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Freedom, Reason, and More: feminist economics and human development

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Abstract Researchers sensitive to issues of gender have made substantial contributions to the literature on economic and cultural development. Discussion of how feminist analysis might affect the definition of development goals, in a broader philosophical sense, has, however, been less advanced. This essays seeks to further this discussion, taking as its starting point the economist and philosopher Amartya Sen's influential insights about 'development as freedom' and the role of reason. It argues that these important insights need to be complemented by (not supplanted by) additional insights into affiliation and emotion. People deeply desire connection, continuity, and a sense of place, as well as freedom, and use their hearts as well as their minds to guide their actions. Cultural neglect of the human need for affiliation and capacity for emotion may help explain why economic outcomes continue to be characterized by extreme global disparity.

Key words: Feminism, Gender, Economics, Freedom, Cultural development, Capability, Philosophy

Introduction

In the years since the publication of Esther Boserup's (1970) *Women's Role in Economic Development*, gender-sensitive analyses of development have advanced at an impressive pace, and the literature is now vast (for example, Elson, 1991; Benería and Feldman, 1992; Agarwal, 1994). Within this literature, a number of feminist economists have questioned the appropriateness of the use of the neoclassical economic model in development studies, particularly when it is used exclusively. Feminist economist Lourdes Benería, for example, writes that 'the model is gender-biased because it downplays the traits of *interdependence* and *emotion* that are so much a part of being human — yet so often associated with or encouraged only in women' (2003, p. 125; emphasis added). Echoing the same concerns as Benería, philosopher Martha Nussbaum includes affiliation ('being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings . . .') and

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emotions ('being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves, to love . . . to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and justified anger') in her list of 'central human capabilities' (2003, p. 41). This essay seeks to take the insight about the neglect of these two features of human experience one step further by exploring the notions of human identity underlying the philosophy of development economics.

As in economics proper, issues of affiliation tend to receive less attention in development theory than do goals of independence and freedom, and emotion is often considered a rather retrograde characteristic, in contrast to reason. This essay begins with a few specific examples of why attention to affiliation and emotion, as well as to freedom and reason, is crucially important. It then seeks to lay the foundation for broader thinking about human development, building on the work of Amartya Sen, and arguing that affiliation and emotion can be incorporated into the best development economics in intellectually respectable and academically rigorous ways. Adoption of a new model of human identity, however, is necessary for moving beyond 'either/or' choices. Because the model of identity — and particularly the use of the term 'emotion' — used in this alternative view may be unfamiliar, the essay includes a brief exposition of a 'relational' model of identity and ends by addressing some particular objections to this way of thinking.

Implications for development economics

Issues of emotion and affiliation are important in many areas of economics and development. Marketers, of course, have known for decades that people are motivated to buy consumer products through manipulations of emotions of desire and fear, and through implicit associations of a product with groups to which a consumer aspires to belong. Social scientists are starting to pay increased attention to such issues as: the economic implications of the need for a sense of 'belonging' (Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit, 2001); the economic significance of personal social interactions (Gui and Sugden, 2005); the notion that individuals are constituted through relationships (Fullbrook, 2002); and the relational nature of business firms (Nelson, 2003). To attempt to analyze human behavior entirely in terms of freedom and reason (as in the neoclassical model of 'individual rational choice'), as if interdependence and passions were easily shed relics of the past, is generally simply not an empirically adequate approach.

An important example in development economics is the case of women's unpaid or 'reproductive' labor. Caring labor, such as working with children or caring for the sick or elderly, is unintelligible without consideration of affiliation and emotion. The 'economic man' of neoclassical theory neither has need for care nor is motivated to provide it: it is exactly issues of interdependence due to vulnerability, feelings of responsibility, and the desire to connect with others in meaningful ways that make 'caring labor' happen. Yet caring labor is also very much an issue of *economics*: without material support for caring work, its quantity and quality may be very much dimin-

ished. Feminist authors have pointed out how, for example, Structural Adjustment Policies that cut back government support for health and education can result in very negative effects on well-being, as the 'invisible' care system of families and communities becomes severely overtaxed.[1] While analyses of caring activities have often tended to stress their traditionally 'economic' aspects (such as their contribution to national product), there is a growing feminist body of work that also takes into account their emotional and affiliative aspects (for example, United Nations Development Programme, 1999, chapter 3; Folbre and Nelson, 2000; Himmelweit, 2002).

Amartya Sen and development philosophy

When seeking to extend a field, it is always advisable to try to build upon the very best existing work. In this spirit, this essay takes as its starting point the 'development as freedom' notion set forth in the work of Nobel laureate economist and philosopher Amartya Sen.

Sen's contributions to the gender-aware, liberatory study of development economics have been of enormous value. He has brought problems of poverty and oppression into mainstream economic and philosophical discourse at an elevated level of sophistication, and suggested highly informed and sensitive ways of dealing with human suffering. He has brought attention to the horror of the 'missing women', and opened up analysis of 'cooperative conflicts' within households (Sen, 1990, 1992a). Sen's 'capabilities' metric for examining what we really want from economic development has vastly improved the discourse, moving it away from inadequate earlier emphases on commodities or utility (Sen, 1985; United Nations Development Programme, 1990–present).

This essay argues, however, that some of the points made by Sen are, in fact, not completely supported by his own analysis, due to a relative neglect of the more interdependent and emotional aspects of human identity. In particular, the following passage in Sen's *Development as Freedom* is both crucial and problematic:

> As people who live — in a broad sense — together, we cannot escape the thought that the terrible occurrences that we see around us are quintessentially our problems. They are our responsibility — whether or not they are also anyone else's. (Sen, 1999a, p. 282)

The idea expressed is clearly important, because without such an awareness of responsibility on the part of both rich and poor, there is no hope for amelioration of human suffering. The passage is empirically problematic, however, because it is not clear who Sen means by 'we'. Many, if not most, people seem to act as if they have quite escaped such a realization of responsibility. US citizens (the group I know best) generally appear to prefer tax rebates to supporting impoverished children in our own country, and seem more interested in our sports utility vehicles than any 'terrible occurrences' abroad. Elites in countries of the economic South often behave in a similar manner.

To realize that responsibility is inescapable, this essay argues, demands freedom, reason, and more.

Freedom and reason in Sen's writings

Freedom, individual agency, and the use of reason are the foci of Sen's analysis of deprivation. In *Development as Freedom*, he writes, '. . . the role of freedom . . . [i]ndeed, individual agency is, ultimately, central to addressing these deprivations' (Sen, 1999a, p. xi). He repeatedly stresses that freedom, for him, is about people's ability 'to lead the kind of lives they value — and have reason to value' (Sen, 1999a, p. 18). Consciousness of 'freedom' is, one might say, consciousness of oneself as an individual, unique, effective actor in the world. Freedom exists when an individual is able to make choices, active and uncoerced. As Sen points out so well, the threats to freedom in contemporary life include both many substantive 'unfreedoms' such as malnutrition and illiteracy, as well as procedural 'unfreedoms' that come about when individuals are denied the opportunity to make choices in their lives by patriarchy, religious intolerance, or authoritarian political regimes.

