Foreign-born men	75.4	79.6	60.0	54.4	78.6	71.0	
Native-born women	41.0	50.0	52.0	58.4	45.7	52.9	
Foreign-born women	45.7	59.2	53.8	54.4	54.1	57.1	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	9.4	6.8	17.3	18.8	7.5	10.6	
Foreign-born men	11.8	9.1	31.1	32.9	10.6	19.0	
Native-born women	20.4	11.9	19.1	20.3	14.8	13.9	
Foreign-born women	20.0	13.8	26.7	30.1	16.3	19.5	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	5.0	3.6	-0.3	0.4	3.3	0.9	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.2	1.9	-0.6	0.3	1.7	-0.3	32 121
Employment (level in thousands)	5.6	4.8	-2.3	0.2	4.0	-0.5	18 501
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	11.7	9.2	20.1	21.6	10.7	14.6	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824403>

Sweden

Immigration to Sweden decreased slightly in 2011 to 96 500, down from 98 800 in 2010, but still remains at the high levels registered in the past five years. Returning Swedish citizens were the largest group (21% of the total), followed by citizens from Iraq and Poland (5% each), Afghanistan (4%), Denmark (3%) and Somalia (3%). Emigration flows from Sweden continued to increase and reached 51 200, almost 5% more compared to 2010. Swedish citizens accounted for 40% of total outflows, mostly going to Nordic and English-speaking countries. Net migration decreased to 45 300 in 2011, down from 53 000 in 2010.

The Swedish population increased by about 67 000 and reached 9.5 million in 2011, with the foreign-born accounting for 63% of the population increase. Overall, the stock of foreign-born in Sweden was 1.4 million in 2011, 15% of the total population. The number of non-seasonal labour migrants to Sweden increased after a 2008 reform which made it easier for employers to recruit labour from non-EU countries. After peaking at 12 300 in 2011, inflows of non-seasonal labour migrants decreased to 11 300 in 2012. The most common countries of origin were India, China, and Turkey; for seasonal workers, it was Thailand. The number of accompanying family members – granted labour market access since the reform – has increased from 4 500 in 2010 to 7 400 in 2011 and 8 600 in 2012.

Sweden remains one of the main EU countries of destination for asylum seekers. The number of applications for asylum increased in 2012 to 44 000, up from 30 000 in 2011. The Swedish Migration Board forecasts a further increase in applications for 2013, in light of applications from Syrians. Many asylum seekers in 2012 came from conflict zones including Somalia and Syria (13% each) and Afghanistan (12%). The first-instance approval rate by the Swedish Migration Board for asylum applications was around 34% in 2012 (compared to 30% in 2011).

The number of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Sweden has been increasing. In 2012 over 3 500 unaccompanied minors applied for asylum in Sweden, compared with 2 600 in 2011 and 2 400 in 2010. The largest groups of unaccompanied minors in 2012 came from Afghanistan (54%), Somalia (13%) and Morocco (4%).

In 2011 over 34 600 applications for citizenship were received, an increase of about 9.5% with respect to 2010; most (87%) were granted.

In 2011, about 6 800 non-EEA individuals were granted a residence permit for studies in Sweden and about 6 500 in 2012. In 2010, prior to the introduction of tuition fees in 2011, the number was 14 200.

A new Act in December 2010 modified the introduction activities for refugees, others in need of protection and their family members and assigned overall co-ordination responsibility to the Public Employment Service (PES). An assessment of the reform by the Swedish Agency for Public Management in 2012 lent support to a greater labour market perspective in activities for new arrivals. In addition, the mapping of new arrivals' qualifications by the PES and the Migration Board was identified as a good basis for offering tailored activities. The assessment identified a need for better co-ordination of activities offered by different authorities and municipalities, and more rapid involvement of newcomers in an introduction plan.

An inquiry into the Swedish for Immigrants (Sfi) language programme is to be presented in October 2013. The inquiry examines how to make Sfi more flexible and individually tailored whether Sfi should be part of municipal adult education (instead of an educational institution of its own), and whether courses should be more individualised and with a clearer link to jobs.

In January 2012, the Swedish Migration Board introduced stricter requirements for employers recruiting workers from non-EU countries, in order to prevent abuse. Employers in certain sectors, for example, must now demonstrate their ability to pay the offered wages before a work permit is granted. This applies for employers in sectors such as cleaning, hotel and restaurants, construction, trade, agriculture and forestry.

In its budget bill for 2013, the Government strengthened efforts to facilitate and speed up the introduction of newly arrived migrants. A set of new targeted measures aimed at preparing the new arrivals for employment was introduced, as well as measures for improving school results for migrant pupils. The target group for the Introduction Act is also enlarged to include more family migrants.

For further information

www.migrationsverket.se/info/start_en.html
<http://government.se/sb/d/8281>.

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

SWEDEN

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	4.8	5.6	8.4	8.0	5.3	8.8	75.9
Outflows	1.4	1.7	2.4	2.5	1.6	2.2	23.7
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Sweden 2001-10 annual average (dashed line), 2011 (solid bar) 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work	3.7	4.8	5.6	6.6			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	26.7	27.1	40.7	37.7			
Humanitarian	12.1	12.7	18.4	17.6			
Free movements	23.1	27.3	35.3	38.0			
Others			
Total	65.6	71.7	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	10.8	17.6	10.3	14.2			
Trainees	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.6			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers	0.5	4.5	3.8	3.6			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers	4.8	12.9	17.2	10.4			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	1.8	1.9	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.1	29 648
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	2.5	4.0	8.1	7.1	3.7	8.0	67
Natural increase	-0.3	1.0	2.8	2.3	0.5	2.1	22
Net migration	2.8	3.0	5.3	4.8	3.1	5.9	45
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	11.3	12.5	14.8	15.1	12.0	13.9	1 427
Foreign population	5.3	5.1	6.8	6.9	5.2	6.0	655
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	8.8	7.8	5.5	5.8	7.2	6.2	36 634
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	75.8	76.2	76.6	76.6	76.6	77.0	
Foreign-born men	59.6	63.7	67.3	62.6	64.7	67.5	
Native-born women	73.2	72.6	73.5	76.6	73.9	73.7	
Foreign-born women	54.7	58.4	56.0	62.6	58.8	57.9	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	5.1	7.0	7.4	6.1	5.5	6.2	
Foreign-born men	13.5	15.1	15.9	16.0	12.8	13.8	
Native-born women	4.3	6.9	6.8	5.9	4.9	6.2	
Foreign-born women	11.2	13.7	16.7	15.9	10.8	14.0	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	4.5	3.2	6.6	3.7	2.7	1.7	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.3	2.7	5.7	3.0	2.3	0.9	41 485
Employment (level in thousands)	2.1	0.8	1.0	1.6	0.4	0.9	4 618
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	5.6	7.6	8.6	7.8	6.7	7.3	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824422>

Switzerland

In 2011, immigration in Switzerland continued to grow with the registration of 142 500 new long-term residence permits, 70.1% of which were granted to EU/EFTA nationals. However, this figure remains below the record level of inflows recorded in 2008. Germany and Portugal remain the two main countries of origin and account for 21.4% and 10.8% respectively of new arrivals. The main origin groups outside the EU/EFTA are nationals of the United States (3% of new entries), India, Eritrea, Brazil and China, each representing fewer than 2% of all new migrants settling in Switzerland. The level of outflows, which rose sharply in 2010 as a result of an increase in departures of EU/EFTA nationals, stabilised at around 64 000.

In 2012 – as in 2011 – an increase was seen in the number of labour migrants, mainly due to arrivals from Southern Europe (Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece). The inflow of foreign workers from Germany, the main source of labour migrants in 2011, declined in 2012. Overall, the vast majority of labour migrants (89.2% in 2011) are EU/EFTA nationals.

There was a steep rise in the number of applications for asylum in Switzerland, up from 15 600 in 2010 to 22 600 in 2011. This is the highest annual number since 2002, mainly due to the events of the “Arab Spring”. This trend was confirmed in 2012, with applications topping 28 600. In 2011 and 2012, asylum seekers from Eritrea were the largest group. In 2012, they were followed by Nigeria and offset Tunisia, although applications from nationals of Tunisia were fewer in 2012 than in 2011. Asylum was granted to 2 500 persons in 2012 (3 700 persons in 2011), which represents a recognition rate of 11.7% compared with 17.7% in 2011.

The number of naturalisations dropped by 7% in 2011, continuing the trend initiated after the peak in 2006, and this trend continued in 2012. Nearly 36 750 persons acquired Swiss nationality in 2011. Naturalisations of Serbian nationals have been declining since the peak in 2006 but still represent the largest origin group of those obtaining Swiss nationality, ahead of Italians and Germans.

The sharp rise in the number of residence permits granted to EU8 nationals following the introduction of unrestricted free movement for the citizens of those States on 1 May 2011 has prompted the Swiss government in May 2012 to reintroduce caps for new workers with stable employment contracts (more than one year), as allowed under the safeguard clause provided for in the agreement on the Free Movement of Persons.

For nationals of Bulgaria and Romania, national restrictions will remain in force until 2014 (and may be extended until 2016 in the event of disruption of the Swiss labour market) for salaried workers on the one hand, and on the other hand for service providers in certain sectors of the economy such as landscape planning, construction, cleaning and security.

Immigration drives population growth, which increases pressure for reforms, particularly in terms of integration (housing, infrastructure, land-use planning and training policies). Enhanced collaboration between the federal government, the cantons, communes and towns as well as the private sector (social partners) has been pursued in order to promote integration. The second National Conference on Integration on 12 May 2011 reaffirmed this strategy which must now be enacted through dialogue with NGOs and private sector stakeholders. A partial revision of the law on foreign nationals is underway with a view to introducing much stricter provisions for integrating foreigners and more closely involve the different stakeholders.

Other ongoing legislative work includes the comprehensive revision of the federal law on citizenship. In particular, this revision aims to ensure coherence with the provisions of the new law on foreign nationals (“LEtr”) in terms of the conditions for integration and to harmonise the cantonal and local residence requirements.

In late 2012 urgent amendments were made to the federal law on asylum. These included the abolition of the possibility of lodging an application for asylum at a Swiss representation abroad and the refusal to recognise refugee status in cases of conscientious objection or desertion. At the same time, measures to speed up the asylum procedure were introduced in mid-2012 for applications from European nationals who no longer require a visa (notably, certain countries of the former Yugoslavia).

Furthermore, political debate is underway as to whether the agreement on the Free Movement of Persons should be extended to Croatia, and two popular initiatives put forward in 2012, one to curtail population increase (ECOPOP initiative) and the other to combat mass immigration.

For further information

www.bfm.admin.ch/bfm/en/home.html


www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/07.html

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

SWITZERLAND

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	12.2	12.7	17.1	18.0	13.3	17.4	142.5			
Outflows	7.8	6.7	8.4	8.1	6.7	7.4	64.0			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Switzerland 2001-10 annual average 2011 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.9						
Family (incl. accompanying family)	21.7	17.8	18.8	14.3						
Humanitarian	6.7	5.8	5.8	4.6						
Free movements	82.0	96.5	71.3	77.6						
Others	2.3	1.9	2.0	1.5						
Total	115.0	124.3	100.0	100.0						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students	8.6	12.4	11.7	10.8						
Trainees	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1						
Working holiday makers						
Seasonal workers						
Intra-company transfers						
Other temporary workers	101.6	92.4	92.6	97.2						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level				
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	2.5	1.4	1.7	2.5	2.5	1.7	19 439			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)				
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total	5.5	5.9	10.0	10.7	7.0	10.6	85			
Natural increase	2.2	1.6	2.3	2.4	1.5	2.0	19			
Net migration	3.3	4.3	7.7	8.3	5.4	8.6	66			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level ('000)				
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	21.9	23.8	26.5	27.3	23.1	25.6	2 158			
Foreign population	19.3	20.3	22.0	22.4	20.0	21.3	1 772			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level				
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	2.1	2.6	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.7	36 757			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level				
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Employment/population ratio	..	85.1	85.3	81.0	86.1	85.6				
Native-born men	..	80.5	82.8	75.5	82.8	83.0				
Foreign-born men	..	73.1	75.1	81.0	72.9	74.9				
Native-born women	..	63.0	66.6	75.5	64.3	66.0				
Foreign-born women	..	2.7	3.1	2.8	2.7	2.5				
Unemployment rate	..	7.8	7.2	6.2	6.3	6.2				
Native-born men	..	3.7	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.2				
Foreign-born men	..	9.7	8.8	7.5	8.1	8.5				
Native-born women				
Foreign-born women				
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average	Level				
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	3.6	2.7	3.0	1.9	2.0	2.2				
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.0	2.0	3.2	0.8	1.2	1.4	51 507			
Employment (level in thousands)	-0.1	0.7	0.4	1.1	0.4	1.5	4 383			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	4.5	4.0	..	4.3				

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824441>

Turkey

Statistics on migration flows in Turkey are limited. There is no source of data on total flows in and out of the country. However, the Ministry for Labour and Social Security (MLSS) registers administrative data on labour emigration outflows and on work permits for foreigners, except where exemptions apply.

MLSS administrative figures on labour emigration flows indicate that the number of contract workers sent abroad by the Turkish Employment Office decreased from 2010 to 2011 by 2%, to 53 800. The two main destinations of Turkish contract workers are the Middle East (28 300) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (18 200).

In 2011, there were 220 000 foreigners holding permits in Turkey. Of these permits, 11% were for employment and 17% for study. In the same year, more than 11 800 new work permits were issued, an increase of 25% compared with 2010.

The number of international students is rising in Turkey. In the 2011-12 academic year, 8 400 students were admitted, bringing the total number of foreign students to 31 900.

The number of irregular migrants apprehended grew by 31% from 2010 to 2010, to 42 800. Of those apprehended in Turkey, about one-third were over-staying workers, and the rest entered illegally.

The inflow of asylum seekers increased by 74% from 2010 to 2011, to 16 000. In 2011, half of applicants came from Iraq and 21% from Iran. Most asylum seekers were transiting Turkey on their way to Europe. In 2011, about 18 000 Syrians entered Turkey after the political crisis in their country. At the end of 2012 there were over 140 000 displaced Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. Turkey provided accommodation and granted open-ended temporary protection. Turkey has maintained open borders, ensured humanitarian aid and refrained from forcibly returning Syrian citizens to their country. The UNHCR has assisted the Turkish authorities with camp operations and registration procedures.

After two years of decline, remittances increased by 26% in 2011, from USD 830 million in 2010 to 1 billion in 2011 (0.1% of GDP), according to the Central Bank of Turkey.

The MLSS changed the criteria and regulations for work permit applications in 2010. Employer criteria include paid-in capital, gross sales or export requirements. The wage offered the foreign employee must be commensurate with the position offered, and in most cases foreign workers must receive at least

1.5 times the minimum wage. Entities sponsoring a work permit must have at least five Turkish citizens on their payroll per foreign worker requested. Exemptions were published in April 2011, and include certain categories of foreigner (refugees, victims of trafficking) and the domestic sector. Exemptions to the 5:1 employee ratio and to the capital requirement may also apply in certain cases, including advanced technology, international agreements and public tenders.

In 2012, the Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners came into force, which requires tourists to stay out of Turkey for three months in each six-month period. This provision was in place since 2010, but enforcement has been strict since February 2012. A tourist residence permit is available for those who wish to stay for up to nine months. Fines for employers of unauthorised foreign workers have been increased, and unauthorised foreign workers face deportation.

Migration policy developments in Turkey are closely related to the negotiations and legislative requirements for admission to the European Union. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection was before the General Assembly of the Parliament in early 2013, awaiting adoption. This law comprises regulations on visas, residence permit issues and deportation of foreigners as well as international protection procedures. It will provide a single legislative framework governing foreigners law, with safeguards for the rights of migrants and refugees in line with EU and international standards.

A readmission agreement with the EU was initialled in June 2012 but has not yet been signed. An existing bilateral readmission protocol between Greece and Turkey is implemented. In February 2012, Turkey signed readmission agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Moldova.

While EU-funded construction of seven reception centres for asylum seekers and refugees continues, increased asylum inflows overloaded the reception system, which was further strained by the need to rehouse refugees living in Van following the October 2011 earthquake in Eastern Turkey.

For further information

www.turkstat.gov.tr

www.nvi.gov.tr

www.csqb.gov.tr/csqbPortal/yabancilar/eng/index.html

www.mfa.gov.tr/

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

TURKEY

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	0.4
Outflows
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners Turkey 		
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work			
Family (incl. accompanying family)			
Humanitarian			
Free movements			
Others			
Total			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers			
Seasonal workers			
Intra-company transfers			
Other temporary workers			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	16 021
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total
Natural increase	13.8	12.2	11.2	11.0	12.8	11.6	813
Net migration
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	2.0
Foreign population	0.4
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	Average 2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							

Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	66.7	48.4	..	66.8	
Foreign-born men	64.5	49.7	..	65.0	
Native-born women	26.1	48.4	..	24.2	
Foreign-born women	27.8	49.7	..	29.1	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	10.5	8.4	..	10.0	
Foreign-born men	12.4	10.3	..	10.6	
Native-born women	11.6	10.2	..	10.4	
Foreign-born women	14.1	13.6	..	11.5	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	6.8	8.4	9.2	8.5	4.7	3.3	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	5.3	7.1	7.7	7.1	3.4	2.0	17 038
Employment (level in thousands)	-2.1	2.2	5.9	1.9	0.6	2.3	23 498
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	..	9.2	10.7	8.8	9.2	9.9	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824460>

United Kingdom

According to ONS estimates, total inflows to the United Kingdom in 2011 were 566 000, a 4% decrease from 2010. Outflows increased by 4% to 351 000, yielding total net migration of 215 000, 15% less than the record figure in 2010. Net outflow of 70 000 UK citizens, 63% more than in 2010, was counterbalanced by net inflow of 286 000 non-UK nationals, slightly lower than in 2010. Provisional figures through June 2012 suggest a further decline in net migration due to lower inflows, especially for non-EU students.

The number of persons granted settlement (permission to stay permanently) in the United Kingdom, including dependants and excluding EU/EFTA nationals, peaked in 2010 but fell by 31%, to 166 900, in 2011. Backlog-resolution measures related to asylum claims had contributed to high figures for discretionary grants in 2010, but these fell 64% in 2011. Work-related grants fell 17% in 2011, to 69 900, while family-related grants fell 22% to 54 100. Preliminary data for 2012 indicate 126 900 grants of settlement, with a decline in all categories, especially discretionary grants. The number of asylum-related grants rose from 4 900 in 2010 to 13 000 in 2011, before falling to 10 600 in 2012. This is partly due to a 2005 rule which replaced immediate settlement for recognised refugees with five years' limited leave.

The number of grants of citizenship fell from 195 000 in 2010 to 177 800 in 2011, but returned to 194 300 in 2012. More than half were on the basis of residence, and 20% were on the basis of marriage.

Asylum applications rose from 17 900 in 2010 to 19 900 in 2011 and 21 800 in 2012. Of 17 400 initial decisions made in 2011, 33% were positive. Pakistan was the main origin country for applicants, followed by Iran (the largest recipients of grants) and Sri Lanka. Political unrest in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012 led to a rise in asylum applications from these nationals.

Under Tier 1 of the Points-Based System (PBS) for highly skilled migrants, 75 200 visas and extensions were issued for main applicants in 2011 (88% were already in the country), and 63 600 in 2012. Falling numbers of applicants reflect government policy to limit Tier 1 to "high value" people. About two-thirds of principal applicants were post-study students, many of whom may have rushed to enter before closure of the route in April 2012. In 2011, Tier 1 recipients were mainly from India (32%), Pakistan (12%), Nigeria and China (10% each).

In Tier 2, the employer-driven skilled migration stream, visas for main applicants totalled 56 300

in 2011 and 68 700 in 2012. Quota-exempt intra-corporate transferees accounted for nearly a third of certificates of sponsorship obtained by employers in 2011 (and 78% of Tier 2 out-of-country visas). Over half of all certificates of sponsorship in Tier 2 were for Indians.

Students, in Tier 4, have been the largest group of immigrants over the past decade. 297 000 visas and extensions were issued for students and dependants in 2012.

In Tier 5, 16 100 people were admitted under the Youth Mobility scheme in 2011. Tier 5 grant recipients were largely Australian, followed by New Zealanders and Canadians.

In 2012, changes to Tier 2 rules increased skill requirements, making a number of mid-level management jobs ineligible, while relaxing advertising requirements for businesses seeking to recruit highly-paid and PhD-level workers. Other changes included higher funds requirements for those entering under all tiers, and curtailment of the duration of stay if a migrant fails to start, or has ceased, work or study.

Migration policy since May 2010 has aimed at reducing net migration. In addition to measures in July 2011, in 2012 students were subject to restricted work placements and a permit duration of five years maximum at degree-level institutions. The Tier 1 post-study work route ended in April 2012, although graduates with a qualifying job offer may transfer, quota-exempt, to Tier 2 of the PBS. Graduate entrepreneurs and MBAs may stay under Tier 1. Since April 2012, duration of stay has been shortened for certain temporary workers (Tier 5). Those using the family route must be independently supported by their sponsor or by other resources, with a minimum gross annual income of GBP 18 600. From October 2013, all applicants for settlement, unless otherwise exempt, must pass the "Life in the United Kingdom" test and demonstrate at least B1 level (Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) English-language speaking and listening qualification.

For further information

www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk

www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=International+Migration


www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office/series/migration-statistics

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

UNITED KINGDOM

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)
					2001-05	2006-10	2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Inflows	6.4	7.9	8.1	7.9	7.3	8.2	488.0
Outflows	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.3	2.8	3.7	202.0
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands			% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners United Kingdom 2001-10 annual average (dashed blue line), 2011 (solid grey bar) 	
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011			
Work	118.9	114.0	30.7	35.5			
Family (incl. accompanying family)	101.4	84.3	26.1	26.2			
Humanitarian	4.9	13.0	1.3	4.0			
Free movements	72.2	72.7	18.6	22.6			
Others	90.6	37.2	23.3	11.6			
Total	388.0	321.2	100.0	100.0			
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10			
<i>Thousands</i>							
International students	124.0	234.0	226.0	179.4			
Trainees			
Working holiday makers	56.6	21.3	20.7	32.9			
Seasonal workers	15.7	21.3	16.3	18.4			
Intra-company transfers	..	17.5	21.0	15.4			
Other temporary workers	202.6	81.6	82.3	137.7			
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
	1.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.5	25 455
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>							
Total	3.6	6.2	7.8	7.6	4.7	6.8	474
Natural increase	1.2	2.3	3.9	4.1	1.6	3.4	256
Net migration	2.4	3.8	3.9	3.5	3.1	3.4	219
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>							
Foreign-born population	7.9	9.4	11.5	12.0	8.7	10.7	7 430
Foreign population	4.0	5.1	7.4	7.7	4.7	6.7	4 785
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>							
	3.7	5.7	4.5	3.9	4.7	4.2	177 785
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>							
Native-born men	78.3	77.9	74.5	70.0	78.1	76.2	
Foreign-born men	71.1	72.4	74.8	66.5	72.3	76.3	
Native-born women	65.7	67.0	65.7	70.0	66.6	66.6	
Foreign-born women	53.1	56.0	58.0	66.5	54.8	57.2	
<i>Unemployment rate</i>							
Native-born men	5.9	4.7	8.7	8.8	5.0	6.9	
Foreign-born men	9.6	7.4	8.8	9.1	7.7	7.7	
Native-born women	4.6	3.7	6.6	7.0	3.9	5.3	
Foreign-born women	7.8	7.1	9.0	9.6	6.8	8.3	
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011
<i>Annual growth in %</i>							
Real GDP	4.5	2.8	1.8	0.9	3.0	0.6	
GDP/capita (level in USD)	4.1	2.1	1.0	0.2	2.5	0.0	35 607
Employment (level in thousands)	1.2	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.9	0.1	29 074
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>							
Unemployment	5.4	4.8	7.8	8.0	4.9	6.6	

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824479>

United States

US immigrant admissions for lawful permanent residents in 2011 increased by 1.9% from the previous year, to 1 062 000. 482 000, or about 46%, were new arrivals. The foreign-born population residing in the United States in 2011 was 40.4 million, 13% of the population. Individuals born in Mexico accounted for 29%, followed by China (5.5%), India (4.6%) and the Philippines (4.5%). Together, these four countries account for approximately one-third of all immigrant admissions every year over the past decade. The share of Asians among total admissions increased from 33% to 43% over the last decade, while the share of North American immigrants fell from 38% in 2002 to 31% in 2011. The number of family and employment-based migrants as well as asylees fell in 2011 over the previous year while the number of refugees and diversity-visa immigrants rose.

Family-sponsored immigration accounted for 688 000 immigrants, or about 65% of all legal immigration to the United States, while 139 300 immigrants (13%) were employment-based. Each year 140 000 visas are reserved for permanent employment-based immigration, which includes accompanying family members.

The diversity programme accounted for 4.7% of total lawful permanent resident inflow. The per-country limit of diversity visas in 2011 was 3 500.

The refugee ceiling remained at 80 000 in 2011. 56 400 refugees were physically admitted. 113 000 refugees, admitted at least one year previously, changed their status to that of permanent immigrant. The leading countries of origin for refugees in 2011 were Burma, Bhutan, and Iraq, with the number of Iraqi refugees dropping from 18 000 in 2010 to 9 400 in 2011.

25 000 individuals were granted asylum status in 2011, and 55 400 asylees who had been in that status for more than one year were granted lawful permanent residence.

1.3 million non-immigrant visas were issued to Mexican nationals in 2011 (of which 1.14 million were border-crossing cards), followed by China (945 000), Brazil (801 000) and India (554 000), and Colombia (234 000). Over the past five years, the number of temporary visas issued to citizens of China and Brazil more than doubled. 447 000 academic student visas were granted in 2011, an increase of 16% over 2010.

The number of naturalisations, falling since 2008, increased to 694 000 persons in 2011, with Mexican-born persons leading the way.

In January 2011, there were approximately 11.5 million unauthorised residents that entered between 1980 and 2010 in the foreign-born population. Of these, only 14% were estimated to have arrived since 2005, suggesting decreasing inflows.

Mexico remains the leading source of unauthorised migration to the United States with about 59% of the unauthorised population in 2011.

Few immigration measures were enacted into law during the 112th congress, in 2011-12, as a contentious political environment, high levels of unemployment and budgetary constraints narrowed the range of policy options and limited legislation. The US House of Representatives did pass two immigration-related bills, but neither advanced in the Senate.

The Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act re-introduced in Congress did not advance. However, the Obama administration took executive action in June 2012 to provide a temporary relief from removal for many individuals who entered the US unlawfully as children, who would have qualified for the requirements of the DREAM Act. Those granted relief under this Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) – about 200 000 by February 2013 – may apply for work authorisation.

Tensions between the role in immigration policy of the federal government, and the scope of state and local action, remained. In June 2012, the US Supreme Court struck down three of the provisions of a 2010 Arizona law that: criminalised wilful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document; prohibited unauthorised aliens from knowingly applying for, soliciting or performing work in the state; and authorised state officers to arrest without warrant any non-citizen where there was probable cause that the alien has committed any public offense which makes them removable. Similar laws had been passed in other states.

The 113rd Congress has taken up discussion of comprehensive immigration reform in 2013. Comprehensive immigration legislation was one element of President Obama's re-election campaign, and legislative packages presented cover regularisation, changes to temporary and permanent skilled and unskilled economic immigration schemes, as well as employment authorisation verification measures. Competing proposals have been tabled regarding regularisation schemes, with the path to naturalisation a key question. Proposals for changes to economic migration schemes would raise caps and broaden exemptions.

For further information

www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics
http://travel.state.gov/visa/statistics/statistics_1476.html
www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/
www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-ina.htm
www.ice.gov

Recent trends in migrant flows and stocks

UNITED STATES

Migration flows (foreigners) National definition	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average		Level ('000)			
					2001-05	2006-10	2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Inflows	3.0	3.8	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.7	1 062.0			
Outflows			
Migration inflows (foreigners) by type	Thousands		% distribution		Inflows of top 10 nationalities as a % of total inflows of foreigners United States 2001-10 annual average (dashed blue line), 2011 (solid grey bar) 					
Permit based statistics (standardised)	2010	2011	2010	2011						
Work	67.0	65.3	6.4	6.1						
Family (incl. accompanying family)	772.4	762.2	74.1	71.8						
Humanitarian	136.3	168.5	13.1	15.9						
Free movements						
Others	66.3	65.5	6.4	6.2						
Total	1 041.9	1 061.4	100.0	100.0						
Temporary migration	2005	2010	2011	Average 2006-10						
<i>Thousands</i>										
International students	237.9	385.2	447.4	325.9						
Trainees	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.6						
Working holiday makers	88.6	118.2	97.4	128.3						
Seasonal workers	31.9	55.9	55.4	53.7						
Intra-company transfers	65.5	74.7	70.7	76.1						
Other temporary workers	266.1	217.6	235.0	251.2						
Inflows of asylum seekers	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	60 587			
Components of population growth	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Per 1 000 inhabitants</i>										
Total	10.3	8.9	7.5	7.2	9.0	8.5	2 250			
Natural increase	5.7	5.7	5.2	5.0	5.7	5.8	1 558			
Net migration	4.6	3.2	2.3	2.2	3.3	2.6	692			
Stocks of immigrants	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level ('000) 2011			
<i>Percentage of the total population</i>										
Foreign-born population	10.7	12.1	12.9	13.0	11.6	12.6	40 382			
Foreign population	6.3	7.2	6.9	6.8	7.0	7.1	21 057			
Naturalisations	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Percentage of the foreign population</i>										
	4.1	2.9	2.9	3.2	2.7	3.5	694 193			
Labour market outcomes	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10				
<i>Employment/population ratio</i>										
Native-born men	77.2	73.3	68.2	68.4	74.1	71.4				
Foreign-born men	82.0	81.7	77.4	78.1	80.8	80.2				
Native-born women	68.4	65.3	62.2	61.9	66.3	64.5				
Foreign-born women	57.7	56.4	57.4	56.7	57.1	58.3				
<i>Unemployment rate</i>										
Native-born men	4.5	6.3	10.9	9.8	6.5	7.9				
Foreign-born men	4.5	5.1	10.0	8.9	5.8	7.0				
Native-born women	4.2	5.2	8.7	8.5	5.2	6.0				
Foreign-born women	5.5	5.2	9.5	9.5	6.5	6.5				
Macroeconomic indicators	2000	2005	2010	2011	Average 2001-05	2006-10	Level 2011			
<i>Annual growth in %</i>										
Real GDP	4.2	3.1	2.4	1.8	2.4	0.7				
GDP/capita (level in USD)	3.0	2.1	1.5	1.1	1.4	-0.2	48 043			
Employment (level in thousands)	2.5	1.8	-0.5	1.2	0.7	-0.3	140 821			
<i>Percentage of the total labour force</i>										
Unemployment	4.0	5.1	9.6	9.0	5.4	7.1				

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824498>

SOURCES AND NOTES OF THE COUNTRY TABLES OF CHAPTER 5

Migration flows of foreigners

OECD countries and the Russian Federation: sources and notes are available in the Statistical annex (Metadata related to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2).

Bulgaria: Number of new permanent and long-term residence permits granted (*Source*: Ministry of the Interior); Lithuania: Arrivals and departures of residents (*Source*: Department of Statistics of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania); Romania: Permanent residence changes (*Source*: Romanian Statistical Yearbook).

Long-term migration inflows of foreigners by type (standardised inflows)

The statistics are based largely on residence and work permit data and have been standardised, to the extent possible (cf. www.oecd.org/migration/imo).

Temporary migration

Based on residence or work permit data. Data on temporary workers generally do not cover workers who benefit from a free circulation agreement.

Inflows of asylum seekers

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (www.unhcr.org/statistics).

Components of population growth

Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania: Eurostat. Other OECD countries and the Russian Federation: Population and Vital Statistics, OECD, 2011.

Total population

Foreign-born population

National sources and Secretariat estimates (cf. www.oecd.org/migration/foreignborn for more information on methods of estimation). Sources and notes of national sources are provided in the Statistical annex (see Metadata related to Tables A.4 and B.4).

Foreign population

National sources. Exact sources and notes for the OECD countries are given in the Statistical annex (Metadata related to Tables A.5 and B.5).

Lithuania: Residents' Register Service (Ministry of the Interior); Romania: Ministry of the Interior.

Naturalisations

National sources. Exact sources and notes for the OECD countries are given in the Statistical annex (Metadata related to Tables A.6 and B.6). Bulgaria and Lithuania: Ministry of the Interior.

Labour market outcomes

European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico: Labour Force Surveys (annual averages); United States: Current Population Survey, March supplement.

Macroeconomic and labour market indicators**Real GDP and GDP per capita**

Annual National Accounts – Comparative tables at the price levels and PPPs of 2005 (OECD).

Employment and unemployment

OECD Employment Outlook 2012, OECD, 2012.

Statistical annex

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Note on Israel:

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Notes on Cyprus:

1. *Note by Turkey:* The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
2. *Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union:* The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Introduction

Most of the data published in this annex have been provided by national correspondents of the continuous reporting system on migration appointed by the OECD Secretariat with the approval of the authorities of member countries. Consequently, these data are not necessarily based on common definitions. Countries under review in this annex are OECD countries for which data are available, as well as the Russian Federation. The continuous reporting system on migration has no authority to impose changes in data collection procedures. It is an observatory which, by its very nature, has to use existing statistics. However, it does play an active role in suggesting what it considers to be essential improvements in data collection and makes every effort to present consistent and well-documented statistics.

The purpose of this annex is to describe the “immigrant” population (generally the foreign-born population). The information gathered concerns the flows and stocks of the total immigrant population as well as the “Acquisitions of nationality”. These data have not been standardised and are therefore not fully comparable across countries. In particular, the criteria for registering persons in population registers and the conditions for granting residence permits, for example, vary across countries, which means that measurements may differ greatly even if the same type of source is being used.

In addition to the problem of the comparability of statistics, there is the difficulty of the very partial coverage of unauthorised migrants. Part of this population may be counted in censuses. Regularisation programmes, when they exist, make it possible to identify and enumerate a far from negligible fraction of unauthorised immigrants after the fact. In terms of measurement, this makes it possible to better measure the volume of the foreign-born population at a given time, even if it is not always possible to determine the year these immigrants entered the country.

Each series in the annex is preceded by an explanatory note concerning the data presented. A summary table then follows (Series A, giving the total for each destination country), and finally the tables by nationality or country of birth, as the case may be (Series B). At the end of each series, a table provides the sources and notes for the data presented in the tables for each country.

General comments

- The tables provide annual series covering the period 2001-11.
- The Series A tables are presented in alphabetical order by the name of the country. In the other tables, nationalities or countries of birth are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.

- In the tables by country of origin (Series B) only the 15 main countries are shown. “Other countries” is a residual calculated as the difference between the total foreign or foreign-born population and the sum for all countries indicated in the table. For some countries, data are not available for all years and this is reflected in the residual entry of “Other countries”. This must be borne in mind when interpreting changes in this category.
- There is no table by nationality for the series on “Outflows of foreign population” (Series A.2). These statistics, as well as data by gender are available online (www.oecd.org/migration/imo).
- The rounding of data cells may cause totals to differ slightly from the sum of the component cells.
- The symbol “..” used in the tables means that the data are not available.

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

OECD countries seldom have tools specifically designed to measure the inflows and outflows of the foreign population, and national estimates are generally based either on population registers or residence permit data. This note describes more systematically what is measured by each of the sources used.

Flows derived from population registers

Population registers can usually produce inflow and outflow data for both nationals and foreigners. To register, foreigners may have to indicate possession of an appropriate residence and/or work permit valid for at least as long as the minimum registration period. Emigrants are usually identified by a stated intention to leave the country, although the period of (intended) absence is not always specified.

In population registers, departures tend to be less well recorded than arrivals. Indeed, the emigrant who plans to return to the host country in the future may be reluctant to inform about his departure to avoid losing rights related to the presence on the register. Registration criteria vary considerably across countries; in particular the minimum duration of stay for individuals to be registered ranges from three months to one year, which poses major problems of international comparisons. For example, in some countries, register data cover many temporary migrants, in some cases including asylum seekers when they live in private households (as opposed to reception centres or hostels for immigrants) and international students.

Flows derived from residence and/or work permits

Statistics on permits are generally based on the number of permits issued during a given period and depend on the types of permits used. The so-called “settlement countries” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) consider as immigrants persons who have been granted the right of permanent residence, and this right is often granted upon arrival. Statistics on temporary immigrants are also published in this annex for these countries. In the case of France, the permits covered are those valid for at least one year (excluding students). Data for Portugal include temporary migrants.

Another characteristic of permit data is that flows of nationals are not recorded. Some flows of foreigners may also not be recorded, either because the type of permit they hold is not included in the statistics or because they are not required to have a permit (freedom of movement agreements). In addition, permit data do not necessarily reflect physical flows or actual lengths of stay since: i) permits may be issued overseas but individuals may decide not to use them, or delay their arrival; ii) permits may be issued to persons who have in fact been resident in the country for some time, the permit indicating a change of status.

Flows estimated from specific surveys

Ireland provides estimates based on the results of Quarterly National Household Surveys and other sources such as permit data and asylum applications. These estimates are revised periodically on the basis of census data. Data for the United Kingdom are based on a survey of passengers entering or exiting the country by plane, train or boat (International Passenger Survey). One of the aims of this survey is to estimate the number and characteristics of migrants. The survey is based on a random sample of approximately one out of every 500 passengers. The figures were revised significantly following the latest census in each of these two countries, which seems to indicate that these estimates do not constitute an “ideal” source either. Australia and New Zealand also conduct passenger surveys which enable them to establish the length of stay on the basis of migrants’ stated intentions when they enter or exit the country.