Sen identifies 'reason' or 'rational deliberation' as the primary means to improving society, and devotes a full chapter in *Development as Freedom* (199a, chapter 11) and all of a high-profile essay 'East and West: the reach of reason' (Sen, 2000) to this theme. Rational deliberation may take the form of individual '*reflection and analysis*', or of the more social deliberations of '*public discussion*' (Sen, 1999a, p. 273; emphasis in original).[2] 'Even when we find something immediately upsetting, or annoying', Sen writes, 'we are free to question that response and ask whether it is an appropriate reaction and whether we should really be guided by it' (1999a, p. 34).

In 'East and West', Sen associates reason with freedom, neutrality of the state towards religion, 'liberty and autonomy' and 'hard beliefs'. He contrasts these to what apparently, in his view, constitute the alternatives: 'the marshy land of tradition', reliance on religious authority, 'discipline and order', 'instincts', and 'unreflected response' (2000, pp. 33, 36, 38).

Sen is refreshingly open about the personal experiences that have been important in informing his view. Early on in *Development as Freedom*, he tells of how he witnessed, at about age 10, the collapse of a Muslim laborer wounded by knife-wielding Hindus during religious rioting, literally in his back yard. 'It made me reflect', Sen writes, 'on the terrible burden of narrowly defined identities, including those firmly based on communities and groups' (1999a, p. 8). And it is no wonder.

Another point of view

In another essay, Sen has also argued for a notion of 'trans-positional objectivity', in which one has to 'start with knowledge based on positional observations and *then* go beyond that' (1992b, p. 1) through a process of 'discriminating aggregation' (1992b, p. 4). In this way, he derives a notion

of objectivity that does not require a 'view from nowhere'. Let me, then, attempt to triangulate Sen's positional observation with my own.

I was born and raised in the white middle class in the United States. From this position, I see a highly individualist, even hyper-individualist, culture. Rather than 'the marshy land of tradition', I see around me an exaggeration of the 'me' culture being helped along by the advertising media, feeding a frenzy of consumerism. In the midst of wealth, suicide and incidents like the Columbine High School shootings seem to me to be signs of a lack of feeling of identification and meaning, rather than of an overabundance of communal identification. Three people I knew, one a family member, have been killed in individual acts of gun violence.

My work as a feminist economist has put me right at the center of debates about freedom, reason, and other values. My economist colleagues tend to hold an extreme belief in the power of analytical reason and the centrality of free choice (relative to whom Sen's far more intelligent and modulated positions have been a life preserver in rough seas). My feminist colleagues, on the other hand, work from a variety of viewpoints.

A few feminists — although far fewer than many critics think — swing to the opposite extreme, and valorize only connectedness and care. The danger in noting that interdependence and emotion have been culturally associated (in the dominant cultures of the West) with women is that this is often misunderstood as attributing to women and men different 'essential natures'. The truly interesting work in feminist theory, however, works at moving beyond essentialist and dualistic thinking. Essentialist thinking confuses cultural ascriptions of gender with biological givens. Dualistic thinking perceives the world in oppositional, 'either/or' terms — such as perceiving emotion as the *opposite* of reason. Feminist theory can help us understand how these habits have influenced own intellectual projects, as well as social and economic life. This literature is now substantial, pointing to how masculine-biased viewpoints have led to a general cultural denigration of care and connection in scholarship and in the lives of both men and women.[3]

In contrast to Sen's aforementioned formative experience of witnessing violence based on too-enthusiastic religious communalism, then, my formative experience might be said to be that of witnessing personal and cultural vertigo based on hyper-individualism, and a dearth of concern with authentic emotional needs. Can we take both distressing situations seriously?

Getting beyond either/or

The danger, of course, in raising any question about Sen's emphasis on the wonderful values of freedom and reason, is that one is then often taken to be an advocate of coercion and thoughtlessness!

Getting beyond such either/or thinking is the major project of this essay. It does not argue that we should consider freedom and reason to be any less important than Sen's analysis suggests. Building on the best of Enlightenment-style liberal analysis, we still, however, must examine what more we need,

if societies are to have any chance of moving in the direction of actual commitment to social betterment.[4]

Right alongside freedom and reason, our scholarly analysis needs to recognize the importance of affiliation*; that is, a sense of belonging, and* emotion*, the ability to feel.*

Consciousness of affiliation is consciousness of oneself as connected to particular other people and to the larger social world, to one's physical place in the world and to the larger natural world. A person who is connected feels grounded, whole, not alone, part of something bigger and interdependent, and senses a reason for being in the world.

Emotion both informs and motivates people. Feelings of fear or joy give us important information about our environment. People act, not just because they 'have reason to', but also from their gut, because they 'feel moved'. Feelings, desires, urges, motivations, reactions, sentiments — whatever we call them — are part of human life. Emotions are what make us desire freedom, or desire the use of reason.

Sen's work has not been without attention to affiliation and emotion, as will be reviewed later in this essay. He has written, for example, that '[i]ndeed, the importance of instinctive psychology and sympathetic response should be adequately recognized ... our hope for the future must, to a considerable extent, depend on the sympathy and respect with which we respond to things happening to others' (2000, p. 34). Compared with the vast majority of other economists, he is far ahead on incorporating affiliation and emotion into his work.[5] Given the state of the economics profession, however, this is something like saying that Alaska is warmer than Antarctica. The attention Sen gives to these is under-theorized and underdeveloped relative to the rest of his excellent work, and also relative to what can be said about these capacities by a more thorough and direct examination.

More distressingly, I have found (in preparing an essay through which I hope to communicate with a broader group of scholars) that many academic researchers — even feminists — tend to be hardly any farther along on this scale. As social beings, we cannot avoid carrying along with us, at least until we examine them, many cultural biases concerning affiliation and emotion, and the respectability of talking about them in scholarly company. Hence, any discussion of the role of affiliation and emotion in 'human development' at the economic and cultural level must start at the beginning, with an examination of the role of these in 'human development' at the individual, psychological level. From the reader who protests that this is 'not economics', temporary indulgence is requested.

Affiliation, emotions, and human development

A particular set of beliefs needs to be challenged if the role of affiliation and emotion in human economic behavior is to become more adequately understood. Spelled out as baldly as they are in the following, they may seem clearly dismissible. Yet these beliefs, centered on an image of humans

primarily as 'rational individuals', are at times held implicitly even by very intelligent people who might explicitly reject them when stated as principles.

Beliefs based on the 'rational individual' model

The first premise of the 'rational individual' model, related to a high regard for freedom, is that independence and autonomy mark the summit of human personal development. Popularized in traditional psychoanalytic theory, and through the separation–individuation process posited by American ego psychology, in this view an infant begins in a state of passive symbiosis. Individuation, in this view, is achieved over time though a process of conflict.[6] The endpoint is the achievement of freedom from dependence — freedom to act in accord with one's own will.

Such an implicit belief is evident whenever a theory takes autonomy as the hallmark of human identity. In discussions of economic and cultural development, this is often evidenced, for example, by implicitly taking, from among the variety of actual human ages and conditions, only independent, prime-age healthy adults — thought of as 'agents' or 'citizens' — as typifying 'humanity'. Ask if a theory can be applied to the young, ill or elderly, or to their caretakers. If not, it is implicitly based on this model.

The second belief, related to a high regard for reason, is that knowledge and intelligence, and consequently all guides for right action, are primarily matters of the conscious mind, involving the mind's facilities for analysis. Emotions and the life of the unconscious are seen, at best, to be of peripheral importance, or, more often, as 'irrational' and representing the antithesis of reasoned behavior. Just as people move away from positions of dependence during the process of maturation, so too, in this view, is the strengthening of one's rational capacity seen as providing relief from one's earlier unruly emotions.

At least three variants of this belief about emotions are possible.

First, the point of rational action may be seen as maximizing 'good' feelings (such as pleasure and happiness) and minimizing 'bad' ones (such as pain and sadness). Simplistic neoclassical utility theory, for example, reflects this hedonistic view. Marketing strategies of the world of commerce reflect it as well — although the feelings of satisfaction are designed to be transitory, in order to keep people's desires alive and their spending flowing.

Second, a somewhat less individualist variant looks to reason to encourage the feeling of peaceful, sociable emotions like fellow-feeling and compassion, and to discourage the feeling of aggressive, anti-social emotions like anger and envy. (This view, incorporating a outright rejection of certain feelings of emotion considered to be 'bad', needs to be distinguished from the use of reason, along with the feeling of an emotion, to guide action — a topic that will be discussed later in this essay.)

Third, the most extreme variant takes total emotional imperturbability as a goal — even feeling a positive desire or reacting with pleasure is seen as indicating a weakness of the mind. The idea that academics could be perfectly detached, above-the-fray 'scientific' observers, whose desires and

ambitions are totally irrelevant to their perfectly 'objective' research, is based on this variant.

In this belief about freedom and all three variants of belief about emotion, dualistic 'either/or' understandings hold firm: freedom is defined in opposition to affiliation, and reason in opposition to emotion.

The only alternatives to this rational individual view are often assumed to be communitarianism (by which I mean an emphasis on *affiliation* as opposed to individuality) and/or romanticism (an emphasis on *emotions* as opposed to reason).

For example, in a recent essay entitled 'Reason before identity', Sen addresses the 'fundamental question about how our identities emerge — whether by choice or by passive recognition', where by 'passive recognition' he is referring to a communitarian formulation (1999b, p. 6). Sen intelligently discusses both options, and comes down strongly on the 'choice' side. But the present essay suggests that this dualistic formulation of the choices is overly constraining. Within academia and without, the sound of a different drum can be heard as well. While this is not the place for an extended treatise on human psychology, some important aspects of the different rhythm can be pointed out.

The 'relational' alternative

What I will call the 'relational' view, in contrast, sees human identity in terms of a continuing tension or balance between knowing one's own powers and connecting with others, rather than in terms of a victory of independence over dependence.[7] Diverse and ambivalent emotions play important roles in this story.

In contrast to the 'rational individual' view already discussed, the relational view can be characterized by three simple propositions:

1. Individuals are constituted through dynamic interaction with their physical and social environments.
2. Emotions are inescapable, in the sense that feeling a broad range of emotions comes with the territory when one is born a human.
3. While emotions lead to harm when handled unskillfully, when skillfully developed they are essential in directing intelligent behavior.

The first statement contrasts with the rational individual view, which sees a maturation as a progression *away from* interdependence. It also contrasts communitarian images of merger, by retaining the important notion of individuality, although now defined in dynamic rather than static terms. That is, in the rational individual view, individuals are rather object-like, formed out of a mud of amorphous subhumanity into discrete, substantial, brick-like entities. In a strongly communitarian view, the community is instead the brick-like entity, formed from individual bits joined in tight 'solid'-arity. The relational view is far more dynamic and fluid, viewing the individual as a thread of qualitatively distinct history within a weaving of larger histories, or a dancer moving within a larger dance.

By recognizing emotions as ever-present (whether admitted to or not), the second proposition of the relational view contrasts with the emotionless variant of the rational individual view, which denies that one has to feel emotions at all, and with the social peace variant, in which the very *feeling* of anger or envy is perceived as something one should work to avoid.

The third statement recognizes that emotions can constitute a positive capacity amenable to development. In this, the relational view contrasts with the hedonistic variant of the rational individual view, which sees emotion as merely raw urges (or preferences) awaiting the action of the rational mind, and the other variants that encourage denial of all or many emotions. Seeing within emotions a positive capacity, however, is not romanticism: the relational view fully acknowledges that *poorly developed* emotional capacity often leads to harm.

The literature in this area is vast, and my impression from reading in the field of social psychology, and to some extent psychology as well, is that what I have called the relational view now tends to be the default understanding among a number of distinguished scholars. Important works in the area include *Emotional Intelligence* (1995) by Daniel Goleman, *Anger: The Misunderstood Emotion* (1982) by Carol Tavris, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (1987) by Daniel N. Stern, and *The Bonds of Love* (1988) by Jessica Benjamin. Many of these draw on the important earlier work in psychoanalytic object-relations theory done by British physician and analyst Donald W. Winnicott (1996). From the neurobiological side, Antonio Damasio's (1994) *Descartes' Error* has also promoted such a view.[8] Philosopher Martha Nussbaum's (2001) *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* develops a relational theory of emotions, useful for moral philosophy, drawing on the work Winnicott and Damasio.[9]

Because 'emotion' seems like such a 'squishy' subject to most academic economists, development theorists, and philosophers, it may be necessary to stress that these scholars have the highest academic credentials. Among those listed are two fellows of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and a fellow of the Fellow of the American Psychological Association, and a number of distinguished professors at prestigious universities.

Might economists, development theorists, and philosophers learn something from scholars who make it their life work to study human identity and emotions?[10]

The relational story in a nutshell

In order to see how this view relates to human development in a global and economic sense, it may help to start with an examination of its alternative view of human development in an ontogenic sense (i.e. development of the individual human). Starting as children, many of these scholars agree, we develop our sense of self *by being responded to*. Paradoxical as it might seem, a strong individual sense of self is dependent on a strong sense of connected interaction.[11]

First of all, from our very earliest months we need to feel our feelings being noticed, in a process Daniel Stern calls 'attunement'. But there is another side to this coin. Even as infants we also need to be assured that such responsiveness is, in fact, coming from a reality *outside* of ourselves. Donald Winnicott describes infants as engaging in acts of 'destruction' — aggressive moves by which the infant tries to control the outside reality. The failure of these moves is what reassures the infant that reality is, in fact, outside.