Table A.1. **Inflows of foreign population into selected OECD countries and the Russian Federation**

Thousands

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Australia											
Permanent	127.9	119.1	123.4	146.4	161.7	176.2	189.5	203.9	222.6	206.7	210.7
Temporary	245.1	240.5	244.7	261.6	289.4	321.6	368.5	420.0	474.8	467.0	504.7
Austria	74.8	86.1	93.3	104.2	98.0	82.9	91.7	94.8	91.8	98.3	114.9
Belgium	66.0	70.2	68.8	72.4	77.4	83.4	93.4	106.0	102.7	113.6	117.9
Canada											
Permanent	250.6	229.0	221.3	235.8	262.2	251.6	236.8	247.2	252.2	280.7	248.8
Temporary	266.6	246.6	227.2	227.2	228.6	248.7	278.1	311.7	291.7	282.4	293.6
Chile	28.9	29.9	29.8	32.1	38.1	48.5	79.4	68.4	57.1	63.9	76.3
Czech Republic	11.3	43.6	57.4	50.8	58.6	66.1	102.5	77.8	40.0	30.5	22.6
Denmark	24.6	21.5	18.4	18.7	20.1	24.0	31.4	37.0	32.0	33.4	34.6
Estonia	0.8	1.0	1.5	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.2	1.7
Finland	11.0	10.0	9.4	11.5	12.7	13.9	17.5	19.9	18.1	18.2	20.4
France	106.9	124.2	136.4	141.6	135.9	135.1	128.9	136.0	126.2	136.1	142.0
Germany	685.3	658.3	601.8	602.2	579.3	558.5	574.8	573.8	606.3	683.5	841.7
Greece	65.3	63.2	46.3	42.9	46.5	33.4	23.2
Hungary	20.3	18.0	19.4	22.2	25.6	23.6	22.6	35.5	25.6	23.9	22.5
Iceland	2.5	1.9	1.4	2.5	4.7	7.1	9.3	7.5	3.4	3.0	2.8
Ireland	32.7	39.9	42.4	41.8	66.1	88.9	120.4	89.7	50.7	23.9	33.7
Israel	43.5	33.6	23.3	20.9	21.2	19.3	18.1	13.7	14.6	16.6	16.9
Italy	172.8	168.7	392.8	373.1	267.6	242.0	490.4	462.3	392.5	419.6	354.3
Japan	351.2	343.8	373.9	372.0	372.3	325.6	336.6	344.5	297.1	287.1	266.9
Korea	163.9	158.9	168.9	178.5	253.7	303.0	300.4	302.2	232.8	293.1	307.2
Luxembourg	11.1	11.0	12.6	12.2	13.8	13.7	15.8	16.8	14.6	15.8	19.1
Mexico	8.1	5.8	6.9	8.5	9.2	6.9	7.2	15.9	23.9	26.2	21.5
Netherlands	94.5	86.6	73.6	65.1	63.4	67.7	80.3	103.4	104.4	110.2	118.5
New Zealand	54.1	48.8	43.4	36.2	54.1	49.8	46.9	46.9	43.6	44.3	40.8
Norway	25.4	30.8	26.8	27.9	31.4	37.4	53.5	58.8	56.7	65.1	70.8
Poland	21.5	30.2	30.3	36.9	38.5	34.2	40.6	41.8	41.3	41.1	41.3
Portugal	151.4	72.0	31.8	34.1	28.1	22.5	32.6	32.3	33.8	30.0	33.0
Russian Federation	193.5	184.6	129.1	119.2	177.2	186.4	287.0	281.6	279.9	191.7	356.5
Slovak Republic	4.7	4.8	4.6	7.9	7.7	11.3	14.8	16.5	14.4	12.7	8.2
Slovenia	30.5	43.8	24.1	11.2	18.0
Spain	394.0	443.1	429.5	645.8	682.7	803.0	920.5	692.2	469.3	431.3	416.3
Sweden	43.8	47.3	47.1	46.7	50.6	78.9	82.6	82.0	82.4	79.0	75.9
Switzerland	101.4	101.9	94.0	96.3	94.4	102.7	139.7	157.3	132.4	134.2	142.5
Turkey	29.9	..
United Kingdom	370.0	418.0	411.0	500.0	469.0	513.0	500.0	505.0	471.0	498.0	488.0
United States											
Permanent	1 058.9	1 059.4	703.5	957.9	1 122.4	1 266.3	1 052.4	1 107.1	1 130.8	1 042.6	1 062.0
Temporary	1 375.1	1 282.6	1 233.4	1 299.3	1 323.5	1 457.9	1 606.9	1 617.6	1 419.2	1 517.9	1 616.8


Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Table A.2.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824517>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
AUSTRALIA (PERMANENT)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
New Zealand	42.3	21.6	16.4	18.7	22.4	23.8	28.3	34.5	33.0	24.4	34.6	49
China	8.3	9.1	9.4	12.5	15.2	17.3	21.1	20.7	22.9	25.0	29.0	57
India	5.8	7.6	8.2	11.3	12.8	15.2	19.8	22.7	25.3	23.5	21.9	47
United Kingdom	13.2	14.6	18.6	25.7	26.2	30.9	30.7	31.7	33.3	26.7	21.5	48
Philippines	3.4	3.4	3.6	4.4	4.8	5.4	6.1	7.1	8.9	10.3	10.7	56
South Africa	6.8	7.2	5.9	7.1	5.7	4.8	5.4	6.9	11.3	11.1	8.1	50
Malaysia	2.5	2.6	3.9	5.1	4.7	4.8	4.8	5.1	5.4	4.9	5.0	53
Sri Lanka	1.8	2.4	2.3	2.1	3.0	3.3	3.8	4.8	5.3	5.8	4.9	46
Viet Nam	1.9	2.5	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.9	3.4	3.0	3.3	3.9	4.8	64
Korea	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.8	3.5	4.0	4.2	5.0	5.2	4.3	4.3	55
Afghanistan	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.3	3.5	3.5	2.6	2.0	2.0	3.2	3.4	33
Ireland	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.7	3.0	3.4	40
Iraq	1.3	1.3	2.9	1.8	3.3	5.1	2.5	2.6	4.4	2.9	3.3	51
Iran	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.2	2.2	2.1	3.3	45
United States	2.3	2.6	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.0	53
Other countries	34.4	39.8	41.5	45.7	48.6	49.7	51.2	51.5	54.4	52.5	49.7	
Total	127.9	119.1	123.4	146.4	161.7	176.2	189.5	203.9	222.6	206.7	210.7	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
AUSTRIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Germany	10.2	9.2	10.9	13.2	14.7	15.9	17.9	19.2	17.6	17.8	18.0	46
Romania	2.4	4.8	5.7	5.5	5.1	4.5	9.3	9.3	9.3	11.5	13.7	50
Hungary	3.0	2.6	2.8	3.2	3.4	3.6	4.5	5.2	5.8	6.5	9.6	48
Serbia	6.3	9.9	10.5	11.6	11.7	7.4	6.4	6.1	6.2	8.5	7.5	43
Poland	3.5	3.0	3.4	7.0	6.8	5.7	5.3	4.4	3.8	4.2	6.9	40
Slovak Republic	2.5	2.5	2.6	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.6	4.9	4.0	4.1	5.6	57
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.0	4.9	5.4	5.4	4.6	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.4	2.5	3.9	43
Turkey	7.8	11.3	10.4	8.2	7.7	4.9	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.3	3.9	39
Bulgaria	0.9	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.2	2.2	2.5	2.6	3.2	3.6	50
Afghanistan	1.5	1.1	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	1.0	1.4	1.3	2.9	26
Russian Federation	0.9	1.8	4.0	6.8	4.0	2.5	2.2	3.0	2.4	2.2	2.6	59
Italy	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4	40
Croatia	6.1	3.8	3.4	3.3	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	46
United States	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.9	50
Czech Republic	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.6	53
Other countries	19.8	26.3	28.0	30.0	27.5	23.5	24.7	24.5	24.7	25.1	28.7	
Total	74.8	86.1	93.3	104.2	98.0	82.9	91.7	94.8	91.8	98.3	114.9	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>


Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

BELGIUM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
France	8.0	8.1	8.2	9.5	10.4	11.6	12.3	14.1	12.3	13.5	13.8	51
Romania	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.4	2.3	3.1	5.5	6.8	6.1	8.0	10.9	43
Netherlands	8.2	8.4	8.5	8.8	10.1	11.5	11.4	11.7	8.8	9.3	9.5	47
Poland	2.9	2.4	2.1	3.5	4.8	6.7	9.4	9.0	9.9	8.9	9.3	49
Morocco	7.1	8.5	8.4	8.0	7.1	7.5	7.8	8.2	9.1	9.8	8.5	52
Spain	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.8	3.6	4.6	5.3	47
Italy	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.7	3.7	3.6	4.3	4.7	43
Bulgaria	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.8	2.6	3.9	3.3	4.2	4.3	46
Germany	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.1	53
Portugal	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.3	3.2	2.9	2.7	3.1	43
Turkey	3.0	3.9	3.8	3.2	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	50
United States	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6	55
India	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	2.1	1.8	2.3	2.3	39
United Kingdom	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.4	1.9	2.2	2.1	44
China	1.3	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.6	56
Other countries	19.5	20.8	20.0	20.6	21.8	22.0	23.6	27.4	29.1	32.9	34.0	
Total	66.0	70.2	68.8	72.4	77.4	83.4	93.4	106.0	102.7	113.6	117.9	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

CANADA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Philippines	12.9	11.0	12.0	13.3	17.5	17.7	19.1	23.7	27.3	36.6	35.0	54
China	40.4	33.3	36.3	36.4	42.3	33.1	27.0	29.3	29.0	30.2	28.7	53
India	27.9	28.8	24.6	25.6	33.1	30.8	26.1	24.5	26.1	30.3	25.0	50
United States	5.9	5.3	6.0	7.5	9.3	10.9	10.5	11.2	9.7	9.2	8.8	51
Iran	5.7	7.9	5.7	6.1	5.5	7.1	6.7	6.0	6.1	6.8	6.8	50
United Kingdom	5.4	4.7	5.2	6.1	5.9	6.5	8.1	9.2	9.6	9.5	6.6	44
Haiti	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	2.5	2.1	4.6	6.2	58
Pakistan	15.4	14.2	12.4	12.8	13.6	12.3	9.5	8.1	6.2	5.0	6.1	51
France	4.5	4.0	4.2	5.1	5.5	5.0	5.6	6.4	7.4	6.9	5.9	43
United Arab Emirates	4.5	4.4	3.3	4.4	4.1	4.1	3.4	4.7	4.6	6.8	5.2	47
Iraq	1.6	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.6	2.6	4.6	4.5	4.7	51
Korea	9.6	7.3	7.1	5.3	5.8	6.2	5.9	7.2	5.9	5.5	4.6	53
Colombia	3.0	3.2	4.3	4.4	6.0	5.8	4.8	5.0	4.2	4.8	4.3	51
Morocco	4.0	4.1	3.2	3.5	2.7	3.1	3.8	3.9	5.2	5.9	4.2	48
Algeria	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.2	3.1	4.5	3.2	3.2	4.8	4.1	3.8	50
Other countries	104.5	94.1	91.5	99.4	104.8	101.9	100.0	99.5	99.4	109.9	93.0	
Total	250.6	229.0	221.3	235.8	262.2	251.6	236.8	247.2	252.2	280.7	248.8	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

CHILE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Peru	12.6	12.8	12.9	15.6	20.0	28.6	53.2	39.0	27.6	27.7	30.7	53
Colombia	1.7	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.7	2.4	3.3	4.4	5.3	7.2	12.5	55
Bolivia	1.0	0.9	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.9	6.0	4.5	3.6	5.8	7.2	52
Argentina	2.1	4.9	4.9	4.3	4.1	3.5	3.0	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.8	38
United States	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.1	2.2	2.9	3.0	37
Ecuador	3.5	2.6	2.0	1.8	1.9	2.2	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.9	50
Dominican Republic	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.6	1.0	1.8	74
China	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.6	33
Brazil	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.4	53
Spain	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.2	37
Venezuela	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.1	52
Haiti	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.9	28
Mexico	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	44
Paraguay	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	53
Uruguay	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.7	40
Other countries	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.6	3.5	5.3	5.0	5.8	6.0	
Total	28.9	29.9	29.8	32.1	38.1	48.5	79.4	68.4	57.1	63.9	76.3	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

CZECH REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Slovak Republic	2.4	13.0	23.7	15.0	10.1	6.8	13.9	7.6	5.6	5.1	4.4	48
Russian Federation	0.7	2.4	1.8	2.0	3.3	4.7	6.7	5.8	4.1	3.7	2.1	57
Ukraine	2.8	10.7	15.5	16.3	23.9	30.2	39.6	18.7	8.1	3.5	2.0	54
Germany	0.2	0.8	0.8	1.3	1.4	0.8	1.9	4.3	2.0	2.0	1.3	15
United States	0.1	0.7	0.9	0.7	1.4	1.8	1.7	2.2	2.5	1.7	1.3	51
Serbia	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.7	92
Viet Nam	2.2	5.7	3.6	4.5	4.9	6.4	12.3	13.4	2.3	1.4	0.7	54
Poland	0.4	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.3	0.9	2.3	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.6	41
Kazakhstan	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.5	56
Bulgaria	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.5	40
Austria	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	12
Romania	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	34
Turkey	0.1	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	..
Korea	0.7	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.4	42
China	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.4	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.3	60
Other countries	1.8	7.1	6.5	6.2	8.9	10.4	18.2	19.4	10.9	8.8	6.4	
Total	11.3	43.6	57.4	50.8	58.6	66.1	102.5	77.8	40.0	30.5	22.6	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>


Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

DENMARK

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Poland	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.3	2.5	4.3	6.5	3.4	2.9	3.2	41
Romania	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.4	1.5	2.0	2.7	41
Germany	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.3	1.9	3.0	3.0	2.2	1.9	1.9	49
Philippines	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.3	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	94
Lithuania	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.6	46
Norway	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	63
Ukraine	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.2	39
Sweden	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	55
United Kingdom	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	39
Bulgaria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.0	37
India	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.1	37
Iceland	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	6.6	53
United States	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.9	49
Latvia	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.9	0.8	45
Thailand	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.5	80
Other countries	16.8	13.7	10.6	9.7	9.3	9.9	12.0	13.0	12.4	13.2	13.9	
Total	24.6	21.5	18.4	18.7	20.1	24.0	31.4	37.0	32.0	33.4	34.6	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

ESTONIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Russian Federation	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.9	47
Finland	0.3
Ukraine	0.2
Germany	0.1
Latvia	0.1
China	0.1
Sweden	0.1
United States	0.1
Italy	0.1
France	0.1
Other countries	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.5	1.5	0.6	0.8	0.8	
Total	0.8	1.0	1.5	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.2	1.7	43

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>


Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

FINLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Estonia	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.7	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.9	4.7	49
Russian Federation	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.5	3.0	2.3	2.3	2.8	59
China	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.8	59
Somalia	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.7	50
Iraq	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.1	0.7	36
Sweden	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	41
Thailand	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	82
India	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	37
Afghanistan	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	46
Viet Nam	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	61
United Kingdom	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	21
Poland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	35
United States	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	38
Turkey	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	33
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	48
Other countries	3.9	3.1	3.3	4.0	4.4	4.7	6.2	7.2	5.8	5.6	6.5	
Total	11.0	10.0	9.4	11.5	12.7	13.9	17.5	19.9	18.1	18.2	20.4	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

FRANCE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Algeria	15.0	23.4	28.5	27.9	24.8	25.4	23.1	22.3	20.0	19.1	20.5	..
Morocco	19.1	21.8	22.6	22.2	20.0	19.2	17.9	19.2	15.5	18.0	17.4	..
Tunisia	6.6	7.8	9.4	8.9	8.0	8.2	7.8	7.9	7.5	9.5	9.7	..
China	2.3	1.9	2.4	2.9	2.8	4.3	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.6	5.3	..
Turkey	6.9	8.5	8.6	9.1	8.9	8.3	7.6	7.7	6.2	5.6	5.3	..
Mali	1.7	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.9	2.8	4.6	5.6	5.0	5.1	..
Senegal	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.6	3.1	3.2	3.8	4.1	..
Cameroon	2.4	2.9	3.4	4.1	4.3	4.4	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.9	..
Haiti	2.2	2.1	2.7	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.3	4.7	3.8	..
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.4	1.8	2.0	2.4	3.4	3.5	3.8	..
Côte d'Ivoire	2.2	2.8	3.4	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.6	..
Russian Federation	1.4	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.0	2.5	2.3	3.0	2.9	3.2	3.5	..
United States	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.9	..
Serbia	1.4	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.6	..
Sri Lanka	2.1	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.1	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.3	..
Other countries	37.1	39.3	40.5	43.4	43.8	43.8	43.7	45.8	41.6	45.2	48.3	
Total	106.9	124.2	136.4	141.6	135.9	135.1	128.9	136.0	126.2	136.1	142.0	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>


Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

GERMANY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Poland	79.0	81.6	88.2	125.0	147.7	151.7	140.0	119.9	112.0	115.6	164.7	34
Romania	20.1	24.0	23.8	23.5	23.3	23.4	42.9	48.2	57.3	75.5	97.5	38
Bulgaria	13.2	13.2	13.4	11.6	9.1	7.5	20.5	24.1	29.2	39.8	52.4	35
Hungary	17.0	16.5	14.3	17.4	18.6	18.6	22.2	25.2	25.3	29.3	41.1	26
Turkey	54.7	58.1	49.8	42.6	36.0	29.6	26.7	26.7	27.2	27.6	28.6	38
Italy	28.8	25.0	21.6	19.6	18.3	17.7	18.2	20.1	22.2	23.9	28.1	38
Greece	16.2	15.0	12.1	10.2	9.0	8.2	8.0	8.3	8.6	12.3	23.0	40
United States	16.0	15.5	14.7	15.3	15.2	16.3	17.5	17.5	17.7	18.3	20.1	46
Serbia	28.3	26.4	22.8	21.7	17.5	10.9	2.2	7.0	9.1	19.1	18.4	39
China	19.1	18.5	16.1	13.1	12.0	12.9	13.6	14.3	15.4	16.2	18.3	50
Russian Federation	35.9	36.5	31.8	28.5	23.1	16.4	15.0	15.1	15.7	16.1	17.5	63
Spain	8.7	8.5	7.7	7.6	7.1	8.2	8.6	7.8	9.0	10.7	16.2	46
India	8.9	9.4	9.2	9.1	8.4	8.9	9.4	11.4	12.0	13.2	15.4	30
France	13.5	12.7	12.3	12.5	12.3	13.6	13.8	13.0	12.9	13.3	13.8	49
Slovak Republic	11.4	11.6	10.6	11.6	11.8	11.3	9.4	8.7	8.5	8.6	12.2	38
Other countries	314.5	286.0	253.5	232.8	209.9	203.1	207.0	206.7	224.4	244.2	274.3	
Total	685.3	658.3	601.8	602.2	579.3	558.5	574.8	573.8	606.3	683.5	841.7	39

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

GREECE

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Albania	39.1	40.2	34.3	32.1	34.6	23.7	..
Russian Federation	2.7	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.2	..
Egypt	3.1	3.9	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.1	..
Ukraine	3.1	1.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.9	..
Georgia	3.0	2.2	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.9	..
India	0.8	1.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.6	..
Philippines	1.3	1.5	1.1	0.8	1.1	0.5	..
Other countries	12.3	10.6	5.6	5.4	5.7	4.5	
Total	65.3	63.2	46.3	42.9	46.5	33.4	..


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
HUNGARY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Romania	10.6	10.3	9.6	12.1	8.9	7.9	6.7	10.0	7.1	6.6	5.8	42
Germany	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.1	3.9	0.7	0.7	3.2	2.7	2.4	2.4	42
Ukraine	2.5	2.1	2.6	3.6	2.1	3.7	2.9	4.1	1.9	1.6	1.3	44
Slovak Republic	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.1	1.6	0.6	0.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	58
United States	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.0	50
China	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.5	1.4	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.1	0.9	43
Serbia	1.0	0.4	0.7	1.6	1.1	2.4	4.4	4.1	1.2	1.0	0.9	40
Turkey	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.6	40
Austria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	37
Russian Federation	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	62
Iran	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	40
United Kingdom	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	34
Korea	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	47
India	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	38
France	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	40
Other countries	3.1	2.8	3.2	2.9	4.2	3.9	3.2	6.5	5.7	5.5	5.7	
Total	20.3	18.0	19.4	22.2	25.6	23.6	22.6	35.5	25.6	23.9	22.5	44

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
ICELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2	1.5	3.3	5.6	3.9	1.2	0.8	0.8	47
Lithuania	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	46
Germany	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	71
United Kingdom	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	33
United States	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	47
Latvia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	49
Denmark	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	43
Sweden	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	56
China	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	55
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	43
Philippines	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	43
France	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	39
Norway	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	43
Canada	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	44
Czech Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	63
Other countries	1.0	0.7	0.6	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Total	2.5	1.9	1.4	2.5	4.7	7.1	9.3	7.5	3.4	3.0	2.8	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>


Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

ISRAEL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Former USSR	33.6	18.5	12.4	10.1	9.4	7.5	6.5	5.6	6.8	7.0	7.2	54
Ethiopia	3.3	2.7	3.0	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	1.6	0.2	1.7	2.7	49
United States	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.4	51
France	1.0	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.6	53
United Kingdom	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.5	49
Argentina	1.4	5.9	1.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	54
Canada	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	58
Belgium	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	53
South Africa	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	49
Brazil	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	52
Hungary	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	54
Turkey	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	52
Germany	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	68
Italy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	45
Australia	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	50
Other countries	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.3	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	
Total	43.5	33.6	23.3	20.9	21.2	19.3	18.1	13.7	14.6	16.6	16.9	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

ITALY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Romania	17.3	17.5	74.5	63.4	43.9	38.2	261.3	162.3	100.7	90.9	90.1	..
Morocco	17.3	14.6	32.4	31.0	21.4	19.5	19.7	35.4	30.7	29.6	23.9	..
China	9.9	10.2	13.5	18.6	14.3	13.1	9.4	11.9	16.6	22.5	20.1	..
Ukraine	2.8	3.8	41.3	33.5	15.1	14.1	14.8	22.3	21.9	29.9	17.9	..
Albania	27.7	25.9	46.6	36.6	27.3	22.1	21.9	33.3	25.5	22.2	16.6	..
Moldova	1.7	2.3	15.3	11.4	9.0	7.5	12.5	19.9	16.5	26.1	15.0	..
India	4.5	5.1	7.9	8.5	6.8	5.9	6.7	11.6	12.5	15.0	13.3	..
Philippines	5.4	4.1	6.6	7.8	5.4	4.3	3.8	7.1	9.5	10.7	10.4	..
Bangladesh	3.4	3.6	5.7	7.2	5.4	4.8	4.5	8.6	8.5	9.7	10.3	..
Egypt	4.5	2.8	5.8	10.6	5.1	4.5	3.3	4.9	7.7	9.4	9.6	..
Peru	3.7	3.1	8.7	9.7	5.2	4.9	4.4	6.7	10.0	12.0	8.7	..
Pakistan	3.4	3.2	4.4	6.3	5.5	3.4	3.0	5.4	8.4	10.7	7.5	..
Brazil	2.4	2.9	5.3	5.0	8.5	10.2	11.7	11.8	9.4	8.4	7.1	..
Sri Lanka	3.7	3.2	4.0	5.0	3.9	3.5	3.6	6.1	6.2	7.2	6.8	..
Senegal	2.6	1.8	7.9	5.2	2.8	2.2	2.2	4.5	4.7	8.8	6.6	..
Other countries	62.4	64.4	112.9	113.2	87.8	84.0	107.5	110.4	103.9	106.3	90.6	
Total	172.8	168.7	392.8	373.1	267.6	242.0	490.4	462.3	392.5	419.6	354.3	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

JAPAN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
China	86.4	88.6	92.2	90.3	105.8	112.5	125.3	134.2	121.2	107.9	100.4	..
Korea	24.7	22.9	21.9	22.8	22.7	24.7	28.1	30.0	27.0	27.9	23.4	..
United States	20.6	21.5	21.5	21.3	22.1	22.2	22.8	24.0	23.5	22.7	19.3	..
Viet Nam	4.7	5.3	6.6	6.5	7.7	8.5	9.9	12.5	10.9	11.9	13.9	..
Thailand	6.8	5.9	6.6	7.1	9.0	8.7	9.0	10.5	9.9	10.9	13.6	..
Philippines	84.9	87.2	93.4	96.2	63.5	28.3	25.3	21.0	15.8	13.3	13.6	..
Indonesia	10.6	9.7	11.1	10.7	12.9	11.4	10.1	10.1	7.5	8.3	8.4	..
Chinese Taipei	4.5	4.9	5.5	5.4	6.6	5.6	..
United Kingdom	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.3	6.3	6.6	5.8	6.0	5.3	5.8	5.2	..
India	4.9	5.8	5.7	4.6	4.9	4.7	..
Brazil	29.7	22.7	33.4	32.2	33.9	27.0	22.9	14.4	3.0	4.7	4.5	..
Germany	4.7	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.3	3.7	..
Nepal	1.6	2.2	3.6	3.6	2.9	3.5	..
France	3.8	4.2	4.5	3.9	4.0	2.9	..
Australia	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.1	1.1	2.8	..
Other countries	76.0	73.5	80.7	78.5	88.4	52.2	51.7	54.1	47.9	50.0	41.5	..
Total	351.2	343.8	373.9	372.0	372.3	325.6	336.6	344.5	297.1	287.1	266.9	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

KOREA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
China	67.0	55.7	52.4	67.4	115.8	161.2	177.0	161.7	117.6	155.3	149.2	49
United States	16.4	19.1	17.8	18.1	18.0	17.8	18.9	23.4	27.1	28.3	28.1	50
Viet Nam	2.6	3.0	6.7	7.8	18.0	20.0	21.2	24.0	16.4	22.9	27.9	51
Thailand	6.7	6.8	7.1	9.8	13.7	15.8	10.5	8.6	5.8	6.9	10.3	42
Philippines	7.4	7.4	10.0	10.1	16.5	17.9	12.2	9.1	8.9	9.1	9.6	55
Uzbekistan	3.9	3.9	7.0	3.6	3.2	4.8	4.9	9.4	4.7	8.6	8.2	31
Indonesia	7.1	9.9	9.3	5.2	10.2	6.9	5.2	9.7	3.3	5.3	8.1	11
Cambodia	0.0	0.1	0.8	0.9	0.8	2.2	1.9	3.4	2.6	3.7	6.4	28
Canada	4.1	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.6	6.0	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.0	53
Sri Lanka	0.7	0.8	2.4	1.9	5.0	4.1	2.5	4.8	1.7	4.2	5.9	3
Japan	8.4	8.7	7.7	7.0	6.8	5.5	5.0	4.7	4.4	4.7	5.5	69
Nepal	0.6	1.0	1.9	1.5	0.6	1.1	0.8	2.4	2.6	2.7	4.3	10
Mongolia	4.9	2.0	4.6	5.1	8.3	9.6	8.6	8.1	5.3	5.4	4.3	51
Myanmar	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.8	0.6	1.8	0.5	0.5	1.7	0.6	2.6	4
Russian Federation	7.0	8.1	9.3	5.5	4.2	3.7	3.4	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.6	60
Other countries	26.6	27.1	26.1	28.5	26.3	25.1	21.7	23.4	21.3	26.2	28.4	..
Total	163.9	158.9	168.9	178.5	253.7	303.0	300.4	302.2	232.8	293.1	307.2	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
LUXEMBOURG

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Portugal	2.3	2.8	3.9	3.5	3.8	3.8	4.4	4.5	3.8	3.8	5.0	42
France	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.2	2.7	2.9	3.2	44
Belgium	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.2	40
Germany	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	44
Italy	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	37
Serbia	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.9	50
Spain	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	48
Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	59
United Kingdom	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	41
Poland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	51
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	47
United States	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	43
Netherlands	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	41
Brazil	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	62
Greece	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	46
Other countries	2.6	2.8	3.2	3.0	3.3	2.8	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.7	
Total	11.1	11.0	12.6	12.2	13.8	13.7	15.8	16.8	14.6	15.8	19.1	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
MEXICO

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
United States	1.4	2.2	2.9	4.0	4.3	44
Cuba	0.3	1.0	1.7	1.8	1.7	50
Colombia	0.3	1.1	1.9	2.3	1.7	59
Venezuela	0.3	0.7	1.3	1.7	1.3	54
Guatemala	0.1	1.0	2.1	1.8	1.2	58
China	0.6	1.3	2.0	1.7	1.1	48
Argentina	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.4	1.0	42
Honduras	0.0	0.8	1.4	1.5	1.0	55
Canada	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	43
Spain	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.0	0.8	31
El Salvador	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.6	54
Peru	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.5	45
Italy	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	31
France	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	45
Korea	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	43
Other countries	2.2	4.1	4.9	4.9	4.0	
Total	8.1	5.8	6.9	8.5	9.2	6.9	7.2	15.9	23.9	26.2	21.5	48


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
NETHERLANDS

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	1.4	1.6	1.5	4.5	5.7	6.8	9.2	13.3	12.7	14.5	18.6	47
Germany	5.1	5.1	4.8	5.3	5.9	7.2	7.5	9.0	8.7	9.8	9.6	55
China	2.8	3.4	3.8	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.4	4.2	4.3	4.5	5.5	50
Bulgaria	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	4.9	5.2	4.3	4.3	5.4	47
United Kingdom	5.9	4.8	4.1	3.6	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.7	4.4	4.4	4.4	41
India	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.2	2.0	2.5	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.8	37
United States	3.1	3.0	2.5	2.3	2.5	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.7	52
Spain	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	2.3	2.6	3.1	3.7	50
Turkey	4.8	5.4	6.2	4.1	3.1	2.8	2.4	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.4	41
Italy	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.9	2.6	2.6	2.8	3.1	39
France	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	47
Romania	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.7	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.6	2.7	56
Greece	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.8	2.7	43
Hungary	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.7	2.2	2.4	2.6	49
Belgium	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.3	50
Other countries	61.4	53.6	41.6	33.7	30.5	30.0	31.4	41.2	44.5	44.8	44.1	
Total	94.5	86.6	73.6	65.1	63.4	67.7	80.3	103.4	104.4	110.2	118.5	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
NEW ZEALAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
United Kingdom	6.8	6.5	8.0	8.7	17.1	13.0	11.3	9.5	7.8	7.5	6.3	49
China	7.8	8.4	6.2	4.0	5.6	6.8	5.6	7.4	5.8	5.6	5.5	54
India	7.4	8.3	4.8	3.1	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.2	3.2	4.0	4.7	44
Philippines	1.3	1.6	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.7	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.9	3.1	56
Fiji	3.6	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.7	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.1	50
South Africa	4.7	3.4	2.4	2.4	4.5	3.6	4.0	4.7	5.2	4.6	2.8	51
Samoa	2.0	1.2	2.2	1.6	2.6	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.0	1.6	2.0	47
Korea	2.4	2.5	1.7	1.5	2.1	2.1	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.4	55
United States	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	2.1	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	52
Tonga	0.8	0.7	2.4	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	46
Malaysia	2.0	1.2	1.0	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	53
Germany	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	57
Sri Lanka	0.9	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.5	51
Japan	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	71
Brazil	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	52
Other countries	12.1	10.2	9.0	7.8	9.2	8.7	7.9	7.7	7.5	8.1	7.3	
Total	54.1	48.8	43.4	36.2	54.1	49.8	46.9	46.9	43.6	44.3	40.8	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>


Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

NORWAY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Poland	0.4	0.7	0.6	1.6	3.3	7.4	14.2	14.4	10.5	11.3	12.9	28
Sweden	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.7	3.4	4.4	5.7	6.0	7.6	8.2	45
Lithuania	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.3	2.4	2.9	3.2	6.6	7.7	36
Philippines	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.8	1.7	2.1	2.6	86
Germany	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.7	2.3	3.8	4.3	2.8	2.7	2.3	45
Latvia	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	1.1	2.3	2.1	37
Eritrea	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.8	1.7	2.0	2.0	47
Iceland	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.6	1.7	1.7	42
Somalia	1.1	2.2	1.7	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.7	50
Denmark	2.0	2.1	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6	40
United Kingdom	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.5	28
Romania	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	43
Thailand	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	84
India	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.2	39
China	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	54
Other countries	14.1	17.3	14.9	15.0	15.5	15.0	18.2	19.9	20.2	20.1	21.5	
Total	25.4	30.8	26.8	27.9	31.4	37.4	53.5	58.8	56.7	65.1	70.8	43

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

POLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Ukraine	4.8	6.9	8.4	10.2	9.8	9.6	9.4	10.3	10.1	10.3	10.1	..
China	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.7	1.2	2.0	2.3	2.8	..
Belarus	1.3	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.6	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.5	..
Viet Nam	1.1	1.2	1.3	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.8	2.8	3.0	2.4	2.1	..
Germany	1.1	1.6	1.5	2.2	6.1	4.6	6.7	2.9	1.7	1.8	1.9	..
Russian Federation	1.6	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	..
Turkey	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	..
Armenia	0.6	0.7	1.0	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.2	..
India	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	..
United States	0.7	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	..
Korea	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	..
Italy	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	..
France	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.1	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	..
Nigeria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	..
United Kingdom	0.8	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.4	0.8	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	..
Other countries	6.6	8.8	8.1	9.4	9.0	8.1	10.3	10.8	11.7	11.9	12.5	
Total	21.5	30.2	30.3	36.9	38.5	34.2	40.6	41.8	41.3	41.1	41.3	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>


Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

PORTUGAL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Brazil	26.6	14.7	6.7	14.4	9.5	6.1	5.0	3.5	2.9	3.4	6.3	..
Romania	7.8	3.2	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.2	5.3	8.1	6.0	4.6	..
Cape Verde	9.1	5.9	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.3	4.1	3.5	3.3	3.5	3.4	..
United Kingdom	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.8	3.9	2.7	2.2	1.8	1.7	..
Spain	1.4	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.5	..
Guinea-Bissau	5.1	2.6	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	..
Bulgaria	1.8	1.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.9	1.5	1.4	1.0	..
Sao Tome and Principe	2.6	1.6	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.1	0.9	..
China	3.9	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.9	..
Italy	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	..
Germany	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.3	1.6	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	..
India	2.9	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.8	..
Angola	7.6	4.7	2.1	1.1	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.7	..
Ukraine	45.5	17.5	4.1	1.9	1.6	1.5	2.0	1.3	0.9	0.4	0.7	..
France	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	..
Other countries	34.5	15.0	7.8	6.4	6.1	5.5	8.2	6.5	6.3	5.0	7.2	..
Total	151.4	72.0	31.8	34.1	28.1	22.5	32.6	32.3	33.8	30.0	33.0	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Uzbekistan	24.9	25.0	21.5	14.9	30.4	37.1	52.8	43.5	42.5	24.1	64.5	29
Ukraine	36.5	36.8	23.4	17.7	30.8	32.7	51.5	49.1	45.9	27.5	43.6	46
Kyrgyzstan	10.7	13.1	6.9	9.5	15.6	15.7	24.7	24.0	23.3	20.9	41.6	45
Kazakhstan	65.2	55.7	29.6	40.2	51.9	38.6	40.3	40.0	38.8	27.9	36.5	52
Tajikistan	6.7	6.0	5.3	3.3	4.7	6.5	17.3	20.7	27.0	18.2	35.1	23
Armenia	5.8	6.8	5.1	3.1	7.6	12.9	30.8	35.2	35.8	19.9	32.7	44
Azerbaijan	5.6	5.6	4.3	2.6	4.6	8.9	21.0	23.3	22.9	14.5	22.3	35
Moldova	7.6	7.6	6.4	4.8	6.6	8.6	14.1	15.5	16.4	11.8	19.6	46
Belarus	6.5	6.8	5.3	5.7	6.8	5.6	6.0	5.9	5.5	4.9	10.2	39
Georgia	9.7	7.1	5.5	4.9	5.5	6.8	10.6	8.8	7.5	5.2	7.3	45
China	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	1.7	1.2	0.8	1.4	7.1	32
Turkmenistan	4.4	4.5	6.3	3.7	4.1	4.1	4.8	4.0	3.3	2.3	4.5	48
Germany	1.6	2.0	2.7	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.2	3.1	2.6	2.6	4.5	47
Viet Nam	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.9	0.7	1.0	0.9	3.3	38
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.9	..
Other countries	7.8	7.2	6.4	5.4	5.1	5.2	7.2	6.6	6.5	9.5	21.8	..
Total	193.5	184.6	129.1	119.2	177.2	186.4	287.0	281.6	279.9	191.7	356.5	39


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Hungary	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	20
Czech Republic	0.6	1.6	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.2	0.9	46
Ukraine	0.7	0.7	0.6	1.0	1.2	1.8	1.6	1.3	0.7	44
Romania	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	3.0	2.3	0.8	0.9	0.6	37
Serbia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.1	0.7	0.4	30
China	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	46
Korea	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.4	43
Russian Federation	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.3	52
Poland	0.1	0.9	0.5	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.3	48
Viet Nam	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	1.3	0.9	0.5	0.3	38
Germany	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.3	29
Bulgaria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	14
Italy	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	19
United Kingdom	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	31
United States	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	34
Other countries	1.4	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.8	3.2	3.1	1.9	
Total	4.7	4.8	4.6	7.9	7.7	11.3	14.8	16.5	14.4	12.7	8.2	35

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
SLOVENIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13.8	17.9	5.3	3.7	4.5	40
Bulgaria	1.4	2.3	1.3	0.0	2.3	..
Croatia	2.2	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.9	28
Serbia	6.3	7.6	2.6	1.6	1.9	35
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2.7	5.0	2.2	1.0	1.2	54
Slovak Republic	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.6	48
Ukraine	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.4	73
Italy	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.4	46
Romania	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.3	34
Russian Federation	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	57
Spain	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	48
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	56
Hungary	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	41
Czech Republic	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.2	76
Poland	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	73
Other countries	1.7	6.2	9.1	2.6	3.2	
Total	30.5	43.8	24.1	11.2	18.0	38