Both the attunement and the destruction are vital to the process of mutual recognition, by which one learns that there is room for two egos in a relationship. Through mutual recognition, one develops a both a strong sense of individuality and of relatedness to the outside world. It is through intersubjective recognition that people achieve 'the establishment of a shared reality' (Benjamin, 1995, p. 41).

This process can go wrong in two major ways. To the extent a child receives attention, but the caregivers withdraw or cave in when the child acts aggressively, the child retains a fantasy of omnipotence. The child, while having a fantasy of being autonomous and powerful, also perceives himself/herself to be profoundly alone and boundaryless, there being no 'outside' anymore to give definition to himself/herself. The victory is hollow. The child also gains no skill in handling emotions, in as much as they are simply allowed to spew out, as in unchecked ventilation of anger. These habits of aggressive seeking to control may continue into adulthood, growing stronger with each re-enactment.

On the other hand, to the extent a child is neglected or abused, and has his/her aggressive actions met with retaliation, the child develops a sense of helplessness and lack of control. This situation also does not help one develop skills in working with emotional energies, because one's emotions are denied and driven underground. Alice Miller (1987) traces much personal and social pathology to what she calls 'the lost world of feelings' arising from children growing up in households where they are emotionally constricted and shamed. Adults may end up hypersensitive to others' feelings, seeking to gain control over their insecure environs through dependence and manipulation.

Actions that we often think of as intrinsic to experiencing a feeling, such as the idea that anger will always lead to aggression or to guilt, are in fact specific learned behaviors. The poor use of emotions, whether by turning them unreflectively outward or unreflectively inward, does not usually successfully bring about a resolution of the situation that led to the emotion. Instead, such frustrated, ineffective expressions of emotion may contribute to physical ailments, violence, and other ills.

Emotions are, we see, strongly involved in — although not identical to — issues of affiliation or belonging, since they are a primary channel by which we interact with objects outside of our own consciousness. They are our openings for connecting with the larger world — in Nussbaum's (1995) words, 'emotions are . . . holes, so to speak, in the walls of the self'. Emotions

of all kinds — love and hate, joy and anger — pass through us, throughout our lives.

In the relational view there are no 'good' emotions that are praiseworthy or 'bad' emotions that one should feel ashamed of having, *per se*, since the immediate feeling of any emotion is unavoidable. Calling anger 'bad', for example, does not stop the feeling of anger from happening, but instead by adding the emotion of shame creates two emotions to deal with, where earlier there was only one.

It is not the emotions themselves, but how much we attend to them, what we do with them, and how skillfully we manage their energy, to which normative judgments can apply. For example, *not encouraging or acting* on an emotion might, as will be discussed later on, be the perfectly appropriate thing to do. However, this is quite different from trying to pretend to oneself that one does not feel the emotion at all. When appropriately felt and skillfully handled, emotions open channels of connection, self-esteem, creativity, compassion, and action. The role of reason is not to lessen the experience of emotion by pushing emotion under the rug, but rather, working along with emotion, to guide our actions wisely and reflectively.

Affiliation *and* freedom

The importance of affiliation and emotion can be acknowledged right along with the importance of freedom and reason. We can learn to think of freedom and affiliation as co-equal, and also of reason and emotion as co-equal. We can think of a balanced and active use of both sides of each pair of capacities as essential for full development, and of each term unbalanced by its complement as an invitation to danger.

Let us look first at how affiliation and freedom each have perverse effects when taken separately, but can be positive when taken together.

The perverse aspects of affiliation arise when affiliation is taken alone, with no attention to freedom. These perverse aspects are well known and are alluded to in Sen's discussions, so for this reason (and not at all, as it might be misunderstood, to downplay them) I will not dwell on them here. For example, authoritarian religions may provide a community and a source of meaning at the expense of individual will and use of reason. In patriarchal marriage, making a bond means making bondage. Traditional ties of duty and obedience and the rigid hierarchies of many custom-driven social groupings can effectively block much-needed advancements in health, nutrition, education, or distributive justice, if such projects are seem to threaten social stability. These are serious problems. Sen's contrast of freedom and reason to cult and tradition suggests such scenarios. Coercion and loss of individual agency are the perverse side of affiliation, when it is not accompanied by freedom.

But freedom without affiliation is perverse as well. Feminist scholarship over the past few decades has pointed out the gendered nature of the association of individuality, freedom, separation, and agency with men and superiority in post-Enlightenment Euro-American culture. Social identifica-

tion, affiliation, connection, and responsiveness have been associated with women and inferiority. Feminist scholarship has pointed out the *illusory* nature of the ideals of absolute freedom and autonomy, given that they involve a denial of bodily and social connection. Historically, feminists and other scholars have noted, the illusion of thoroughgoing autonomy, freedom, and power has been maintained by projecting off all the dependencies and vulnerabilities inherent in human bodily existence onto some other, subordinated and powerless, class. This other class — be it of women, slaves, or another 'other' — is in turn envisioned as lacking human subjectivity, and thus as having value only to the extent of their affiliation with, and service to, a real 'autonomous' man or citizen.

This echoes the insights of the relational view about the dynamic relation between freedom and affiliation. At the freedom-only extreme, the 'omnipotent' individual, who lacks a feeling of being intimately connected to the world, experiences a sort of existential vertigo and insecurity — a sense of rootlessness and disconnection. Utter freedom is utter free-fall. At the affiliation-only extreme, the 'helpless' individual likewise lacks a sense of her (or his) own uniqueness and power, and is easily coerced. Like two extremes of a spectrum bending back until they touch in a circle, the extreme end of freedom, taken alone, meets the extreme end of affiliation, taken alone. The radically free and 'omnipotent' individual demands the submission and invisible services of radically subordinate and 'helpless' others in order to retain the illusion of radical independence.

The maintenance of a shared reality, on the other hand, requires losing this panicked grasp, moving instead to the firmer ground of mutual recognition. In the space of mutual recognition, the possibility of non-absolute forms of freedom and affiliation — *knowing oneself as a subject*, and *relating to others knowing they are subjects* as well — appears.

Emotion *and* reason

Impulsive, unreasonable, and harmful actions come from emotion when it is not joined with reason. This perverse side of emotion may be what Sen means when he refers to 'unreflected response'. Certainly, one is correct to fear the outcomes of uncontrolled rage, of envious actions, of overwhelming irrational fear. And, one must add, it is not just 'bad' emotions like anger, envy and fear that cause problems. Irrational loyalty and unexamined love can also be problematic, as when one's unreflective passion for one's country or one's object of religious devotion contributes to cult violence (as in Sen's example). A personal example might be being pulled by feelings of attraction into a relationship with a manifestly inappropriate romantic partner. It is no wonder that emotions, when acted on without reflection, are widely considered troublesome.

Emotion, however, should not be simply identified with the state of *lacking reason*. Emotion and reason are co-equal capacities that hold the possibility of good, when in balance. The state of lacking reason is, more precisely, *thoughtlessness*, or acting on impulse alone.

Once an emotion is felt, one then faces choices.

One choice would be to bypass reason and reflection, and immediately emote the feeling. This is, of course, often a very unwise choice, and can be especially socially harmful in the case of hate and aggression. While one cannot really choose *not to feel* an emotion like anger, according to relational scholarship, one can learn how to choose *not to act* on it when acting would cause harm.

Another path would be to try to deny that the emotion exists. Relational scholarship suggests that this usually forces the emotional energy to move to an unconscious level. Since such suppressed emotions tend to be eventually emoted — again without the aid of reason — through more convoluted means (e.g. ulcers), this is also not skillful. The application of reason requires that the emotion *first* be held in the realm of attention.

A third option is to let the emotion rise into consciousness and deal with it reflectively, first giving it bare attention, and then adding reason and deliberation as well. 'What is this emotion? What stimulated it? Are there any facts I should check, or people I should talk to, to check that it is appropriate for the present case? Should I cultivate it, and help it grow? Or should I turn my focus to other things, and let it fade? Should I act on it?' These are the kinds of questions that arise when emotional responses are combined with thoughtful reflection.

Sometimes, if the emotions seem to be initially overpowering, getting to the place where an individual can accomplish such reflection may require deep breathing, vigorous exercise, a span of time and/or the support of a community. Sometimes a whole community may share an emotional bent — say, anger and fear directed at a particular ethnic or racial minority — and community-wide processes, as well as individual ones, are needed to facilitate appropriate investigation and reflection (which will remain uphill work, nonetheless). Sen's 'reflection and analysis', and 'public discussion', are, indeed, ways in which individuals or groups can turn emotional energy to good use — but to get there, one first has to experience the emotion and create the physical and social environment in which reflection and discussion can do their work.

Returning to the examples of socially harmful activities given earlier — for example, cult violence inspired by overwhelming anger and irrational loyalty — let us now be more precise about where the problem lies. To reiterate: impulsive, unreasonable, and harmful actions come from emotion when it is not joined with reason. The examples given earlier of damage include actions based on *unreflective* emotions, both those stereotypically 'bad' (like anger and envy) and 'good' (like loyalty and affection).

The damaging element is not in the 'badness' of certain emotions. The so-called 'bad' emotions, when acted on reflectively, can have *good* effects. It is good to feel fear if you come upon a tiger in the forest — it helps you run. It is a good idea to feel anger if you are being treated unconscionably — it alerts you to the need for change. It would not be wise, of course, to cultivate such emotions to the point of living a life of anxiety or bitterness,

but judging such a cultivation to be unskillful is quite different than judging the emotions as they arise to be 'bad' in themselves.

The purpose of this essay is not to deny or minimize the dangers of unexamined emotion, taken alone, in any way. One should share fully in Sen's aversion to 'unreflected response'. But it is the failing of letting emotions run 'unreflected', not the factual existence of emotional 'response' itself, that is to be feared.

Just as emotion without reason poses dangers, reason without emotion also has a distinct downside. Reason is excellent at making inferences, at making comparisons, at calculating, but in the end it has no power to *move* — no power to signal to us which is the more valuable way to go. Emotions, not reasons, are at the root of our motivations. As Daniel Goleman writes, 'The very root of the word *emotion* is *motere*, the Latin verb "to move" ' (1995, p. 6).

Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio's analysis of emotion as a key *aspect* of thoughtfulness is instructive here. In one example, he tells of a patient whose reasoning faculties had been left untouched by a brain disorder, but whose capacity to feel emotion had been damaged (Damasio, 1994, pp. 193–194). The patient worked at calculating the costs and benefits of possible times for his next appointment for nearly half an hour, and would have gone on longer. His 'sense' of when to stop the calculation was gone. His gut could not signal him about what was valuable and less valuable; in this case, in regard to uses of time. Without any input from emotion, reason was sterile and unproductive. It is not just excessive emotion that leads to bad decisions, Damasio writes, but in fact 'the *absence* of emotion and feeling is no less damaging, no less capable of compromising the rationality that makes us distinctively human and allows us to decide in consonance with a sense of personal future, social convention, and moral principle' (1994, p. xii; emphasis in original).

Reason without emotion is cold, inert, and sterile. It is unable on its own to lead to thoughtful responses to life situations. To illustrate this fact in a way that is perhaps closer to home, one might examine one's own motivations in struggling with a difficult problem in mathematical modeling, data analysis, or exposition of an argument. Looking underneath the work, there is always an incentive functioning at an emotional level, in terms of the desire for a feeling of accomplishment, or a fear of loss of status if a project is left incomplete. Most researchers have also at some time or other experienced a project that has 'gone flat' — that is, while it seems appropriate and logical to work on the project, one somehow finds it difficult raise the impulse to move forward.

The logic of both/and

One might summarize these ideas in the simple diagrams shown in Figures 1 and 2. In these figures, the upper portion represents complementary positive values, and the lower cells name the perverse result that arises from a lack of the positive value found on the diagonal.[12] For example, reason is



FIGURE 1. The complementarity of freedom and affiliation. If freedom and affiliation are not balanced, the result is either vertigo or coercion.



FIGURE 2. The complementarity of reason and emotion. If reason and emotion are not balanced, the result is either inertia or impulse.

a good thing — but when *not combined* with emotional energy, it has no power to move, resulting in inertia.

Just as Sen outlined two roles for freedom, as intrinsically good and as fostering good outcomes (1999a, pp. 4,18), we can think of two roles for affiliation and emotion. Affiliation and emotion are good in themselves because they fill human needs to feel a part of something larger than ourselves, to feel loved and valued, to feel of service and alive. And affiliation and emotion are instrumentally good, because without them there is no foundation for anyone to care about anyone else, about the environment, or about any larger goal, or to have the energy to act on behalf of good goals. Using both/and thinking, however, emphasizes that these good outcomes come from affiliation and emotion *combined with* freedom and reason.

Affiliation and emotion in Sen's writings

Sen is, of course, not completely insensitive to the roles of affiliation and emotion, and in fact has been (as mentioned earlier) a leader in bringing these issues into economic discussions. But he comes nowhere near giving them co-equal status with freedom and reason. They form a sort of undertow — sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker — to his analysis, particularly in the parts of *Development and Freedom* and 'East and West' that deal with 'social commitment', 'responsibility', and 'values'.