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

SPAIN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Romania	23.3	48.3	55.0	103.6	108.3	131.5	197.6	71.5	52.4	62.6	60.9	52
Morocco	39.5	40.2	41.2	73.4	82.5	78.5	85.0	93.6	61.8	47.9	43.2	42
Pakistan	1.8	1.8	1.7	9.4	12.4	8.2	10.6	13.4	10.6	21.7	16.9	22
China	5.2	5.7	7.5	20.3	18.4	16.9	20.4	27.2	18.6	17.4	16.7	50
United Kingdom	16.0	25.3	31.8	48.4	44.7	42.5	38.2	25.0	19.2	17.3	16.6	47
Colombia	71.2	34.2	11.1	21.5	24.9	35.6	41.7	42.2	25.6	18.1	16.1	54
Italy	6.2	10.4	10.0	15.0	16.5	18.6	21.2	18.0	13.6	12.9	13.1	43
Bulgaria	11.8	15.9	13.7	21.0	18.4	21.7	31.3	13.1	9.7	10.4	11.9	49
Dominican Republic	5.4	5.5	6.6	10.3	12.2	14.7	18.1	17.8	10.8	8.3	11.7	55
Brazil	4.3	4.7	7.4	16.5	24.6	32.6	36.1	27.3	14.4	11.9	9.8	62
Paraguay	0.3	0.7	2.4	10.4	12.6	21.6	24.0	20.6	13.4	11.9	9.8	74
Peru	7.1	8.0	13.5	17.7	19.9	21.7	27.4	31.1	16.3	10.0	9.3	57
Germany	10.7	11.2	10.8	14.0	15.2	16.9	17.8	12.6	10.4	9.3	9.1	51
Ecuador	82.6	89.0	72.8	17.2	15.2	21.4	30.2	37.8	18.2	11.0	8.8	49
France	4.9	5.5	5.9	9.9	11.1	12.7	13.0	10.1	8.9	8.6	8.6	49
Other countries	103.6	136.9	138.1	237.3	245.6	307.8	307.9	231.0	165.4	151.8	153.8	
Total	394.0	443.1	429.5	645.8	682.7	803.0	920.5	692.2	469.3	431.3	416.3	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

SWEDEN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Iraq	6.5	7.4	5.4	2.8	2.9	10.9	15.2	12.1	8.5	4.5	4.5	50
Poland	0.8	1.1	1.0	2.5	3.4	6.3	7.5	7.0	5.2	4.4	4.4	46
Afghanistan	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.7	1.7	0.8	1.0	1.6	1.9	3.4	30
Denmark	2.5	3.2	3.6	3.8	4.0	5.1	5.1	4.1	3.8	3.4	3.2	42
Somalia	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.1	1.3	3.0	3.8	4.1	6.9	6.8	3.1	47
China	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.2	2.6	53
Thailand	0.9	1.2	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.5	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.5	80
Finland	3.4	3.3	3.2	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	56
Germany	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.9	3.6	3.4	2.8	2.2	2.2	50
Iran	1.3	1.4	1.0	1.5	1.1	2.0	1.4	1.8	2.4	2.8	2.2	51
Eritrea	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.6	2.1	51
Norway	3.0	3.5	3.2	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.9	2.1	2.0	48
Turkey	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.2	2.0	36
Romania	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	2.6	2.5	1.8	1.7	1.9	44
United Kingdom	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.8	34
Other countries	18.4	18.9	19.4	20.4	23.0	33.4	28.9	31.2	34.0	35.6	35.6	
Total	43.8	47.3	47.1	46.7	50.6	78.9	82.6	82.0	82.4	79.0	75.9	47


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
SWITZERLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Germany	14.6	15.5	14.9	18.1	20.4	24.8	41.1	46.4	33.9	30.7	30.5	42
Portugal	4.9	9.3	12.3	13.6	12.2	12.5	15.5	17.8	13.7	12.8	15.4	41
France	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.7	6.9	7.6	11.5	13.7	10.9	11.5	11.5	43
Italy	5.6	6.1	5.6	5.7	5.4	5.5	8.4	9.9	8.5	10.1	10.8	37
United Kingdom	3.9	3.1	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.4	5.1	5.6	4.8	5.5	5.4	42
Spain	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.6	2.1	2.4	2.5	3.3	4.6	45
United States	3.3	2.9	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.2	4.0	4.2	53
Poland	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.3	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.0	3.4	45
Austria	2.5	2.6	2.0	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.8	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.9	41
India	2.4	2.4	41
Eritrea	2.1	2.4	50
Brazil	2.5	2.2	69
China	1.9	2.1	59
Hungary	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.2	2.1	50
Russian Federation	1.9	2.0	64
Other countries	56.9	52.4	44.5	41.7	39.0	40.4	50.4	54.8	52.2	39.6	40.6	
Total	101.4	101.9	94.0	96.3	94.4	102.7	139.7	157.3	132.4	134.2	142.5	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
TURKEY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Azerbaijan	2.5
Afghanistan	2.2
Russian Federation	1.8
Germany	1.6
United States	1.5
Iran	1.5
Kazakhstan	1.4
Turkmenistan	1.2
Iraq	1.2
United Kingdom	1.1
Bulgaria	1.1
Kyrgyzstan	1.0
Ukraine	0.9
Syria	0.9
China	0.8
Other countries	9.1	..	
Total	29.9

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
UNITED KINGDOM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
India	16	21	30	51	47	57	55	48	64	68	61	..
China	18	29	31	32	22	23	21	18	22	28	45	..
Pakistan	10	7	10	21	16	31	27	17	17	30	43	..
Poland	2	16	49	60	88	55	32	34	33	..
Lithuania	0	13	17	..
France	16	9	21	10	14	11	17	..
United States	13	16	16	14	15	16	15	17	17	16	16	..
Australia	34	20	21	27	20	26	18	14	12	18	13	..
Germany	16	13	15	18	11	7	13	..
Italy	1	14	8	9	10	..
Ireland	0	11	14	10	..
Bangladesh	4	3	5	6	10	10	6	6	13	9	9	..
Canada	4	5	6	6	..	7	..	6	9	..
Nigeria	2	2	5	9	9	9	9	11	12	10	8	..
Romania	0	10	7	8	..
Other countries	125	177	182	248	217	201	201	231	187	179	141	..
Total	262	289	327	434	405	452	455	456	430	459	453	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>Table B.1. **Inflows of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
UNITED STATES (PERMANENT)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Mexico	205.6	218.8	115.6	175.4	161.4	173.8	148.6	190.0	164.9	139.1	143.4	..
China	56.3	61.1	40.6	55.5	70.0	87.3	76.7	80.3	64.2	70.9	87.0	..
India	70.0	70.8	50.2	70.2	84.7	61.4	65.4	63.4	57.3	69.2	69.0	..
Philippines	52.9	51.0	45.3	57.8	60.7	74.6	72.6	54.0	60.0	58.2	57.0	..
Dominican Republic	21.2	22.5	26.2	30.5	27.5	38.1	28.0	31.9	49.4	53.9	46.1	..
Cuba	27.5	28.2	9.3	20.5	36.3	45.6	29.1	49.5	39.0	33.6	36.5	..
Viet Nam	35.4	33.6	22.1	31.5	32.8	30.7	28.7	31.5	29.2	30.6	34.2	..
Korea	20.5	20.7	12.4	19.8	26.6	24.4	22.4	26.7	25.9	22.2	22.8	..
Colombia	16.6	18.8	14.7	18.8	25.6	43.2	33.2	30.2	27.8	22.4	22.6	..
Haiti	27.0	20.2	12.3	14.2	14.5	22.2	30.4	26.0	24.3	22.6	22.1	..
Iraq	5.0	5.2	2.5	3.5	4.1	4.3	3.8	4.8	12.1	19.9	21.1	..
Jamaica	15.3	14.8	13.3	14.4	18.3	25.0	19.4	18.5	21.8	19.8	19.7	..
El Salvador	31.1	31.1	28.2	29.8	21.4	31.8	21.1	19.7	19.9	18.8	18.7	..
Bangladesh	7.2	5.5	4.6	8.1	11.5	14.6	12.1	11.8	16.7	14.8	16.7	..
Pakistan	16.4	13.7	9.4	12.1	14.9	17.4	13.5	19.7	21.6	18.3	15.5	..
Other countries	450.9	443.4	296.9	395.8	512.1	571.9	447.5	449.3	496.7	428.5	429.6	..
Total	1 058.9	1 059.4	703.5	957.9	1 122.4	1 266.3	1 052.4	1 107.1	1 130.8	1 042.6	1 062.0	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824631>

Table A.2. **Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries**
Thousands

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Australia											
Permanent departures	23.4	24.1	24.9	29.9	31.6	33.6	35.2	37.8	39.8	43.7	44.4
Long-term departures	42.2	31.9	29.5	29.6	31.8	34.4	36.1
Austria	51.0	44.5	48.9	50.0	49.8	55.0	52.6	55.3	66.1	66.4	73.6
Belgium	31.4	31.0	33.9	37.7	38.5	39.4	38.5	44.9	49.1	50.8	56.6
Czech Republic	20.6	31.1	33.2	33.8	21.8	31.4	18.4	3.8	9.4	14.9	5.7
Denmark	14.8	14.9	15.8	15.8	16.3	17.3	19.0	23.3	26.6	27.1	26.6
Estonia	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6
Finland	2.2	2.8	2.3	4.2	2.6	2.7	3.1	4.5	4.0	3.1	3.3
Germany	497.0	505.6	499.1	547.0	483.6	483.8	475.8	563.1	578.8	529.6	538.8
Hungary	1.9	2.4	2.6	3.5	3.3	4.0	4.1	4.2	5.6	6.0	2.7
Ireland	20.7	33.4	36.1	52.8	40.3	38.6
Japan	232.8	248.4	259.4	278.5	292.0	218.8	214.9	234.2	262.0	242.6	230.9
Korea	107.2	114.0	152.3	148.8	266.7	183.0	163.6	215.7	236.4	196.1	217.7
Luxembourg	7.6	8.3	6.9	7.5	7.2	7.7	8.6	8.0	7.3	7.7	7.5
Netherlands	20.4	21.2	21.9	23.5	24.0	26.5	29.0	30.7	35.5	40.2	47.6
New Zealand	15.3	15.6	18.9	22.2	22.8	20.5	21.4	23.0	23.6	26.3	26.4
Norway	15.2	12.3	14.3	13.9	12.6	12.5	13.3	15.2	18.4	22.5	22.9
Portugal	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1
Slovak Republic	3.6	5.0	1.1	1.5	2.0	3.3	3.3	2.9	1.9
Slovenia	3.4	4.6	4.0	6.0	6.5	11.0	11.8	7.3	15.1	12.0	..
Spain	..	6.9	10.0	41.9	48.7	120.3	199.0	232.0	288.3	336.7	317.7
Sweden	12.7	14.1	15.1	16.0	15.8	20.0	20.4	19.2	18.3	22.1	23.7
Switzerland	52.7	49.7	46.3	47.9	49.7	53.0	56.2	54.1	55.2	65.5	64.0
United Kingdom	150.0	177.0	172.0	148.0	175.0	192.0	169.0	255.0	228.0	203.0	202.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the table.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824536>

Metadata related to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. **Migration flows**

	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Australia	<p><i>Permanent migrants:</i> Includes offshore migration (<i>Settler Arrivals</i>) and onshore migration (people granted permanent residence while in Australia on a temporary visa). Permanent migrants include holders of a permanent visa, a temporary (provisional) visa where there is a clear intention to settle, citizens of New Zealand indicating an intention to settle and persons otherwise eligible to settle.</p> <p><i>Temporary migrants:</i> Entries of temporary migrants, excluding students. Includes short and long-term temporary entrants, e.g. top managers, executives, specialists and technical workers, diplomats and other personnel of foreign governments, temporary business entry, working holiday makers and entertainers.</p> <p><i>Permanent departures:</i> Residents who on departure state that they do not intend to return to Australia.</p>	Data refer to the fiscal year (July to June of the year indicated).	Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
Austria	Foreigners holding a residence permit and who have actually stayed for at least 3 months.	Until 2001, data are from local population registers. Starting in 2002, they are from the central population register. The data for 2002-07 were revised to match with the results of the register-based census of 2006.	Population Registers, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 3 months. Outflows include administrative corrections.	Asylum seekers were formerly grouped under a single category. From 1st January 2008 on, they are classified like other migrants. This may explain some of the increase for certain nationalities between 2007 and 2008.	Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSIE).
Canada	<p><i>Permanent migrants:</i> Inflows of persons who have acquired permanent resident status (including onshore).</p> <p><i>Temporary migrants:</i> Inflows (first entries) of people who are lawfully in Canada on a temporary basis under the authority of a temporary resident permit. Temporary residents include foreign workers (including seasonal workers), foreign students, refugee claimants, people allowed to remain temporarily in Canada on humanitarian grounds and other individuals entering Canada on a temporary basis who are not under a work or student permit and who are not seeking protection.</p>	Table B.1 presents the inflow of persons who have acquired permanent resident status only. Country of origin refers to country of last permanent residence. Due to privacy considerations, the figures have been subjected to random rounding. Under this method, all figures in the table are randomly rounded either up or down to multiples of 5.	Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
Chile	Temporary residence permits granted.		Register of permits of residence granted, Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Czech Republic	Foreigners holding a permanent or a long-term residence permit or who were granted asylum in the given year.	In 2000, data include only holders of a permanent residence permit. From 2001 on, data also include refugees and long-term residence permit holders.	Register of Foreigners, Population Information System of the Ministry of the Interior and Czech Statistical Office.
Denmark	Foreigners who live legally in Denmark, are registered in the Central population register, and have been living in the country for at least one year. From 2006 on, Statistics Denmark started using a new calculation on the underlying demographic data. The data from 2006 on are therefore not comparable with previous years. Outflows include administrative corrections.	Excludes asylum seekers and all those with temporary residence permits.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Foreigners expecting to stay in the country for a period of at least 12 months.		Population Register and Police and Border, Guard Board (PBG), Statistics Estonia.

Metadata related to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. **Migration flows** (cont.)

	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Finland	Foreign nationals with a valid residence permit for longer than one year. Nordic citizens who are moving for less than 6 months are not included.	Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Excludes asylum seekers and persons with temporary residence permits.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	The "permanent" entries consist of the first statistical registration as a permanent migrant of people coming from abroad, regularised or who changed their status from a temporary one. Data include entries due to labour migration (employees, non employed holders of a "competence and talent" permit or a "scientific" permit), family migration (family reunification, members of families of French persons or refugees, families accompanying workers), refugees and other permit holders.	Excludes citizens from the European Economic Area.	French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII), Ministry of the Interior, French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA).
Germany	Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay at least one week in the country.	Includes asylum seekers living in private households. Excludes inflows of ethnic Germans. In 2008, local authorities started to purge registers of inactive records. As a result, higher emigration figures were reported from this year.	Central Population Register, Federal Statistical Office.
Greece	Initial issuance of residence permit.	Does not refer to physical inflows but to flows into legal status.	Ministry of Interior Affairs.
Hungary	<i>Immigrant</i> : Foreign citizens who entered Hungary in the given year and obtained a residence permit. <i>Emigrant</i> : Foreign citizens having a residence or a settlement document and who left Hungary in the given year without the intention to return, or whose permission's validity has expired and did not apply for a new one or whose permission was invalidated by authority due to withdrawal.		Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Foreigners expecting to stay in the country for a period of at least 12 months.		Register of Migration Data, Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Figures are derived from the quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) series. All figures are based on year ending April. <i>Inflows</i> : The estimates relate to those persons resident in the country at the time of the survey and who were living abroad one year before (Table A.1). <i>Outflows</i> : Persons resident in the country at a point in the previous twelve month period who are now living abroad (Table A.2). Data for years 2007-10 have been revised in line with revisions to the Population and Migration estimates published September 2012.		Central Statistics Office.
Israel	Data refer to permanent immigrants by last country of residence.	The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy	Foreigners holding a residence, work or student permit.	Excludes seasonal workers.	Population Register, ISTAT.
Japan	Foreigners holding a valid visa and intending to remain in the country for more than 90 days.	Excludes temporary visitors and re-entries.	Register of Foreigners, Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.
Korea	Data refer to long-term inflows/outflows (more than 90 days).		Ministry of Justice.
Luxembourg	Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 3 months.		Central Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).

Metadata related to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. **Migration flows** (cont.)

	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Mexico	Number of foreigners who are issued an immigrant permit for the first time ("inmigrante" FM2).		National Migration Institute (INM).
Netherlands	Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least four of the next six months. Total outflows (Table A.2) include the "net administrative corrections", i.e. unreported emigration of foreigners.	Inflows exclude asylum seekers who are staying in reception centres.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
New Zealand	<i>Inflows</i> : Residence approvals. <i>Outflows</i> : Permanent and long term departures (foreign-born persons departing permanently or intending to be away for a period of 12 months or more).		Immigration Service, Department of Labour, and New Zealand Statistics.
Norway	Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 6 months.	Asylum seekers are registered as immigrants only after having settled in a Norwegian municipality following a positive outcome of their application. An asylum seeker whose application has been rejected will not be registered as an "immigrant", even if the application process has taken a long time and the return to the home country is delayed for a significant period.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland	Number of permanent and "fixed-term" residence permits issued. Since 26 August 2006, nationals of European Union member states and their family members are no longer issued residence permits in Poland. However, they still need to register their stay in Poland, provided that they are planning to stay in Poland for more than three months.	2007 data include registrations of nationals of European Union member states for the period August 2006 to December 2007.	Office for Foreigners.
Portugal	Data based on residence permits. 2001 to 2004 figures include foreigners that entered the country with Long Term Visas (Temporary Stay, Study and Work) issued in each year and also foreigners with Stay Permits yearly delivered under the 2001 programme of regularisation (126 901 in 2001, 47 657 in 2002, 9 097 in 2003 and 178 in 2004). In 2005, inflows include residence permits and long term visas issued over the year. Since 2006, figures include long term visas for non-EU25 citizens and new residence titles attributed to EU25 citizens (who do not need a visa). In 2011, inflows exclude foreigners who have regularised their situation under Article 88.2 of the foreigner law (<i>continuous regularisation</i>).		Immigration and Border Control Office (SEF), National Statistical Institute (INE) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Russian Federation	<i>Inflows</i> : Temporary and permanent residence permits issued. <i>Outflows</i> : Holders of a temporary or a permanent residence permit.		Federal Migration Service, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovak Republic	Until 2002, first long term and permanent residence permits. From 2003 on, data include permanent, temporary, and tolerated residents.		Register of Foreigners, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
Slovenia	<i>Inflows</i> : Number of first temporary residence permits. <i>Outflows</i> : Temporary and permanent migrants declaring moving abroad.		Central Population Register, Ministry of the Interior, and National Statistical Office.
Spain	Data include information regarding registrations and cancellations due to changes of residence registered in the Municipal Registers for all foreigners, by nationality, independently of their legal status.	From 2004 on, the Residential Variation Statistics (RVS) also include registrations by omission and cancellations for undue registration of foreign nationals. Cancellations by expiration are included from 2006 on.	RVS derived from Municipal Population Registers (<i>Padron municipal de habitantes</i>), National Statistical Institute (INE).

Metadata related to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. **Migration flows** (cont.)

	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Sweden	Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least one year.	Excludes asylum seekers and temporary workers.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit. Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months.		Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
Turkey	Residence permits issued for the first time to foreigners intending to stay 12 months or more in the country.		General Directorate of Security, Ministry of the Interior.
United Kingdom	<i>Inflows:</i> Non-British citizens admitted to the United Kingdom. Data in Table A.1 are adjusted to include short term migrants (including asylum seekers) who actually stayed longer than one year. Data by nationality in Table B.1 on inflows are not adjusted. Statistics whose coefficient of variation exceeds 30% are not shown separately but grouped under "Other countries". <i>Outflows:</i> Non-British citizens leaving the territory of the United Kingdom.		International Passenger Survey, Office for National Statistics.
United States	<i>Permanent migrants:</i> Issues of permanent residence permits. <i>Temporary migrants:</i> Data refer to non-immigrant visas issued, excluding visitors and transit passengers (B and C visas) and crewmembers (D visas). Includes family members.	Includes persons already present in the United States who changed status. Data cover the fiscal year (October to September of the year indicated).	US Department of Homeland Security and Bureau of Consular Affairs, the United States Department of State.

Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro.

Inflows of asylum seekers

The statistics on asylum seekers published in this annex are based on data provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Since 1950, the UNHCR, which has a mission of conducting and co-ordinating international initiatives on behalf of refugees, has regularly produced complete statistics on refugees and asylum seekers in OECD countries and other countries of the world (www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html).

These statistics are most often derived from administrative sources, but there are differences depending on the nature of the data provided. In some countries, asylum seekers are enumerated when the application is accepted. Consequently, they are shown in the statistics at that time rather than at the date when they arrived in the country. Acceptance of the application means that the administrative authorities will review the applicants' claims and grant them certain rights during this review procedure. In other countries, the data do not include the applicants' family members, who are admitted under different provisions (France), while other countries count the entire family (Switzerland).

The figures presented in the summary table (Table A.3) generally concern initial applications (primary processing stage) and sometimes differ significantly from the totals presented in Table B.3, which give data by country of origin. This is because the data received by the UNHCR by country of origin combine both initial applications and appeals, and it is sometimes difficult to separate these two categories retrospectively. The reference for total asylum applications remains the figures shown in summary Table A.3.

Table A.3. Inflows of asylum seekers into OECD countries and the Russian Federation

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012 ¹
Australia	12 366	5 863	4 295	3 201	3 204	3 515	3 980	4 771	6 206	8 246	11 505	15 790
Austria	30 135	39 354	32 359	24 634	22 461	13 349	11 921	12 841	15 821	11 012	14 416	17 420
Belgium	24 549	18 805	16 940	15 357	15 957	11 587	11 115	12 252	17 186	21 755	26 003	18 520
Canada	44 038	39 498	31 937	25 750	20 786	22 873	28 342	34 800	33 970	22 543	24 985	20 500
Chile	81	43	87	203	380	573	756	872	644	260	305	..
Czech Republic	18 094	8 484	11 396	5 459	4 160	3 016	1 878	1 711	1 355	979	756	520
Denmark	12 512	6 068	4 593	3 235	2 260	1 918	1 852	2 360	3 819	4 965	3 811	6 140
Estonia	12	9	14	14	11	7	14	14	36	30	67	80
Finland	1 651	3 443	3 221	3 861	3 574	2 331	1 434	4 016	5 910	4 018	3 086	2 920
France	54 291	58 971	59 768	58 545	49 733	30 748	29 387	35 404	42 118	48 074	52 147	54 940
Germany	88 287	71 127	50 563	35 607	28 914	21 029	19 164	22 085	27 649	41 332	45 741	64 540
Greece	5 499	5 664	8 178	4 469	9 050	12 267	25 113	19 884	15 928	10 273	9 311	9 580
Hungary	9 554	6 412	2 401	1 600	1 609	2 117	3 425	3 118	4 672	2 104	1 693	2 160
Iceland	52	117	80	76	88	39	42	77	35	51	76	120
Ireland	10 325	11 634	7 900	4 769	4 324	4 314	3 988	3 866	2 689	3 405	2 310	940
Israel	456	355	..	922	909	1 348	5 382	7 738	809	1 448	5 745	..
Italy	9 620	16 015	13 455	9 722	9 548	10 348	14 053	30 324	17 603	10 052	34 117	15 710
Japan	353	250	336	426	384	954	816	1 599	1 388	1 203	1 867	2 540
Korea	39	37	86	145	412	278	717	364	324	425	1 011	1 140
Luxembourg	687	1 043	1 549	1 577	802	523	426	463	477	744	2 076	2 050
Mexico	415	257	275	404	687	480	374	317	680	1 039	753	..
Netherlands	32 579	18 667	13 402	9 782	12 347	14 465	7 102	13 399	14 905	13 333	11 590	8 850
New Zealand	1 601	997	841	580	348	276	245	254	336	340	305	320
Norway	14 782	17 480	15 959	7 945	5 402	5 320	6 528	14 431	17 226	10 064	9 053	9 790
Poland	4 529	5 170	6 909	8 079	6 860	4 430	7 205	7 203	10 587	6 534	5 086	9 180
Portugal	234	245	88	113	114	128	224	161	139	160	275	300
Russian Federation	1 684	876	737	910	960	1 170	3 369	5 418	5 701	3 889	2 292	..
Slovak Republic	8 151	9 743	10 358	11 395	3 549	2 871	2 643	910	822	541	491	550
Slovenia	1 511	702	1 100	1 173	1 596	518	425	238	183	246	373	260
Spain	9 489	6 309	5 918	5 535	5 254	5 297	7 662	4 517	3 007	2 744	3 414	2 580
Sweden	23 515	33 016	31 348	23 161	17 530	24 322	36 370	24 353	24 194	31 823	29 648	43 890
Switzerland	20 633	26 125	20 806	14 248	10 061	10 537	10 387	16 606	16 005	13 521	19 439	25 950
Turkey	5 041	3 795	3 952	3 908	3 921	4 553	7 646	12 981	7 834	9 226	16 021	16 730
United Kingdom	91 600	103 080	60 050	40 625	30 840	28 320	28 300	31 315	30 675	22 645	25 455	27 410
United States	59 432	58 439	43 338	44 972	39 240	41 101	40 449	39 362	38 080	42 971	60 587	68 000
OECD	596 113	577 217	463 502	371 492	316 315	285 752	319 365	364 606	363 312	348 106	423 518	449 420

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.3.

1. Preliminary data.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824555>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
AUSTRALIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Iran	559	57	75	71	101	77	84	161	312	458	2 152
Afghanistan	2 161	53	54	116	32	21	20	52	940	1 265	1 720
China	1 176	1 083	800	822	966	1 033	1 207	1 232	1 192	1 187	1 189
Pakistan	132	86	63	61	103	90	145	220	260	428	817
India	650	549	604	242	173	316	349	373	213	409	769
Iraq	1 784	148	142	66	80	188	216	199	298	373	490
Egypt	59	50	61	72	65	48	41	96	134	123	415
Sri Lanka	397	219	166	125	317	324	445	422	555	589	370
Fiji	799	369	165	84	52	34	70	81	262	375	277
Nepal	92	73	57	40	73	36	48	33	45	161	271
Libya	3	5	4	1	1	1	7	12	200
Malaysia	261	232	184	210	170	109	145	238	231	249	182
Zimbabwe	36	44	37	27	22	43	94	215	351	288	175
Indonesia	897	619	230	164	166	296	183	238	192	179	174
Lebanon	191	108	90	57	56	65	75	91	115	200	158
Other countries	3 169	2 168	1 563	1 043	827	835	858	1 119	1 099	1 950	2 146
Total	12 366	5 863	4 295	3 201	3 204	3 515	3 980	4 771	6 206	8 246	11 505

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
AUSTRIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	12 955	6 651	2 357	757	923	699	761	1 382	2 237	1 582	3 609
Russian Federation	366	2 221	6 709	6 172	4 355	2 441	2 676	3 435	3 559	2 322	2 314
Pakistan	486	359	508	575	498	110	103	106	183	276	949
Somalia	326	221	191	45	89	183	467	411	344	190	610
Serbia	1 637	4 723	2 526	2 835	4 403	2 522	1 774	1 715	2 041	975	547
Iraq	2 118	4 466	1 446	232	221	380	472	490	399	336	484
India	1 802	3 366	2 822	1 839	1 530	479	385	355	427	433	476
Iran	734	760	979	343	306	274	248	250	340	387	457
Algeria	121	239	221	234	185	138	109	173	248	304	447
Syria	137	134	153	131	77	88	166	140	279	194	422
Nigeria	1 047	1 432	1 849	1 828	880	421	394	535	837	573	414
Turkey	1 868	3 561	2 854	1 114	1 064	668	659	417	554	369	414
Morocco	10	25	32	29	32	77	55	140	90	137	313
Georgia	597	1 921	1 525	1 731	954	564	400	511	975	370	261
China	154	779	661	663	492	212	223	236	398	217	238
Other countries	5 777	8 496	7 526	6 106	6 452	4 093	3 029	2 545	2 910	2 347	2 461
Total	30 135	39 354	32 359	24 634	22 461	13 349	11 921	12 841	15 821	11 012	14 416

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

BELGIUM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Serbia	1 932	1 523	1 280	1 294	1 203	778	1 223	1 057	2 065	4 556	3 106
Afghanistan	504	326	329	287	253	365	696	879	1 659	1 124	2 774
Guinea	494	515	354	565	643	413	526	661	1 052	1 455	2 046
Iraq	368	461	282	388	903	695	825	1 070	1 386	1 637	2 005
Russian Federation	2 424	1 156	1 680	1 361	1 438	1 582	1 436	1 620	1 605	1 886	1 747
Albania	763	539	340	255	167	125	193	172	256	208	1 152
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	667	337	194	175	97	85	59	122	201	1 631	1 117
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 371	1 789	1 778	1 471	1 272	843	716	579	670	813	1 080
Pakistan	237	177	341	308	222	160	150	150	233	325	924
Armenia	571	340	316	477	706	381	339	461	1 099	1 266	556
Syria	230	199	210	182	228	167	199	281	347	374	494
Bangladesh	72	45	58	39	84	46	61	79	75	178	493
Bosnia and Herzegovina	565	226	134	109	114	111	63	71	90	120	488
Somalia	179	125	128	139	113	124	168	163	216	262	454
Cameroon	324	435	625	506	530	335	279	367	302	289	451
Other countries	13 848	10 612	8 891	7 801	7 984	5 377	4 181	4 520	5 930	5 631	7 116
Total	24 549	18 805	16 940	15 357	15 957	11 587	11 114	12 252	17 186	21 755	26 003

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

CANADA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Hungary	3 895	1 180	132	162	58	48	24	288	2 440	2 300	4 423
China	2 413	2 862	1 848	1 982	1 821	1 645	1 456	1 711	1 592	1 650	1 922
Colombia	1 831	2 718	2 131	3 664	1 487	1 361	2 632	3 132	2 299	1 384	904
Pakistan	3 192	3 884	4 257	1 006	746	652	361	403	437	526	882
Namibia	12	8	9	17	9	9	12	12	29	306	859
Mexico	1 669	2 397	2 560	2 918	3 541	4 948	7 028	8 069	9 296	1 299	763
Nigeria	790	828	637	589	591	685	759	766	760	846	696
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	178	459	402	322	418	375	355	498	651	710	682
Sri Lanka	3 001	1 801	1 270	1 141	934	907	808	1 008	824	1 200	635
India	1 300	1 313	1 125	1 083	844	764	554	561	502	532	632
Saint Lucia	67	249	294	167	218	165	131	252	366	486	599
Haiti	237	256	195	175	378	759	3 741	4 936	1 597	1 062	523
Croatia	17	18	16	14	19	11	17	13	54	199	473
El Salvador	561	305	190	194	180	244	289	587	528	511	460
Somalia	799	388	348	408	285	206	231	505	508	425	416
Other countries	24 076	20 832	16 523	11 908	9 257	10 089	9 467	12 059	12 087	9 107	10 116
Total	44 038	39 498	31 937	25 750	20 786	22 868	27 865	34 800	33 970	22 543	24 985

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
CHILE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Colombia	33	27	56	182	347	540	713	816	601	220	267
Cuba	4	3	1	7	1	..	4	2	2	14	9
Ecuador	1	4	14	4	19	4	1	4
Bolivia	1	2	3	4
El Salvador	3
Costa Rica	1	1	3	2	..	2	..	3
Haiti	2	1	1	3	9	17	6	1	2
Argentina	1	1	1	1	..	2
Nigeria	2	..	2	2	..	1	1	2
Russian Federation	3	1	2
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3	1	9	3	3	3	..	2	2
Venezuela	1	2	3	..	2
Morocco	1
Peru	3	..	3	2	6	6	3	8	6	5	1
Iraq	4	..	1	2	1	1
Other countries	29	12	21	5	9	3	14	6	17	12	
Total	81	43	87	203	380	573	756	872	644	260	305

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
CZECH REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Ukraine	4 419	1 676	2 044	1 600	1 020	571	293	323	220	141	152
Belarus	438	312	281	226	244	174	130	81	60	67	71
Russian Federation	642	629	4 853	1 498	278	171	99	85	66	62	47
Viet Nam	1 525	891	566	385	217	124	100	109	65	49	46
Mongolia	134	79	81	123	119	95	160	193	161	106	41
Turkey	58	31	11	31	33	66	213	253	69	68	32
Kyrgyzstan	50	59	80	138	35	85	63	36	26	36	32
Uzbekistan	34	84	75	30	41	25	25	17	19	16	26
Afghanistan	356	27	50	15	7	1	20	36	4	10	26
Myanmar	1	3	26	23	42	23
Syria	25	13	6	4	22	20	31	36	54	17	23
Cuba	8	5	7	20	94	19	12	18	20
Nigeria	40	34	37	50	83	96	69	39	43	..	18
Kazakhstan	133	66	47	44	34	236	30	80	192	57	18
Georgia	1 290	678	319	201	54	43	45	39	33	9	17
Other countries	8 941	3 899	2 939	1 114	1 973	1 289	504	339	308	281	164
Total	18 094	8 483	11 396	5 459	4 160	3 016	1 879	1 711	1 355	979	756

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
DENMARK

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	3 749	1 186	664	285	173	122	138	418	1 049	1 476	903
Iran	263	178	158	140	123	89	106	196	334	597	461
Syria	62	31	56	56	46	55	71	105	380	821	428
Serbia	567	1 030	750	784	375	272	95	121	273	407	326
Russian Federation	123	198	269	163	119	61	114	183	335	340	304
Iraq	2 099	1 045	442	217	264	507	695	543	305	237	115
Somalia	566	391	370	154	80	57	35	58	177	110	107
Algeria	19	97	62	50	45	15	16	38	46	46	103
West Bank and Gaza Strip	184	167	153	148	..	68	53	91	..	106	68
Libya	6	28	14	16	19	11	4	6	18	12	67
Pakistan	118	63	36	81	40	31	17	14	49	26	57
Tunisia	6	11	7	11	4	2	5	11	9	9	56
Nigeria	25	62	61	89	55	52	22	29	53	24	52
Morocco	2	20	18	17	14	14	7	19	31	29	45
Myanmar	1	5	3	1	7	2	5	9	18	41	41
Other countries	2 479	1 556	1 530	1 023	896	560	469	519	742	684	678
Total	10 269	6 068	4 593	3 235	2 260	1 918	1 852	2 360	3 819	4 965	3 811

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
ESTONIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2	..	11
Afghanistan	1	9	7	8
Armenia	2	1	1	7
Georgia	1	..	4	1	2	6	..	6
Russian Federation	..	1	4	..	4	4	3	3	5	7	4
Belarus	7	4	..	1	4
Somalia	3
Libya	3
Cameroon	1	3
Uzbekistan	3	1	3
Iraq	1	..	1	..	3	1	2	..	2
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2
Ukraine	..	1	1	1	2
Turkey	..	5	..	7	2	1	..	1	..	1	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Other countries	4	2	4	5	2	1	4	2	11	13	7
Total	12	9	14	14	11	7	14	14	36	30	67

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
FINLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Iraq	103	115	150	123	289	225	327	1 253	1 183	575	588
Somalia	18	54	91	253	321	92	82	1 176	1 169	571	365
Russian Federation	289	272	288	215	233	176	172	208	599	436	294
Afghanistan	25	27	51	166	237	97	96	249	445	265	292
Serbia	98	223	519	792	413	282	151	181	336	327	168
Iran	56	41	47	99	79	91	79	143	159	142	125
Syria	8	6	39	15	11	17	8	24	36	41	109
Nigeria	8	28	77	92	73	64	41	76	130	84	105
Belarus	55	39	46	58	57	97	48	68	94	66	83
Turkey	94	197	185	140	97	41	73	65	140	117	74
Georgia	7	11	26	93	64	35	6	13	22	61	70
Algeria	38	38	38	31	33	25	24	27	48	47	55
Bulgaria	..	287	287	238	570	463	13	82	722	485	48
Democratic Republic of the Congo	23	53	38	48	37	38	36	31	56	47	39
Angola	30	39	45	38	38	33	31	21	43	41	36
Other countries	799	2 013	1 294	1 460	1 022	548	318	399	728	713	635
Total	1 651	3 443	3 221	3 861	3 574	2 324	1 505	4 016	5 910	4 018	3 086

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
FRANCE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Russian Federation	1 783	1 741	3 347	3 331	3 080	2 313	3 265	3 595	3 392	4 334	4 062
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3 781	5 260	5 093	3 848	3 022	2 283	2 154	2 543	2 800	3 426	3 845
Serbia	1 591	1 629	2 704	3 812	3 997	3 047	3 122	3 257	5 313	5 843	3 664
Armenia	544	963	1 106	1 292	1 642	1 684	1 929	2 075	3 112	1 775	3 639
Bangladesh	825	668	956	959	860	607	960	1 249	1 441	3 145	3 572
Sri Lanka	2 000	1 992	2 129	2 246	2 071	2 145	2 159	2 322	3 129	2 864	3 222
China	2 948	2 869	5 330	4 196	2 590	1 214	1 286	821	1 602	1 937	2 187
Guinea	745	753	808	1 020	1 147	859	981	1 270	1 671	2 034	2 033
Haiti	2 713	1 904	1 488	3 133	5 060	1 844	677	930	1 458	2 008	2 016
Turkey	5 347	6 582	7 192	4 741	3 867	2 758	2 234	2 198	2 047	1 415	1 737
Côte d'Ivoire	727	600	1 420	1 106	1 147	859	632	632	510	536	1 671
Georgia	1 067	1 554	1 726	1 563	788	282	176	379	471	1 355	1 645
Pakistan	600	438	756	1 046	572	393	343	325	634	893	1 433
Comoros	445	60	44	53	193	62	63	1 105	387	753	1 381
Mauritania	2 332	2 998	2 380	1 540	1 067	548	432	719	1 214	984	1 157
Other countries	19 843	21 076	23 289	24 659	18 630	9 850	8 974	11 984	12 937	14 772	14 883
Total	47 291	51 087	59 768	58 545	49 733	30 748	29 387	35 404	42 118	48 074	52 147