His inclusion of a 'need to take part in the life of the community' in his discussions of capabilities (Sen, 1999a, p. 271), for example, recognizes affiliation, while his analysis of commitments, which 'need not involve any denial of the person's rational will' (1999a, p. 89), is perhaps not too far from the idea presented in this essay of a sort of affiliation that is compatible with freedom. On why people might make commitments, he writes that 'there is some spontaneity in the *feelings* that people have for one another', which seems to allow a small role for emotion, as perhaps does the notion of 'a *sense* of justice' (Sen, 1999a, pp. 263, 261; emphasis added). Sen briefly

notes how emotional response played a role in the philosophies of Smith, Kant and Hume (2000, p. 34).[13]

Yet, in other discussions, the notions that we are social, embodied beings with emotions seem to be radically downplayed. I could not suppress a small, grim chuckle at Sen's description of how combating 'antifemale bias' in societies will 'require empirical knowledge as well as analytical arguments'. Certainly intellectual arguments are useful, and are part of the struggle for justice. However, such biases cannot be changed by intellectual tools alone, since they are not held in the intellect alone. Prejudice against people according to sex, race, or sexual preference — or even by association with the 'exotic' East (as Sen implicitly combats in his 'East and West' essay) — often has deep emotional roots. To the extent people are unsure of, or feel insecure in, their place in the world, beliefs about the supposed superiority and inferiority of others forms a part of their very sense of who they are. Men may define themselves as not-women, for example, and people from the West defined themselves as more 'advanced' than people from the East. Emotional reactivity and entrenched arrangements of power can hence make even the best-reasoned and best-documented arguments unhearable. Emotional and experiential tools, and organized political activism, are needed as well, to open people up to re-evaluating such deep-seated biases.

Sen's suggested sources for justice and ethics in *Development as Freedom* are similarly limited. They include only rational deliberation and evolutionary selection, and say nothing about how the feeling that one is connected might play a part (Sen, 1999a, p. 273). Even the sense of responsibility, which forms the problematic for this essay, is referred to by Sen not as a deep emotion, but rather in mental terms, as the '*thought* that ... terrible occurrences ... are quintessentially our problems' (emphasis added) (Sen, 1999a, p. 282). In 'East and West' Sen is more sympathetic towards 'sympathy', as noted earlier in this essay, yet this line of thought remains underdeveloped.

In more recent writings than the two focused on in this essay, Sen has defended his work against the charge that he takes a purely 'individualist' view of human nature (2002, 2003). He writes that people are 'quintessentially social creatures' (Sen, 2002, p. 81), in a way that resonates with more with the relational approach than with a strictly individualist one. The point of this essay is — to clarify again — about emphasis and development: this essay demonstrates that the affiliation aspects of human identity are not expressed in Sen's writings with the same sort of emphasis and consistency that he gives to the topic of freedom, nor are they developed as fully as they could be, and likewise for emotion.[14]

Meeting objections

Active responsibility for 'terrible occurrences' arises from a personal feeling of connection to the (suffering) world, and a passion for good, combined with the sense that one has some individual efficacy. The aspect of efficacy

is, in turn, related to one's perceived freedom and capacities, including reason.[15]

Various objections may, however, be raised to this project of incorporating affiliation right beside freedom, and emotion directly alongside reason.

Is reason not enough?

One objection might be that my concerns for affiliation and emotion are unnecessary. It might be argued that freedom and reason, somehow properly understood, themselves generate the sense of responsibility for each other of which Sen writes. A critic of my views might, as evidence, point to the fact that many good liberals (i.e. people who think in terms of agency, freedom, and reason) are deeply concerned about the ills of the world. This cannot be taken, however, as proof that the source of their sense of responsibility lies within their conscious, analytical explanations.

Consider, for example, the rather attenuated notions of reason-based responsibility contained in the notions of 'moral imagination' and Adam Smith's 'impartial spectator' discussed by Sen (1999a, p. 162; 2000, p. 35). These rely on mental processes of setting the other in the place of the self in one's mind, or treating oneself as impartially as one would treat another, via a thought-experiment. For example, in the discussion of the creation of social values, Sen describes a mental process where people are 'able to think . . . in the human mind' of the interests of others (1999a, p. 262). Under close examination, it seems that the underlying assumption is that we are *not* connected to others, and therefore have to actively *think* ourselves into an 'imaginary' position in order to rationalize our concern. This reflects the 'rational individual' view, whether one is conscious of it or not.

What if, instead, we see people as fundamentally connected (as well as individual), and with powers beyond (but not replacing) the mental? That is, what if we take a relational view? Contrast the exclusively individualist and mind-oriented approach with Rita Nakashima Brock's discussion of the powers of 'heart':[16]

> Heart is the center, innermost region, and most real, vital meaning and core of our lives. The human heart is symbolically the source of emotions, especially human ones such as love, empathy, loyalty, and courage. The profoundest intellect lodges in our heart where thought is bound with integrity, insight, consciousness, and conscience . . . To have a change of heart involves a shift in perspective of our whole being . . . Heart is what binds us to others, safeguards our memory, integrates all dimensions of ourselves, and empowers us to act with courage. (1998, p. xiv)

Nowhere, in discussions relying on thinking oneself into an imagined connection, does one find such a rich description of how emotion and affiliation, combined with thought and integrity, create the foundations of active responsibility. Lest the listing of only stereotypically 'good' emotions suggest romanticism, one should add that a consideration of 'heart' should also

include the hatred of injustice, the spirit to battle oppression, and a willingness to *dis*avow those loyalties and empathies that do not withstand the application of, as Brock puts it, 'insight, consciousness, and conscience'.

Or consider the words reportedly spoken by Vising Rathod, a Hindu and notary public, about his action during an episode of cult violence in the Indian state of Gujarat. Leaving the safety of his house and pushing through a crowd of rioters, he had helped pull 25 Muslims from a burning mosque. 'I did it out of humanity, because in my heart I knew it was the right thing to do', he said. 'There is much affection between the Hindus and Muslims here, and I could not just stand by and let them die. What has happened is shameful' (quoted in Duff-Brown, 2002, p. A12). He speaks of connection, heart, affection, shame. More broadly-based skillful use of reason and emotion, it is true, could have led to a society in which Rathod's Hindu neighbors would not have set the fire. But the world that Rathod, and we, live in today is not that world. Could anything less than 'heart' have moved him to action? Will anything less than heart actively promote human development, on a global scale?

What about fundamentalism?

Cults, fundamentalisms, nationalist frenzies and the like may seem to be a-rational throw-backs to earlier, pre-liberal times. The idea that the liberal emphasis on individual freedom and reason is the key that unlocks the door from narrow, perhaps feudal or religious bondage and superstition is popular — and seems implicit in Sen's work. In 'East and West', Sen defends the Enlightenment hopefulness about reason to critics who would find Enlightenment thought 'thin and mechanical', and blame Enlightenment thought for any of the atrocities of recent centuries (Sen, 2000, p. 33, quoting Jonathan Glover). While I am not interested in blaming, it seems to me arguable that socially concerned liberals' hesitancy to analyze the relational and emotional underpinnings of their own commitment — to look carefully at 'heart' — is not entirely unrelated to contemporary social ills.