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
GERMANY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	5 837	2 772	1 473	918	711	531	338	657	3 375	5 905	7 767
Serbia	7 758	6 679	4 909	3 855	5 522	3 237	2 057	1 645	2 038	6 651	6 053
Iraq	17 167	10 242	3 850	1 293	1 983	2 117	4 327	6 836	6 538	5 555	5 831
Iran	3 455	2 642	2 049	1 369	929	611	631	815	1 170	2 475	3 352
Syria	2 232	1 829	1 192	768	933	609	634	775	819	1 490	2 634
Pakistan	1 180	1 084	1 122	1 062	551	464	301	320	481	840	2 539
Russian Federation	4 523	4 058	3 383	2 757	1 719	1 040	772	792	936	1 199	1 689
Turkey	10 869	9 575	6 301	4 148	2 958	1 949	1 437	1 408	1 429	1 340	1 578
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1 163	505	320	198	193	132	89	82	109	2 466	1 131
Somalia	262	203	257	240	163	146	121	165	346	2 235	984
India	2 651	2 246	1 736	1 118	557	512	413	485	681	810	822
Nigeria	526	987	1 051	1 130	608	481	503	561	791	716	759
Viet Nam	3 721	2 340	2 096	1 668	1 222	990	987	1 042	1 115	1 009	758
Azerbaijan	1 645	1 689	1 291	1 363	848	483	274	360	652	469	646
Eritrea	299	378	556	456	367	281	335	262	346	642	632
Other countries	24 999	23 898	18 977	13 264	9 650	7 446	5 945	5 880	6 823	7 530	8 566
Total	88 287	71 127	50 563	35 607	28 914	21 029	19 164	22 085	27 649	41 332	45 741

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
GREECE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Pakistan	252	250	681	247	1 154	2 378	9 144	6 914	3 716	2 748	2 309
Georgia	..	8	48	323	1 897	428	1 559	2 241	2 170	1 162	1 121
Afghanistan	1 459	1 238	561	382	458	1 087	1 556	2 287	1 510	524	637
Bangladesh	33	34	233	208	550	3 750	2 965	1 778	1 809	987	615
China	2	70	140	52	251	97	36	55	391	549	406
Senegal	..	5	3	1	7	66	219	386	336	381	375
Nigeria	33	184	444	325	406	391	390	746	780	393	362
Syria	15	13	19	44	57	143	1 311	808	965	167	352
Egypt	2	3	22	83	104	27	75	95	145	104	306
Albania	10	9	12	23	21	20	51	202	517	693	276
Ghana	17	3	19	16	41	85	71	104	154	291	271
Iraq	1 972	2 567	2 831	936	971	1 415	5 474	1 760	886	342	257
Iran	212	411	608	228	203	528	354	312	303	125	247
India	41	84	105	42	166	162	261	227	156	381	179
Morocco	148	10	4	8	11	7	9	18	156	57	161
Other countries	1 303	775	2 448	1 551	2 753	1 683	1 638	1 951	1 934	1 369	1 437
Total	5 499	5 664	8 178	4 469	9 050	12 267	25 113	19 884	15 928	10 273	9 311

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
HUNGARY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	4 311	2 348	469	38	22	13	35	116	1 194	702	649
Serbia	214	97	112	180	243	384	911	1 604	2 325	447	239
Pakistan	157	40	53	54	40	18	15	246	41	41	121
Syria	17	20	11	10	18	32	48	16	19	23	91
Somalia	298	213	113	18	7	42	99	185	75	51	61
Algeria	76	34	79	57	19	22	48	19	11	35	56
Iraq	1 014	2 008	348	36	18	68	136	125	57	48	54
West Bank and Gaza Strip	104	29	35	63	24	37	52	41	23	225	36
Iran	144	160	170	46	25	20	14	10	87	62	33
Tunisia	7	6	4	4	5	1	..	5	5	10	30
Morocco	9	..	1	2	2	4	5	4	5	14	30
Turkey	116	124	125	125	65	43	56	70	114	59	25
Nigeria	111	125	74	73	89	109	86	56	66	37	22
Georgia	29	91	205	288	114	175	131	165	116	68	21
Egypt	24	4	22	3	13	20	41	50	19	14	20
Other countries	2 923	1 113	580	603	905	1 129	1 747	406	515	268	205
Total	9 554	6 412	2 401	1 600	1 609	2 117	3 424	3 118	4 672	2 104	1 693

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
ICELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Russian Federation	2	16	3	3	9	6	5	3	7
Nigeria	1	3	1	7	2	1	1	5	2	2	7
Algeria	5	3	..	2	3	1	1	..	1	..	6
Iraq	..	2	3	6	..	1	1	4	2	5	5
Belarus	1	3	4	3	..	4	3	4
India	2	4
Ethiopia	..	2	..	2	2	1	1	4
Georgia	2	6	1	..	3	2	..	4	..	1	4
Afghanistan	1	..	3	2	6	2	1	5	2	7	3
Iran	7	..	1	2	4	2	1	3	7	6	3
Somalia	2	2	5	2
Colombia	2
Eritrea	1	..	1	2	2	1	2
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	5	1	1	4	2
Serbia	6	1	1	6	2	2	1	15	2
Other countries	22	80	61	43	56	18	28	32	16	19	19
Total	52	117	80	76	88	39	42	77	35	51	76

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

IRELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Nigeria	3 461	4 050	3 110	1 776	1 278	1 038	1 028	1 009	569	630	340
Pakistan	127	120	62	55	68	167	185	237	257	347	295
China	25	85	168	152	96	139	259	180	194	244	179
Democratic Republic of the Congo	281	270	256	140	138	109	149	173	102	148	136
Afghanistan	27	7	24	106	142	88	78	79	68	92	127
Zimbabwe	102	357	88	69	51	77	87	114	91	126	107
Algeria	174	106	68	66	32	49	47	65	71	70	79
South Africa	203	183	114	45	33	38	39	75	54	71	73
Somalia	70	77	183	198	367	161	144	141	84	112	63
Ghana	148	293	180	64	67	88	82	104	82	118	59
Albania	118	165	142	99	58	35	71	51	47	49	54
Cameroon	144	187	125	62	57	78	44	67	50	101	51
Bangladesh	..	16	6	7	20	5	24	47	30	97	45
Moldova	549	536	244	100	100	110	133	141	86	82	44
Georgia	97	103	133	130	151	171	174	181	88	98	44
Other countries	4 797	5 076	2 997	1 696	1 667	1 962	1 441	1 202	816	1 020	614
Total	10 323	11 631	7 900	4 765	4 325	4 315	3 985	3 866	2 689	3 405	2 310

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

ISRAEL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Nigeria	6	14	..	100	160	448	567	418	198	168	209
Côte d'Ivoire	3	50	..	74	43	91	751	507	20	289	173
Ghana	3	2	..	34	25	74	192	233	113	189	148
Ethiopia	201	140	..	316	56	13	45	495	16	148	94
Eritrea	57	19	..	31	4	20	1 766	3 067	..	2	75
Sudan	2	2	..	14	102	164	1 402	2 142	..	4	37
Colombia	17	3	..	28	23	31	67	92	40	75	36
Myanmar	1	25	12	14	20	8	11
Chad	..	1	1	5	19	1	17	7
Somalia	..	1	2	1	8	13	1	4	7
Egypt	3	2	..	1	3	8	1	..	1	..	5
Guinea	1	1	..	7	181	151	23	24	10	35	4
Rwanda	2	1	..	1	..	1	7	1	3
Democratic Republic of the Congo	22	38	..	19	17	7	3	68	..	10	3
Togo	1	1	..	21	10	8	22	13	..	15	2
Other countries	137	80	..	251	271	316	503	638	409	492	4 931
Total	456	355	..	922	909	1 348	5 382	7 738	809	1 448	5 745

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
ITALY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Nigeria	388	594	722	930	536	830	1 336	5 673	3 991	1 385	6 208
Tunisia	25	7	53	48	14	278	222	139	4 558
Ghana	15	33	505	62	407	530	673	1 815	991	278	3 128
Mali	1	..	97	268	419	215	67	2 582
Pakistan	113	1 256	787	267	411	203	176	1 143	1 362	929	2 058
Côte d'Ivoire	14	93	348	183	586	508	982	1 653	643	235	1 938
Bangladesh	174	374	297	342	407	283	315	1 684	1 338	222	1 595
Afghanistan	299	137	70	84	76	177	663	1 732	711	873	1 289
Somalia	145	601	1 743	186	117	99	757	4 864	1 604	84	1 205
Senegal	20	26	13	16	67	131	156	162	775
Burkina Faso	1	3	15	32	192	646	256	86	737
Sudan	97	867	641	486	637	308	383	493	90	38	712
Turkey	1 690	730	466	323	168	175	394	501	541	854	612
Niger	9	14	63	100	71	154	49	12	563
Chad	2	3	7	13	10	52	11	3	527
Other countries	6 628	11 330	7 876	6 805	6 052	6 929	7 752	9 086	5 423	4 685	5 630
Total	9 620	16 015	13 455	9 722	9 548	10 348	14 053	30 324	17 603	10 052	34 117

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
JAPAN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Myanmar	23	38	111	138	212	626	500	979	568	342	491
Nepal	1	3	5	11	4	20	29	109	251
Turkey	123	52	77	131	40	149	76	156	94	126	234
Sri Lanka	3	9	4	9	7	27	43	90	234	171	224
Pakistan	47	26	12	12	10	12	27	37	92	83	169
Bangladesh	10	12	6	33	29	15	14	33	51	33	98
India	9	9	12	7	..	2	2	17	59	91	51
Nigeria	..	12	2	2	2	10	6	10	17	33	51
Cameroon	..	15	8	11	1	5	12	29	11	20	48
Iran	20	19	25	18	16	27	19	38	40	35	48
Uganda	1	1	1	2	4	16	46	21	30
China	10	22	22	16	16	13	17	18	18	17	20
Philippines	6	2	5	..	1	4	10	9	15
Ghana	1	1	1	4	3	13	15
Ethiopia	1	2	2	2	3	14	29	51	15	18	11
Other countries	107	34	46	40	37	41	61	97	101	82	111
Total	353	250	336	426	384	954	816	1 599	1 388	1 203	1 867

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

KOREA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Pakistan	6	2	9	..	1	5	4	47	95	129	434
Sri Lanka	8	27	67	71	26	4	100
Uganda	1	9	46	20	50	21	15	12	78
Myanmar	21	46	50	12	23	33	32	34	64
Afghanistan	2	1	1	1	1	..	1	..	8	15	60
Nigeria	26	16	100	27	16	19	39
Bangladesh	1	11	6	1	9	8	23	30	41	41	38
Côte d'Ivoire	1	..	2	1	45	11	8	6	4	4	36
Kyrgyzstan	3	77	28
Liberia	1	2	4	8	11	6	15	15	1	4	20
India	2	..	1	..	2	6	15
Nepal	1	2	8	78	275	12	2	5	14
Kenya	1	3	7	3	4	2	5	9
Guinea	1	1	2	8
China	3	11	10	64	145	28	29	30	19	7	8
Other countries	25	10	31	12	56	57	118	68	60	61	60
Total	39	37	86	145	412	278	717	364	324	425	1 011

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

LUXEMBOURG

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Serbia	206	495	541	361	219	207	240	233	155	302	1 164
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	68	44	23	13	..	3	5	7	6	13	452
Russian Federation	66	68	60	66	54	43	13	13	26	16	48
Tunisia	..	4	2	1	2	3	1	..	2	3	42
Iraq	8	34	14	9	8	16	14	29	37	95	41
Bosnia and Herzegovina	87	77	59	35	36	17	24	31	35	11	38
Algeria	16	30	81	69	39	8	11	4	11	43	30
Albania	34	54	66	48	33	20	16	14	26	18	24
Iran	..	13	31	59	41	31	16	18	24	23	22
Afghanistan	9	..	2	6	3	8	3	4	13	15	22
Turkey	27	8	14	3	2	3	3	2	4	18	21
Georgia	5	7	44	7	6	1	1	1	2	7	16
Eritrea	1	2	6	..	11	11	11	14
Somalia	10	4	10	18	27	7	1	10	8	29	12
Azerbaijan	5	1	2	3	1	1	11	2	11
Other countries	145	204	601	879	329	149	78	86	106	138	119
Total	686	1 043	1 550	1 578	802	523	426	463	477	744	2 076

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
MEXICO

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
El Salvador	4	3	5	46	31	31	45	51	119	159	181
Honduras	4	7	37	67	51	39	31	55	184	135	168
Guatemala	35	10	62	23	29	20	15	18	39	59	69
Cuba	24	50	14	26	80	65	27	7	42	42	48
Colombia	58	65	38	40	40	52	57	41	62	82	43
Haiti	1	1	8	11	20	17	41	61	65	39	38
India	32	6	1	10	27	5	2	3	37	271	36
Nigeria	1	10	6	..	2	1	13	1	8	23	27
Sri Lanka	28	5	..	13	16	8	..	3	11	51	21
Ghana	..	4	2	1	3	3	9	14
Nepal	10	6	..	8	..	19	13
Democratic Republic of the Congo	..	4	6	1	5	..	2	2	5	6	9
Pakistan	7	1	2	11	7
Bangladesh	10	13	5	8	3	4	29	..	1	5	7
Argentina	1	..	3	1	6
Other countries	210	79	90	158	373	230	111	63	102	128	66
Total	415	257	275	404	687	480	374	317	680	1 039	753

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
NETHERLANDS

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	3 614	1 067	492	688	902	932	143	395	1 281	1 364	1 885
Iraq	1 329	1 020	3 473	1 043	1 620	2 766	2 004	5 027	1 991	1 383	1 435
Somalia	1 098	533	451	792	1 315	1 462	1 874	3 842	5 889	3 372	1 415
Iran	1 519	663	555	450	557	921	187	322	502	785	929
Armenia	529	417	203	247	197	280	97	208	349	611	471
Eritrea	213	152	123	148	204	175	153	236	475	392	458
Russian Federation	918	426	245	206	285	254	81	95	151	207	451
China	706	534	298	285	356	318	243	563	304	302	276
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	187	80	30	30	14	26	2	4	7	389	266
Belarus	115	131	55	25	31	44	5	6	32	64	256
Guinea	1 467	475	199	116	105	116	102	154	235	230	209
Georgia	298	216	116	73	213	156	66	64	412	587	189
Syria	522	325	234	180	278	293	36	48	101	125	168
Sudan	869	512	293	255	339	320	57	53	116	166	162
Libya	64	58	71	27	53	34	22	63	101	165	136
Other countries	19 131	12 058	6 564	5 217	5 878	6 368	2 030	2 319	2 959	3 191	2 884
Total	32 579	18 667	13 402	9 782	12 347	14 465	7 102	13 399	14 905	13 333	11 590

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
NEW ZEALAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Iran	129	101	135	88	47	29	27	28	24	43	29
Fiji	44	22	19	2	12	10	10	7	45	66	29
Bahrain	3	1	1	22
Egypt	3	1	2	2	6	..	2	4	5	6	22
Pakistan	22	21	7	9	8	11	8	3	18	8	22
China	68	25	56	49	19	30	26	24	20	22	20
Sri Lanka	97	52	23	29	6	30	25	25	30	28	19
South Africa	13	8	10	8	3	2	2	3	9	20	14
Iraq	69	31	39	12	22	35	30	33	25	11	11
Afghanistan	17	4	4	..	1	..	3	2	2	5	11
Hungary	..	77	32	9	6	4	8	3	..	2	10
Bangladesh	32	19	29	22	23	16	18	9	7	6	8
Saudi Arabia	2	5	3	8	..	3	2	3	3	16	7
Czech Republic	39	2	10	29	28	12	4	10	23	14	5
Zimbabwe	98	85	73	20	8	5	8	8	8	6	5
Other countries	965	544	399	292	159	88	72	92	117	86	71
Total	1 601	997	841	579	348	276	245	254	336	340	305

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
NORWAY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Somalia	1 080	1 534	1 623	958	667	632	187	1 293	1 901	1 397	2 216
Eritrea	132	269	201	110	177	316	789	1 799	2 667	1 711	1 256
Afghanistan	603	786	2 050	1 059	466	224	234	1 363	3 871	979	979
Russian Federation	1 318	1 719	1 923	937	545	548	863	1 078	867	628	365
Iraq	1 056	1 624	971	412	671	1 002	1 227	3 137	1 214	460	357
Iran	412	450	621	394	279	218	222	720	574	429	355
Ethiopia	173	325	293	148	100	143	241	354	706	505	293
Serbia	928	2 460	2 216	859	468	369	592	681	408	454	251
Nigeria	27	139	241	205	94	54	108	436	582	354	240
Sudan	47	94	67	33	45	36	37	118	251	181	209
Syria	57	80	97	71	79	49	49	115	278	119	198
Libya	62	123	288	134	23	13	49	81	84	36	139
Uzbekistan	105	206	95	51	42	52	38	148	145	108	115
China	19	87	118	67	49	51	40	81	71	192	101
Algeria	346	468	191	103	45	37	27	100	161	133	101
Other countries	8 417	7 116	4 964	2 404	1 652	1 576	1 825	2 927	3 446	2 378	1 878
Total	14 782	17 480	15 959	7 945	5 402	5 320	6 528	14 431	17 226	10 064	9 053

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
POLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Russian Federation	1 490	3 048	5 581	7 182	6 244	4 018	6 668	6 647	5 726	4 795	3 034
Georgia	92	39	30	47	47	31	12	54	4 213	1 082	1 427
Armenia	635	223	104	18	27	15	22	33	147	107	168
Belarus	74	67	58	53	82	55	62	33	37	46	64
Ukraine	144	102	85	72	84	43	26	25	36	45	43
Kyrgyzstan	4	3	10	19	16	13	7	5	13	37	41
Afghanistan	415	595	251	57	6	11	9	4	14	25	35
Viet Nam	197	48	25	16	23	27	40	57	67	47	26
Iraq	108	137	75	6	15	16	22	66	21	27	25
Kazakhstan	16	8	6	30	24	18	5	17	5	11	17
Congo	1	4	3	1	5	2	5	3	5	7	16
Nigeria	26	7	15	10	10	11	18	19	23	19	13
Eritrea	2	3	1	12
Syria	10	1	4	7	7	..	4	8	7	8	11
Turkey	9	6	22	29	11	10	10	17	11	19	11
Other countries	1 283	865	652	533	259	160	292	215	262	258	143
Total	4 506	5 153	6 921	8 080	6 860	4 430	7 205	7 203	10 587	6 534	5 086

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
PORTUGAL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Guinea	4	2	1	..	1	6	14	8	18	43	46
Somalia	1	..	16	3	..	2	26
Nigeria	3	3	2	1	1	6	2	8	9	7	22
Côte d'Ivoire	6	2	1	..	1	18
Colombia	6	3	5	8	27	6	86	26	15	16	13
Democratic Republic of the Congo	10	6	3	2	7	16	11	20	5	9	13
Guinea-Bissau	1	4	1	5	6	5	1	4	5	10	11
Pakistan	7	..	1	5	..	1	2	..	1	4	11
Iran	4	2	1	2	1	4	6	11
Russian Federation	5	13	3	13	7	6	6	..	2	5	9
Sierra Leone	39	34	3	2	3	4	3	1	3	7	7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7	16	10	3	..	6
Ukraine	..	3	5	6	1	1	..	1	5	..	6
Senegal	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	7	1	2	5
Ethiopia	1	1	1	1	5
Other countries	151	174	63	62	57	68	61	70	68	48	66
Total	232	245	88	113	114	128	224	161	139	160	275

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	1 300	618	500	638	674	827	2 211	2 047	1 577	1 611	1 005
Georgia	40	23	46	24	27	138	586	2 684	3 580	1 353	626
Uzbekistan	34	34	38	72	102	37	63	90	136	164	118
Democratic People's Rep. of Korea	1	7	11	26	59	39	110
Kyrgyzstan	11	1	3	..	12	..	5	3	7	291	68
Syria	1	18	6	6	44
Tajikistan	22	18	12	23	3	7	43	48	29	37	34
Kazakhstan	19	19	25	13	4	5	2	10	10	13	21
Democratic Republic of the Congo	11	7	4	10	7	2	34	23	11	18	20
Iraq	73	35	13	18	20	13	36	61	37	16	19
Belarus	1	1	15	16	4	6	16
Azerbaijan	12	23	21	9	5	21	31	48	4	20	16
Ukraine	6	..	4	6	4	10	20	19	10	23	16
Iran	5	12	16	13
Côte d'Ivoire	12
Other countries	156	98	71	97	99	102	312	320	219	276	154
Total	1 684	876	737	910	960	1 170	3 369	5 418	5 701	3 889	2 292

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Somalia	129	199	114	12	16	3	9	..	13	23	78
Afghanistan	4 315	1 669	627	393	109	41	67	72	51	76	75
Georgia	27	58	582	989	258	209	134	119	98	63	62
Moldova	16	266	587	826	309	385	208	113	73	42	41
Russian Federation	84	618	2 653	2 413	1 037	463	307	100	72	66	38
India	1 111	1 611	1 653	2 969	561	727	619	88	57	44	24
Viet Nam	38	220	61	155	100	63	58	41	56	32	22
Pakistan	176	168	307	799	196	182	648	109	168	34	15
China	33	1 764	1 080	1 271	280	164	96	44	39	31	13
Iran	109	79	182	53	9	5	2	5	10	12	13
Turkey	47	34	61	139	39	27	9	5	5	9	12
Armenia	29	102	758	144	17	14	28	22	21	12	10
Syria	10	15	72	47	24	6	38	7	10	4	10
Serbia	27	50	65	51	29	15	7	15	21	10	9
Bangladesh	429	1 032	558	544	277	183	108	36	15	6	8
Other countries	1 571	1 858	998	590	288	384	305	134	113	77	61
Total	8 151	9 743	10 358	11 395	3 549	2 871	2 643	910	822	541	491

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
SLOVENIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	66	7	2	5	6	2	12	10	11	31	69
Turkey	379	73	192	188	231	62	38	72	12	32	51
Serbia	205	121	181	413	640	243	237	74	41	33	44
Pakistan	12	25	28	16	28	6	11	4	6	..	29
Tunisia	1	4	3	3	25
Somalia	4	9	1	1	8	20
Iran	272	61	88	7	4	3	2	11	9	11	11
Algeria	44	67	65	19	3	2	2	6	11
Syria	1	..	2	4	11
Morocco	..	5	1	4	9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22	29	48	123	303	44	22	13	41	27	9
Iraq	214	133	190	28	15	6	4	..	3	10	8
West Bank and Gaza Strip	5	1	17	7	5	11	4	..	1	10	7
Ukraine	7	13	1	4	5	1	2	1	7
Egypt	34	1	1	6
Other countries	280	154	252	361	350	140	93	52	56	66	56
Total	1 511	702	1 100	1 173	1 596	518	425	238	183	246	373

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
SPAIN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Côte d'Ivoire	11	45	241	110	162	236	335	500	304	119	550
Cuba	2 371	1 179	125	79	78	59	83	119	84	406	440
Nigeria	1 350	1 440	1 688	1 029	726	632	680	808	458	238	259
Guinea	30	46	171	228	173	23	91	98	130	166	150
West Bank and Gaza Strip	70	56	59	106	131
Cameroon	10	24	178	72	99	83	57	71	111	156	129
Algeria	231	350	682	991	406	230	247	152	181	176	122
Colombia	2 532	1 105	577	760	1 655	2 239	2 497	752	255	123	104
Syria	18	9	7	39	35	15	31	97	30	19	97
Pakistan	32	20	20	25	7	23	23	52	57	63	78
Democratic Republic of the Congo	118	175	274	203	170	102	141	105	114	87	70
Russian Federation	350	172	153	84	138	110	88	66	55	44	65
Libya	..	1	..	3	1	1	1	..	1	1	63
Iran	30	18	21	34	23	20	27	64	45	63	62
Somalia	38	41	128	13	24	10	154	195	104	39	59
Other countries	2 368	1 684	1 653	1 865	1 557	1 514	3 137	1 382	1 019	938	1 035
Total	9 489	6 309	5 918	5 535	5 254	5 297	7 662	4 517	3 007	2 744	3 414

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
SWEDEN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	593	527	811	903	435	594	609	784	1 694	2 393	4 122
Serbia	3 102	5 852	5 305	4 022	2 944	2 001	2 601	2 040	1 842	7 949	4 033
Somalia	525	1 107	3 069	905	422	1 066	3 349	3 361	5 874	5 553	3 981
Eritrea	151	266	641	395	425	608	878	857	1 000	1 443	1 647
Iraq	6 206	5 446	2 700	1 456	2 330	8 951	18 559	6 083	2 297	1 977	1 633
Iran	780	762	787	660	582	494	485	799	1 144	1 182	1 120
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2 775	2 885	1 397	785	387	234	217	150	129	123	981
Russian Federation	841	1 496	1 361	1 288	1 057	755	788	933	1 058	988	933
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	420	501	470	429	158	111	101	57	86	908	890
Mongolia	259	376	342	346	326	461	519	791	753	727	773
Syria	441	541	666	411	392	433	440	551	587	421	640
Belarus	327	722	901	519	372	432	365	361	347	338	419
Libya	114	456	435	419	451	318	420	646	367	311	402
Azerbaijan	158	778	1 032	1 041	431	247	230	390	487	271	389
Uzbekistan	344	640	403	258	349	446	416	741	298	272	377
Other countries	6 479	10 661	11 028	9 324	6 469	7 171	6 393	5 809	6 231	6 967	7 308
Total	23 515	33 016	31 348	23 161	17 530	24 322	36 370	24 353	24 194	31 823	29 648

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
SWITZERLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Eritrea	68	203	235	180	159	1 201	1 662	2 849	1 724	1 708	3 225
Tunisia	146	163	154	121	102	80	90	74	204	291	2 324
Serbia	3 425	3 692	2 921	1 777	1 506	1 228	989	1 327	1 285	1 376	1 552
Nigeria	289	1 062	480	418	219	209	310	988	1 786	1 597	1 303
Afghanistan	530	237	218	207	238	233	307	405	751	632	1 006
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	884	1 085	337	225	142	69	67	97	62	403	838
China	161	394	228	70	87	475	251	272	365	333	688
Syria	148	221	175	127	116	161	290	388	400	387	688
Somalia	369	387	471	592	485	273	395	2 014	753	302	558
Turkey	1 960	1 940	1 652	1 154	723	693	621	519	559	462	508
Algeria	828	1 020	836	480	186	161	132	236	300	313	464
Sri Lanka	684	459	340	251	233	328	618	1 262	1 415	892	433
Morocco	25	34	32	33	30	39	30	37	36	113	429
Iraq	1 201	1 182	1 444	631	468	816	935	1 440	935	501	378
Iran	336	286	262	200	291	302	232	393	259	276	326
Other countries	9 579	13 760	11 021	7 782	5 076	4 269	3 458	4 305	5 171	3 935	4 719
Total	20 633	26 125	20 806	14 248	10 061	10 537	10 387	16 606	16 005	13 521	19 439

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

TURKEY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Iraq	982	974	342	964	1 047	722	3 470	6 904	3 763	3 656	7 912
Iran	3 385	2 505	3 092	2 029	1 716	2 297	1 685	2 116	1 981	2 881	3 411
Afghanistan	431	47	77	341	364	261	705	2 642	1 009	1 248	2 486
Somalia	25	23	183	308	473	680	1 125	647	295	448	744
Syria	10	14	7	16	10	7	21	20	46	37	188
Kyrgyzstan	..	1	1	5	5	..	3	4	2	246	169
West Bank and Gaza Strip	9	24	6	23	29	51	157	..	72	64	157
Uzbekistan	24	38	24	28	24	24	42	35	38	101	147
Democratic Republic of the Congo	4	24	7	10	12	28	76	71	41	66	76
Yemen	..	2	2	1	..	1	2	..	72
Cameroon	1	1	5	18	19	20	57
Côte d'Ivoire	1	32	11	3	10	12	56
Uganda	1	..	1	..	1	48
Sudan	7	2	64	28	76	113	76	156	92	48	43
China	47	41	19	57	30	31	16	27	12	11	32
Other countries	116	100	128	98	134	304	254	337	452	387	423
Total	5 041	3 795	3 952	3 908	3 921	4 553	7 646	12 981	7 834	9 226	16 021

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

UNITED KINGDOM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Pakistan	2 860	3 780	3 145	3 030	2 290	1 850	1 765	2 075	2 100	2 150	3 947
Iran	3 420	3 370	3 495	3 990	3 505	2 685	2 510	2 595	2 145	2 225	3 047
Sri Lanka	5 510	3 485	810	400	480	620	1 250	1 865	1 445	1 635	2 126
Afghanistan	8 920	8 065	2 590	1 605	1 775	2 660	2 815	3 725	3 540	1 845	1 528
Libya	140	245	220	185	185	130	55	75	100	125	1 187
Nigeria	810	1 220	1 110	1 210	1 230	990	905	1 070	910	1 150	1 058
China	2 400	3 725	3 495	2 410	1 775	2 030	2 185	1 615	1 585	1 375	921
Eritrea	620	1 315	1 070	1 265	1 900	2 735	1 905	2 335	1 410	770	836
Sudan	390	770	1 050	1 445	990	750	400	290	255	645	791
Zimbabwe	2 140	8 695	4 020	2 520	1 390	2 145	2 300	4 475	7 610	1 955	738
Bangladesh	510	825	820	550	465	495	590	510	495	500	666
Somalia	6 420	9 425	7 195	3 295	2 105	2 175	1 960	1 575	1 105	680	660
India	1 850	1 975	2 410	1 485	1 000	715	600	775	715	610	611
Syria	110	85	155	410	390	185	190	180	185	160	499
Albania	1 065	1 350	685	345	200	185	190	175	235	220	427
Other countries	33 845	54 780	27 770	16 475	11 135	7 985	8 260	7 980	6 840	6 600	6 413
Total	71 010	103 110	60 040	40 620	30 815	28 335	27 880	31 315	30 675	22 645	25 455

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality**
UNITED STATES

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
China	8 008	10 237	4 906	5 627	7 623	9 362	8 781	9 825	10 725	12 510	15 649
Mexico	8 747	8 775	3 955	1 763	1 581	1 673	2 551	2 713	2 295	3 879	8 304
El Salvador	1 264	640	376	1 423	1 755	2 393	3 455	2 789	2 366	2 685	4 324
Guatemala	1 131	1 193	2 236	1 569	1 411	1 515	2 388	1 853	1 740	2 171	3 671
India	1 894	1 708	1 241	866	620	602	576	734	751	755	2 477
Honduras	58	59	50	603	781	986	1 096	893	850	1 030	1 559
Haiti	4 938	3 643	3 316	5 107	5 299	5 135	3 079	2 078	1 649	1 223	1 377
Nepal	53	172	314	321	415	494	532	680	1 068	1 054	1 321
Egypt	527	603	407	398	329	406	367	412	399	479	1 136
Ethiopia	1 467	1 287	890	1 118	807	1 168	1 124	1 168	1 249	1 193	1 066
Russian Federation	844	837	761	783	669	638	615	677	806	828	888
Ecuador	31	36	29	80	56	85	89	168	174	404	807
Eritrea	220	246	196	213	224	282	329	420	559	595	767
Venezuela	96	259	899	1 509	1 226	954	754	709	430	584	764
Pakistan	410	567	513	859	551	512	433	491	491	538	674
Other countries	29 744	28 142	23 249	22 733	15 893	14 896	14 280	13 752	12 528	13 043	15 803
Total	59 432	58 404	43 338	44 972	39 240	41 101	40 449	39 362	38 080	42 971	60 587

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824650>

Metadata related to Tables A.3 and B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers**

Totals in Table A.3 might differ from the tables by nationality (Table B.3) because the former totals get revised retroactively while the origin breakdown does not. Data for Table A.3 generally refer to first instance/new applications only and exclude repeat/review/appeal applications while data by origin (Table B.3) may include some repeat/review/appeal applications.

Comments on countries of asylum:

France: From 2003 on, data include unaccompanied minors.

United Kingdom: Prior to 2003, data by nationality refer to the number of cases, and not persons. All figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of 5.

United States: Data for 2004-10 are a combination of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS – number of cases) affirmative asylum applications, and of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR – number of persons) defensive asylum applications, if the person is under threat of removal.

Comments on countries of origin:

Serbia: Data may include asylum-seekers from Serbia, Montenegro, Serbia and Montenegro, and/or Former Yugoslavia.

Sources: Governments, compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Data Unit, www.unhcr.org/statistics.

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

Who is an immigrant?

There are major differences in how immigrants are defined across OECD countries. Some countries have traditionally focused on producing data on foreign residents (European countries, Japan and Korea) whilst others refer to the foreign-born (settlement countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). This difference in focus relates in part to the nature and history of immigration systems and legislation on citizenship and naturalisation.

The foreign-born population can be viewed as representing first-generation migrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens. The size and composition of the foreign-born population is influenced by the history of migration flows and mortality amongst the foreign-born. For example, where inflows have been declining over time, the stock of the foreign-born will tend to age and represent an increasingly established community.

The concept of foreign population may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country. The characteristics of the population of foreign nationals depend on a number of factors: the history of migration flows, natural increase in the foreign population and naturalisations. Both the nature of legislation on citizenship and the incentives to naturalise play a role in determining the extent to which native-born persons may or may not be foreign nationals.

Sources for and problems in measuring the immigrant population

Four types of sources are used: population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys and censuses. In countries which have a population register and in those which use residence permit data, stocks and flows of immigrants are most often calculated using the same source. There are exceptions, however, with some countries using census or labour force survey data to estimate the stock of the immigrant population. In studying stocks and flows, the same problems are encountered whether population register or permit data are used (in particular, the risk of underestimation when minors are registered on the permit of one of the parents or if the migrants are not required to have permits because of a free movement agreement). To this must be added the difficulty of purging the files regularly to remove the records of persons who have left the country.

Census data enable comprehensive, albeit infrequent analysis of the stock of immigrants (censuses are generally conducted every five to ten years). In addition, many labour force surveys now include questions about nationality and place of birth, thus providing a source of annual stock data. The OECD produces estimates of stocks for some countries

Some care has to be taken with detailed breakdowns of the immigrant population from survey data since sample sizes can be small. Both census and survey data may underestimate the number of immigrants, because they can be missed in the census or because they do not live in private households (labour force surveys may not cover those living in collective dwelling such as reception centres and hostels for immigrants). Both these sources may cover a portion of the unauthorised population, which is by definition excluded from population registers and residence permit systems.

Table A.4. **Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries and the Russian Federation**

Thousands and percentages

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Australia	4 482.1	4 584.9	4 694.3	4 796.6	4 927.1	5 090.1	5 281.4	5 516.9	5 760.3	5 901.2	6 029.1
% of total population	23.1	23.3	23.6	23.8	24.2	24.6	25.1	25.7	26.2	26.5	26.7
Austria	1 112.1	1 137.4	1 141.2	1 154.8	1 195.2	1 215.7	1 246.3	1 277.1	1 292.9	1 315.5	1 349.0
% of total population	13.8	14.1	14.1	14.1	14.5	14.7	15.0	15.3	15.5	15.7	16.0
Belgium	1 112.2	1 151.8	1 185.5	1 220.1	1 268.9	1 319.3	1 380.3	1 443.9	1 503.8	1 628.8	1 643.6
% of total population	10.8	11.1	11.4	11.7	12.1	12.5	13.0	13.5	13.9	15.0	14.9
Canada	5 448.5	5 600.7	5 735.9	5 872.3	6 026.9	6 187.0	6 331.7	6 471.9	6 617.6	6 777.6	6 933.4
% of total population	17.6	17.9	18.1	18.4	18.7	19.0	19.2	19.4	19.6	19.9	20.1
Chile	..	184.5	223.0	235.5	247.4	258.8	290.9	317.1	352.3	369.4	..
% of total population	..	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2	..
Czech Republic	448.5	471.9	482.2	499.0	523.4	566.3	636.1	679.6	672.0	661.2	668.8
% of total population	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.9	5.1	5.5	6.2	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.4
Denmark	321.8	331.5	337.8	343.4	350.4	360.9	378.7	401.8	414.4	428.9	441.5
% of total population	6.0	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.6	6.9	7.3	7.5	7.7	7.9
Estonia	245.3	242.5	239.3	235.5	228.6	226.5	224.3	221.9	217.9	212.7	210.8
% of total population	18.0	17.8	17.7	17.5	17.0	16.9	16.7	16.6	16.3	15.9	15.7
Finland	145.1	152.1	158.9	166.4	176.6	187.9	202.5	218.6	233.2	248.1	266.1
% of total population	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.8	4.1	4.4	4.6	4.9
France	6 260.6	6 421.2	6 587.6	6 748.9	6 910.1	7 017.2	7 129.3	7 202.1	7 196.5	7 289.3	7 358.2
% of total population	10.5	10.7	10.9	11.1	11.3	11.4	11.5	11.6	11.5	11.6	11.6
Germany	10 399.0	10 431.0	10 534.0	10 623.0	10 601.0	10 591.0	10 689.0
% of total population	12.6	12.7	12.8	12.9	12.9	13.0	13.1
Greece	1 122.9	828.4	750.7
% of total population	10.3	7.3	6.6
Hungary	300.1	302.8	307.8	319.0	331.5	344.6	381.8	394.2	407.3	451.4	473.3
% of total population	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.5	4.7
Iceland	18.3	19.1	19.5	20.7	24.7	30.4	35.9	37.6	35.1	34.7	34.7
% of total population	6.4	6.6	6.8	7.1	8.3	10.0	11.5	11.8	11.0	10.9	10.9
Ireland	356.0	390.0	426.5	461.8	520.8	601.7	682.0	739.2	766.8	772.5	752.5
% of total population	9.2	9.9	10.7	11.4	12.6	14.2	15.7	16.7	17.2	17.3	16.8
Israel	1 978.1	1 983.2	1 974.8	1 960.8	1 947.6	1 930.0	1 916.2	1 899.4	1 877.7	1 869.0	1 855.0
% of total population	31.8	31.3	30.6	29.8	29.1	28.3	27.6	26.9	26.2	24.5	23.9
Italy	2 240.0	4 375.2	4 798.7	5 350.4	5 457.8
% of total population	3.9	7.4	8.0	8.9	9.0
Luxembourg	144.8	147.8	154.9	160.4	168.3	175.4	183.7	194.5	197.2	205.2	215.3
% of total population	32.8	33.1	34.4	35.3	36.5	37.4	38.6	40.2	40.0	40.9	42.1
Mexico	584.5	610.1	699.3	733.7	850.1	961.1	..
% of total population	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	..
Netherlands	1 674.6	1 714.2	1 731.8	1 736.1	1 734.7	1 732.4	1 751.0	1 793.7	1 832.5	1 868.7	1 906.3
% of total population	10.4	10.6	10.7	10.7	10.6	10.6	10.7	10.9	11.1	11.2	11.4
New Zealand	698.6	737.1	770.5	796.7	840.6	879.5	915.0	950.0	981.3	1 013.0	1 040.7
% of total population	18.0	18.7	19.1	19.5	20.3	21.0	21.6	22.3	22.7	23.2	23.6
Norway	315.1	333.9	347.3	361.1	380.4	405.1	445.4	488.8	526.8	569.1	616.3
% of total population	7.0	7.4	7.6	7.9	8.2	8.7	9.5	10.3	10.9	11.6	12.4
Poland	775.3	776.2	674.9
% of total population	2.0	2.0	1.8
Portugal	651.5	719.4	745.6	774.8	742.1	753.0	769.6	790.3	834.8	851.5	871.8
% of total population	6.3	6.9	7.1	7.4	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.4	7.9	8.0	8.3
Russian Federation	..	11 976.8	11 194.7	..
% of total population	..	8.2	7.9	..
Slovak Republic	119.1	207.6
% of total population	2.2	3.9

Table A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries and the Russian Federation (cont.)

Thousands and percentages

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Slovenia	..	170.0	228.6	230.1
% of total population	..	8.5	11.2	11.2
Spain	2 594.1	3 302.4	3 693.8	4 391.5	4 837.6	5 250.0	6 044.5	6 466.3	6 604.2	6 677.8	6 737.9
% of total population	6.4	8.0	8.8	10.3	11.1	11.9	13.5	14.2	14.4	14.5	14.6
Sweden	1 028.0	1 053.5	1 078.1	1 100.3	1 125.8	1 175.2	1 227.8	1 281.6	1 338.0	1 384.9	1 427.3
% of total population	11.6	11.8	12.0	12.2	12.5	12.9	13.4	13.9	14.4	14.8	15.1
Switzerland	<i>1 613.8</i>	<i>1 658.7</i>	<i>1 697.8</i>	<i>1 737.7</i>	<i>1 772.8</i>	<i>1 811.2</i>	<i>1 882.6</i>	<i>1 974.2</i>	<i>2 037.5</i>	<i>2 075.2</i>	<i>2 158.4</i>
% of total population	<i>22.3</i>	<i>22.8</i>	<i>23.1</i>	<i>23.5</i>	<i>23.8</i>	<i>24.2</i>	<i>24.9</i>	<i>25.8</i>	<i>26.3</i>	<i>26.6</i>	<i>27.3</i>
Turkey
% of total population
United Kingdom	4 865.0	<i>5 000.0</i>	<i>5 143.0</i>	<i>5 338.0</i>	<i>5 557.0</i>	5 757.0	6 192.0	6 633.0	6 899.0	7 056.0	7 430.0
% of total population	8.2	<i>8.4</i>	<i>8.6</i>	<i>8.9</i>	<i>9.4</i>	9.6	10.3	11.0	11.3	11.5	12.0
United States	31 548.1	33 096.2	33 667.7	34 257.7	35 769.6	37 469.4	38 048.5	38 016.1	38 452.8	39 916.9	40 381.6
% of total population	11.1	11.5	11.6	11.7	12.1	12.6	12.6	12.5	12.5	12.9	13.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Tables B.4. Estimates are in italic.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824574>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
AUSTRALIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
United Kingdom	1 126.9	1 120.0	1 118.5	1 120.8	1 125.7	1 141.0	1 154.8	1 169.2	1 180.2	1 182.5	1 180.2	49
New Zealand	394.1	407.4	414.9	419.9	430.0	445.1	467.8	497.4	521.9	538.3	564.9	49
China	157.0	174.2	192.2	210.6	233.8	259.2	285.1	319.4	350.8	377.0	391.1	55
India	103.6	114.5	126.4	140.6	157.9	180.1	215.6	263.3	321.2	343.2	343.1	43
Viet Nam	169.5	172.4	176.3	178.8	181.5	185.5	189.8	196.3	204.4	210.1	212.1	53
Italy	238.5	236.5	234.2	231.9	229.7	227.3	223.6	219.2	215.5	211.5	209.8	48
Philippines	112.2	116.3	121.3	126.6	132.6	140.0	148.5	159.4	170.5	178.6	183.0	63
South Africa	87.0	95.4	101.8	108.9	114.7	120.3	127.6	137.3	149.0	153.6	157.6	50
Malaysia	87.2	90.0	94.0	98.7	102.6	107.1	112.6	119.2	125.2	130.0	137.7	54
Germany	117.5	118.7	120.0	121.3	122.6	124.4	125.2	125.5	125.2	124.8	126.1	52
Greece	132.5	132.7	133.0	133.1	133.3	133.4	131.6	129.5	127.5	125.6	123.9	51
Korea	41.8	44.6	47.7	50.8	55.1	60.3	69.4	78.7	86.5	89.2	97.6	52
Sri Lanka	58.6	61.5	64.0	65.7	68.5	71.7	76.4	82.5	88.4	92.4	94.1	49
Hong Kong, China	75.2	76.8	78.8	79.9	81.5	83.2	83.9	84.7	85.7	86.5	89.5	52
Lebanon	80.0	81.2	83.0	84.0	85.3	86.5	87.9	88.8	89.1	89.3	89.5	48
Other countries	1 500.7	1 542.8	1 588.3	1 625.1	1 672.2	1 725.0	1 781.7	1 846.4	1 919.3	1 968.7	2 029.1	
Total	4 482.1	4 584.9	4 694.3	4 796.6	4 927.1	5 090.1	5 281.4	5 516.9	5 760.3	5 901.2	6 029.1	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
AUSTRIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Germany	140.1	142.7	148.1	155.5	163.0	169.8	178.4	187.0	192.5	198.5	203.8	54
Serbia	165.7	170.0	175.2	181.5	187.7	188.5	188.2	188.3	187.9	188.6	188.1	52
Turkey	126.8	135.2	142.7	147.9	152.5	154.1	155.9	157.8	159.0	159.9	160.1	47
Bosnia and Herzegovina	119.8	122.7	125.8	128.8	131.2	132.1	132.9	133.6	133.5	134.1	135.4	50
Romania	39.1	42.0	44.7	46.6	47.8	48.2	53.4	57.6	60.5	65.2	70.8	56
Poland	41.3	42.0	43.1	47.8	51.8	54.2	56.0	56.9	56.8	57.6	60.5	54
Czech Republic	56.7	55.4	54.6	54.2	52.9	51.5	50.2	48.9	47.3	45.9	44.9	62
Hungary	30.7	31.2	31.6	32.5	33.2	33.9	35.3	36.9	38.3	40.1	43.9	55
Croatia	33.2	34.0	34.5	35.0	35.2	35.1	35.0	34.8	34.4	34.0	33.8	53
Russian Federation	7.8	9.1	12.1	18.0	21.2	22.8	24.2	26.0	26.6	27.3	28.5	58
Slovak Republic	12.8	13.9	14.9	16.8	18.3	19.3	20.5	22.5	23.4	24.2	26.3	65
Italy	25.9	25.6	25.8	25.9	25.7	25.5	25.5	25.6	25.6	25.9	26.3	49
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	13.0	14.3	15.4	16.4	17.3	17.6	18.1	18.6	18.9	19.4	19.5	46
Bulgaria	7.6	8.5	9.3	9.9	10.2	10.3	11.5	12.7	13.5	14.8	16.1	57
Slovenia	16.8	16.6	16.4	16.4	16.2	16.0	15.8	15.7	15.4	15.3	15.4	56
Other countries	274.5	274.2	247.1	221.5	230.9	236.7	245.5	254.4	259.3	264.6	275.5	
Total	1 112.1	1 137.4	1 141.2	1 154.8	1 195.2	1 215.7	1 246.3	1 277.1	1 292.9	1 315.5	1 349.0	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>


Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

BELGIUM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Morocco	118.8	126.5	134.2	141.3	147.9	155.1	162.6	170.2	178.9	189.1
France	151.9	152.5	153.0	154.2	156.2	159.3	164.6	169.0	171.3	175.0
Netherlands	97.8	101.3	104.4	107.7	111.6	115.8	120.4	123.8	124.8	126.4
Italy	132.2	130.5	128.7	126.7	125.1	123.6	122.2	121.4	120.5	120.2
Turkey	71.6	78.6	78.6	81.0	83.8	86.4	89.0	91.4	93.6	97.0
Germany	83.4	80.1	83.3	83.5	83.6	83.6	83.8	84.2	84.1	84.2
Democratic Republic of the Congo	50.8	52.7	53.8	66.8	68.5	70.5	72.4	74.2	76.2	81.3
Poland	20.4	21.9	23.0	25.2	29.0	33.7	40.5	45.5	51.7	57.7
Russian Federation	14.6	17.6	25.1	29.8	30.8	34.5	39.0	51.1
Spain	37.0	36.6	36.2	35.7	35.5	35.4	35.5	36.1	37.0	38.8
Romania	7.7	8.7	9.5	10.6	12.6	15.3	20.4	26.2	30.6	37.7
Portugal	21.3	21.7	22.3	22.8	23.3	24.0	25.0	26.5	27.5	28.3
Algeria	15.1	16.0	17.0	17.7	18.5	19.4	20.3	21.2	22.4	24.3
United Kingdom	26.1	25.9	25.6	25.3	24.9	24.2	24.1	24.2	23.8	23.6
Bulgaria	8.2	11.7	14.4	18.7
Other countries	278.0	298.8	301.1	303.8	323.4	343.1	360.8	383.8	408.1	475.4
Total	1 112.2	1 151.8	1 185.5	1 220.1	1 268.9	1 319.3	1 380.3	1 443.9	1 503.8	1 628.8	1 643.6	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

CANADA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
United Kingdom	606.0	579.6
China	332.8	466.9
India	314.7	443.7
Philippines	232.7	303.2
Italy	315.5	296.9
United States	237.9	250.5
Hong Kong, China	235.6	215.4
Germany	174.1	171.4
Poland	180.4	170.5
Viet Nam	148.4	160.2
Portugal	153.5	150.4
Pakistan	79.3	133.3
Jamaica	120.2	123.4
Netherlands	117.7	112.0
Sri Lanka	87.3	105.7
Other countries	2 112.4	2 503.9
Total	5 448.5	6 187.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>


Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

CHILE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Peru	..	37.9	49.1	53.7	58.4	66.1	83.4	107.6	130.9	138.5
Argentina	..	48.2	50.0	51.9	53.8	57.7	59.7	59.2	60.6	61.9
Bolivia	..	10.9	12.4	13.0	13.5	14.7	20.2	22.2	24.1	25.1
Ecuador	..	9.4	9.9	10.9	11.8	13.3	14.7	17.5	19.1	20.0
Colombia	..	4.1	4.5	5.5	6.6	7.7	9.2	10.9	12.9	14.4
Spain	..	9.1	11.0	11.3
Brazil	..	6.9	9.6	10.1
United States	..	7.8	9.7	10.0
Germany	..	5.5	6.5	6.7
China	..	1.7	4.6	5.2
Other countries	..	42.3	97.1	100.5	103.3	99.3	103.8	99.8	63.2	66.2
Total	..	184.5	223.0	235.5	247.4	258.8	290.9	317.1	352.3	369.4

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

DENMARK

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	30.4	30.8	30.9	30.9	31.0	31.1	31.4	31.8	32.3	32.5	32.4	48
Germany	22.6	22.5	22.5	22.6	23.0	23.9	25.8	27.8	28.2	28.5	28.6	52
Poland	10.6	10.7	10.9	11.3	12.4	14.7	18.5	24.4	25.4	26.6	28.0	51
Iraq	18.0	19.7	20.7	20.8	20.7	20.7	21.2	21.3	21.3	21.3	21.2	45
Bosnia and Herzegovina	18.1	18.1	18.2	17.9	17.7	17.6	18.0	18.0	17.9	17.8	17.6	50
Norway	13.4	13.6	13.9	14.0	14.1	14.2	14.3	14.5	14.7	14.7	14.9	65
Sweden	12.5	12.3	12.2	12.3	12.5	12.7	12.9	13.2	13.2	13.2	13.1	63
Iran	11.4	11.6	11.7	11.7	11.7	11.8	11.9	11.9	12.1	12.5	12.9	42
United Kingdom	10.6	10.6	10.7	10.7	10.8	11.1	11.4	11.8	11.8	12.1	12.2	35
Pakistan	10.5	10.6	10.7	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.6	10.8	11.2	11.7	12.1	45
Former Yugoslavia	12.5	12.4	12.3	11.9	11.7	11.5	11.5	11.2	12.6	12.3	12.0	50
Lebanon	12.0	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.1	12.0	45
Afghanistan	7.2	8.4	9.0	9.4	9.5	9.6	9.6	9.7	10.0	10.6	11.1	44
Romania	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6	3.3	4.6	5.9	7.7	10.1	46
Somalia	12.2	12.3	11.8	11.2	10.7	10.4	10.4	10.2	10.1	10.1	10.0	47
Other countries	117.9	123.6	128.2	133.7	139.6	146.6	155.9	168.4	175.6	185.4	193.3	..
Total	321.8	331.5	337.8	343.4	350.4	360.9	378.7	401.8	414.4	428.9	441.5	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

FINLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Former USSR	34.8	36.3	37.3	38.5	40.2	41.9	43.8	45.8	47.3	48.7	50.5	63
Sweden	28.3	28.6	28.9	29.2	29.5	29.8	30.2	30.6	31.0	31.2	31.4	48
Estonia	8.7	9.5	10.3	11.2	12.6	14.5	16.7	19.2	21.8	25.0	29.5	51
Russian Federation	3.1	3.5	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.3	5.9	6.7	7.3	8.0	9.0	56
Somalia	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.8	6.4	7.1	8.1	8.8	47
Iraq	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.8	5.3	6.2	7.2	7.9	38
China	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.5	4.1	4.6	5.3	6.0	6.6	7.0	7.7	59
Thailand	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.1	3.6	4.1	4.8	5.4	6.1	6.7	7.4	79
Former Yugoslavia	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.9	5.0	5.2	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.3	6.4	44
Germany	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.3	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.1	43
Turkey	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.7	4.1	4.5	4.9	5.1	5.4	27
United Kingdom	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.7	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.8	28
Viet Nam	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.8	55
Iran	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.4	42
India	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.3	37
Other countries	37.7	39.5	41.7	44.0	47.4	51.1	56.4	62.2	66.9	71.8	77.8	
Total	145.1	152.1	158.9	166.4	176.6	187.9	202.5	218.6	233.2	248.1	266.1	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

FRANCE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Algeria	1 356.6	1 359.3	1 366.5	1 361.0
Morocco	846.9	859.0	870.9	881.3
Portugal	592.0	598.0	604.7	608.6
Tunisia	365.8	368.5	370.6	370.7
Italy	372.3	364.4	357.0	350.2
Spain	307.0	300.0	295.9	290.3
Turkey	237.4	243.4	246.8	251.1
Germany	225.6	224.6	223.5	221.7
United Kingdom	148.8	158.0	164.0	166.8
Belgium	139.0	140.5	143.6	145.8
Viet Nam	119.6	119.8	120.1	119.7
Madagascar	108.5	110.7	112.5	114.5
Senegal	103.3	106.1	108.3	112.1
Poland	101.6	101.7	102.6	102.9
Switzerland	85.6	87.4	89.1	90.6
Other countries	1 800.0	1 875.9	1 953.1	2 014.8
Total	6 910.1	7 017.2	7 129.3	7 202.1	7 196.5	7 289.3	7 358.2	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
GERMANY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	1 472	1 477	1 511	1 508	1 489	1 497	1 491	49
Poland	719	723	532	508	1 103	1 112	1 137	55
Russian Federation	1 005	875	513	445	992	977	1 004	54
Kazakhstan	340	206	140	628	696	747	52
Italy	437	431	431	433	434	420	425	37
Romania	317	318	209	168	386	372	392	54
Ukraine	202	193	181	228	227	233	58
Croatia	268	256	251	256	249	226	227	53
Greece	233	229	240	232	227	231	227	46
Serbia	334	321	209	204	203	53
Austria	191	191	194	198	199	197	188	51
Bosnia and Herzegovina	237	225	217	207	176	154	155	50
Netherlands	107	103	115	123	128	133	143	47
Former USSR	77	56	286	218	142	53
France	99	99	103	110	118	120	118	49
Other countries	5 314	4 962	5 403	5 737	3 749	3 807	3 857	
Total	10 399	10 431	10 529	10 623	10 601	10 591	10 689	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
GREECE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Albania	403.9	384.6
Georgia	71.7	62.6
Russian Federation	72.7	55.7
Bulgaria	38.9	45.7
Romania	26.5	32.4
Germany	101.4	29.3
Pakistan	10.9	20.1
Bangladesh	4.7	14.2
Ukraine	16.7	13.3
Poland	15.5	10.8
Cyprus	22.5	10.2
Egypt	32.7	10.2
Turkey	76.6	9.5
Armenia	9.0	9.1
United States	23.1	7.5
Other countries	196.2	113.0
Total	1 122.9	828.4	750.7	..

Notes: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See notes on Cyprus at the beginning of the Statistical annex.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
HUNGARY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Romania	145.2	146.5	148.5	152.7	155.4	170.4	196.1	202.2	198.2	201.9	214.5	52
Germany	15.3	15.9	16.3	18.8	21.9	24.5	27.4	28.7	31.3	29.4	31.3	50
Ukraine	4.9	4.9	4.6	6.5	13.4	29.2	58
Serbia	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	8.6	25.0	49
Slovak Republic	2.1	3.0	3.2	3.3	5.7	22.2	62
Former Yugoslavia	33.4	30.3	30.7	29.9	29.6	28.6	28.5	28.0	33.7	33.2	15.5	48
Former USSR	30.4	31.0	31.4	32.2	31.9	27.4	28.5	30.1	31.2	30.7	15.1	67
China	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.7	5.0	5.4	5.6	10.9	11.1	45
Hungary	8.4	47
Austria	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.7	5.4	6.2	6.9	7.3	7.9	7.8	8.1	45
United States	2.1	2.4	2.7	3.0	3.4	4.0	4.3	4.6	5.0	6.9	7.3	47
Former Czechoslovakia	34.6	33.3	33.4	31.4	32.6	30.4	29.6	28.5	28.5	24.1	7.2	68
United Kingdom	3.2	3.8	4.3	4.8	4.7	5.4	41
Russian Federation	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	2.8	4.5	62
Poland	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.9	4.0	64
Other countries	28.8	32.7	33.9	39.2	43.7	33.8	39.1	42.5	46.4	67.1	64.6	
Total	300.1	302.8	307.8	319.0	331.5	344.6	381.8	394.2	407.3	451.4	473.3	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
ICELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.2	3.6	6.6	10.5	11.6	10.1	9.5	9.3	47
Denmark	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0	51
Sweden	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	51
United States	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8	46
Germany	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	61
Philippines	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	66
Lithuania	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.4	48
United Kingdom	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	39
Thailand	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	74
Norway	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	54
Latvia	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	51
Viet Nam	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	55
China	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	65
France	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	48
Portugal	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	35
Other countries	5.4	5.5	5.7	6.1	6.8	7.8	8.3	8.5	8.1	8.1	8.3	
Total	18.3	19.1	19.5	20.7	24.7	30.4	35.9	37.6	35.1	34.7	34.7	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

IRELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
United Kingdom	..	242.2	266.1	281.1	51
Poland	..	2.1	62.5	114.3	48
Lithuania	..	2.1	24.6	34.6	52
United States	..	21.0	24.6	26.9	54
Latvia	..	2.2	13.9	19.8	56
Nigeria	..	8.9	16.3	19.4	54
Romania	..	5.8	8.5	17.8	49
India	..	3.3	9.2	17.7	46
Philippines	..	3.9	9.4	13.6	58
Germany	..	8.5	11.5	12.7	55
China	..	5.6	11.0	11.3	52
Slovak Republic	8.1	10.6	47
France	..	6.7	9.1	9.9	50
Brazil	..	1.2	4.7	9.2	50
Pakistan	..	3.3	5.8	8.2	35
Other countries	..	73.2	116.3	145.4	
Total	..	390.0	601.7	752.5	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

ISRAEL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Former USSR	948.4	951.6	946.9	941.0	935.1	929.1	921.7	913.8	877.5	875.4	863.6	55
Morocco	164.1	161.9	159.7	157.5	155.4	153.2	150.7	148.5	154.7	152.6	150.1	53
Ukraine	127.5	124.6	56
Russian Federation	109.5	106.1	58
Romania	120.9	117.3	113.8	110.4	106.9	103.7	100.2	96.9	96.4	93.2	91.3	56
United States	82.6	84.9	52
Ethiopia	60.5	63.0	65.8	69.4	72.8	76.1	79.4	80.8	77.4	78.9	81.9	50
Iraq	74.5	73.0	71.4	69.9	68.3	66.7	65.1	63.5	63.7	61.9	60.8	53
Poland	76.7	72.5	68.3	64.4	60.6	57.0	53.4	50.1	54.0	50.9	50.1	57
Iran	51.1	50.5	49.9	49.4	48.8	48.2	47.6	46.8	49.8	48.9	48.6	51
France	28.5	30.1	31.4	33.2	35.4	37.6	39.6	40.9	41.4	42.9	43.5	55
Argentina	33.0	38.6	39.5	38.9	38.2	37.7	37.2	36.7	37.6	37.5	37.7	53
Tunisia	30.0	29.3	54
Yemen	35.6	34.6	33.7	32.7	31.8	30.8	29.9	28.9	28.9	28.0	27.2	56
Turkey	30.3	29.6	28.9	28.2	27.5	26.9	26.2	25.6	26.1	25.6	25.2	53
Other countries	354.4	360.3	365.7	366.0	367.2	363.0	365.0	366.5	370.6	23.7	30.0	
Total	1 978.0	1 983.0	1 975.0	1 961.0	1 948.0	1 930.0	1 916.0	1 899.0	1 878.0	1 869.0	1 855.0	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>


Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

ITALY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2009 (%)
Romania	678.5	847.5
Albania	418.9	482.4
Morocco	277.0	355.9
Germany	209.2
Ukraine	138.8	149.9
Poland	100.3	122.5
Philippines	121.0	120.0
India	107.0	115.9
Moldova	83.6	108.4
Ecuador	98.9	102.0
Peru	98.5	94.0
China	89.7	92.5
Tunisia	85.2	83.2
Egypt	68.8	81.5
Serbia	78.3	75.6
Other countries	1 931.0	1 758.2
Total	4 375.2	4 798.7

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

LUXEMBOURG

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Portugal	41.7	60.9
France	18.8	28.1
Belgium	14.8	16.8
Germany	12.8	14.8
Italy	12.3	13.2
Cape Verde	2.4	4.6
Serbia	4.6
United Kingdom	3.2	4.2
Netherlands	3.3	3.5
Spain	2.1	2.9
Poland	1.0	2.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.7	2.2
Romania	0.6	1.9
China	1.0	1.9
Brazil	0.6	1.8
Other countries	28.6	40.8
Total	144.8	205.2

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>


Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

MEXICO

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
United States	738.1
Guatemala	35.3
Spain	18.9
Colombia	13.9
Cuba	12.1
France	7.2
Korea	6.7
Germany	6.2
China	4.0
Japan	3.0
Australia	0.4
Morocco	0.2
Egypt	0.2
South Africa	0.2
New Zealand	0.1
Other countries	114.6
Total	584.5	610.1	699.3	733.7	850.1	961.1

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

NETHERLANDS

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	186.2	190.5	194.6	195.9	196.0	195.4	194.8	195.7	196.7	197.4	197.4	48
Suriname	188.0	189.0	189.7	190.1	189.2	187.8	187.0	186.7	186.8	186.2	185.5	55
Morocco	159.8	163.4	166.6	168.5	168.6	168.0	167.2	166.9	167.4	167.7	168.3	48
Indonesia	163.9	161.4	158.8	156.0	152.8	149.7	146.7	143.7	140.7	137.8	135.1	56
Germany	122.1	120.6	119.0	117.7	116.9	116.4	117.0	119.2	120.5	122.3	122.8	59
Poland	18.6	20.1	21.2	25.0	30.0	35.3	42.1	51.1	58.1	66.6	78.2	55
Former Yugoslavia	55.9	56.2	55.5	54.5	53.7	53.0	52.8	52.7	52.8	52.7	52.7	52
Belgium	46.5	46.8	47.1	47.1	47.1	47.4	47.9	48.6	49.2	50.0	50.9	56
Former USSR	27.1	30.8	32.8	34.5	35.3	36.0	37.4	39.4	41.9	45.6	49.2	63
China	25.8	28.7	31.5	33.5	34.8	35.5	37.1	40.0	42.5	44.7	47.5	56
United Kingdom	47.9	48.5	48.3	47.5	46.6	45.8	45.8	46.7	47.1	47.2	47.5	45
Iraq	36.0	35.8	36.0	35.9	35.3	34.8	35.7	38.7	40.9	41.0	40.8	42
Afghanistan	28.5	31.0	32.1	32.4	32.0	31.3	31.0	30.7	31.1	31.8	32.6	46
Iran	23.2	24.2	24.2	24.1	23.8	23.8	24.2	24.8	25.4	26.2	27.2	45
United States	22.1	22.5	22.6	22.6	22.8	23.0	23.3	24.0	24.3	24.9	25.7	51
Other countries	523.2	544.7	551.9	550.9	549.9	549.3	561.2	584.8	607.1	626.6	644.8	..
Total	1 674.6	1 714.2	1 731.8	1 736.1	1 734.7	1 732.4	1 751.0	1 793.7	1 832.5	1 868.7	1 906.3	52


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
NEW ZEALAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
United Kingdom	218.4	245.1
China	38.9	78.1
Australia	56.3	62.7
Samoa	47.1	50.6
India	20.9	43.3
South Africa	26.1	41.7
Fiji	25.7	37.7
Korea	17.9	28.8
Netherlands	22.2	22.1
Tonga	18.1	20.5
United States	13.3	18.3
Philippines	10.1	15.3
Cook Islands	15.2	14.7
Malaysia	11.5	14.5
Chinese Taipei	12.5	10.8
Other countries	144.3	175.2
Total	698.6	879.5

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
NORWAY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	6.2	6.7	7.0	8.3	11.2	18.0	30.8	42.7	49.5	57.1	67.6	34
Sweden	33.0	33.0	33.1	33.1	33.9	35.0	36.8	39.4	41.8	44.6	47.0	49
Germany	12.2	12.9	13.5	14.1	15.2	16.7	19.7	23.0	24.9	26.2	27.3	47
Denmark	22.1	22.3	22.3	22.2	22.3	22.3	22.5	22.6	22.7	22.9	23.3	48
Lithuania	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.9	3.0	5.0	7.3	9.9	15.6	22.7	40
Iraq	12.3	14.7	14.9	15.4	16.7	17.4	18.2	19.4	20.6	21.4	22.0	44
Somalia	8.6	10.7	12.1	12.8	13.5	14.5	16.0	16.9	18.0	19.4	20.7	47
United Kingdom	14.1	14.3	14.3	14.6	14.7	15.1	15.6	16.2	16.9	17.5	18.1	39
Pakistan	14.1	14.6	14.9	15.2	15.6	15.9	16.2	16.7	17.2	17.6	18.0	48
United States	14.6	14.6	14.6	14.5	14.6	14.8	15.2	15.7	16.0	16.3	16.6	51
Philippines	6.4	7.0	7.5	8.0	8.7	9.6	10.9	12.3	13.5	14.7	16.3	78
Russian Federation	4.7	6.0	7.5	8.9	10.1	10.9	12.2	13.1	13.8	14.6	15.3	66
Thailand	4.6	5.5	6.3	7.3	8.3	9.3	10.5	11.8	13.1	14.1	15.2	82
Iran	10.1	10.7	11.3	11.6	11.8	12.0	12.3	12.6	13.1	13.6	14.4	45
Viet Nam	11.5	11.7	11.9	12.1	12.3	12.5	12.6	12.9	13.0	13.1	13.3	54
Other countries	140.1	148.5	155.2	161.6	169.6	178.2	190.9	206.2	223.0	240.5	258.7	
Total	315.1	333.9	347.3	361.1	380.4	405.1	445.4	488.8	526.8	569.1	616.3	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

POLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Ukraine	..	312.3	227.5	..
Belarus	..	105.2	83.6	..
Germany	..	98.2	84.0	..
Lithuania	..	79.8	55.6	..
Russian Federation	..	55.2
France	..	33.9
United States	..	8.4
Czech Republic	..	6.3
Austria	..	3.9
Kazakhstan	..	3.8
Serbia	..	3.6
Romania	..	3.4
Italy	..	3.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	..	3.3
United Kingdom	..	2.8	38.0	..
Other countries	..	52.8	186.2	..
Total	..	776.2	674.9	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

PORTUGAL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Angola	174.2	162.6	54
Brazil	49.9	139.7	58
France	95.3	94.5	54
Mozambique	76.0	73.1	54
Cape Verde	45.0	62.0	53
Guinea-Bissau	21.4	29.6	44
Germany	24.3	28.0	52
Venezuela	22.4	25.2	54
Romania	23.7	49
United Kingdom	10.1	19.1	50
Sao Tome and Principe	12.5	18.6	56
Spain	14.0	16.5	57
Switzerland	12.9	16.5	49
South Africa	11.2	11.5	53
China	2.3	10.9	48
Other countries	80.1	140.5	..
Total	651.5	871.8	53


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ukraine	..	3 560.0	2 942.0
Kazakhstan	..	2 585.0	2 481.9
Uzbekistan	..	918.0	1 111.7
Azerbaijan	..	846.1	743.9
Belarus	..	935.8	740.9
Kyrgyzstan	..	463.5	573.3
Armenia	..	481.3	511.2
Tajikistan	..	383.1	452.2
Georgia	..	629.0	436.4
Moldova	..	277.5	285.3
Turkmenistan	..	175.3	180.0
Germany	..	150.2	137.7
Latvia	..	102.5	86.7
Lithuania	..	86.2	68.9
Estonia	..	67.4	57.0
Other countries	..	316.0	385.8
Total	..	11 976.8	11 194.7

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Czech Republic	71.5	107.7
Hungary	17.2	22.5
Ukraine	7.1	13.3
Poland	3.4	7.2
Russian Federation	1.6	5.8
Germany	0.6	4.7
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.1	4.6
Romania	3.0	4.4
Austria	0.7	3.9
United States	0.7	3.5
France	1.3	3.4
Viet Nam	0.6	2.4
United Kingdom	1.8
Bulgaria	1.0	1.7
China	1.6
Other countries	10.0	19.2
Total	119.1	207.6

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
SLOVENIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	96.9	106.8	39
Croatia	49.2	56.6	51
Serbia	29.2	34.7	43
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	13.7	16.0	38
Germany	15.4	50
Austria	5.9	45
Italy	4.6	52
Switzerland	2.0	49
France	1.8	46
Ukraine	1.8	49
Russian Federation	1.3	54
Bulgaria	1.1	72
China	0.9	66
United Kingdom	0.7	36
Slovak Republic	0.6	45
Other countries	39.7	21.5	
Total	..	170.0	228.6	271.8	44

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
SPAIN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Romania	68.6	137.8	206.4	312.1	397.3	511.0	706.2	762.2	784.8	810.3	833.2	48
Morocco	370.7	438.2	474.5	557.2	606.0	621.3	683.1	737.8	760.2	769.1	775.8	41
Ecuador	259.8	387.6	470.1	487.2	456.6	434.7	458.4	479.1	484.6	480.6	469.7	52
United Kingdom	140.6	173.6	187.5	238.2	283.7	322.0	358.3	379.3	390.0	392.9	398.0	50
Colombia	205.3	259.4	264.5	288.2	287.0	291.7	330.4	358.8	371.1	374.0	373.5	58
Argentina	118.9	191.7	226.5	260.4	271.4	273.0	290.3	295.4	291.7	286.4	279.3	49
Germany	173.0	189.4	176.9	193.1	208.9	222.1	237.9	246.7	251.0	251.1	250.7	51
France	170.6	180.2	178.1	188.7	199.4	208.8	220.2	227.1	229.7	228.1	225.8	51
Peru	59.0	72.9	88.8	108.0	123.5	137.0	162.4	188.2	197.6	198.1	197.8	54
Bolivia	15.5	30.6	54.4	99.5	140.7	200.7	240.9	229.4	213.9	202.7	192.4	59
Bulgaria	30.2	53.4	70.4	93.0	100.8	120.2	150.7	160.0	163.6	165.7	168.0	47
China	37.5	51.1	62.3	87.0	104.8	108.3	127.0	146.3	154.1	160.8	167.5	51
Venezuela	71.6	83.5	100.3	116.2	124.9	130.6	144.6	152.4	155.1	159.3	161.6	54
Dominican Republic	49.9	59.1	65.8	78.0	87.1	96.7	114.7	129.7	136.8	141.2	148.8	61
Portugal	67.3	71.8	71.1	80.8	93.8	111.6	136.2	148.2	148.8	146.3	143.3	40
Other countries	755.4	922.1	996.4	1 203.9	1 351.9	1 460.5	1 683.1	1 825.7	1 871.2	1 911.2	1 952.7	
Total	2 594.1	3 302.4	3 693.8	4 391.5	4 837.6	5 250.0	6 044.5	6 466.3	6 604.2	6 677.8	6 737.9	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>


Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

SWEDEN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Finland	193.5	191.5	189.3	186.6	183.7	180.9	178.2	175.1	172.2	169.5	166.7	60
Iraq	55.7	62.8	67.6	70.1	72.6	82.8	97.5	109.4	117.9	121.8	125.5	46
Poland	40.5	41.1	41.6	43.5	46.2	51.7	58.2	63.8	67.5	70.3	72.9	57
Former Yugoslavia	73.3	74.4	75.1	74.6	74.0	73.7	72.9	72.3	71.6	70.8	70.1	49
Iran	51.8	52.7	53.2	54.0	54.5	55.7	56.5	57.7	59.9	62.1	63.8	47
Bosnia and Herzegovina	52.2	52.9	53.9	54.5	54.8	55.5	55.7	56.0	56.1	56.2	56.3	51
Germany	38.9	39.4	40.2	40.8	41.6	43.0	45.0	46.9	47.8	48.2	48.4	53
Denmark	38.9	39.9	40.9	41.7	42.6	44.4	45.9	46.2	46.0	45.5	45.0	47
Turkey	32.5	33.1	34.1	35.0	35.9	37.1	38.2	39.2	40.8	42.5	43.9	45
Norway	43.4	44.5	45.1	45.0	44.8	44.7	44.6	44.3	43.8	43.4	43.1	56
Somalia	13.5	14.0	14.8	15.3	16.0	18.3	21.6	25.2	31.7	37.8	40.2	50
Thailand	11.2	12.4	14.3	16.3	18.3	20.5	22.9	25.9	28.7	31.4	33.6	78
Chile	27.2	27.3	27.5	27.7	27.8	28.0	28.0	28.1	28.3	28.4	28.4	50
China	9.0	9.8	10.9	11.9	13.3	14.5	16.0	18.3	21.2	24.0	25.7	60
Lebanon	20.2	20.5	20.8	21.1	21.4	22.7	23.0	23.3	23.7	24.1	24.4	44
Other countries	326.4	337.1	348.6	362.3	378.4	401.5	423.5	450.0	480.6	508.9	539.5	
Total	1 028.0	1 053.5	1 078.1	1 100.3	1 125.8	1 175.2	1 227.8	1 281.6	1 338.0	1 384.9	1 427.3	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

Thousands

SWITZERLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Germany	318.9	330.0	51
Italy	233.1	241.0	45
Portugal	172.3	187.4	46
France	132.3	138.4	53
Turkey	76.0	76.9	47
Serbia	59.1	61.7	50
Austria	58.8	59.2	62
Spain	53.5	57.2	50
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	51.7	53.5	48
Bosnia and Herzegovina	51.1	52.4	52
United Kingdom	41.1	43.7	47
United States	33.7	34.9	52
Brazil	32.3	33.4	71
Sri Lanka	28.6	29.6	47
Poland	21.5	24.0	59
Other countries	713.9	737.4	
Total	2 075.2	2 158.4	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
UNITED KINGDOM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
India	570.0	553.0	601.0	661.0	687.0	686.0	48
Poland	229.0	423.0	495.0	540.0	534.0	617.0	51
Pakistan	274.0	357.0	422.0	427.0	382.0	441.0	47
Ireland	417.0	410.0	420.0	401.0	401.0	429.0	51
Germany	269.0	253.0	273.0	296.0	301.0	292.0	59
Bangladesh	221.0	202.0	193.0	199.0	193.0	219.0	46
South Africa	198.0	194.0	204.0	220.0	227.0	208.0	51
Nigeria	117.0	147.0	137.0	166.0	167.0	203.0	50
Italy	86.0	102.0	108.0	117.0	130.0	150.0	53
China	80.0	104.0	120.0	86.0	118.0	148.0	53
Philippines	95.0	107.0	101.0	134.0	110.0	140.0	56
Zimbabwe	111.0	106.0	101.0	126.0	111.0	137.0	56
France	111.0	134.0	129.0	144.0	122.0	132.0	52
Sri Lanka	102.0	114.0	96.0	105.0	118.0	131.0	46
Kenya	138.0	135.0	140.0	134.0	118.0	129.0	55
Other countries	2 739.0	2 851.0	3 093.0	3 143.0	3 337.0	3 368.0	
Total	5 757.0	6 192.0	6 633.0	6 899.0	7 056.0	7 430.0	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>Table B.4. **Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**Thousands
UNITED STATES

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Mexico	9 287.7	9 889.0	10 078.7	10 256.9	10 993.9	11 535.0	11 739.6	11 451.3	11 478.2	11 746.5	11 691.6	47
India	1 205.2	1 238.0	1 297.9	1 372.3	1 410.7	1 505.4	1 514.0	1 626.9	1 665.1	1 796.5	1 855.7	47
Philippines	1 371.1	1 467.7	1 443.3	1 509.8	1 594.8	1 634.1	1 708.5	1 685.1	1 733.9	1 766.5	1 814.9	60
China	1 063.4	1 081.2	1 127.7	1 218.4	1 202.9	1 357.5	1 367.8	1 339.1	1 425.8	1 604.4	1 651.5	55
Viet Nam	946.1	1 024.1	1 066.0	1 052.0	1 072.9	1 116.2	1 102.2	1 154.7	1 149.4	1 243.8	1 253.9	52
El Salvador	787.2	856.2	872.6	931.9	988.0	1 042.2	1 108.3	1 078.3	1 157.2	1 207.1	1 245.5	48
Korea	878.1	944.5	957.7	955.4	993.9	1 021.2	1 050.7	1 034.7	1 012.9	1 086.9	1 095.1	58
Cuba	902.5	880.8	888.7	925.0	902.4	932.6	980.0	987.8	982.9	1 112.1	1 090.6	51
Dominican Republic	631.9	648.5	679.9	716.5	708.5	764.9	747.9	779.2	791.6	879.9	878.9	58
Guatemala	443.1	510.0	523.7	585.2	644.7	741.0	683.8	743.8	790.5	797.3	844.3	41
Canada	829.1	812.8	849.5	808.5	830.3	847.2	816.4	824.3	814.1	785.6	787.5	55
Jamaica	536.3	580.4	600.8	590.1	579.2	643.1	587.6	631.7	645.0	650.8	694.6	56
Colombia	511.9	561.9	529.6	499.3	554.8	589.1	603.7	603.3	617.7	648.3	655.1	58
Germany	651.3	647.9	622.7	643.8	626.5	635.6	624.2	641.5	614.8	611.8	618.2	63
Haiti	434.7	448.4	505.7	445.3	483.7	495.8	544.5	545.8	536.0	596.4	602.7	55
Other countries	11 068.5	11 504.5	11 623.1	11 747.4	12 182.3	12 608.6	12 869.4	12 888.5	13 037.8	13 383.0	13 601.4	
Total	31 548.1	33 096.2	33 667.7	34 257.7	35 769.6	37 469.4	38 048.5	38 016.1	38 452.8	39 916.9	40 381.6	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824669>

Metadata related to Tables A.4 and B.4. **Stocks of foreign-born population**

	Comments	Source
Australia	Ⓒ Estimated resident population (ERP) based on Population Censuses. In between Censuses, the ERP is updated by data on births, deaths and net overseas migration. <i>Reference date:</i> 30 June.	Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).
Austria	Ⓒ Stock of foreign-born residents recorded in the population register. Break in time series in 2002. Revised data for 2002-07 to be coherent with the results of register-based census of 2006. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December (since 2002).	Population Register, Statistics Austria. Prior to 2002: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	Ⓒ Stock of foreign-born recorded in the population register. Excludes asylum seekers.	Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSIE).
Canada	Ⓒ 2001 and 2006: Total immigrants (excluding non-permanent residents). Immigrants are persons who are, or have ever been, landed immigrants in Canada. A landed immigrant is a person who has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by immigration authorities. Some immigrants have resided in Canada for a number of years and have changed status, while others are recent arrivals. ε PM for other years.	Statistics Canada.
Chile	Ⓒ 2002 Census. Ⓒ Register of residence permits granted for other years.	Register of permits of residence granted, Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Czech Republic	Ⓒ 2001 Census. ε CM for other years.	Czech Statistical Office.
Denmark	Ⓒ Immigrants according to the national definition, e.g. persons born abroad to parents both foreign citizens or born abroad. When no information is available on the parents' nationality/country of birth, persons born abroad are classified as immigrants.	Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Ⓒ Population Register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Finland	Ⓒ Population register. Includes foreign-born persons of Finnish origin.	Statistics Finland.
France	Ⓒ 2006-09 annual Censuses. Ⓒ 2010 Census. ε PM for other years (A.4). Including persons who were born French abroad.	National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
Germany	Ⓒ Microcensus.	Federal Statistical Office.
Greece	Ⓒ 2001 Census. Usual foreign-born resident population. Ⓒ From 2010 on: Labour Force Surveys (4th quarter).	National Statistical Service.
Hungary	Ⓒ Includes foreigners and ethnic Hungarians. Includes refugees. From 2010 on, it includes third country nationals holding a residence permit. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Population Register, Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Ⓒ Population national Register. Numbers from the Register are likely to be overestimated. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Ⓒ 2002 and 2006 Censuses. Persons usually resident and present in their usual residence on census night. ε PM for other years.	Central Statistics Office.
Israel	Estimates are based on the results of the Population Censuses. Intercensal changes are estimated based on variations recorded in the Population Register. The data refer to permanent immigrants, that is, to persons who entered the country to take up permanent residence under the Law of Return or the Law of Entrance. Before 2006, the detail by country of origin (Table B.4) includes Jews and Others and excludes Arabs whereas from 2006 on, it includes Jews only. For the whole period, the total foreign-born population (Table A.4) includes Jews and Others and excludes Arabs. Data for Algeria include Tunisia until 2009. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy		National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Luxembourg	Ⓒ 2001 and 2010: 2001 and 2011 Censuses. ε CM for other years.	Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Stotec).
Mexico	Ⓒ From 2005 on, estimation of the total number of foreign-born from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE).	National Migration Institute (INM) and National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
Netherlands	Ⓒ <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January of the following year.	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).