Karen Armstrong (2000), in *The Battle for God*, argues that contemporary fundamentalist religious movements have a *symbiotic* relationship with liberalism.[17] According to Armstrong, there is a 'void at the heart of modern culture' due to modern, liberal developments that have elevated the mind but neglected the heart (2000, p. 370). As she explains it:

> [Premodern people] evolved two ways of thinking, speaking, and acquiring knowledge ... *mythos* and *logos*. Both were essential; they were regarded as complementary ways of arriving at truth, and each had its special area of competence. Myth was ... not concerned with practical matters, but with meaning. Unless we find some significance in our lives, we mortal men and women fall very easily into despair. The *mythos* ... was also rooted in what we would call the unconscious mind ... embodied in cult, rituals, and ceremonies which worked aesthetically upon worshipers ...

> enabling them to apprehend the deeper currents of existence ... *Logos* was the rational, pragmatic, and scientific thought that enabled men and women to function well in the world ... [I]n the West today ... we are very familiar with *logos*, which is the basis of our society ... We use this logical, discursive reasoning when we have to make things happen ... *logos* forges ahead and tries to ... achieve a greater control over our environment. (Armstrong, 2000, pp. xii–xv)

However, by the eighteenth century, thinkers began to consider logos as the only means to truth. While liberal thinkers find this exciting, fundamentalist thinkers find it frightening and attempt to resacralize the world. Unfortunately, instead of reclaiming mythos for what it is — instead of using story and song to create connection and compassion — what more often happens is that fundamentalists try to assert the myths of their faiths as thought they were facts. The very pressure of the modern, logocentric world view, Armstrong argues, is what draws out aggressive reaction from fundamentalist movements and cults (2000, p. 367).[18]

Such an analysis does not condemn liberal values of individualism, freedom and reason, nor blame such notions for modern atrocities. Freedom and reason can be considered to be every bit as good and important as Sen argues.

It does, however, suggest that the solution to the problems of unreflected loyalties and responses — that so trouble Sen — may not lie in simply increasing rational reflection and the pure promotion of liberal values. And here it is, that our scholarly analysis meets the task of actually trying to encourage active responsibility and compassion in the real world: to the extent that our analysis continues to use largely *only* the vocabulary of individualism and reason, and exclude that of affiliation and emotion, we as academics contribute to the enshrinement of *logos* and the starvation of *mythos*. The solution to fundamentalism, at this point in time, may lie in increased attention to the complementary aspects of *mythos* and heart that people need in order to experience their lives as connected and meaningful. Pushing further on the *logos* side only may intensify reaction.

What about the 'bad' emotions?

The issue of 'bad' emotions must be returned to once again, because it tends to be such an obstacle to getting across the alternative view of emotions presented in this essay. It bears repeating that feelings, as *feelings*, are not a plane amenable to normative interpretation. Saying that emotions like anger, envy or fear are 'bad' is like saying that oak trees are 'bad'. Oak trees are, it is true, bad to have in your vegetable garden, but they are good to have in parks.

Likewise, while anger and the like have bad effects in many circumstances, certainly feminists and anyone else who has ever fought for justice for an oppressed group should be able to recognize circumstances where

such 'bad' emotions are good to have. We know that becoming *angry* at mistreatment, at least temporarily *envious* of attainments one has been constrained from achieving, *fearful* of backsliding, and so on, are part of what keeps people from being doormats. These are simply reactions that can help people preserve a sense of self and integrity in a world not always friendly towards their striving toward freedom. Limiting oneself to only the socially peaceful, 'nice', emotions is not a good thing when such social peace would perpetuate a structure of oppression.

As an example of the need for a capabilities, rather than utilitarian, approach to well-being, Sen writes of widows near Calcutta who reported themselves as healthy, even when an observer would claim otherwise (1984, p. 309). This is true enough. But, in terms of motivation to *improve* the situation, would not some 'annoyance' — treated by Sen as a nuisance ('*Even* when we find something immediately upsetting, or annoying'; emphasis added 1999a, p. 34) — be of positive value? As mentioned earlier, Nussbaum includes 'Being able ... to experience ... justified anger' on her list of 'central human functional capabilities' (2000, pp. 78–79).

That said, what we *do* with our feelings is amenable to normative evaluation. Feeling anger, for example, does not of necessity lead to abusive behavior or a life of bitterness. Such poor outcomes arise from a feeling when it is *accompanied by* poor skills or habits. Carol Tavris points towards better skills when she writes: 'The moral use of anger, I believe, requires an awareness of choice and an embrace of reason — For most of the small indignities of life, the best remedy is a Charlie Chaplin movie. For the large indignities, fight back. And learn the difference' (1982, p. 253).

Conclusion

Amartya Sen's work is the culmination of intelligent discussion of human well-being from within a frame of fully sophisticated and nuanced liberal individualism. I have argued, however, that Sen's insights about the roles of freedom and reason in development need to be complemented by (not supplanted by) additional depth of insight into affiliation and emotion. Sen's references to responsibility and social commitment, while providing a bridge into this area, require further development and expansion in order to adequately reflect the powerful affiliative motivations at work in people who are not only individuals, but are also socially, familially, physically and ecologically embedded —people who deeply desire freedom and also deeply desire connection, continuity, and a sense of place.

In the area of economic development, issues of inequality as well as social and environmental sustainability are intimately related to the degree to which people acknowledge their mutual constitution with the physical world and that they are 'people who live ... together' (Sen, 1999a, p. 282). Could the cut-throat financial opportunism, media manipulation, and hyper-individualist consumerist culture we see around us in countries of the economic North be serving as an anesthetic for the painful loss of *mythos*? Meanwhile, would a better understanding of affiliation and emotion help

resolve the impasse between anti-Western religious and cultural movements, and 'development' as it has been traditionally understood by scholars working from a model of rational individualism?

In short, the world would be a much better place if more people had both the intelligence and compassion exemplified by Amartya Sen. The world would be a better place if we all really could not escape the recognition that 'the terrible occurrences that we see around us are . . . our responsibility'. As Sen writes, 'our hope for the future must, to a considerable extent, depend on the sympathy and respect . . . with which we respond . . .' (2000, p. 34). Yet to develop these capacities requires that intellectual leaders — even economists and other development theorists — move beyond single-minded emphasis on freedom and reason. We also need a fully developed, relational examination of affiliation and emotion. The task requires heart.

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Notes

1 See references in Benería (2003).

2 Sen also includes emulation of thoughts and actions that "others have found reasons" to adopt (1999a, p. 273), but this point takes us away from the main point here, which is the emphasis on deliberation, by someone even if not by oneself.