Metadata related to Tables A.4 and B.4. **Stocks of foreign-born population** (cont.)

	Comments	Source
New Zealand	Ⓒ 2001 and 2006 Censuses. ε PM for other years.	Statistics New Zealand.
Norway	Ⓒ <i>Reference date</i> : 31 December.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland	Ⓒ 2002 and 2011 Censuses. Excluding foreign temporary residents who, at the time of the census, had been staying at a given address in Poland for less than 12 months. Country of birth in accordance with political (administrative) boundaries at the time of the census.	Central Statistical Office.
Portugal	Ⓒ 2001 and 2011 censuses. ε CM for other years.	National Statistical Institute (INE).
Russian Federation	Ⓒ 2002 Census.	Federal Migration Service, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovak Republic	Ⓒ 2001 Census. Population who had permanent resident status at the date of the Census. Ⓒ 2004 Population Register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Ⓒ Central Population Register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	Ⓒ Population register. <i>Reference date</i> : 1st January (For a given year, data refer to the 1st January of the following year).	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	Ⓒ <i>Reference date</i> : 31 December.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Ⓒ 2000 Census. Ⓒ 2010 Population Register of the Confederation. ε CM for other years.	Federal Statistical Office.
Turkey	Ⓒ 2000 Census.	Turkish Statistical Institute.
United Kingdom	Ⓒ 2001 Census. Ⓒ From 2006 on: Labour Force Survey. Foreign-born residents. ε PM for other years. Figures are rounded.	Office for National Statistics.
United States	Ⓒ American Community Survey. ACS 2011 data from IPUMS-USA (http://usa.ipums.org/usa/).	Census Bureau.

Legends: Ⓒ Observed figures.

ε Estimates (in italic) made by means of the component method (CM) or the paramteric method (PM).

For more details on the method of estimation, please refer to www.oecd.org/migration/foreignborn. No estimate is made by country of birth (Table B.4).

Data for Serbia may include persons born in Montenegro.

Table A.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries and the Russian Federation

Thousands and percentages

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Austria	730.3	746.8	754.2	774.4	796.7	804.8	835.2	870.7	895.1	927.6	970.5
% of total population	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.5	9.7	9.7	10.1	10.4	10.7	11.1	11.5
Belgium	846.7	850.1	860.3	870.9	900.5	932.2	971.4	1 013.3	1 057.7	1 119.3	1 169.1
% of total population	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.6	8.8	9.1	9.5	9.8	10.3	10.6
Canada	1 568.6	1 758.9
% of total population	5.1	5.4
Czech Republic	210.8	231.6	240.4	254.3	278.3	321.5	392.3	437.6	432.5	424.3	434.2
% of total population	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	3.1	3.8	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.1
Denmark	266.7	265.4	271.2	267.6	270.1	278.1	298.5	320.2	329.9	346.0	358.9
% of total population	5.0	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.8	6.0	6.2	6.4
Estonia	273.8	269.5	266.5	262.6	255.1	243.8	232.2	223.6	219.2	218.7	218.3
% of total population	20.1	19.8	19.7	19.5	19.0	18.1	17.3	16.7	16.4	16.3	16.3
Finland	98.6	103.7	107.0	108.3	113.9	121.7	132.7	143.3	155.7	168.0	183.1
% of total population	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.4
France	3 541.8	3 696.9	3 731.2	3 773.2	3 769.0	3 824.8
% of total population	5.7	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Germany	7 318.6	7 335.6	7 334.8	6 717.1	6 755.8	6 751.0	6 744.9	6 727.6	6 694.8	6 753.6	6 930.9
% of total population	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.5
Greece	355.8	436.8	472.8	533.4	553.1	570.6	643.1	733.6	839.7	810.0	757.4
% of total population	3.2	4.0	4.3	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.7	6.5	7.4	7.2	6.7
Hungary	116.4	115.9	130.1	142.2	154.4	166.0	174.7	184.4	197.8	209.2	207.6
% of total population	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.1
Iceland	9.9	10.2	10.2	10.6	13.8	18.6	23.4	24.4	21.7	21.1	21.0
% of total population	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.6	4.7	6.1	7.5	7.6	6.8	6.6	6.6
Ireland	..	219.3	413.2	537.0
% of total population	..	5.6	9.7	12.0
Italy	1 448.4	1 549.4	1 990.2	2 402.2	2 670.5	2 938.9	3 432.7	3 891.3	4 235.1	4 570.3	4 825.5
% of total population	2.5	2.7	3.5	4.2	4.6	5.0	5.8	6.6	7.1	7.6	8.0
Japan	1 778.5	1 851.8	1 915.0	1 973.7	2 011.6	2 083.2	2 151.4	2 215.9	2 184.7	2 132.9	2 078.5
% of total population	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6
Korea	229.6	271.7	460.3	491.4	510.5	660.6	800.3	895.5	920.9	1 002.7	982.5
% of total population	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0
Luxembourg	166.7	170.7	177.8	183.7	191.3	198.3	205.9	215.5	216.3	220.5	229.9
% of total population	37.8	38.3	39.5	40.4	41.5	42.3	43.2	44.5	43.8	43.9	44.9
Mexico	262.7
% of total population	0.2
Netherlands	690.4	700.0	702.2	699.4	691.4	681.9	688.4	719.5	735.2	760.4	786.1
% of total population	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.7
Norway	185.9	197.7	204.7	213.3	222.3	238.3	266.3	303.0	333.9	369.2	407.3
% of total population	4.1	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.7	6.4	6.9	7.6	8.2
Poland	..	49.2	54.9	57.5	60.4	49.6	..	55.4
% of total population	..	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	..	0.1
Portugal	360.8	423.8	444.6	469.1	432.0	437.1	446.3	443.1	457.3	448.1	439.1
% of total population	3.5	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.2
Russian Federation	..	1 025.4	687.0	..
% of total population	..	0.7	0.5	..
Slovak Republic	29.4	29.5	29.2	22.3	25.6	32.1	40.9	52.5	62.9	68.0	70.7
% of total population	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.3
Slovenia	99.6	95.4	101.5
% of total population	4.9	4.7	4.9
Spain	1 977.9	2 664.2	3 034.3	3 730.6	4 144.2	4 519.6	5 268.8	5 648.7	5 747.7	5 751.5	5 711.0
% of total population	4.9	6.4	7.2	8.7	9.5	10.3	11.7	12.4	12.5	12.5	12.4

Table A.5. **Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries and the Russian Federation (cont.)**

Thousands and percentages

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Sweden	471.3	469.8	452.8	457.8	457.5	485.9	518.2	555.4	595.1	633.3	655.1
% of total population	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.7	6.0	6.4	6.8	6.9
Switzerland	1 419.1	1 447.3	1 471.0	1 495.0	1 511.9	1 523.6	1 571.0	1 638.9	1 680.2	1 720.4	1 772.3
% of total population	19.6	19.9	20.0	20.2	20.3	20.4	20.8	21.4	21.7	22.0	22.4
United Kingdom	2 587.0	2 584.0	2 742.0	2 857.0	3 035.0	3 392.0	3 824.0	4 186.0	4 348.0	4 524.0	4 785.0
% of total population	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.7	6.4	6.9	7.1	7.4	7.7
United States	18 533.7	20 490.6	20 634.1	21 115.7	21 159.7	21 863.7	22 359.4	21 835.7	21 100.8	21 317.3	21 057.0
% of total population	6.5	7.1	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.2	6.9	6.9	6.8

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Tables B.5.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824593>


Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

AUSTRIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Germany	75.3	78.2	83.6	91.2	100.4	109.2	119.8	130.7	138.2	146.4	153.5	50
Serbia	140.9	141.8	137.6	136.8	137.9	135.8	132.6	134.9	134.2	135.7	136.1	48
Turkey	127.1	127.2	123.0	116.5	113.1	108.2	109.2	110.7	112.2	113.5	114.0	48
Bosnia and Herzegovina	95.5	96.1	94.2	90.9	88.3	86.2	85.0	84.6	84.3	84.2	85.2	46
Croatia	57.3	58.5	58.5	58.6	58.1	56.8	56.4	56.3	56.3	56.5	56.8	47
Romania	17.8	19.5	20.5	21.3	21.9	21.9	27.6	32.3	36.0	41.7	48.5	55
Poland	21.4	21.8	22.2	26.6	30.6	33.3	35.5	36.9	37.4	38.8	42.5	48
Hungary	13.1	13.7	14.2	15.1	16.3	17.4	19.3	21.5	23.5	26.0	30.6	52
Russian Federation	3.7	4.9	8.0	14.2	17.2	18.8	20.0	21.8	22.3	22.8	23.4	56
Slovak Republic	7.5	8.5	9.5	11.3	13.0	14.2	15.7	18.1	19.3	20.5	23.0	64
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	13.2	14.4	15.3	16.0	16.3	16.3	16.5	17.0	17.3	18.0	18.3	47
Italy	10.7	10.9	11.3	11.7	12.2	12.7	13.4	14.3	15.1	16.0	17.0	41
Bulgaria	4.7	5.3	5.9	6.3	6.5	6.4	7.6	9.0	9.9	11.4	12.9	55
China	5.1	6.5	7.6	8.3	8.8	8.9	9.3	9.7	9.9	9.9	10.2	55
Czech Republic	6.2	6.6	6.9	7.4	7.7	8.0	8.3	9.1	9.2	9.4	9.9	63
Other countries	130.8	132.9	136.0	142.2	148.5	150.7	158.9	163.9	170.2	176.9	188.8	
Total	730.3	746.8	754.2	774.4	796.7	804.8	835.2	870.7	895.1	927.6	970.5	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

BELGIUM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Italy	190.8	187.0	183.0	179.0	175.5	171.9	169.0	167.0	165.1	162.8	159.7	46
France	111.1	113.0	114.9	117.3	120.6	125.1	130.6	136.6	140.2	145.3	150.0	52
Netherlands	92.6	96.6	100.7	105.0	110.5	117.0	123.5	130.2	133.5	137.8	141.2	47
Morocco	90.6	83.6	81.8	81.3	80.6	80.6	79.9	79.4	81.9	84.7	86.1	50
Poland	8.9	10.4	11.6	14.0	18.0	23.2	30.4	36.3	43.1	49.7	56.1	53
Spain	45.0	44.5	43.8	43.2	42.9	42.8	42.7	43.6	45.2	48.0	50.9	49
Germany	34.7	35.1	35.5	36.3	37.0	37.6	38.4	39.1	39.4	39.8	40.0	51
Turkey	45.9	42.6	41.3	39.9	39.7	39.4	39.5	39.6	39.6	39.8	39.4	49
Portugal	25.8	26.0	26.8	27.4	28.0	28.7	29.8	31.7	33.1	34.5	36.1	48
Romania	3.3	4.0	4.6	5.6	7.5	10.2	15.3	21.4	26.4	33.6	42.4	47
United Kingdom	26.4	26.2	26.2	26.0	25.7	25.1	25.1	25.5	25.0	25.0	24.8	44
Democratic Republic of the Congo	13.0	13.6	13.8	13.2	13.5	14.2	15.0	16.8	18.1	19.6	20.6	52
Bulgaria	1.5	1.9	2.2	2.7	3.3	3.9	6.7	10.4	13.2	17.3	20.4	49
Greece	17.6	17.3	17.1	16.6	16.3	15.7	15.2	14.9	14.8	14.8	15.0	49
Russian Federation	2.9	3.3	3.7	4.0	5.5	6.4	7.2	11.8	12.8	14.0	14.7	56
Other countries	136.8	144.9	153.2	159.5	175.9	190.3	203.3	208.9	226.3	252.6	271.7	
Total	846.7	850.1	860.3	870.9	900.5	932.2	971.4	1 013.3	1 057.7	1 119.3	1 169.1	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
CZECH REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ukraine	51.8	59.1	62.3	78.3	87.8	102.6	126.7	131.9	131.9	124.3	118.9	44
Slovak Republic	53.2	61.1	64.9	47.4	49.4	58.4	67.9	76.0	73.4	71.8	81.3	45
Viet Nam	23.9	27.1	29.0	34.2	36.8	40.8	51.1	60.3	61.1	60.3	58.2	42
Russian Federation	12.4	12.8	12.6	14.7	16.3	18.6	23.3	27.1	30.3	31.8	32.4	55
Poland	16.5	16.0	15.8	16.3	17.8	18.9	20.6	21.7	19.3	18.2	19.1	52
Germany	4.9	5.2	5.2	5.8	7.2	10.1	15.7	17.5	13.8	13.9	15.8	21
Moldova	2.5	2.8	3.3	4.1	4.7	6.2	8.0	10.6	10.0	8.9	7.6	40
Bulgaria	4.1	4.2	4.0	4.4	4.6	4.6	5.0	5.9	6.4	6.9	7.4	37
United States	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.5	5.3	5.6	6.1	7.3	41
China	3.3	3.2	4.0	3.4	3.6	4.2	5.0	5.2	5.4	5.5	5.6	46
Mongolia	6.0	8.6	5.7	5.6	5.4	59
United Kingdom	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.2	3.5	3.8	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.9	22
Romania	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.6	4.1	4.4	4.8	35
Kazakhstan	3.0	3.4	3.9	4.2	4.5	55
Belarus	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.2	59
Other countries	28.4	29.9	29.4	34.7	38.3	43.3	44.9	52.1	53.1	53.9	56.8	
Total	210.8	231.6	240.4	254.3	278.3	321.5	392.3	437.6	432.5	424.3	434.2	43

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
DENMARK

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	33.4	31.9	30.3	30.0	29.5	28.8	28.8	28.9	29.0	29.2	29.0	49
Poland	5.7	5.7	5.9	6.2	7.4	9.7	13.8	19.9	21.1	22.6	24.5	48
Germany	12.9	13.0	13.3	13.6	14.2	15.4	18.0	20.4	21.1	21.6	22.1	48
Iraq	16.5	18.0	19.4	19.2	18.7	18.1	18.3	17.6	16.7	16.7	15.7	47
Norway	13.2	13.4	13.8	13.9	13.9	14.2	14.4	14.8	15.0	15.1	15.3	61
United Kingdom	12.8	12.7	12.8	12.8	12.9	13.2	13.7	14.2	14.3	14.7	15.0	35
Sweden	10.8	10.7	10.8	10.9	11.2	11.6	12.1	12.7	12.8	12.9	13.1	59
Bosnia and Herzegovina	..	17.8	17.2	14.0	12.7	12.2	12.1	11.8	11.5	11.4	11.1	48
Afghanistan	7.1	8.2	9.1	9.3	9.4	9.4	9.5	9.4	9.1	9.5	9.6	46
Romania	2.4	3.7	5.1	6.9	9.5	45
Iceland	6.0	6.6	7.1	7.4	7.7	8.0	8.3	8.5	8.9	9.0	8.6	52
Thailand	4.9	5.2	5.4	5.6	5.9	6.2	6.7	7.3	7.7	8.3	8.6	84
Former Yugoslavia	34.8	10.8	10.7	9.8	9.4	8.7	8.6	8.1	9.1	8.9	8.5	50
Pakistan	7.2	6.9	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.7	6.9	7.1	7.8	8.2	49
Somalia	14.6	13.3	13.1	11.3	9.8	9.0	8.8	8.5	8.3	8.2	8.0	48
Other countries	86.8	91.2	95.4	96.8	100.9	107.0	116.3	127.5	133.1	143.3	152.1	
Total	266.7	265.4	271.2	267.6	270.1	278.1	298.5	320.2	329.9	346.0	358.9	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>


Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

FINLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Estonia	11.7	12.4	13.4	14.0	15.5	17.6	20.0	22.6	25.5	29.1	34.0	51
Russian Federation	22.7	24.3	25.0	24.6	24.6	25.3	26.2	26.9	28.2	28.4	29.6	58
Sweden	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.5	42
Somalia	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.9	4.9	5.6	6.6	7.4	48
China	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.6	3.0	3.4	4.0	4.6	5.2	5.6	6.2	53
Iraq	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.0	3.2	4.0	5.0	5.7	35
Thailand	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.6	3.0	3.5	3.9	4.5	5.0	5.5	87
Turkey	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.8	4.0	4.2	30
Serbia	1.9	2.2	2.8	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.8	3.9	45
Germany	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	41
India	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.6	2.0	2.3	2.7	3.2	3.5	3.8	37
United Kingdom	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.7	19
Viet Nam	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.8	3.1	54
Afghanistan	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.8	44
Iran	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	42
Other countries	31.0	31.6	31.0	30.6	32.8	35.9	40.5	45.3	49.4	53.4	58.2	
Total	98.6	103.7	107.0	108.3	113.9	121.7	132.7	143.3	155.7	168.0	183.1	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

FRANCE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Portugal	490.6	491.0	492.5	493.9
Algeria	481.0	475.3	471.3	469.0
Morocco	460.4	452.0	444.8	440.7
Turkey	223.6	223.4	220.1	220.7
Italy	177.4	175.2	174.3	173.5
United Kingdom	136.5	146.6	151.8	154.0
Tunisia	145.9	144.2	143.9	144.0
Spain	133.8	131.0	130.1	128.5
Germany	92.4	93.4	93.9	95.0
Belgium	81.3	84.4	87.7	90.9
China	66.2	72.1	76.7	81.4
Mali	56.7	59.5	59.7	62.2
Haiti	40.4	62.0	62.2	56.6
Senegal	49.5	50.5	50.2	51.5
Congo	44.3	46.1	47.7	48.6
Other countries	861.7	990.2	1 024.3	1 062.6
Total	3 541.8	3 696.9	3 731.2	3 773.2	3 769.0	3 824.8	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>


Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

GERMANY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	1 947.9	1 912.2	1 877.7	1 764.3	1 764.0	1 738.8	1 713.6	1 688.4	1 658.1	1 629.5	1 607.2	48
Italy	616.3	609.8	601.3	548.2	540.8	534.7	528.3	523.2	517.5	517.5	520.2	41
Poland	310.4	317.6	326.9	292.1	326.6	361.7	384.8	393.8	398.5	419.4	468.5	50
Greece	362.7	359.4	354.6	316.0	309.8	303.8	294.9	287.2	278.1	276.7	283.7	46
Serbia	125.8	297.0	316.8	330.6	319.9	298.0	232.4	236.8	49
Croatia	223.8	231.0	236.6	229.2	228.9	227.5	225.3	223.1	221.2	220.2	223.0	51
Russian Federation	136.1	155.6	173.5	178.6	185.9	187.5	187.8	188.3	189.3	191.3	195.3	62
Austria	189.0	189.3	189.5	174.0	174.8	175.7	175.9	175.4	174.5	175.2	175.9	47
Romania	88.1	88.7	89.1	73.4	73.0	73.4	84.6	94.3	105.0	126.5	159.2	49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	159.0	163.8	167.1	156.0	156.9	157.1	158.2	156.8	154.6	152.4	153.5	48
Netherlands	112.4	115.2	118.7	114.1	118.6	123.5	128.2	133.0	134.9	136.3	137.7	45
Ukraine	103.5	116.0	126.0	128.1	130.7	129.0	127.0	126.2	125.6	124.3	123.3	62
Portugal	132.6	131.4	130.6	116.7	115.6	115.0	114.6	114.5	113.3	113.2	115.5	45
France	111.3	112.4	113.0	100.5	102.2	104.1	106.5	108.1	107.3	108.7	110.9	53
Spain	128.7	127.5	126.0	108.3	107.8	106.8	106.3	105.5	104.0	105.4	110.2	50
Other countries	2 696.7	2 705.8	2 704.3	2 291.9	2 123.1	2 095.8	2 078.4	2 090.0	2 115.0	2 224.5	2 310.0	
Total	7 318.6	7 335.6	7 334.8	6 717.1	6 755.8	6 751.0	6 744.9	6 727.6	6 694.8	6 753.6	6 930.9	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

GREECE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Albania	209.5	262.1	294.7	325.6	341.0	347.4	384.6	413.9	501.7	485.0
Bulgaria	12.6	18.6	17.3	25.3	27.9	29.5	30.7	40.2	54.5	48.4
Romania	7.2	13.8	14.6	16.2	18.9	18.9	25.7	29.5	33.8	33.3
Georgia	10.2	12.0	9.5	14.1	16.9	15.1	23.8	33.6	33.9	32.8
Pakistan	2.9	4.8	6.2	4.2	5.5	6.7	13.9	18.0	23.0	21.2
Bangladesh	0.9	1.5	1.0	1.8	3.2	2.1	2.6	14.1	12.5	14.6
Russian Federation	19.9	22.0	17.8	16.8	17.6	18.9	21.6	16.7	19.5	14.1
Ukraine	6.4	11.3	10.2	13.1	12.2	12.2	14.1	11.9	13.7	12.2
Poland	13.5	14.1	15.9	17.0	16.1	16.6	21.4	18.9	11.2	10.2
Cyprus	5.2	7.7	8.1	12.2	11.0	10.6	11.2	14.2	11.8	9.9
Germany	3.5	2.3	4.3	3.8	5.6	6.7	7.1	8.1	7.3	9.6
Egypt	4.3	6.1	11.2	6.3	2.6	3.6	5.2	12.6	10.3	9.5
India	2.1	1.9	1.7	2.3	1.6	0.7	3.3	5.0	7.7	8.0
United Kingdom	5.3	3.6	6.2	7.1	7.7	7.6	8.0	7.5	7.5	7.3
Armenia	5.1	4.0	4.7	7.3	6.1	7.1	5.0	9.1	12.3	6.7
Other countries	47.3	50.8	49.5	60.1	58.9	66.8	64.8	80.2	79.0	87.2
Total	355.8	436.8	472.8	533.4	553.1	570.6	643.1	733.6	839.7	810.0	757.4	..

Notes: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See notes on Cyprus at the beginning of the Statistical annex.



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
HUNGARY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Romania	45.0	47.3	55.7	67.5	66.2	67.0	65.8	66.4	72.7	76.9	73.5	44
Germany	7.7	7.1	7.4	6.9	10.5	15.0	14.4	16.7	18.7	20.2	21.9	48
Ukraine	9.8	9.9	13.1	13.9	15.3	15.9	17.3	17.6	17.2	16.5	15.4	54
China	6.8	6.4	6.8	6.9	8.6	9.0	10.2	10.7	11.2	11.8	12.1	45
Serbia	8.4	7.9	8.3	13.6	8.4	8.5	13.7	13.7	11.5	10.7	8.7	47
Slovak Republic	2.2	1.5	2.5	1.2	3.6	4.3	4.9	6.1	6.4	7.3	8.1	60
Former Yugoslavia	4.1	..	3.7	4.2	3.5	3.3	5.7	5.8	4.7	46
Austria	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.5	1.5	2.2	2.6	3.0	3.7	3.9	4.1	37
Russian Federation	2.0	1.8	2.2	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.3	3.5	3.8	65
United States	1.9	2.3	2.4	3.1	3.3	3.4	45
Viet Nam	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.5	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.3	50
Poland	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.8	62
Former USSR	5.1	5.7	4.0	5.1	3.0	3.1	2.7	2.6	3.0	3.0	2.7	69
United Kingdom	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.4	1.5	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	33
France	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.3	40
Other countries	22.8	21.9	19.0	18.3	22.5	23.0	25.1	28.3	31.4	35.8	38.3	
Total	116.4	115.9	130.1	142.2	154.4	166.0	174.7	184.4	197.8	209.2	207.6	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
ICELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	3.2	6.0	9.9	11.0	9.6	9.1	9.0	46
Lithuania	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.6	46
Germany	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	66
Denmark	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	56
Latvia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	50
United Kingdom	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	29
Philippines	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	56
Thailand	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	69
United States	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	46
Portugal	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5	36
Sweden	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	61
France	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	47
Norway	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	62
Viet Nam	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	51
Spain	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	44
Other countries	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.4	4.2	5.1	4.9	4.6	4.0	3.9	3.9	
Total	9.9	10.2	10.2	10.6	13.8	18.6	23.4	24.4	21.7	21.1	21.0	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

IRELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	..	2.1	62.7	121.7	48
United Kingdom	..	101.3	110.6	110.0	50
Lithuania	..	2.1	24.4	36.4	52
Latvia	..	1.8	13.2	20.4	56
Nigeria	..	8.7	16.0	17.3	54
Romania	..	4.9	7.6	17.1	49
India	..	2.5	8.3	16.9	46
Philippines	..	3.7	9.3	12.6	56
Germany	..	7.0	10.1	11.1	56
United States	..	11.1	12.3	10.8	57
China	..	5.8	11.0	10.7	50
Slovak Republic	8.0	10.7	48
France	..	6.2	8.9	9.6	51
Brazil	..	1.1	4.3	8.6	49
Hungary	8.0	48
Other countries	..	61.1	106.5	115.1	..
Total	..	219.3	413.2	537.0	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

ITALY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Romania	83.0	95.0	177.8	248.8	297.6	342.2	625.3	796.5	887.8	968.6
Albania	159.3	216.6	270.4	316.7	348.8	375.9	401.9	441.4	466.7	482.6
Morocco	167.9	215.4	253.4	294.9	319.5	343.2	365.9	403.6	431.5	452.4
China	62.1	69.6	86.7	111.7	127.8	144.9	156.5	170.3	188.4	209.9
Ukraine	12.6	12.7	58.0	93.4	107.1	120.1	132.7	154.0	174.1	200.7
Philippines	67.7	64.9	72.4	82.6	89.7	101.3	105.7	113.7	123.6	134.2
Moldova	5.7	7.0	24.6	38.0	47.6	55.8	68.6	89.4	105.6	130.9
India	32.5	35.5	44.8	54.3	61.8	69.5	77.4	91.9	105.9	121.0
Poland	32.9	30.0	40.3	50.8	60.8	72.5	90.2	99.4	105.6	109.0
Tunisia	53.4	59.5	68.6	78.2	83.6	88.9	93.6	100.1	103.7	106.3
Peru	31.7	34.2	43.0	53.4	59.3	66.5	70.8	77.6	87.7	98.6
Ecuador	12.3	15.3	33.5	53.2	62.0	68.9	73.2	80.1	85.9	91.6
Egypt	31.8	33.7	40.6	52.9	58.9	65.7	69.6	74.6	82.1	90.4
Bangladesh	22.0	20.6	27.4	35.8	41.6	49.6	55.2	65.5	74.0	82.5
Sri Lanka	38.8	34.2	39.2	45.6	50.5	56.7	61.1	68.7	75.3	81.1
Other countries	634.6	605.1	709.5	791.8	853.9	917.2	984.9	1 064.5	1 137.2	1 210.4
Total	1 448.4	1 549.4	1 990.2	2 402.2	2 670.5	2 938.9	3 432.7	3 891.3	4 235.1	4 570.3	4 825.5	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

JAPAN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
China	381.2	424.3	462.4	487.6	519.6	560.7	606.9	655.4	680.5	687.2	674.9	58
Korea	632.4	625.4	613.8	607.4	598.7	598.2	593.5	589.2	578.5	566.0	545.4	54
Brazil	266.0	268.3	274.7	286.6	302.1	313.0	317.0	312.6	267.5	230.6	210.0	46
Philippines	156.7	169.4	185.2	199.4	187.3	193.5	202.6	210.6	211.7	210.2	209.4	78
Peru	50.1	51.8	53.6	55.8	57.7	58.7	59.7	59.7	57.5	54.6	52.8	47
United States	46.2	48.0	47.8	48.8	49.4	51.3	51.9	52.7	52.1	50.7	49.8	34
Viet Nam	19.1	21.1	23.9	26.0	28.9	32.5	36.9	41.1	41.0	41.8	44.7	46
Thailand	31.7	33.7	34.8	36.3	37.7	39.6	41.4	42.6	42.7	41.3	42.8	75
Indonesia	20.8	21.7	22.9	23.9	25.1	24.9	25.6	27.3	25.5	24.9	24.7	36
India	11.7	13.3	14.2	15.5	17.0	18.9	20.6	22.3	22.9	22.5	21.5	30
Nepal	7.8	9.4	12.3	15.3	17.5	20.4	33
United Kingdom	17.5	18.5	18.2	18.1	17.5	17.8	17.3	17.0	16.6	16.0	15.5	27
Pakistan	7.9	8.2	8.4	8.6	8.8	9.1	9.3	9.9	10.3	10.3	10.8	21
Canada	11.0	11.9	12.0	12.1	12.0	11.9	11.5	11.0	10.7	10.0	9.5	29
Bangladesh	7.9	8.7	9.7	10.7	11.0	11.3	11.3	11.4	11.2	10.2	9.4	29
Other countries	118.2	127.5	133.3	137.0	138.8	133.9	136.7	140.8	140.9	139.2	136.9	
Total	1 778.5	1 851.8	1 915.0	1 973.7	2 011.6	2 083.2	2 151.4	2 215.9	2 184.7	2 132.9	2 078.5	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

KOREA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
China	73.6	84.5	185.5	208.8	217.0	311.8	421.5	487.1	489.1	505.4	536.7	50
Viet Nam	16.0	16.9	23.3	26.1	35.5	52.2	67.2	79.8	86.2	98.2	110.6	45
Philippines	16.4	17.3	27.6	27.9	30.7	40.3	42.9	39.4	38.4	39.5	38.4	44
Indonesia	15.6	17.1	28.3	26.1	22.6	23.7	23.7	27.4	25.9	27.4	29.6	9
United States	22.0	37.6	40.0	39.0	41.8	46.0	51.1	56.2	63.1	57.6	26.5	38
Thailand	3.6	4.8	20.0	21.9	21.4	30.2	31.7	30.1	28.7	27.6	26.0	26
Uzbekistan	4.0	4.1	10.7	11.5	10.8	11.6	10.9	15.0	15.9	20.8	24.4	24
Chinese Taipei	22.8	22.7	22.6	22.3	22.2	22.1	22.1	27.0	21.7	21.5	21.4	47
Mongolia	..	1.4	9.2	11.0	13.7	19.2	20.5	21.2	21.0	21.8	21.3	43
Japan	14.7	15.4	16.2	16.6	17.5	18.0	18.4	18.6	18.6	19.4	21.1	71
Sri Lanka	2.5	2.7	4.9	5.5	8.5	11.1	12.1	14.3	14.4	17.4	20.5	3
Cambodia	..	0.0	0.7	1.3	2.0	3.3	4.6	7.0	8.8	11.7	16.8	39
Nepal	2.1	2.3	4.2	5.3	4.9	5.0	4.6	5.9	7.4	9.2	12.6	13
Bangladesh	9.1	9.0	13.6	13.1	9.1	8.6	7.8	7.7	7.3	9.3	10.6	4
Pakistan	3.3	3.7	7.1	9.2	8.7	8.9	8.0	7.9	7.8	8.3	8.2	8
Other countries	24.0	32.1	46.4	45.9	44.3	48.6	53.0	51.0	66.5	107.6	58.0	
Total	229.6	271.7	460.3	491.4	510.5	660.6	800.3	895.5	920.9	1 002.7	982.5	44

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
LUXEMBOURG

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Portugal	59.8	61.4	64.9	67.8	70.8	73.7	76.6	80.0	79.8	82.4	85.3	..
France	20.9	21.6	22.2	23.1	24.1	25.2	26.6	28.5	29.7	31.5	33.1	..
Italy	19.1	19.0	19.0	19.0	19.1	19.1	19.1	19.4	18.2	18.1	18.1	..
Belgium	15.4	15.9	16.2	16.3	16.5	16.5	16.5	16.7	16.8	16.9	17.2	..
Germany	10.1	10.2	10.5	10.8	10.9	11.3	11.6	12.0	12.1	12.0	12.3	..
United Kingdom	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.3	5.5	5.5	5.6	..
Spain	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.0	..
Netherlands	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	..
Poland	..	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.5	2.7	3.0	..
Denmark	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.0	1.9	..
Romania	..	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.9	..
Sweden	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	..
Greece	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.7	..
Ireland	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	..
Finland	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	..
Other countries	24.1	24.1	26.2	27.6	29.4	31.1	33.3	35.2	35.6	34.7	37.6	..
Total	166.7	170.7	177.8	183.7	191.3	198.3	205.9	215.5	216.3	220.5	229.9	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
MEXICO

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
United States	60.0
Spain	18.6
Argentina	15.2
Colombia	14.6
Canada	10.9
Cuba	10.3
China	10.2
Venezuela	10.1
France	9.4
Germany	8.9
Guatemala	8.4
Peru	6.6
Brazil	6.3
Korea	6.0
Italy	5.7
Other countries	61.6
Total	262.7


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
NETHERLANDS

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	100.3	100.3	101.8	100.6	98.9	96.8	93.7	92.7	90.8	88.0	84.8	49
Germany	55.6	56.1	56.5	57.1	58.5	60.2	62.4	65.9	68.4	71.4	72.8	55
Poland	6.3	6.9	7.4	11.0	15.2	19.6	26.2	35.5	43.1	52.5	65.1	51
Morocco	104.3	97.8	94.4	91.6	86.2	80.5	74.9	70.8	66.6	61.9	56.6	49
United Kingdom	43.6	44.1	43.7	42.5	41.5	40.3	40.2	41.1	41.4	41.4	41.4	40
Belgium	26.1	26.6	26.9	27.2	27.6	54
China	9.4	11.2	13.3	14.7	15.0	15.3	16.2	18.1	19.8	21.4	23.9	52
Italy	18.6	18.7	18.5	18.4	18.5	18.6	19.0	20.3	21.1	21.9	22.6	37
Spain	17.4	17.5	17.4	17.1	16.9	16.5	16.5	17.3	18.1	19.2	20.3	51
France	14.1	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.7	14.7	15.1	16.4	17.2	17.8	18.1	51
Bulgaria	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	6.4	10.2	12.3	14.1	16.8	50
Portugal	10.6	11.3	11.8	12.0	12.1	12.2	12.9	14.2	15.4	15.7	16.4	45
United States	15.2	15.4	15.1	14.8	14.6	14.6	14.5	14.9	14.6	14.8	15.3	51
Indonesia	10.1	10.8	11.2	11.4	11.5	11.4	11.4	11.6	11.6	11.7	11.8	68
India	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.7	4.3	5.4	6.4	8.0	8.7	9.6	10.8	39
Other countries	254.3	290.6	291.2	287.9	281.3	273.5	272.4	255.9	259.2	271.8	281.7	
Total	690.4	700.0	702.2	699.4	691.4	681.9	688.4	719.5	735.2	760.4	786.1	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
NORWAY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	2.2	2.6	2.7	3.9	6.8	13.6	26.8	39.2	46.7	55.2	66.6	33
Sweden	25.1	25.2	25.4	25.8	26.6	27.9	29.9	32.8	35.8	39.2	42.0	48
Lithuania	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.9	3.0	5.1	7.6	10.4	16.4	24.1	40
Germany	7.5	8.2	8.8	9.6	10.6	12.2	15.3	18.9	20.8	22.4	23.7	45
Denmark	19.7	20.0	20.0	20.1	20.2	20.3	20.5	20.6	20.7	20.9	21.4	46
United Kingdom	11.0	11.2	11.0	11.2	11.2	11.6	12.0	12.6	13.3	14.0	14.7	35
Russian Federation	3.9	4.8	6.2	7.4	8.2	8.8	9.7	10.4	10.6	10.8	10.9	64
Somalia	6.6	8.4	9.9	10.5	10.6	10.8	10.6	10.9	10.8	11.1	10.8	48
Iraq	10.8	13.0	13.4	13.7	13.1	12.1	10.7	11.0	10.9	10.6	10.3	42
Thailand	3.0	3.6	4.2	5.0	5.7	6.4	6.9	7.9	8.6	9.3	10.0	85
Philippines	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.9	4.8	6.1	6.8	7.8	8.9	82
United States	7.9	8.0	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.9	8.3	8.5	8.6	8.8	51
Afghanistan	1.8	3.0	4.3	5.1	5.9	6.5	6.5	6.6	7.2	7.7	7.6	37
Eritrea	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.4	2.1	3.8	5.7	7.6	48
Iceland	4.0	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	4.0	5.3	6.4	7.6	47
Other countries	79.5	82.0	83.0	84.9	85.9	88.7	94.3	104.2	113.7	123.2	132.4	
Total	185.9	197.7	204.7	213.3	222.3	238.3	266.3	303.0	333.9	369.2	407.3	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>


Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

POLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Ukraine	..	9.9	5.2	6.1	7.2	10.2	..	13.4	..
Germany	..	3.7	11.4	11.8	12.2	4.4	..	5.2	..
Russian Federation	..	4.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	4.2	..	4.2	..
Belarus	..	2.9	1.5	1.8	2.2	3.2	..	3.8	..
Viet Nam	..	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.9	..	2.6	..
Armenia	..	1.6	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.4	..	1.8	..
Sweden	..	0.5	2.6	2.8	2.8	1.3
Bulgaria	..	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1
United States	..	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1
Former USSR	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.0
Austria	..	0.3	2.6	2.7	2.8	1.0
Greece	..	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.9
United Kingdom	..	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8
France	..	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7
Czech Republic	..	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7
Other countries	..	18.2	19.4	19.6	20.1	14.8	..	24.4	..
Total	..	49.2	54.9	57.5	60.4	49.6	..	55.4	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

PORTUGAL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Brazil	48.7	61.6	66.3	78.6	70.4	74.0	69.8	107.3	116.6	119.6	111.5	57
Ukraine	45.7	63.0	66.4	67.0	44.9	42.8	40.1	52.6	52.4	49.5	48.0	46
Cape Verde	57.3	62.1	63.6	65.6	69.6	68.2	65.0	51.8	49.4	44.7	45.5	51
Romania	8.4	11.3	12.0	12.5	11.1	12.0	19.4	27.4	32.5	36.8	39.3	43
Angola	28.4	32.7	34.4	35.4	34.6	33.7	32.9	27.8	26.8	23.8	21.8	51
Guinea-Bissau	21.3	23.8	24.8	25.6	25.2	24.6	24.5	25.1	23.7	20.4	19.0	42
United Kingdom	15.0	15.9	16.9	18.0	19.0	19.8	23.6	15.4	16.4	17.2	17.7	48
China	7.3	8.5	9.1	9.7	9.4	10.6	10.8	13.4	14.4	15.8	16.9	48
Moldova	10.1	13.1	13.7	14.8	15.5	16.0	15.0	21.4	20.8	15.6	13.6	48
Sao Tome and Principe	8.3	9.6	10.1	10.9	11.9	11.4	11.0	12.0	11.8	10.9	10.8	53
Spain	13.6	14.6	15.3	15.9	16.4	16.6	18.0	7.2	8.1	8.9	9.3	47
Germany	11.1	11.9	12.5	13.1	13.6	13.9	15.5	8.2	8.6	9.0	9.1	49
Bulgaria	2.2	3.5	4.0	3.9	3.3	3.6	5.1	6.5	7.2	8.2	8.6	45
India	4.3	5.0	5.2	5.3	4.0	4.2	4.4	5.6	5.9	5.4	5.5	27
Italy	3.4	3.8	4.2	4.6	4.8	6.0	6.0	3.9	4.5	5.1	5.3	39
Other countries	75.7	83.3	86.1	88.3	78.6	80.1	85.3	57.7	58.3	57.2	57.2	..
Total	360.8	423.8	444.6	469.1	432.0	437.1	446.3	443.1	457.3	448.1	439.1	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Uzbekistan	..	70.9	131.1
Ukraine	..	230.6	93.4
Tajikistan	..	64.2	87.1
Azerbaijan	..	154.9	67.9
Armenia	..	136.8	59.4
Kyrgyzstan	..	28.8	44.6
Moldova	..	51.0	33.9
China	..	30.6	28.4
Kazakhstan	..	69.5	28.1
Belarus	..	40.3	27.7
Georgia	..	52.9	12.1
Viet Nam	..	22.5	11.1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	..	2.8	7.8
Turkmenistan	..	6.4	5.6
Turkey	..	5.0	5.4
Other countries	..	58.2	43.6
Total	..	1 025.4	687.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Czech Republic	5.9	5.4	4.9	3.6	4.4	5.1	6.0	6.9	8.3	9.0	6.4	44
Romania	0.4	0.7	3.0	5.0	5.4	5.8	5.6	27
Hungary	1.8	2.1	2.7	3.6	4.6	5.3	4.6	22
Germany	1.6	2.3	2.9	3.8	4.0	4.1	3.2	21
Poland	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.8	3.6	4.0	4.4	5.4	5.6	2.9	37
Serbia	0.4	0.7	1.4	2.9	3.6	3.9	2.8	39
Ukraine	4.6	4.7	4.9	4.0	3.7	3.9	3.7	4.7	5.9	6.3	2.8	50
Austria	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.7	2.1	2.2	1.7	22
Bulgaria	0.6	0.5	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.5	22
Italy	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.4	13
France	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.4	29
United Kingdom	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.3	27
Korea	0.4	0.8	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.1	40
China	0.5	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.0	48
Viet Nam	0.8	1.1	1.4	2.5	2.3	2.3	1.0	46
Other countries	16.5	17.0	17.0	12.1	5.6	6.8	7.9	9.1	11.9	13.2	8.3	
Total	29.4	29.5	29.2	22.3	25.6	32.1	40.9	52.5	62.9	68.0	47.1	33

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
SLOVENIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	42.5	41.7	42.7	23
Croatia	10.2	10.3	10.8	31
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	10.1	9.5	10.0	39
Serbia	10.0	7.5	9.7	29
Bulgaria	1.6	2.3	3.1	21
Ukraine	1.3	1.4	1.5	72
Italy	0.9	1.1	1.2	36
China	1.0	1.0	1.0	45
Germany	0.8	0.9	0.9	44
Russian Federation	0.6	0.7	0.9	66
Slovak Republic	0.7	0.9	0.8	45
United Kingdom	0.4	0.5	0.5	37
Romania	0.4	0.3	0.5	45
United States	0.3	0.3	0.3	42
France	0.2	0.3	0.3	38
Other countries	18.5	16.8	17.3	
Total	99.6	95.4	101.5	31

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
SPAIN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Romania	67.3	137.3	208.0	317.4	407.2	527.0	731.8	798.9	831.2	865.7	896.0	48
Morocco	307.5	379.0	420.6	511.3	563.0	582.9	652.7	718.1	754.1	774.0	783.1	41
United Kingdom	128.1	161.5	174.8	227.2	274.7	315.0	353.0	375.7	387.7	391.2	397.5	49
Ecuador	259.5	390.3	475.7	497.8	461.3	427.1	427.7	421.4	399.6	360.7	306.4	50
Colombia	191.0	244.7	248.9	271.2	265.1	261.5	284.6	296.7	292.6	273.2	244.7	55
Germany	113.8	130.2	117.3	133.6	150.5	164.4	181.2	191.0	195.8	196.0	196.7	50
Italy	46.2	65.4	77.1	95.4	115.8	135.1	157.8	175.3	184.3	188.0	191.7	42
Bolivia	13.5	28.4	52.3	97.9	139.8	200.5	242.5	230.7	213.2	199.1	184.7	59
Bulgaria	29.7	52.8	69.9	93.0	101.6	122.1	154.0	164.7	169.6	172.9	176.2	47
China	37.7	51.2	62.5	87.7	104.7	106.7	125.9	147.5	158.2	167.1	175.8	47
Portugal	52.1	56.7	55.8	66.2	80.6	100.6	127.2	140.9	142.5	140.8	138.5	38
Peru	44.8	55.9	68.6	85.0	95.9	103.7	121.9	139.2	140.2	132.6	121.9	52
France	59.8	69.9	66.9	77.8	90.0	100.4	112.6	120.5	123.9	122.5	121.5	50
Argentina	56.7	109.4	130.9	153.0	150.3	141.2	147.4	142.3	132.2	120.7	108.4	51
Brazil	23.7	31.3	37.4	54.1	72.4	90.2	116.5	126.2	117.8	107.6	99.0	65
Other countries	546.6	700.0	767.8	961.9	1 071.2	1 141.3	1 332.0	1 459.7	1 504.8	1 539.4	1 568.9	
Total	1 977.9	2 664.2	3 034.3	3 730.6	4 144.2	4 519.6	5 268.8	5 648.7	5 747.7	5 751.5	5 711.0	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>


Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

SWEDEN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Finland	97.5	96.3	93.5	90.3	87.1	83.5	80.4	77.1	74.1	70.6	67.9	58
Iraq	36.2	40.1	41.5	39.8	31.9	30.3	40.0	48.6	55.1	56.6	55.8	46
Poland	15.5	13.9	13.4	14.7	17.2	22.4	28.9	34.7	38.6	40.9	42.7	49
Denmark	26.6	28.1	29.7	31.2	32.9	35.8	38.4	39.7	40.3	40.5	40.5	42
Norway	33.3	34.7	35.5	35.6	35.4	35.5	35.6	35.5	35.2	34.9	34.8	51
Somalia	9.6	8.7	8.8	9.0	9.6	11.6	14.7	18.3	24.7	30.8	33.0	49
Germany	17.3	18.1	19.1	19.9	21.0	22.5	24.7	26.6	27.5	27.6	27.8	48
Thailand	6.3	6.8	8.3	9.8	11.2	12.5	13.9	15.5	17.1	18.3	19.0	80
United Kingdom	13.8	14.2	14.4	14.6	14.7	15.1	15.7	16.5	17.3	17.4	18.1	30
China	4.9	5.2	5.7	6.2	6.7	6.9	7.7	9.4	11.8	14.1	15.5	53
Iran	13.5	12.9	12.5	12.4	11.5	10.5	10.2	10.6	11.8	13.5	14.3	47
Afghanistan	4.6	5.3	6.1	6.8	6.9	7.7	7.9	8.2	8.6	9.8	12.7	37
Turkey	13.9	12.6	12.4	12.3	11.7	10.2	10.0	10.2	10.8	11.9	12.4	39
Romania	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	4.4	6.5	7.7	8.8	10.2	46
United States	10.0	9.6	9.4	9.3	9.2	8.4	8.3	8.5	8.9	9.1	9.3	45
Other countries	165.9	160.9	140.3	143.7	148.2	170.8	177.4	189.4	205.6	228.6	241.1	
Total	471.3	469.8	452.8	457.8	457.5	485.9	518.2	555.4	595.1	633.3	655.1	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

SWITZERLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Italy	314.0	308.3	303.8	300.2	296.4	291.7	289.6	290.0	289.1	289.1	290.5	42
Germany	116.6	125.0	133.6	144.9	157.6	172.6	201.9	233.4	250.5	264.2	276.8	44
Portugal	135.5	141.1	149.8	159.7	167.3	173.5	182.3	196.2	205.3	213.2	224.2	45
Serbia	194.7	198.1	199.8	199.2	196.2	190.8	187.4	180.3	149.9	115.0	104.8	48
France	61.5	63.2	65.0	67.0	69.0	71.5	77.4	85.6	90.6	95.1	99.5	46
Turkey	79.5	78.8	77.7	76.6	75.4	73.9	72.6	71.7	71.0	70.6	70.2	47
Spain	81.0	78.9	76.8	74.3	71.4	68.2	65.1	64.4	64.1	64.2	66.0	45
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	58.4	59.8	60.5	60.8	60.7	60.1	60.0	59.7	59.8	60.2	60.8	48
United Kingdom	22.2	22.8	23.4	24.1	24.9	26.0	28.7	31.9	34.1	36.4	38.6	42
Austria	29.9	31.1	31.6	32.5	32.8	32.9	34.0	35.5	36.5	37.2	38.2	46
Bosnia and Herzegovina	45.7	46.0	45.4	44.8	43.2	41.3	39.3	37.5	35.8	34.6	33.5	48
Croatia	43.9	43.4	42.7	41.8	40.6	39.1	37.8	36.1	34.9	33.8	32.8	50
Sri Lanka	24.6	49
Netherlands	14.6	15.0	15.2	15.4	15.8	16.1	17.0	18.1	18.5	19.1	19.4	45
Brazil	18.1	72
Other countries	416.2	434.0	445.5	453.0	456.9	265.9	277.9	299.0	341.1	389.6	376.2	
Total	1 419.1	1 447.3	1 471.0	1 495.0	1 511.9	1 523.6	1 571.0	1 638.9	1 680.2	1 720.4	1 772.3	47


Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824688>

Table B.5. **Stock of foreign population by nationality**Thousands
UNITED KINGDOM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	<i>Of which: Women 2011 (%)</i>
Poland	34.0	24.0	34.0	48.0	110.0	209.0	406.0	498.0	549.0	550.0	658.0	51
Ireland	436.0	403.0	367.0	368.0	369.0	335.0	341.0	359.0	344.0	344.0	386.0	52
India	132.0	145.0	154.0	171.0	190.0	258.0	258.0	294.0	293.0	354.0	332.0	44
Pakistan	82.0	97.0	83.0	86.0	95.0	78.0	133.0	178.0	177.0	137.0	166.0	44
Italy	102.0	98.0	91.0	121.0	88.0	76.0	95.0	96.0	107.0	117.0	153.0	52
Germany	59.0	68.0	70.0	96.0	100.0	91.0	88.0	91.0	121.0	129.0	132.0	61
Lithuania	47.0	54.0	73.0	67.0	99.0	129.0	54
Portugal	58.0	85.0	88.0	83.0	85.0	81.0	87.0	95.0	96.0	104.0	123.0	54
France	82.0	92.0	102.0	95.0	100.0	110.0	122.0	123.0	148.0	116.0	114.0	53
Nigeria	45.0	42.0	33.0	43.0	62.0	61.0	89.0	81.0	106.0	106.0	114.0	51
China	24.0	73.0	89.0	109.0	76.0	107.0	106.0	52
Philippines	27.0	32.0	54.0	52.0	51.0	71.0	76.0	64.0	93.0	58.0	86.0	50
South Africa	68.0	64.0	95.0	92.0	100.0	105.0	90.0	94.0	113.0	102.0	81.0	46
Romania	12.0	19.0	32.0	52.0	72.0	79.0	47
Sri Lanka	50.0	52.0	35.0	32.0	52.0	47.0	46.0	36.0	43.0	57.0	69.0	46
Other countries	1 388.0	1 382.0	1 536.0	1 570.0	1 633.0	1 738.0	1 831.0	1 963.0	1 963.0	2 072.0	2 057.0	
Total	2 587.0	2 584.0	2 742.0	2 857.0	3 035.0	3 392.0	3 824.0	4 186.0	4 348.0	4 524.0	4 785.0	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Metadata related to Tables A.5 and B.5. **Stocks of foreign population**

	Comments	Source
Austria	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December. Prior to 2002: annual average.	Population Register, Statistics Austria. Prior to 2002: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. From 2008 on, asylum seekers are included. This results in some artificial increase for some nationalities between 2007 and 2008. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information.
Canada	2001 and 2006 Censuses.	Statistics Canada.
Czech Republic	Holders of a permanent residence permit (mainly for family reasons), a long-term visa (over 90 days), a long-term residence permit (1-year permit, renewable) or a temporary residence permit (EU citizens). <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Register of Foreigners, Ministry of the Interior.
Denmark	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Excludes asylum seekers and all persons with temporary residence permits. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia		Police and Border Guard Board.
Finland	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	Foreigners with permanent residence in France. Including trainees, students and illegal migrants who accept to be interviewed. Excluding seasonal and cross-border workers.	Censuses, National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
Germany	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes asylum seekers living in private households. Excludes foreign-born persons of German origin (<i>Aussiedler</i>). Decrease in 2004 is due to cross checking of residence register and central register of foreigners. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Central Population Register, Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Includes some undocumented foreigners. <i>Reference date:</i> 4th quarter.	Labour Force Survey, National Statistical Service.
Hungary	Foreigners having a residence or a settlement document. From 2010 on, it includes refugees. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Office of Immigration and Nationality, Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Data are from the National Register of Persons. It is to be expected that figures are overestimates. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Census data.	Central Statistics Office (CSO).
Italy	Until 2003, data refer to holders of residence permits. Children under 18 who are registered on their parents' permit are not counted. Data include foreigners who were regularised following the 1998, 2002 and 2009 programmes. Since 2004, data refer to resident foreigners (those who are registered with municipal registry offices). <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Ministry of the Interior and National Statistical Institute (ISTAT).
Japan	Foreigners staying in Japan more than 90 days and registered in the register of Foreigners. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Register of Foreigners, Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.
Korea	Foreigners staying in Korea more than 90 days and registered in population registers. Data have been revised since 2002 in order to include foreign nationals with Korean ancestors (called overseas Koreans) who enter with F-4 visa and are also registered in population registers. The large increase in 2003 is mainly due to a regularisation programme introduced in that year.	Ministry of Justice.
Luxembourg	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in population register. Does not include visitors (less than three months) and cross-border workers. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December. 2010 figures are extracted from the February 2011 census.	Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	Number of foreigners who hold a valid permit for permanent residence (immigrants, FM2) or temporary residence (non immigrants, FM3).	National Migration Institute (INM).
Netherlands	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Figures include administrative corrections and asylum seekers (except those staying in reception centres). <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January of the following year.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
Norway	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. It excludes visitors (less than six months) and cross-border workers. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.

Metadata related to Tables A.5 and B.5. **Stocks of foreign population (cont.)**

	Comments	Source
Poland	2002 census data cover permanent residents, excluding those who had been staying abroad for more than 12 months. Foreign temporary residents who had been staying in Poland for less than 12 months. From 2006 on, data are from the Central Population Register.	2002 Census and Central Population Register, Central Statistical Office.
Portugal	Holders of a valid residence permit. Data for 2001-04 include stay permits delivered following the 2001 regularisation programme as well as foreigners who received long term permits (temporary stay, study and work) issued in each year. Data for 2005-06 include holders of valid residence permits, holders of valid stay permits (foreigners who renewed their stay Permits) and holders of long term visas (both issued and renewed every year). Work visas issued after 2004 include a certain number of foreigners that benefited from the regularisation scheme and also from the specific dispositions applying to Brazilian workers that resulted from a bilateral agreement. Data for women do not include the holders of long-term visas.	Ministry of the Interior, National Statistical Institute (INE) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Russian Federation	Censuses.	Federal Migration Service, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovak Republic	Holders of a permanent or long term residence permit.	Register of Foreigners, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Number of valid residence permits, regardless of the administrative status of the foreign national. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Central Population Register, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	Population register. Data include all registered foreign citizens independently of their administrative status. <i>Reference date:</i> 1st January (For a given year, data refer to the 1st January of the following year).	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Stock of all those with residence or settlement permits (permits B and C respectively). Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months. Does not include seasonal or cross-border workers. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
United Kingdom	Foreign residents. Those with unknown nationality from the New Commonwealth are not included (around 10 000 to 15 000 persons). There is a break in the series in 2004 as a result of a new weighting procedure. <i>Reference date:</i> 31 December.	Labour Force Survey, Home Office.
United States	Foreigners born abroad.	Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.

Data for Serbia may include persons from Montenegro.

Acquisitions of nationality

Nationality law can have a significant impact on the measurement of the national and foreign populations. In France and Belgium, for example, where foreigners can fairly easily acquire the nationality of the country, increases in the foreign population through immigration and births can eventually contribute to a significant rise in the population of nationals. On the other hand, in countries where naturalisation is more difficult, increases in immigration and births among foreigners manifest themselves almost exclusively as growth in the foreign population. In addition, changes in rules regarding naturalisation can have significant impact. For example, during the 1980s, a number of OECD countries made naturalisation easier and this resulted in noticeable falls in the foreign population (and rises in the population of nationals).

However, host-country legislation is not the only factor affecting naturalisation. For example, where naturalisation involves forfeiting citizenship of the country of origin, there may be incentives to remain a foreign citizen. Where the difference between remaining a foreign citizen and becoming a national is marginal, naturalisation may largely be influenced by the time and effort required to make the application, and the symbolic and political value individuals attach to being citizens of one country or another.

Data on naturalisations are usually readily available from administrative sources. The statistics generally cover all means of acquiring the nationality of a country. These include standard naturalisation procedures subject to criteria such as age or residency, etc., as well as situations where nationality is acquired through a declaration or by option (following marriage, adoption or other situations related to residency or descent), recovery of former nationality and other special means of acquiring the nationality of the country.

Table A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries and the Russian Federation
Numbers and percentages

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Australia	81 191	83 484	82 859	90 763	99 237	111 569	147 085	92 212	99 221	95 284	83 698
% of foreign population
Austria	31 731	36 011	44 694	41 645	34 876	25 746	14 010	10 258	7 978	6 135	6 690
% of foreign population	4.5	4.9	6.0	5.5	4.5	3.2	1.7	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.7
Belgium	62 982	46 417	33 709	34 754	31 512	31 860	36 063	37 710	32 767	34 635	29 786
% of foreign population	7.3	5.5	4.0	4.0	3.6	3.5	3.9	3.9	3.2	3.3	2.7
Canada	167 353	141 591	155 117	193 620	198 691	260 755	199 844	176 525	156 304	143 562	181 127
% of foreign population	..	9.0	11.4
Chile	340	245	329	376	519	498	698	619	812	629	874
% of foreign population
Czech Republic	6 321	4 532	3 410	5 020	2 626	2 346	1 877	1 837	1 621	1 495	1 936
% of foreign population	3.1	2.1	1.5	2.1	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.5
Denmark	11 902	17 300	6 583	14 976	10 197	7 961	3 648	5 772	6 537	3 006	3 911
% of foreign population	4.6	6.5	2.5	5.5	3.8	2.9	1.3	1.9	2.0	0.9	1.1
Estonia	3 090	4 091	3 706	6 523	7 072	4 753	4 228	2 124	1 670	1 184	1 518
% of foreign population	1.1	1.5	1.4	2.4	2.7	1.9	1.7	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.7
Finland	2 720	3 049	4 526	6 880	5 683	4 433	4 824	6 682	3 413	4 334	4 558
% of foreign population	3.0	3.1	4.4	6.4	5.2	3.9	4.0	5.0	2.4	2.8	2.7
France	127 548	128 092	144 640	168 826	154 827	147 868	131 738	137 452	135 842	143 275	114 584
% of foreign population	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.0
Germany	178 098	154 547	140 731	127 153	117 241	124 566	113 030	94 470	96 122	101 570	106 897
% of foreign population	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6
Greece	10 806	16 922	17 019
% of foreign population	1.9	2.6	2.3
Hungary	8 590	3 369	5 261	5 432	9 870	6 172	8 442	8 104	5 802	6 086	20 554
% of foreign population	7.8	2.9	4.5	4.2	6.9	4.0	5.1	4.6	3.1	3.1	9.8
Iceland	352	356	463	671	726	844	647	914	728	450	370
% of foreign population	4.0	3.6	4.5	6.6	6.8	6.1	3.5	3.9	3.0	2.1	1.7
Ireland	2 443	2 817	3 993	3 784	4 079	5 763	6 656	4 350	4 594	6 387	..
% of foreign population	1.8	1.6
Italy	10 382	10 685	13 406	11 934	19 266	35 766	38 466	39 484	40 084	40 223	21 206
% of foreign population	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.5
Japan	15 291	14 339	17 633	16 336	15 251	14 108	14 680	13 218	14 785	13 072	10 359
% of foreign population	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5
Korea	1 680	3 883	7 734	9 262	16 974	8 125	10 319	15 258	26 756	17 323	..
% of foreign population	0.8	1.7	2.8	2.0	3.5	1.6	1.6	1.9	3.0	1.9	..
Luxembourg	496	754	785	841	954	1 128	1 236	1 215	4 022	4 311	3 405
% of foreign population	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.9	2.0	1.5
Mexico	3 090	4 737	4 317	6 429	5 610	4 175	5 470	4 471	3 489	2 150	2 633
% of foreign population
Netherlands	46 667	45 321	28 799	26 173	28 488	29 089	30 653	28 229	29 754	26 275	28 598
% of foreign population	7.0	6.6	4.1	3.7	4.1	4.2	4.5	4.1	4.1	3.6	3.8
New Zealand	23 651	19 569	18 366	22 227	24 462	29 248	29 916	23 623	18 005	15 173	19 287
% of foreign population
Norway	10 838	9 041	7 867	8 154	12 655	11 955	14 877	10 312	11 442	11 903	14 637
% of foreign population	5.9	4.9	4.0	4.0	5.9	5.4	6.2	3.9	3.8	3.6	4.0
Poland	766	1 186	1 634	1 937	2 866	989	1 528	1 054	2 503	2 926	2 325
% of foreign population	3.3	2.8	1.8	4.1	5.9	4.4
Portugal	1 082	1 369	1 747	1 346	939	3 627	6 020	22 408	24 182	21 750	..
% of foreign population	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.8	1.4	5.0	5.5	4.8	..
Russian Federation	359 195	272 463	31 528	330 419	504 518	366 488	367 699	361 363	394 137	111 298	134 980
% of foreign population	3.1	19.6

Table A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries and the Russian Federation
Numbers and percentages

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Slovak Republic	3 492	4 016	1 393	1 125	1 478	680	262	239	272
% of foreign population	11.8	13.8	6.3	4.4	4.6	1.7	0.5	0.4	0.4
Slovenia	823	1 448	1 690	1 807	1 798
% of foreign population	1.8	1.9
Spain	16 743	21 810	26 556	38 335	42 829	62 339	71 810	84 170	79 597	123 721	114 599
% of foreign population	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.4	2.2	2.0
Sweden	35 458	36 978	32 351	26 130	35 531	46 995	32 473	29 330	28 562	32 457	36 634
% of foreign population	7.5	7.8	6.9	5.8	7.8	10.3	6.7	5.7	5.1	5.5	5.8
Switzerland	27 586	36 515	35 424	35 685	38 437	46 711	43 889	44 365	43 440	39 314	36 757
% of foreign population	2.0	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.6	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.3	2.1
Turkey	..	23 725	21 086	8 238	6 901	5 072
% of foreign population
United Kingdom	90 282	120 121	130 535	148 273	161 699	154 018	164 637	129 377	203 789	195 046	177 785
% of foreign population	3.9	4.6	5.1	5.4	5.7	5.1	4.9	3.4	4.9	4.5	3.9
United States	608 205	573 708	463 204	537 151	604 280	702 589	660 477	1 046 539	743 715	619 913	694 193
% of foreign population	3.4	3.1	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.0	4.6	3.3	2.9	3.2

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Tables B.6.


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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
AUSTRALIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
United Kingdom	14 073	16 473	14 971	19 980	21 750	23 274	30 452	20 209	19 216	19 101	16 401	48
India	2 356	2 781	3 391	4 068	6 408	9 363	12 864	7 756	12 789	12 948	10 076	45
China	4 936	5 105	5 996	6 164	6 846	8 425	11 357	6 696	8 369	8 898	6 876	57
Philippines	2 688	2 855	3 009	3 470	3 677	4 142	5 179	3 264	3 974	4 051	5 592	56
South Africa	3 467	3 970	4 503	5 238	5 189	5 316	7 077	4 290	4 571	4 389	4 206	49
New Zealand	15 627	16 112	14 578	10 858	8 710	7 096	7 795	5 129	3 760	4 304	3 458	50
Viet Nam	2 095	1 902	1 749	2 285	2 147	2 171	2 893	1 581	1 669	1 688	1 929	67
Sri Lanka	1 506	1 316	1 436	1 743	1 750	2 536	3 812	2 324	2 598	2 520	1 671	47
Korea	985	743	826	1 088	1 291	1 876	2 946	1 560	1 562	2 321	1 570	56
Malaysia	1 303	1 573	1 672	1 971	2 008	2 158	3 350	2 033	1 799	2 207	1 487	53
United States	1 160	1 298	1 307	1 578	1 675	1 951	2 347	1 575	1 524	1 680	1 356	52
Bangladesh	350	306	348	447	663	950	1 207	1 212	2 529	1 178	1 183	49
Ireland	816	825	744	1 084	1 183	1 213	1 667	928	1 105	1 302	1 145	44
Zimbabwe	126	220	436	587	782	1 015	1 266	806	1 062	1 090	1 143	51
Thailand	486	541	612	806	983	1 200	1 621	852	1 239	1 343	1 125	75
Other countries	29 217	27 464	27 281	29 396	34 175	38 883	51 252	31 997	31 455	26 264	24 480	
Total	81 191	83 484	82 859	90 763	99 237	111 569	147 085	92 212	99 221	95 284	83 698	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
AUSTRIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	10 046	12 623	13 665	13 004	9 545	7 542	2 076	1 664	1 242	937	1 178	44
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3 856	5 913	8 268	8 657	7 026	4 596	3 329	2 207	1 457	1 278	1 174	57
Serbia	4 296	4 806	9 836	7 245	6 681	4 825	4 254	2 595	2 003	1 268	1 092	51
Croatia	1 986	2 537	2 588	2 212	2 276	2 494	1 349	824	440	456	363	63
Russian Federation	166	161	83	194	235	228	128	127	135	137	296	56
Romania	2 813	1 774	2 096	1 373	1 128	981	455	382	246	114	223	68
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	471	574	786	803	991	716	414	377	281	150	182	53
Afghanistan	44	69	135	322	454	261	43	106	108	113	157	43
Iran	451	328	272	411	432	253	88	99	103	111	138	43
Germany	106	85	106	135	135	122	113	67	174	132	117	50
Ukraine	71	104	146	230	182	145	81	70	80	75	106	74
China	727	715	591	545	323	182	57	67	76	58	97	63
Egypt	807	599	615	616	506	382	100	121	124	94	97	43
Poland	606	930	768	768	443	236	172	129	138	99	91	62
India	638	656	525	562	421	159	137	122	90	84	82	44
Other countries	4 647	4 137	4 214	4 568	4 098	2 624	1 214	1 301	1 281	1 029	1 297	
Total	31 731	36 011	44 694	41 645	34 876	25 746	14 010	10 258	7 978	6 135	6 690	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
BELGIUM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Morocco	24 018	15 832	10 565	8 704	7 977	7 753	8 722	8 427	6 919	7 380	7 035	54
Italy	3 451	2 341	2 646	2 271	2 086	2 360	2 017	1 762	1 700	2 833	3 697	48
Turkey	14 401	7 805	5 186	4 467	3 602	3 204	3 039	3 182	2 763	2 760	2 359	51
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2 991	2 809	1 785	2 566	1 917	1 567	1 793	1 795	1 555	1 603	1 158	58
Russian Federation	265	301	153	244	297	487	1 533	2 599	1 647	1 641	1 032	56
France	1 025	856	698	780	772	820	836	838	792	717	638	59
Cameroon	214	266	242	250	317	463	401	490	600	54
Algeria	1 281	926	826	826	739	658	687	744	739	739	584	47
Netherlands	601	646	522	665	672	692	668	683	608	641	495	48
Pakistan	474	404	270	298	306	348	666	559	628	605	440	48
Poland	677	630	460	465	470	550	586	619	640	523	394	65
Iran	144	131	135	137	252	352	304	450	377	46
Romania	321	294	277	314	332	429	554	480	362	395	356	64
Serbia	239	403	317	756	769	768	701	803	452	51
Ghana	297	319	270	313	281	315	388	357	416	501	330	50
Other countries	12 941	12 851	9 376	11 688	10 915	11 522	13 304	14 850	13 293	12 554	9 839	
Total	62 982	46 417	33 709	34 754	31 512	31 860	36 063	37 710	32 767	34 635	29 786	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
CANADA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
India	14 029	12 623	13 934	21 826	22 059	33 967	25 789	20 827	17 396	18 956	22 202	51
Philippines	9 485	7 622	8 225	9 022	11 035	15 566	12 196	11 666	11 068	11 608	16 138	58
China	17 406	16 321	20 021	25 138	25 771	34 474	24 345	21 025	16 008	13 412	15 550	57
Pakistan	8 610	7 292	6 494	10 676	12 429	17 121	11 623	9 430	7 838	8 062	9 925	51
United Kingdom	2 964	2 698	4 366	7 452	6 743	6 492	5 170	4 657	4 310	4 456	6 010	48
United States	2 943	2 812	3 859	5 288	5 058	5 117	4 267	4 133	3 734	3 712	5 085	55
Iran	6 322	5 712	5 135	4 616	4 984	8 087	5 336	4 988	3 828	3 575	4 932	50
Korea	3 106	3 464	4 350	5 909	5 425	7 558	5 860	5 248	3 835	3 159	4 088	53
Colombia	554	724	953	1 510	2 084	3 136	3 782	4 671	4 286	3 811	4 076	53
Romania	3 376	2 672	3 105	3 294	4 470	5 884	4 682	4 374	4 417	3 089	3 720	53
Sri Lanka	4 376	3 500	3 261	5 151	4 579	5 650	4 703	3 691	3 186	2 915	3 340	55
Algeria	1 756	1 557	1 687	1 500	2 146	3 329	2 552	2 150	3 159	2 451	3 315	49
Russian Federation	3 417	3 379	3 438	3 796	4 077	4 621	3 677	3 324	2 714	2 365	2 973	55
Bangladesh	2 282	1 553	1 527	2 053	2 859	3 415	2 023	1 873	2 140	2 282	2 888	48
Morocco	924	922	1 347	1 190	2 338	3 871	2 728	2 225	3 371	2 031	2 724	48
Other countries	85 803	68 740	73 415	85 199	82 634	102 467	81 111	72 243	65 014	57 678	74 161	
Total	167 353	141 591	155 117	193 620	198 691	260 755	199 844	176 525	156 304	143 562	181 127	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
CHILE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Peru	36	30	52	84	123	117	196	174	170	128	214	57
Cuba	16	17	25	55	88	92	109	115	107	98	137	45
Bolivia	111	76	96	59	99	93	95	69	114	78	119	65
Ecuador	2	4	2	12	20	21	43	62	72	81	97	62
Colombia	12	2	14	13	16	19	44	26	61	44	75	64
China	48	28	30	40	18	25	24	16	46	25	24	38
Argentina	7	8	11	13	15	7	11	10	20	11	23	43
Venezuela	1	1	4	1	2	3	9	8	14	14	22	68
Pakistan	..	1	2	2	9	7	10	4	17	15	16	19
India	22	3	16	11	10	7	13	16	16	44
Chinese Taipei	31	15	20	16	45	46	44	35	60	38	15	13
Russian Federation	1	1	..	1	2	1	3	5	8	50
Syria	5	8	3	7	6	9	9	9	6	33
Uruguay	2	8	4	2	4	6	5	2	6	100
United States	1	1	..	2	1	6	17
Other countries	46	43	50	59	61	45	81	67	131	97	90	
Total	340	245	329	376	519	498	698	619	812	629	874	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
CZECH REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ukraine	173	251	419	446	239	425	424	398	520	391	501	..
Slovak Republic	3 593	2 109	989	1 741	1 259	786	625	521	431	377	378	..
Poland	163	304	170	298	167	86	50	53	58	63	198	..
Former Czechoslovakia	1 607	1 273	1 154	1 784	190	205	225	229	173	171	144	..
Viet Nam	76	29	46	47	62	43	40	42	44	52	86	..
Romania	140	109	116	101	143	131	36	83	35	36	76	..
Russian Federation	87	65	7	86	134	107	102	84	58	50	68	..
Kazakhstan	25	43	156	89	43	129	18	121	21	17	48	..
Armenia	11	8	18	23	32	61	28	19	16	11	47	..
Belarus	19	13	14	21	35	27	39	27	20	15	38	..
Moldova	2	4	4	1	11	9	33	21	23	15	32	..
Bulgaria	132	95	54	62	48	48	14	11	12	21	28	..
Algeria	..	3	6	5	9	9	12	4	..	10	17	..
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13	20	47	62	63	37	19	11	9	9	16	..
Yemen	12	..
Other countries	280	206	210	254	191	243	212	213	201	257	247	
Total	6 321	4 532	3 410	5 020	2 626	2 346	1 877	1 837	1 621	1 495	1 936	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
DENMARK