3 Influential early works in this area include Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan (1982). For a recent update, see Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) and for applications to economics see England (2003) and Nelson (1996). Similar to this paper, van Staveren (2001) and Gasper and van Staveren (2003) also critique Sen's work for its lack of attention to values other than freedom, including care. van Staveren argues that one should add the value of care (and upgrade the value of justice) to equal status with freedom (2001, pp. 151–152). While I differ somewhat from van Staveren in my categorizations, I differ even more on the issue of whether there are specific, appropriate domains for each value. van Staveren tends to identify care with households and communities, justice with the polity, and freedom with markets, while I would argue for a less segmented view that sees all values — including the care-related values of affiliation and emotion — as relevant to all spheres (for example, Nelson, 2003). My notion of 'emotion' is also considerably broader than a focus on 'care', taken as an emotional tone with positive value, since I want to include discussion of both the benefits of the so-called 'bad' emotions like anger and envy, and the dangers of unreflective caring.

4 I use the phrase 'Enlightenment-style liberal analysis' as a shorthand for emphasis on individuality, freedom, and reason. I will not refer to this as 'Enlightenment' thought *per se* since, as Sen points out in 'East and West', such ideas are not unique to that particular epoch of European thought.

5 At least three other people have written noteworthy pieces on emotions and economics, which should be mentioned here, although this is not the place for a full discussion. Frank (1988) asks how emotions can be advantageous for self-interested economic behavior.

However, he immediately equates rationality with self-interest (1988, p. 2) on the one hand, and emotions (passions) with irrationality (pp. x, xii) and action that looks at first sight as if it is not in one's self interest, on the other. Hirschman's (1997 [1977]) work is a historical study of how, before the time of Adam Smith, there arose a belief that leadership of the state would be more benign if motivated by economic interests than when motivated by the pursuit of honor and praise. Elster (1998) treats emotions from within the framework of a rational, choosing, agent, asking how emotion is involved in observable behavior. He dismisses views (like that argued here) that claim a cognitive and valuable role for emotions, rejecting the idea that there could be a role for them alongside reason. Frank and Elster stay firmly within the view that treats emotions as 'irrational'. Hirschman's analysis, while insightful, is directed to a different issue than the current essay.

6 See for a discussion, Benjamin (1988, p. 18).

7 The term 'intersubjective' could also be used to describe this view (Benjamin, 1988).

8 Because of the complexities of the discussions, such authors might find themselves surprised to be combined on one list! The 'rational individual' view is so extreme, however, that I believe it is safe to assert that these scholars would be united in their rejection of that, and on the three propositions by which I characterize the relational alternative.

9 Nussbaum (2001) coins the term "neo-Stoic" to describe what is in essence the (about-to-be-described) relational view. I fear, however, that a term with 'Stoic' in it will be easily confused with the emotionless variant of what I call the 'rational individual' view, at least by non-philosophers, and so I have not adopted this terminology. My analysis here is very similar to Nussbaum, with two qualifications. First, her treatment of emotions in her lengthy book is of course much deeper and more extensive than what I can manage in an article. Second, while she balances the two factors of egoism and social construction very well in her discussions of child development and societal emotional norms, her basic definition of emotion using the language of distinct individual persons (for example, Nussbaum, 2001, p. 4) seems to me to be overly influenced by traditionally liberal, individualist thinking.

10 I have chosen to emphasize here evidence from the social and physical sciences, as being closest to the mindset of academic economists and analytic philosophers. One can also find arguments for a relational view within the contemplative branches of the major Western religions. (The quote from Sen on which this essay focuses comes, perhaps not surprisingly, from a section where he refers to religion and theology.) There are, of course, substantial parallels to the views discussed here in Buddhist-inspired writings, mind/body therapies, and other 'Eastern' practices of increasing popularity in the countries of the 'West'. I prefer, however, to not reinforce a simplistic dichotomizing between what might be (mis-)labeled 'Western' Enlightenment 'masculinist principles', as opposed to 'Eastern' mystical 'feminine principles'. Much like Sen demonstrating the roots of 'liberalism' in classical South Asia in his 'East and West' essay, I would prefer to emphasize here the roots of relational understanding that come from *within* Euro-American culture. (This essay could be written as a sort of 'West and East: the reach of mindfulness', with suitable parallels drawn about 'Enlightenment'.)

11 In non-academic speak, this is commonly called love. See Winnicott (1996) and Stern (1987).

12 These are similar to diagrams I have used elsewhere in exploring gender and the definition and methodology of economics (Nelson, 1996).

13 Emotions appear in Sen's other works as well. For example, Sen (1982) discusses humans as 'social animals' who may act both from 'sympathy' and 'commitment'. Sen (1993) contrasts his capabilities approach to other approaches that look only at 'happiness' or 'desire fulfillment'.

14 In a (gracious) response to a slightly earlier draft of this essay, Sen (2003) wrote:

> You have clear concerns that you feel are not well reflected in my work, and without demeaning what I have done in any way you build on it to make a more secure structure, as you see it. This is, of course, what academic contributions are about.

> I think you probably over-estimate the extent to which you need 'individualism' for the way I see things ... I am enclosing ... [Sen, 2002]. In your case, however, my arguments are not really in any way disruptive of what you do. Rather, it is mainly a question of choice of language, especially since 'individualism' has become such a charged expression.

Sen has not raised any objection to my characterization of the role of emotion in his work.

15 Sen at one point argues that "freedom is both necessary and sufficient for responsibility" (1999a, p. 284). While I agree with the necessity argument that one cannot, of course, expect someone to be responsible for something they are not free to affect, Sen's sufficiency argument is more problematic. "[A]ctually having the freedom and capability to do something", Sen writes, "does impose on the person the duty to consider whether to do it or not, and this does involve individual responsibility" (1999a, p. 284). This sort of responsibility, for which freedom is sufficient, is a passive one that apparently does not actually require that people act, but only 'consider' acting. That is, one might be *accounted to be* responsible for some problem, whether or not one actually takes responsibility for the situation in an active way. But this seems to me to be too thin a notion of responsibility to be useful for exposition of the quote about "terrible occurrences ... are our responsibility" on which this essay reflects. What global tribunal or 'view from nowhere' judge is going to declare that the rich and complacent of the world are accountable for the children who die every year of hunger? And what good would it do, if they did?

16 While Brock's analysis is framed by a particular religious context, she also deals with the negative aspects of this context (for example, 1998, p. xv) and points out affinities of her work with other types of theistic and non-theistic approaches (1998, p. 35). For another treatment of 'heart', see Folbre (2001).

17 Armstrong includes various Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, and Confucian movements under the broad rubric of fundamentalisms.

18 See also Folbre (2001, pp. 203–206) on 'Jihad vs. McWorld'.

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