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Iraq	871	1 161	153	1 015	961	1 113	515	1 166	1 201	368	838	49
Afghanistan	215	301	40	367	282	260	178	359	790	354	576	43
Somalia	1 074	2 263	324	2 022	1 709	923	317	527	264	142	233	50
Turkey	3 130	2 418	2 158	732	878	1 125	527	581	511	239	227	55
Iran	437	519	120	505	317	203	89	207	155	63	113	58
Bosnia and Herzegovina	519	224	270	265	131	110	61
China	195	289	203	339	382	281	162	181	199	103	103	51
Norway	134	93	73	76	51	76	64
Pakistan	297	573	94	332	305	172	93	191	214	21	73	44
Sweden	66	48	39	52	58	64	61
Ethiopia	58	32	71	116	98	62	35
Former Yugoslavia	355	784	239	835	324	594	165	196	228	83	62	42
Sri Lanka	365	594	119	678	332	148	73	127	74	20	58	64
Viet Nam	318	508	280	318	232	213	129	78	144	86	58	50
Thailand	124	172	62	180	114	95	61	79	96	64	57	51
Other countries	4 521	7 718	2 791	7 653	4 361	2 057	942	1 627	2 152	1 125	1 201	
Total	11 902	17 300	6 583	14 976	10 197	7 961	3 648	5 772	6 537	3 006	3 911	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
FINLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Russian Federation	533	418	1 682	2 313	2 094	1 399	1 665	2 211	1 026	1 925	1 652	70
Estonia	295	319	468	690	291	176	182	262	166	243	302	68
Sweden	57	61	94	149	198	178	163	274	126	104	196	43
Turkey	82	112	141	171	128	110	102	195	94	132	166	33
Iran	58	68	124	225	233	213	218	329	180	137	145	47
Serbia	14	41	32	338	346	248	240	371	173	122	133	50
Iraq	224	217	165	447	346	405	443	379	207	78	106	49
Afghanistan	..	23	3	14	48	101	102	279	186	108	100	50
Somalia	222	204	209	165	414	445	464	595	290	131	96	47
Ukraine	8	28	66	130	65	46	45	62	53	92	95	66
China	106	136	126	95	60	57	68	84	53	85	88	64
Viet Nam	164	205	133	209	82	64	79	78	42	54	82	62
India	33	37	23	53	32	8	26	28	27	73	76	53
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8	34	58	129	129	81	82	84	56	41	67	55
Morocco	37	41	31	70	32	35	46	49	22	65	54	44
Other countries	879	1 105	1 171	1 682	1 185	867	899	1 402	712	944	1 200	
Total	2 720	3 049	4 526	6 880	5 683	4 433	4 824	6 682	3 413	4 334	4 558	58

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
FRANCE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Morocco	34 922	33 967	36 875	..	37 848	28 699	26 097	27 637	20 965	48
Algeria	15 498	15 711	20 245	..	25 435	20 256	20 659	20 941	15 039	49
Turkey	10 755	10 468	10 492	..	13 618	10 202	9 171	8 448	6 333	46
Tunisia	10 251	9 956	11 412	..	12 012	9 471	9 268	8 520	6 288	44
Portugal	9 182	8 844	9 576	..	8 888	7 778	6 415	4 903	3 805	50
Russian Federation	730	831	951	..	1 132	3 530	4 157	4 503	3 382	64
Senegal	1 463	1 858	2 185	..	2 345	3 038	3 364	3 508	2 825	52
Cameroon	1 381	1 770	2 196	..	2 081	2 014	2 411	2 824	2 356	63
Côte d'Ivoire	1 194	1 495	1 869	..	1 987	2 197	2 565	3 003	2 161	58
Mali	581	774	947	..	1 365	2 237	2 704	2 698	2 054	50
Serbia	1 884	1 910	2 133	..	2 749	3 375	3 219	3 179	2 048	50
Congo	1 100	1 475	1 769	..	2 390	2 933	3 269	3 327	1 908	52
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 401	1 572	2 012	..	2 631	2 402	2 294	2 293	1 698	53
Haiti	1 571	2 082	2 734	..	2 744	2 922	2 981	2 771	1 627	55
Madagascar	1 281	1 352	1 628	..	1 440	1 360	1 498	1 691	1 570	70
Other countries	34 354	34 027	37 616	168 826	36 162	147 868	131 738	35 038	35 770	43 029	40 525	
Total	127 548	128 092	144 640	168 826	154 827	147 868	131 738	137 452	135 842	143 275	114 584	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
GERMANY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Turkey	76 573	64 631	56 244	44 465	32 661	33 388	28 861	24 449	24 647	26 192	28 103	45
Iraq	1 264	1 721	2 999	3 564	4 136	3 693	4 102	4 229	5 136	5 228	4 790	41
Poland	1 774	2 646	2 990	7 499	6 896	6 907	5 479	4 245	3 841	3 789	4 281	72
Ukraine	3 295	3 656	3 889	3 844	3 363	4 536	4 454	1 953	2 345	3 118	4 264	61
Morocco	4 425	3 800	4 118	3 820	3 684	3 546	3 489	3 130	3 042	2 806	3 011	39
Russian Federation	4 972	3 734	2 764	4 381	5 055	4 679	4 069	2 439	2 477	2 753	2 965	61
Iran	12 020	13 026	9 440	6 362	4 482	3 662	3 121	2 734	3 184	3 046	2 728	50
Afghanistan	5 111	4 750	4 948	4 077	3 133	3 063	2 831	2 512	3 549	3 520	2 711	50
Serbia	400	3 539	8 824	12 601	10 458	6 484	4 309	3 039	2 657	50
Viet Nam	3 014	1 482	1 423	1 371	1 278	1 382	1 078	1 048	1 513	1 738	2 428	55
Romania	2 026	1 974	1 394	1 309	1 789	1 379	3 502	2 137	2 357	2 523	2 399	71
Greece	1 402	1 105	1 114	1 507	1 346	1 657	2 691	1 779	1 362	1 450	2 290	48
Israel	1 364	1 739	2 844	3 164	2 871	4 313	2 405	1 971	1 681	1 649	1 971	47
Kazakhstan	2 148	2 027	3 010	1 443	2 975	3 207	2 180	1 602	1 439	1 601	1 923	62
Italy	1 048	847	1 180	1 656	1 629	1 558	1 265	1 392	1 273	1 305	1 707	49
Other countries	57 662	47 409	41 974	35 152	33 119	34 995	33 045	32 366	33 967	37 813	38 669	
Total	178 098	154 547	140 731	127 153	117 241	124 566	113 030	94 470	96 122	101 570	106 897	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
GREECE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Albania	5 688	9 996	14 271
Georgia	489	1 285	550
Russian Federation	475	834	410
Turkey	223	212	175
Australia	105	164	138
Armenia	80	165	137
Ukraine	68	167	129
United States	105	175	127
Germany	39	85	105
Cyprus	109	68	87
Romania	83	79	63
Bulgaria	105	89	62
Canada	44	49	49
Egypt	62	50	45
Israel	82	81	40
Other countries	3 049	3 423	631
Total	10 806	16 922	17 019

Notes: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See notes on Cyprus at the beginning of the Statistical annex.


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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
HUNGARY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Romania	5 644	2 238	3 415	3 605	6 890	4 303	6 052	5 535	3 805	3 939	15 658	54
Ukraine	828	541	834	857	558	646	2 189	63
Serbia	949	357	757	758	672	721	1 678	44
Slovak Republic	161	206	116	106	97	97	414	63
Russian Federation	162	111	7	156	119	111	168	64
Croatia	50	148	26	34	25	26	61	52
Germany	25	22	28	33	35	25	55	56
Viet Nam	53	40	53	95	39	75	38	58
Poland	26	10	10	14	13	9	27	59
Austria	6	6	3	8	7	4	20	45
Mongolia	11	14	10	4	14	16	18	83
United States	3	4	12	11	9	2	17	41
Czech Republic	142	14	60	75	60	76	16	63
China	16	15	31	29	20	27	15	67
Turkey	7	4	6	13	10	9	12	17
Other countries	2 946	1 131	1 846	1 827	541	377	437	376	319	303	168	..
Total	8 590	3 369	5 261	5 432	9 870	6 172	8 442	8 104	5 802	6 086	20 554	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
ICELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland	39	48	67	133	184	222	162	164	153	50	35	57
Philippines	64	45	64	59	45	105	69	126	106	67	35	60
Serbia				73	70	78	33	109	76	27	34	47
Thailand	40	50	51	48	50	54	45	62	40	28	27	67
Colombia	2	..	2	5	2	4	4	4	9	5	24	67
Viet Nam	15	9	8	19	23	41	16	52	51	39	14	57
Russian Federation	4	5	11	33	23	24	17	38	17	21	12	50
United States	32	22	34	33	31	34	33	20	15	19	11	18
Ukraine	1	2	4	18	6	9	13	18	18	15	10	60
Nepal	1	7	10	5	8	10	4	9	33
Lithuania	4	3	1	9	7	5	23	23	9	11	8	63
United Kingdom	6	13	15	15	10	14	5	4	4	5	7	43
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	3	1	1	17	7	24	14	16	9	6	33
Sweden	3	6	5	7	16	11	9	1	5	3	6	67
Portugal	1	9	5	1	12	6	2	3	4	2	6	50
Other countries	137	141	195	216	223	220	187	268	195	145	126	
Total	352	356	463	671	726	844	647	914	728	450	370	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
IRELAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Nigeria	155	189	142	319	454	1 012
Philippines	43	70	37	84	410	630
India	144	126	119	166	339	443
South Africa	257	363	219	205	318	343
Pakistan	213	239	189	196	201	306
China	57	85	45	102	131	258
Russian Federation	81	109	86	160	246	253
Bangladesh	8	20	25	41	146	238
Ukraine	31	25	34	97	153	202
Sudan	40	39	40	80	123	170
Zimbabwe	55	67	46	89	111	147
Romania	92	81	46	74	117	143
Moldova	21	22	11	67	72	115
United States	890	1 518	1 841	875	156	112
Belarus	11	14	7	38	72	106
Other countries	1 981	2 796	3 769	1 757	1 545	1 909
Total	2 443	2 817	3 993	3 784	4 079	5 763	6 656	4 350	4 594	6 387

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
ITALY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Morocco	579	624	1 132	1 046	..	3 295	3 850	..	5 917	6 952
Albania	687	703	830	882	..	2 330	2 605	..	6 101	5 628
Romania	855	968	977	847	..	2 775	3 509	..	2 032	2 929
Peru	263	305	383	253	883	..	1 147	1 377
Brazil	619	604	726	579	..	1 751	1 928	..	1 226	1 313
Tunisia	215	175	271	258	..	371	920	..	1 256	1 215
Ukraine	129	167	224	209	1 389	1 033
Poland	475	519	677	619	..	1 320	1 255	974
Egypt	235	195	264	283	..	217	704	..	926	912
Russian Federation	384	439	463	436	..	1 181	1 279	861
Cuba	512	542	646	539	..	1 535	1 355	840
Argentina	316	411	541	515	..	2 569	2 410	..	1 556	834
Dominican Republic	354	393	409	317	939	717
Moldova	754	703
Serbia	154	186	194	175	397	764
Other countries	4 605	4 454	5 669	4 976	..	18 422	14 289	..	19 923	13 171
Total	10 382	10 685	13 406	11 934	19 266	35 766	38 466	39 484	40 084	40 223	21 206	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
JAPAN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Korea	10 295	9 188	11 778	11 031	9 689	8 531	8 546	7 412	7 637	6 668	5 656	..
China	4 377	4 442	4 722	4 122	4 427	4 347	4 740	4 322	5 392	4 816	3 259	..
Other countries	619	709	1 133	1 183	1 135	1 230	1 394	1 484	1 756	1 588	1 444	..
Total	15 291	14 339	17 633	16 336	15 251	14 108	14 680	13 218	14 785	13 072	10 359	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
KOREA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
China	1 391	3 344	6 146	7 443	14 881	7 156	8 178	12 545
Viet Nam	8	30	81	147	362	243	461	1 147
Philippines	21	112	928	1 074	786	317	335	579
Mongolia	1	10	43	36	109	32	82	134
Uzbekistan	5	6	21	34	79	38	60	80
Thailand	7	12	41	53	69	39	57	73
Pakistan	9	13	63	58	66	18	34	27
Other countries	238	356	411	417	622	282	1 112	673	26 756	17 323
Total	1 680	3 883	7 734	9 262	16 974	8 125	10 319	15 258	26 756	17 323

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
LUXEMBOURG

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Portugal	106	147	158	188	252	338	352	293	1 242	1 351	1 085	50
Belgium	39	87	73	83	101	87	97	77	224	258	450	51
Italy	105	119	120	111	97	161	138	109	362	665	425	52
France	33	65	57	44	51	74	75	76	277	342	314	60
Serbia	2	55	67	115	425	412	229	46
Germany	45	47	50	62	79	74	95	76	322	333	208	60
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	6	8	22	29	46	72	76	270	202	114	43
Cape Verde	20	48	50	41	33	45	46	49	77	40	60	43
United Kingdom	..	1	2	3	1	8	5	..	62	53	44	66
Netherlands	13	11	17	6	7	20	10	20	31	50	38	53
Spain	4	6	11	8	9	7	17	10	48	58	35	63
United States	2	2	..	2	3	47	44	32	63
Russian Federation	4	5	2	5	8	13	10	10	40	50	30	80
Poland	5	6	9	10	10	3	4	4	30	27	27	67
Ukraine	2	3	4	5	5	11	25	22	23	91
Other countries	117	206	226	253	269	192	241	286	540	404	291	
Total	496	754	785	841	954	1 128	1 236	1 215	4 022	4 311	3 405	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
MEXICO

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Colombia	..	434	..	901	813	689	892	690	390
Cuba	..	549	..	661	666	429	660	459	307
United States	..	94	..	215	286	334	287	246	266
Argentina	..	142	..	328	372	400	450	400	265
Spain	..	140	..	218	301	239	286	251	227
Guatemala	..	1 650	..	1 624	247	114	185	141	209
China	..	211	..	310	324	188	294	324	196
Peru	..	226	..	320	191	215	292	213	166
El Salvador	..	208	..	243	235	137	159	118	163
Venezuela	..	39	..	107	197	185	316	309	159
Honduras	..	77	..	118	156	59	123	98	131
France	..	62	..	105	93	105	71	77	82
Italy	..	57	..	93	99	89	94	108	76
Chile	..	29	..	77	86	58	90	69	72
Nicaragua	..	74	..	99	87	53	80	61	57
Other countries	3 090	745	4 317	1 010	1 457	881	1 191	907	723	2 150	2 633	
Total	3 090	4 737	4 317	6 429	5 610	4 175	5 470	4 471	3 489	2 150	2 633	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
NETHERLANDS

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Morocco	12 721	12 033	7 126	5 873	7 086	6 896	6 409	5 034	5 508	5 797	6 824	54
Turkey	5 513	5 391	3 726	4 026	3 493	3 407	4 073	3 147	4 167	4 984	5 029	54
Suriname	2 025	1 957	1 242	1 421	2 031	1 636	1 285	1 006	1 142	967	934	59
Thailand	355	289	171	161	160	171	195	220	383	413	571	84
Ghana	360	357	157	74	199	296	314	283	411	367	519	57
Afghanistan	803	1 118	982	801	550	562	662	584	596	402	371	66
Indonesia	416	380	291	203	293	248	302	262	306	298	357	78
Philippines	348	263	159	129	198	209	226	209	308	263	330	83
Egypt	528	437	190	97	238	245	304	255	337	259	309	51
Brazil	290	249	137	131	159	189	173	201	307	272	307	78
Poland	597	530	318	212	347	238	268	237	271	202	296	77
India	309	250	138	117	187	214	214	153	263	193	292	56
Iraq	2 315	2 367	832	489	333	331	501	866	674	288	289	59
Iran	754	336	180	122	184	225	221	273	279	217	281	59
Pakistan	255	241	132	83	204	199	199	174	251	208	279	62
Other countries	19 078	19 123	13 018	12 234	12 826	14 023	15 307	15 325	14 551	11 145	11 610	
Total	46 667	45 321	28 799	26 173	28 488	29 089	30 653	28 229	29 754	26 275	28 598	57

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
NEW ZEALAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
United Kingdom	3 034	2 196	2 286	2 388	2 450	2 933	3 607	3 505	2 974	2 617	4 450	49
South Africa	2 033	1 972	1 996	2 411	2 433	2 805	3 119	2 413	1 808	1 339	2 105	50
Samoa	1 598	1 316	1 193	1 069	1 161	1 375	1 447	1 433	1 549	1 908	2 034	48
India	1 380	1 356	1 257	2 136	2 926	4 346	5 211	3 431	2 246	1 567	1 649	47
Fiji	1 278	1 147	1 053	1 456	1 551	1 693	1 729	1 938	1 536	1 307	1 212	52
China	2 584	1 901	2 041	2 856	3 339	3 901	3 084	1 919	1 131	676	846	53
Philippines	838	657	557	704	846	1 135	1 170	718	696	848	663	55
Zimbabwe	163	129	110	415	585	817	902	653	368	265	632	53
Korea	1 058	695	645	1 098	1 528	1 644	1 454	887	585	457	444	51
United States	301	360	357	360	289	372	418	392	331	327	437	51
Malaysia	347	243	290	345	284	334	453	423	449	456	403	53
Tonga	409	271	207	199	169	193	260	279	315	378	337	50
Thailand	218	249	233	279	290	253	210	166	165	131	222	72
Germany	94	62	90	96	86	131	154	114	97	130	170	48
Myanmar	38	37	37	101	101	48	43	28	12	15	161	48
Other countries	8 278	6 978	6 014	6 314	6 424	7 268	6 655	5 324	3 743	2 752	3 522	
Total	23 651	19 569	18 366	22 227	24 462	29 248	29 916	23 623	18 005	15 173	19 287	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
NORWAY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Somalia	676	546	392	526	1 250	1 281	2 196	1 315	1 737	1 528	2 131	50
Afghanistan	36	17	21	23	75	194	674	877	857	1 054	1 281	43
Iraq	331	497	403	619	2 141	2 142	2 577	1 072	1 267	1 338	947	56
Russian Federation	192	308	280	365	548	458	436	515	622	673	644	56
Iran	361	324	228	508	832	535	740	495	785	554	539	53
Pakistan	409	829	497	568	694	590	544	773	469	430	526	58
Philippines	261	299	265	249	322	246	421	233	445	322	421	76
Liberia	..	3	2	..	1	2	6	7	40	176	407	51
Thailand	302	257	193	234	299	263	427	247	483	267	380	72
Ethiopia	79	63	55	83	116	140	313	341	216	225	341	47
Sweden	249	216	211	221	276	376	241	211	184	248	300	47
Turkey	356	412	398	393	385	355	445	209	145	214	280	48
Myanmar	..	6	5	..	7	..	5	4	33	103	260	48
Eritrea	24	26	12	20	50	60	88	67	63	248	254	52
Viet Nam	594	292	210	222	216	216	178	248	161	177	243	72
Other countries	6 968	4 946	4 695	4 123	5 443	5 097	5 586	3 698	3 935	4 346	5 683	
Total	10 838	9 041	7 867	8 154	12 655	11 955	14 877	10 312	11 442	11 903	14 637	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
POLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ukraine	62	214	431	538	759	417	662	369	877	992	800	..
Belarus	31	54	108	129	316	101	126	152	357	418	320	..
Russian Federation	14	22	52	145	257	129	114	64	162	215	200	..
Germany	47	49	60	62	156	1	39	37	47	92	106	..
Viet Nam	13	17	11	11	36	29	47	12	64	97	104	..
Armenia	6	13	8	6	18	27	30	16	79	101	103	..
United States	11	9	32	41	59	8	23	27	47	50	53	..
Sweden	13	30	107	81	90	8	26	48	34	61	52	..
Canada	23	22	46	36	73	7	17	24	35	40	45	..
Kazakhstan	43	53	68	38	62	10	10	18	41	38	42	..
Bulgaria	29	30	41	32	54	8	16	8	21	21	38	..
Moldova	19	8	23	24	20	28	29	..
Syria	18	27	9	37	57	5	12	5	22	18	22	..
Lithuania	64	93	126	85	36	11	11	9	24	14	19	..
China	7	6	6	14	5	7	1	1	10	15	18	..
Other countries	385	547	529	682	869	213	371	240	663	726	374	
Total	766	1 186	1 634	1 937	2 866	989	1 528	1 054	2 503	2 926	2 325	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
PORTUGAL

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Brazil	283	345	345	307	162	491	415	4 080	3 993	4 007
Cape Verde	228	271	370	274	132	1 047	2 189	6 013	5 368	3 982
Moldova	2	3	6	..	2 230	2 896	2 675
Angola	65	82	144	63	38	336	738	2 075	2 113	1 953
Guinea-Bissau	55	73	38	95	36	873	1 602	2 754	2 442	1 847
Ukraine	2	2	12	..	484	978	1 358
Sao Tome and Principe	20	34	58	22	7	134	448	1 391	1 289	1 097
India	6	9	11	3	6	25	32	417	1 055	919
Russian Federation	9	6	21	31	259	535	580
Guinea	450	717	475
Pakistan	2	4	21	32	74	200	388
Bangladesh	31	316	404	340
Romania	4	5	20	..	209	258	303
Mozambique	24	27	56	17	4	57	155	262	253	208
Senegal	111	120	193
Other countries	401	528	725	546	534	584	347	1 283	1 561	1 425
Total	1 082	1 369	1 747	1 346	939	3 627	6 020	22 408	24 182	21 750

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Kyrgyzstan	21 217	17 324	1 717	27 449	38 422	33 166	61 239	51 210	48 720	37 348	52 362	..
Kazakhstan	133 341	101 756	8 678	106 613	123 286	68 087	64 831	58 736	50 628	27 130	29 986	..
Uzbekistan	33 373	29 665	2 266	29 676	73 315	67 021	53 109	43 982	49 784	4 788	7 906	..
Armenia	19 267	14 573	1 722	23 139	39 330	34 860	39 328	45 253	54 828	6 261	7 847	..
Ukraine	72 449	53 396	7 623	50 593	94 133	66 502	55 424	58 500	62 025	5 715	7 783	..
Tajikistan	8 748	7 944	869	10 749	16 148	12 198	16 444	21 891	39 214	4 393	6 152	..
Azerbaijan	19 629	13 663	2 010	24 555	35 720	22 045	24 885	29 643	34 627	5 265	5 635	..
Belarus	8 356	6 399	563	10 179	12 943	7 919	6 572	7 099	6 062	3 888	3 993	..
Moldova	9 038	6 740	366	7 283	13 727	12 809	13 876	15 782	20 429	1 992	2 802	..
Georgia	20 748	12 297	1 459	20 695	25 225	14 008	12 156	11 110	9 876	2 513	2 405	..
Turkmenistan	4 776	3 551	398	5 358	7 713	5 577	4 737	4 444	4 026	482	544	..
Latvia	1 869	1 184	196	954	1 062	756	516	466	469	135	169	..
Afghanistan	575	214	..	53	136	101	109	153	124	188	153	..
Lithuania	1 032	609	56	488	722	496	460	539	430	149	151	..
Turkey	170	102	27	50	44	51	60	105	129	144	146	..
Other countries	4 607	3 046	3 578	12 585	22 592	20 892	13 953	12 450	12 766	10 907	6 946	..
Total	359 195	272 463	31 528	330 419	504 518	366 488	367 699	361 363	394 137	111 298	134 980	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ukraine	251	549	450	377	704	203	35	44	61	69
Serbia	443	506	185	42	112	53	46	57	53	47
Czech Republic	597	775	167	121	158	93	39	45	45	42
Romania	450	442	220	147	100	31	10	10	18	44
Hungary	5	9	7	9	6	15	3	12	9	33
Russian Federation	65	96	37	35	42	31	4	8	8	63
China	484	200	6	5	4	6	3	2	7	43
Croatia	35	50	22	16	18	5	2	2	7	29
United States	97	136	64	113	110	93	9	7	6	33
Viet Nam	405	619	40	40	62	37	7	15	5	60
Poland	43	26	14	20	18	7	1	5	4	50
Belarus	5	14	5	5	8	9	1	..	4	100
Iran	15	20	8	2	..	1	5	..	4	50
Bulgaria	66	42	24	35	19	7	1	3	3	0
Germany	19	30	10	13	16	16	8	3	3	0
Other countries	512	502	134	145	101	73	88	26	35	
Total	3 492	4 016	1 393	1 125	1 478	680	262	239	272	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
SLOVENIA

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	368	445	467	556	622	58
Italy	72	116	179	206	205	57
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	45	..	140	194	177	54
Serbia	159	452	396	289	211	54
Croatia	56	203	181	115	162	60
Argentina	15	21	59	77	56	52
Brazil	3	4	5	25	36	50
Ukraine	6	13	23	31	87
Australia	6	24	13	13	23	57
United States	11	14	19	19	37
Russian Federation	5	7	19	6	17	76
Canada	4	6	5	11	17	71
Chile	1	2	3	13	62
Germany	8	12	3	10	12	50
Moldova	1	2	4	10	50
Other countries	82	139	192	256	187	
Total	823	1 448	1 690	1 807	1 798	57

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
SPAIN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ecuador	510	1 173	1 951	6 370	10 031	19 477	21 371	25 536	25 769	43 091	32 026	57
Colombia	848	1 267	1 801	4 194	7 334	12 720	13 852	15 409	16 527	23 995	19 803	60
Morocco	2 822	3 111	6 831	8 036	5 555	5 690	7 864	8 615	6 683	10 703	14 427	42
Peru	2 322	3 117	2 933	3 958	3 645	4 713	6 490	8 206	6 368	8 291	9 255	55
Argentina	791	997	1 009	1 746	2 293	3 536	4 810	5 188	4 629	6 395	5 482	52
Bolivia	89	104	129	218	289	648	709	1 103	1 813	4 778	5 333	63
Dominican Republic	2 126	2 876	2 648	2 834	2 322	2 805	2 800	3 496	2 766	3 801	4 985	61
Cuba	1 191	2 088	1 602	1 889	2 506	2 703	2 466	2 870	2 696	3 546	3 088	57
Venezuela	326	439	529	703	752	908	1 324	1 581	1 744	2 730	2 596	60
Uruguay	239	219	235	327	408	624	839	1 201	1 451	2 219	1 978	50
Brazil	411	477	500	683	695	782	779	1 049	943	1 738	1 854	70
Chile	359	353	350	484	620	844	838	1 141	1 090	1 688	1 556	52
Portugal	568	627	536	634	478	430	381	566	485	800	884	48
Paraguay	42	46	23	42	60	87	78	179	298	766	864	72
Mexico	263	352	344	451	437	567	593	763	584	932	856	62
Other countries	3 836	4 564	5 135	5 766	5 404	5 805	6 616	7 267	5 751	8 248	9 612	
Total	16 743	21 810	26 556	38 335	42 829	62 339	71 810	84 170	79 597	123 721	114 599	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
SWEDEN

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Iraq	4 043	4 160	4 678	5 298	11 544	12 895	5 950	4 224	3 180	4 367	6 191	9
Finland	1 512	1 561	2 816	2 703	2 588	2 975	2 757	2 535	2 432	2 971	2 230	63
Poland	1 906	2 604	1 325	990	793	1 000	762	686	824	1 487	1 791	55
Thailand	454	606	443	500	585	876	1 007	1 261	1 314	1 429	1 547	81
Turkey	2 796	2 127	1 375	1 269	1 702	2 921	1 456	1 125	1 200	1 049	1 343	48
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 241	4 064	3 090	1 469	1 788	2 627	2 081	1 764	1 146	919	1 123	53
Somalia	2 802	1 789	1 121	840	688	931	655	787	885	1 076	1 091	51
Iran	2 031	1 737	1 350	1 296	1 889	2 796	1 459	1 113	1 110	967	1 028	266
Russian Federation	621	626	642	535	886	1 510	919	759	865	769	948	66
Serbia	27	61	132	367	842	49
Germany	198	243	209	244	294	457	386	606	700	923	778	48
Syria	588	1 063	1 218	1 117	1 208	1 314	596	512	500	428	690	50
Afghanistan	329	285	278	361	623	1 062	777	812	1 180	848	636	53
Chile	727	689	548	464	543	754	687	593	488	526	485	51
Lebanon	720	884	388	298	439	648	282	296	292	308	415	47
Other countries	12 490	14 540	12 870	8 746	9 961	14 229	12 672	12 196	12 314	14 023	15 496	
Total	35 458	36 978	32 351	26 130	35 531	46 995	32 473	29 330	28 562	32 457	36 634	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
SWITZERLAND

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Serbia	3 686	5 803	6 332	7 854	9 503	11 721	10 441	10 252	8 453	6 859	4 359	51
Italy	5 386	6 633	5 085	4 196	4 032	4 502	4 629	4 921	4 804	4 111	4 109	46
Germany	586	817	670	639	773	1 144	1 361	3 022	4 035	3 617	3 544	52
Portugal	779	920	1 165	1 199	1 505	2 383	2 201	1 761	2 336	2 217	2 298	54
Turkey	3 116	4 128	4 216	3 565	3 467	3 457	3 044	2 866	2 593	2 091	1 886	49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 128	1 865	2 268	2 371	2 790	3 149	3 008	2 855	2 408	1 924	1 628	53
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1 022	1 639	1 802	1 981	2 171	2 596	2 210	2 287	1 831	1 586	1 337	47
France	1 307	1 367	1 215	1 181	1 021	1 260	1 218	1 110	1 314	1 084	1 325	53
Croatia	1 045	1 638	1 565	1 616	1 681	1 837	1 660	2 046	1 599	1 483	1 273	58
Spain	699	691	800	823	975	1 283	1 246	1 096	1 245	1 120	1 091	54
United Kingdom	310	350	306	289	287	323	353	319	365	298	351	50
Netherlands	90	90	155	254	178	210	234	189	229	227	228	55
Austria	233	227	194	150	167	174	166	193	205	189	205	47
Poland	159	200	160	177	163	185	195	152	158	148	169	72
Belgium	53	118	153	173	209	156	55
Other countries	11 673	15 832	15 823	17 244	19 227	12 487	11 923	11 143	11 692	12 151	12 798	
Total	27 586	36 515	35 424	35 685	38 437	46 711	43 889	44 365	43 440	39 314	36 757	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932824707>

Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
TURKEY

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Bulgaria	..	13 178	12 423	3 528	3 299	1 769
Azerbaijan	..	2 667	1 908	1 541	780	563
Russian Federation	..	1 264	1 033	700	346	287
Afghanistan	..	27	56	233	312	245
Kazakhstan	..	379	450	398	272	195
Syria	..	212	201	135	124	175
Iraq	..	136	103	153	146	143
Iran	..	121	112	178	156	137
Greece	..	48	37	119	104	107
United Kingdom	..	19	12	26	61	93
Kyrgyzstan	..	147	146	140	129	88
Uzbekistan	..	175	150	109	76	87
Ukraine	..	618	598	87	58	85
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	..	85	84	72	82	80
Romania	..	886	455	52	84	76
Other countries	..	3 763	3 318	767	872	942
Total	..	23 725	21 086	8 238	6 901	5 072

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
UNITED KINGDOM

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
India	8 177	10 003	10 799	13 598	14 137	15 134	14 507	11 835	26 541	29 405	26 290	..
Pakistan	10 144	10 946	12 769	14 094	12 605	10 260	8 143	9 442	20 945	22 054	17 641	..
Nigeria	6 277	6 486	6 302	6 242	6 622	5 874	6 031	4 531	6 953	7 873	7 932	..
Philippines	1 382	1 344	1 609	2 011	3 797	8 839	10 844	5 382	11 751	9 429	7 133	..
China	1 580	2 362	1 863	1 918	2 425	2 601	3 117	2 677	6 041	7 581	6 966	..
South Africa	2 319	3 278	4 536	6 366	7 046	7 665	8 149	5 266	8 367	7 446	6 351	..
Sri Lanka	2 767	8 092	5 106	4 530	6 997	5 717	6 496	3 284	4 762	4 944	5 886	..
Iraq	1 831	3 449	2 257	2 335	3 259	4 120	5 479	8 894	5 497	4 385	5 742	..
Iran	1 450	2 849	1 817	2 241	3 522	3 283	4 426	2 199	2 876	2 587	5 540	..
Bangladesh	5 385	5 737	6 133	5 786	3 637	3 724	2 257	3 633	12 041	7 966	5 149	..
Zimbabwe	547	798	1 428	1 814	2 128	2 556	5 592	5 707	7 703	6 301	4 877	..
Somalia	5 495	7 498	8 544	11 164	8 297	9 029	7 450	7 163	8 139	5 817	4 664	..
Afghanistan	372	874	1 612	4 055	4 951	3 397	10 554	5 539	5 012	5 281	3 951	..
Ghana	3 169	3 080	3 515	3 217	3 307	2 989	3 373	3 134	4 662	4 551	3 931	..
Turkey	4 037	8 040	4 916	4 860	6 767	5 583	4 709	4 641	7 207	4 630	3 627	..
Other countries	35 350	45 285	57 329	64 042	72 202	63 247	63 510	46 050	65 292	64 796	62 105	..
Total	90 282	120 121	130 535	148 273	161 699	154 018	164 637	129 377	203 789	195 046	177 785	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.



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Table B.6. **Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality**
UNITED STATES

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Mexico	103 234	76 531	56 093	63 840	77 089	83 979	122 258	231 815	111 630	67 062	94 783	..
India	34 311	33 774	29 790	37 975	35 962	47 542	46 871	65 971	52 889	61 142	45 985	..
Philippines	35 431	30 487	29 081	31 448	36 673	40 500	38 830	58 792	38 934	35 465	42 520	..
China	34 423	32 018	24 014	27 309	31 708	35 387	33 134	40 017	37 130	33 969	32 864	..
Colombia	10 872	10 634	7 962	9 819	11 396	15 698	12 089	22 926	16 593	18 417	22 693	..
Cuba	11 393	10 889	7 727	11 236	11 227	21 481	15 394	39 871	24 891	14 050	21 071	..
Viet Nam	41 596	36 835	25 995	27 480	32 926	29 917	27 921	39 584	31 168	19 313	20 922	..
Dominican Republic	15 010	15 591	12 627	15 464	20 831	22 165	20 645	35 251	20 778	15 451	20 508	..
Jamaica	13 978	13 973	11 232	12 271	13 674	18 953	12 314	21 324	15 098	12 070	14 591	..
Haiti	10 408	9 280	7 263	8 215	9 740	15 979	11 552	21 229	13 290	12 291	14 191	..
El Salvador	13 663	10 716	8 738	9 602	12 174	13 430	17 157	35 796	18 927	10 343	13 834	..
Korea	18 053	17 307	15 968	17 184	19 223	17 668	17 628	22 759	17 576	11 170	12 664	..
Pakistan	8 375	8 658	7 431	8 744	9 699	10 411	9 147	11 813	12 528	11 601	10 655	..
Peru	6 659	7 375	6 130	6 980	7 904	10 063	7 965	15 016	10 349	8 551	10 266	..
Brazil	3 925	3 885	3 091	4 074	4 583	7 028	5 745	8 808	7 960	8 867	10 251	..
Other countries	246 874	255 755	210 062	245 510	269 471	312 388	261 827	375 567	313 974	280 151	306 395	..
Total	608 205	573 708	463 204	537 151	604 280	702 589	660 477	1 046 539	743 715	619 913	694 193	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Metadata related to Tables A.6 and B.6. **Acquisition of nationality**

	Comments	Source
Australia		Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
Austria	Data refer to persons living in Austria at the time of acquisition.	Statistics Austria and BMI (Ministry of the Interior).
Belgium		Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSEI) and Ministry of Justice.
Canada	Data refer to country of birth, not to country of previous nationality. Persons who acquire Canadian citizenship may also hold other citizenships at the same time if allowed by the country of previous nationality.	Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
Chile	Register of residence permits.	Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Czech Republic	Acquisition of nationality by declaration or by naturalisation.	Ministry of the Interior.
Denmark		Statistics Denmark.
Estonia		Ministry of the Interior.
Finland	Includes naturalisations of persons of Finnish origin.	Statistics Finland.
France	Data by former nationality for naturalisations by anticipated delaration is unknown for the years 2004, 2006 and 2007.	Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice.
Germany	Figures do not include ethnic Germans.	Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Data refer to all possible types of citizenship acquisition: naturalisation, declaration (for Greek descents), adoption by a Greek, etc.	Ministry of the Interior.
Hungary	Mainly Hungarian nationals from neighbouring countries who became Hungarian citizens, sometimes after their former Hungarian citizenship was abolished.	Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register), Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Includes children who receive Icelandic citizenship with their parents.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	From 2005 on, figures include naturalisations and Post nuptial citizenship figures.	Department of Justice and Equality.
Italy		Ministry of the Interior.
Japan		Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Bureau.
Korea		Ministry of Justice.
Luxembourg	Excludes children acquiring nationality as a consequence of the naturalisation of their parents.	Ministry of Justice.
Mexico		Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).
Netherlands		Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand	The country of origin of persons granted New Zealand citizenship is the country of birth if birth documentation is available. If not, the country of origin is the country of citizenship as shown on the person's passport.	Department of Internal Affairs.
Norway		Statistics Norway.
Poland	From 2002 on, data include naturalisations by marriage and acknowledgment of persons of Polish descent, in addition to naturalisation by ordinary procedure.	Office for Repatriation and Aliens.
Portugal	From 2008 on, following the modification of the law on Portuguese citizenship in 2006 and 2007, the data include every foreigner who used to have a foreign citizenship and obtained Portuguese citizenship in the given year. Until 2007, data exclude acquisitions of nationality due to marriage or adoption.	National Statistical Office (INE) and Ministry of Justice (Central register).
Russian Federation	Excludes citizenship acquired through consulates. From 2009 on, applicants to Russian citizenship must have stayed in the country as temporary residents for at least a year, and as permanent residents for at least five years.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federal Migration Service.
Slovak Republic	Data refer to persons living in the Slovak Republic at the time of acquisition.	Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Include all grounds on which the citizenship was obtained.	Ministry of the Interior – Internal Administrative Affairs, Migration and Naturalisation Directorate.
Spain	Includes only naturalisations on grounds of residence in Spain. Excludes individuals recovering their former (Spanish) nationality.	Ministry of Employment and Social Security, based on naturalisations registered by the Ministry of Justice.
Sweden		Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland		Federal Office of Migration.
Turkey		Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs.
United Kingdom	The increase in 2009 is partly due to the processing of a backlog of applications filled prior to 2009.	Home Office.
United States	Data by country of birth refer to fiscal years (October to September of the year indicated).	US Department of Homeland Security.

Data for Serbia may include persons from Montenegro.

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